





NEW AGENDA

SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY

Can the ANC rebuild its lost integrity?



Confronting Inequality

IFAA Conference warns of the challenge



Stigma and discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals hinder progress in the fight against HIV/AIDS

By Professor Azwi Mavhandu-Mudzusi

As an HIV/AIDS coordinator at the University of Venda since 2004, it is of great concern that the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) community is being excluded from HIV/AIDS programmes.

I first encountered LGBTIQ students at the HIV/AIDS unit at the University of Venda when a student came to the unit for HIV counselling and testing. Her pre-test form listed two females and one male as sexual partners. When I asked about the student's sexual orientation I got an interesting reply.

The student said she is a lesbian, but the rights of LGBTIQ students are violated. "We are treated like dirt. We are called names, humiliated in public and even assaulted just for being who we are." Her solution was to get a boyfriend as a disguise.

I was shocked and proposed a collaborative project between the University of Venda and Voluntary Service Overseas. This was accepted by the university and a project called Support, Advocacy and Care of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex youth at selected universities in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region was formed.

The aim of the project was to improve the quality of life of LGBTIQ students at universities and communities within Southern Africa. I conducted research on the attitudes of university students towards the LGBTIQ community and found that the majority of respondents held negative attitudes towards these students.

For example I was told, "I feel so disgusted and wish that they are skinned alive, especially gays. I rejoice when I hear that lesbians are gang-raped or killed. They are against our community morals; they cause disgrace to our culture even though they are given rights. This is un-African. Ndi vhutudzi hezwi, I tou vha matula (It is taboo and a bad omen)."

I also explored the experiences of LGBTIQ individuals at a rural South African university and the findings showed that LGBTIQ



students' human rights were consistently violated by students and staff. They were excluded from sports, denied financial support, evicted from hostels, excluded from discussion groups, and threatened with rape and murder.

What also became clear was the heteronormative attitudes of the university healthcare personnel who perceived non-heterosexual and gender non-conforming as an illness, attributable to sorcery or witchcraft.

Such discriminatory experiences force LGBTIQ individuals to change their sexual practices in an attempt to be seen as straight to avert stigma and discrimination. The result is they may share sexual partners among support group members or engage in concurrent sexual relationships, where individuals have heterosexual relationships (with a trophy partner) in public, while privately having partners of their choice based on their actual sexual orientation. If one participant is HIV-positive this increases the possibility of infecting the entire group.

The same applies to students who engaged in quick sexual encounters in any convenient location when the opportunity arises.

Sometimes women request sperm from male acquaintances to fall pregnant to prove that they are heterosexual. Activities to maintain the facade of being heterosexual

increases the risk of HIV infection and transmission. As long as LGBTIQ individuals' rights are violated, they will continue to engage in sexually risky behaviour.

To inculcate and restore human rights that are congruent with South Africa's new democracy a four-pronged Advocacy, Care and Support model for LGBTIQ students in SADC universities was developed. It targets LGBTIQ individuals, the university community, the higher education sector and society. The model outlines the following recommended action:

- Individual counselling and referrals to a psychologist for LGBTIQ individuals in cases of severe emotional distress;
- Initiating support groups, advocating for appropriate room allocations for transgender individuals;
- HIV/AIDS workshops for LGBTIQ students with a focus on their specific needs;
- Raising awareness in the university community through dialogue, seminars, round-table discussions, debates, sensitisation workshops, radio talks and unisex bathrooms.
- Registering LGBTIQ student structures and infusing the curricula with content on gender and sexual diversity;
- In the higher education sector journals and books must challenge heteronormativity in SADC countries;
- Holding conference, presentations, research indabas and seminars, and cross-sexual and cross-gender sports;
- Sensitising the nation at large through radio talks, community indabas, workshops with religious and traditional leaders, and dialogues with community leaders to deconstruct existing taboos.

Professor Mavhandu-Mudzusi is the winner of the Department of Science and Technology's 2017 Women in Science Awards in the Humanities and Social Sciences category.



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can be no peace
in any part
of the world
where there are
people
oppressed...”

- Chief Albert Luthuli
Africa's First Nobel Peace Laureate



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
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SADTU 2030 VISION

South Africa's biggest teacher and education workers' Union with 260 000 members, adopted its 2030 Vision in October 2011 to serve as the Union's guiding light for the next 20 years. Twelve years into our Vision we are still on track, spearheaded by our Curtis Nkondo Professional Development Institute which has trained thousands of educators.

The SADTU 2030 Vision is rooted in the reality of what defines an African teacher during the African century. The Vision believes that SADTU needs to build a new teacher for a changing South Africa. The Vision is based the following pillars:

1. SERVICING UNION MEMBERS


- Conduct extensive research on appropriate conditions of service for a teacher in a developmental state;
- Continuous redefinition of teacher conditions of service to correspond with the inflationary realities of the society we operate within;
- Create membership benefits that create a captured community of members thus creating a SADTU experience to be aspired for;
- Establish membership-targeted capacity building programmes that separate a SADTU member from the rest but within acceptable national norms and standards.

2. CREATING A LEARNING NATION

- Create, through our commitment to the classroom, a nation that learns and advances its civilization;
- Extensive and teacher-based research on the best possible methods of teaching;
- Continuous improvement of learning through the introduction of nation-building learning material.

3. PROMOTING A DEVELOPMENTAL-ORIENTED NATION STATE

- Create and/or participate in public awareness campaigns that define the national development trajectory for the coming fifty years;



- Enhance national development awareness through the creation and/or promotion of a national value system that supports South Africa's development trajectory;
- Reorient membership to focus on national development objectives through learning content delivered to those entrusted to our care;
- Create a patriotic cadre of teachers and learners through socially cohesive programmes.

4. CREATING INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

- Create a criteria for international cooperation that is based on what defines the character of SADTU;
- Promote international solidarity programmes that are based on SADTU's core belief systems;
- Establish a continent biased international relations programme that defines affiliation and/or disaffiliation to international bodies;
- Create a cross-border community of industry like-mindedness within first the SADC region and later, the entire African continent.

5. BUILDING A DELIVERY-BASED ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY

- Build a sustainable revenue base that is complementary to membership subscriptions;

- Create a SADTU village that promotes organizational excellence in all fields or required management;
- Create an organizer capacity that sustains current membership levels and/or increases them.

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NEW ANC LEADERSHIP

By Ben Turok

Asigh of relief and a groan of despair. That is how many of us reacted to the ANC leadership contest.

Ramaphosa and Mantashe will now be the public face of the ANC and that is for the good. Magashule and Duarte will be the engine room and that is a different matter altogether. Mabuza will be head of the ANC's national deployment committee and of the political committee overseeing Parliament. It is hard to believe that this conference of grassroots representatives could elect the iron fist from the Free State to run Luthuli House for the next five years.

Delegates elected some people who clearly do not represent the interests of the mass of the people. We can only assume that slate politics intervened, rather than good sense.

Whereas there have been numerous condemnations of lists, including a last minute appeal by the ANC Electoral Commission for branch delegates to vote only for leaders known to them, this was rejected from the floor in favour of sticking to lists circulated in advance of the conference. And so the ANC has ended up with what someone called a mixed masala to lead it into the 2019 national elections. The point is, can Magashule and co bring about the renewal that everyone is craving?

For that matter can the new leadership overcome the danger of two centres of power while Zuma remains head of state and concentrates on staying out of jail?

Corruption and state capture will continue to thwart our country's economic progress as long as Zuma remains in charge of the administration of justice.



Ben Turok

The Economist said recently that "... between R150 – R200bn (5% of GDP), has been filched." (December 2017). In his closing speech at the conference Ramaphosa said, "... we must confront the reality that critical institutions of our state have been targeted by individuals and families ... We are called upon to act against corruption and collusion." We shall see whether this is applied to those close to him.

We can now expect public pressure to increase as the expectations of change are dampened. The ANC Stalwarts and Veterans will get no recognition from Magashule and Duarte for their efforts to restore the integrity in the movement. They will have to go it alone or reach out to other forces seeking change.

There is also the increased restlessness in Parliament within the ANC caucus as evidenced by the 52 ANC MPs who did not vote with the party in the Zuma no confidence vote.

Business has found a new voice in the BLSA as corruption and poor performance in the state system is now

widely recognised but not addressed. Other business organisations are also speaking out and the press is outspoken in exposing the rot in the state system, in government and within the ANC itself.

Behind a lot of the disquiet lies the dismal data about the economy. We do not need to repeat the figures for unemployment, poverty and inequality, they are well known. But we do wish to draw attention to the weak performance of SA Business and their withdrawal from the real economy as indicated by the fact that foreign interests now own 60% of the values on the Stock Exchange.

But the ANC is likely to remain a large mass party since so many of its members have personal interests in terms of political appointments, careers, and other opportunities as long as it remains a governing party right across all spheres of the state.

We need to encourage much more participation in public life by individuals and groups who understand the depth of our crisis as a society and to speak truth to power as never before.

Finally, the seemingly endless controversies about what to do about our economy need resolution. We desperately need a simple set of proposals to resolve our most immediate problems and lay the basis for more fundamental structural change in the future. Many of the present proposals are too complex and too ambitious. We need urgent action on a limited set of realisable objectives around which broad agreement is achievable. Perhaps an Economic Codesa is the answer. **NA**

COALITIONS AND ALLIANCES DEMARCATÉ CROSSROADS IN ANC TRAJECTORIES

By Susan Booysen

Susan Booysen is a professor at the University of the Witwatersrand School of Governance. She is the author of three books, is editor of three more books and is an experienced researcher in politics, public policy and governance. This article was written before the ANC electoral conference, showing Prof Booysen's foresighted analysis of alliance politics to come.



Susan Booysen

A number of scenarios are being considered by analysts in light of the ANC's Electoral Conference in December. A primary concern is the future of the ANC. Are splits more likely as South Africa heads to elections in 2019? The writer gives us some answers by looking at what has happened to the ANC since it came to power.

“

Multiple polls indicated extreme popular dissatisfaction with Zuma's rule ... in August 2017 his approval rating stood at 18% of metropolitan South Africans.

INTRODUCTION

This article uses the lens of alliances and coalitions as they materialised at the time of the elective conference to dissect the jagged curve of the ANC's fall from hegemony and ongoing electoral dominance. It analyses both ANC internal politics (including inter-factional cooperation and the Tripartite Alliance) and inter-party cooperation with and beyond the

ANC. This is in the context of how the conference electoral outcome will affect the ANC's likelihood of being re-elected in the national and provincial elections of 2019.

The central argument is that at a time when the ANC needed the ability to form a united, inter-factional alliance to defeat fragile but also potent inter-party alliances and coalitions, such an intra-ANC alliance appeared impossible. In Gramscian (1971) terms, the ANC is in an interregnum in which the old is dying and the new is yet to be born.

The rest of the article presents interpretations of both the series of alliances and coalitions that have been keeping the ANC in power, a stock-taking of the damage they have suffered in recent years, and the future in light of the concurrent disintegration and disfigurement of the alliances on which the ANC has relied.

CONCEPTUALISATION AND THE ANC'S PAST RELIANCE ON ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS

In the party political arena an alliance is designated as two or more political parties coming together prior to an

election with the aim of maximising their votes. Beyond party politics alliances in the political domain focus on maximising mutual interests. Coalitions concern more concrete cooperative actions, for example when political parties jointly exercise government power. Coalitions hence refer to political parties cooperating in government, or in a legislative body, on the basis of an election outcome. In all cases the parties or agencies involved hope to achieve common goals through a shared strategy (Kadima 2006; Booysen 2013).

The ANC is on familiar ground when it comes to alliances and coalitions: in the days of the *anciën* regime, the transition of the 1990s and in the time of multi-party democracy the ANC relied on these formations. They helped the ANC to ascend into and consolidate its power in government. The United Democratic Front (UDF) from the 1980s to early 1990s, for example, was a broad-based alliance between progressive internal political forces that dovetailed with the ANC in a de facto alliance. The ANC of the time itself was an alliance of 'internals', 'exiles' and 'islanders' that captured state power with the help of the labour movement, including the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu).

The ANC continued on a coalition path after 1994, by now largely on the new inter-party terrain. In terms of South Africa's 1993 interim constitution the ANC, the National Party (NP) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) joined to form a Government of National Unity (GNU). The GNU alliance faded when the (by then) New National Party (NNP) voted to disband and its Members of Parliament were absorbed into the ANC. The ANC's rise to its electoral high of 2004 was aided by its alliance with the NNP, even though large numbers of NNP supporters chose rather to fuse into the Democratic Alliance (DA).

Coalitions also aided the ANC in consolidating government power



Campaign success would also depend on the ANC mobilising a large, youthful, new electorate to erode the EFF's existing and potential future base. It would need a pro-Zuma candidate.

provincially. In KwaZulu-Natal it had a long-standing coalition with the IFP, until finally it eclipsed the IFP in 2009 with an outright provincial majority. In the Western Cape, the ANC won the 1999 elections with a plurality of 42% of the votes, but lost provincial control to the NNP and the DP after these two parties formed an alliance (of short duration) and then took over provincial government (see Kadima 2006: 70). In the wake of floor-crossing the ANC regained the province with the help of the NNP until 2009 when the DA took over through elections.

In the wake of the 2016 local government elections, coalitions and alliances again came to the foreground. By this time the pendulum had moved and it was the turn mostly of the main opposition parties to capture a range of hung municipalities by forming coalitions amongst themselves and with 'community organisation parties', which often had won a single ward in the municipality at stake. In a few instances the ANC managed to form coalitions (with the help of minor parties), but mostly it was the ANC that was being edged out of power, in processes that could potentially be replicated at provincial and national level come South Africa's 2019 elections (see below).

ANC FACTIONAL SPLITS AT THRESHOLD OF RETAINING POWER

The ANC by 2017-18 was already affected adversely by a decade of intensely factional rule associated with Zuma's incumbency. It followed in the wake of the Mbeki period's comparatively modest factional rule, which had antagonised core ANC constituencies due to exclusion from 'drinking at the trough' and alienation due to Mbeki's predilection for neoliberalism and state managerialism. The ANC's house became too small for both factions: the Polokwane ANC election outcome fuelled the Congress of the People (Cope's) split from the ANC.

In time the Zumaists established themselves as the ANC – dominant and determined to use their dominance to gain from incumbency. They became the frontline for protecting the personal excesses and manipulation of the party and political system effected by ANC president Zuma and the circles of lesser beneficiaries surrounding him. They remained loyal even in the face of knowing that not just multiple state institutions, but also the ANC, had suffered capture by their president and his associates (see Amabhungane 2017; Pauw 2017).

The ANC retained a buffer over opposition parties both at the time of the Cope split and the subsequent, post-2012 Mangaung split by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). It could still let dissenters go without risking the ANC's electoral majority. However, the ANC's margin over the opposition was worn down with the EFF's post-2012 growth (albeit in a humble 6-8% support band). It combined with two further factors to wear down the ANC's margin over the collective of opposition parties.

The first was the incremental growth of the DA, which included modest inroads into the ANC's base (at municipal ward level in 2016 it >>

amounted to around 2-3 percentage point shifts in typical ANC support areas). The second was a holding formation of previous ANC supporters, now unwilling to vote ANC, yet not migrating to an opposition party vote. This bloc abstained and thus dented the ANC's performance, while opposition (and especially the DA) mobilised high turnout from their supporters, and stabilised turnout rates in comparison with preceding elections.

National projections of the 2016 local election results were that the ANC's support was barely 56%. Several subsequent opinion polls showed that the ANC would risk losing its outright national majority should the party be led by Zuma or a close Zuma associate (like Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma). A politician in her own right, she had however been endorsed directly by Jacob Zuma and had not distanced herself from his transgressions. Multiple polls indicated extreme popular dissatisfaction with Zuma's rule: his endorsements as president of South Africa slipped relentlessly. For example, in August 2017 his approval rating stood at 18% of metropolitan South Africans (TNS-Kantor 2017).

Despite a statement by Ramaphosa that he would 'serve under any elected ANC leader' (in late 2017) the conditions were ripe for factional fallout, even a split reminiscent of Polokwane-Cope. But this time the ANC no longer enjoyed an electoral buffer. A split by Ramaphosa-ists could render the ANC short of an outright electoral majority nationally. Given the turn of public opinion in and beyond the ANC, the ANC would probably only win a post-split election should it suppress public opinion, manipulate or subjugate the media, get help from state security agencies, conduct ideological warfare (for example projecting domestic mobilisation and resistance as 'regime change influenced by the West'), and even manipulate the Electoral Commission and election results.



If pressure to axe President Zuma threatens to split the ANC under Ramaphosa, restraint is likely.

Campaign success would also depend on the ANC mobilising a large, youthful new electorate to erode the EFF's existing and potential future base. It would have to present a pro-Zuma candidate as the saint of 'radical economic transformation'.

The EFF's electoral support is crucial to the new generation of opposition coalitions. In 2016-17 it often held the balance of power between the ANC and opposition parties. These new sets of coalitions – in the 2016 hung councils in metropolitan and smaller municipalities – were often fragile: in many instances one member's defection brought about a new majority. The coalitions were subject to manipulation, especially by the ANC that could mobilise the EFF, small community parties and some of the other micro-parties against persistent racism and socio-economic inequities, qualities that remained associated with, for example, the DA base.

DEMISE OF THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE

The once-powerful Tripartite Alliance between the ANC, South African Communist Party (SACP) and Cosatu had helped to sustain the ANC through a series of campaigns and elections. Much of ANC grassroots electioneering had been carried by Cosatu, but from 2013 on, through elections of 2014 and 2016, Cosatu as the backbone of ANC

campaigns faded and then vanished. The Zumaist ANC's intolerance of criticism of the ANC president contributed to this development. Conformity and loyalty superseded cutting-edge debate and frank analysis. Hence the historic tripartite forum, that once bolstered ANC hegemony, broke down.

Amongst the significant changes were the exiting of former general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi, and the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) splitting from Cosatu. By 2017 the new Vavi-associated union federation, the South African Federation of Trade Unions (Saftu), was launched. In 2017 even the supposedly pro-Zuma remains of Cosatu stepped up increasingly to condemn corruption and state capture, and participated in #ZumaMustFall campaigns.

The Alliance decline was vivid on the side of the SACP too. Post-Polokwane, the SACP had been excited at the prospects of Zuma as the next vehicle through which the SACP would leave an ideological imprint. There was a near-complete turnaround in the Zuma-SACP relationship during the next decade. At first the SACP enjoyed high deployment in the state apparatuses, losing much of its autonomous identity. Then, in the period from approximately 2013 onward the relationship soured while the now-purged ANC Youth League and tri-province Premier League became Zuma's trusted avant garde. Many SACP members were marginalised as ANC branches prepared for the 2016 local election. Some paid with their lives for having aspired to roles in the new local government. By late 2017 the SACP reached the point of contesting a municipal by-election ward in Metsimaholo municipality in the Free State under its own banner. It threatened also to contest national elections.

By virtue of the SACP and Cosatu's presence in the Tripartite Alliance,



it was assumed that the ANC had a de facto left conscience. But by late 2017 the NEC described the SACP's Metsimaholo contestation as 'regrettable' (ANC 14 November 2017). It declared itself as committed to 'engaging the [SACP] on this matter' to ensure that the Alliance remains 'united and strong' but the Alliance was dysfunctional. The two partners that had been pillars of ANC hegemony had fallen away. The ANC's condonation and cover-up of corruption and capture had contributed to the fissure. However, the potential remained for the SACP and Cosatu to return to the ANC fold under

“

A CR campaign would nevertheless have to persuade voters that Zuma does not rule from the political grave.

non-Zuma leadership. Alternatively, it could bolster a next ANC split-off party should the ANC internal divisions escalate.

ANC AS TROUBLED ALLIANCE OF INTERNAL FACTIONS

The most important coalition in the life of the ANC of South Africa might very well be one that follows, potentially, in the aftermath of its 54th national conference, namely that of keeping its internal factions united in one party – if the two main factions find the common ground. The run-up to December 2017 saw multiple symptoms of intractable inter-faction hostility. It was about retaining power versus challenging for power of owning and controlling the ANC. The Zumaist faction remained dominant into the last meeting of the 2012-17 NEC in November 2017.

The Zumaist ANC strategy at this stage was firstly to perpetuate its control (and associated unity) of the ANC, and to use this to forestall a split. Precursors were the stalemates on removing President Zuma from power, on several occasions in party and state: from the ANC NEC of late October 2016

to the parliamentary motion of no confidence of August 2017. The threat by late 2017, however, was that an ANC under a Zumaist candidate (most obviously, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) would fail to win the next national and some provincial elections. A Ramaphosa victory in conditions of entrenched Zumaist influence throughout the state (entrenchment of those with everything to lose in the face of incisive anti-corruption action) would be no walk in the park either. Pro-Zuma forces embedded in state structures could bring ongoing government destabilisation.

These future alternatives both suggest a stalemate situation, which is set to continue through the interregnum from the ANC conference to the 2019 national elections. A big question is whether ANC unity could prevail in the aftermath of the succession campaign: can there be space for both an anti-corruption faction and one that will by definition shelter outgoing President Zuma?

The ANC in this interregnum will face several crossroads where the factions' baggage and compromises could bring upheaval of party and state. The analogy of the post-Polokwane ➤

period (that followed the hostile factional victory), along with political decay since, demarcate these moments in the year and a half from late 2017 to the election of 2019.

CONFERENCE OUTCOMES JUNCTURE

Fire the president of South Africa period: President Zuma, like Thabo Mbeki a decade earlier, is vulnerable in his position as president of South Africa, especially under an ANC-Ramaphosa victory. If pressure to axe President Zuma threatens to split the ANC under Ramaphosa, restraint is likely. If Zuma, however, uses presidential powers in his pre-December 2017 'presidential prerogative' and unaccountable style the axe will fall irrespective of risking an ANC split. If Zuma exercises restraint, efforts will focus more on proceeding piecemeal (possibly half-heartedly) against previous excesses and try and let the pending election campaign compensate. Under a Dlamini-Zuma-ANC ascendancy there would be an outright attempt to retain Zuma as SA president, and his will is likely to be incorporated into state action, inseparable from the programme of the new ANC president. The premise will be that the damage of continued Zuma influence could be neutralised through an election campaign.

Split-off period: Both ANC-presidential victory scenarios point to the first priority being the ANC's preservation through efforts to counter a factional split. Experiences with previous splits showed that split-off parties do not supersede the ANC, and are likely to face a future of either aligning with other opposition parties or with the ANC. Dismal prospects thus decrease but cannot forestall the possibility of a split. If unity fails and an NDZ-ANC prevails, current indications are that it will come short on instituting clean governance and fiscal responsibility. A broad alliance

of ANC dissenting factions (such as unforgiving Ramaphosa-ists, including stalwarts) might exit this ANC, form new support-building alliances across civil society and possibly with some opposition parties. They would associate with the 'original ANC values' and form a new ANC.

Campaign for Election 2019: If unity prevails, neither of the two main vying ANC factions will hand the ANC an easy election campaign. A campaign in which the Ramaphosa (CR) faction is dominant would benefit from a publicly credible leader steering the ANC, with the sense of ANC reinvention, renewal and a better ANC taking control. A CR campaign would nevertheless have to persuade voters that Zuma does not rule from the political grave, and that CR incumbents have the capacity to uproot corruption and state capture. A CR campaign would also have to persuade a sceptical electorate that it is in command of the Zumaist state security and information apparatuses, besides all the previously captured institutions. A Dlamini-Zuma (NDZ) campaign would have to show the difference between the new and old Zumas as presidential incumbents. Campaign credibility would hinge on action to correct the damages of the Jacob Zuma era. Given the unlikelihood of the NDZ campaign doing this, it would then depend on hitching itself to the big nationalistic-patriotic, anti-western, radical leading light thrust. These ideas have been central to the ANC's own ideological positioning, but were abused and distorted through the Gupta-Bell Pottinger efforts to create distraction from Zuma-related capture of party and state.

Many of the indicators of the future trajectory of the ANC – whether an internal alliance of factions will hold and bring in a new ANC, or if the ANC factions part ways and split the ANC, possibly into a minority status – emerged from the period of the 2016-17 presidential succession

campaign. The rules are fluid and acrimony and subterfuge ruled. All candidate weaknesses were exploited and all organisational and branch tactics exhausted. The Polokwane and Mangaung conferences had schooled the ANC actors.

CONCLUSION

The critical dual question for the ANC is therefore not just if its centre holds, but whether there are sufficient centripetal forces to entice ANC factions to compromise and cooperate, and to give credible content to such a process. This does not just depend on personal and political will, but on the factions' perception that the common core of the ANC is so compromised by the Zuma years that there is no longer an identifiable and defensible post-conference ANC. The glue might be in the knowledge that the ANC's final chance to reposition and reinvent presents itself in the interregnum between its party elective conference and the national election. Judged by the succession campaigns, however, one cannot assume such a consensus.

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University of Limpopo hosts Faculty of Science and Agriculture International Energy Storage Workshop



Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of Limpopo, Prof N Mokgalong, and the Minister of Science and Technology, Mrs Naledi Pandor

The rechargeable battery technology continues to evolve at a fast pace to meet the growing demands of electric vehicles, solar (or wind) energy storage as well as large-scale energy storage on the grid. The Department of Science and Technology (DST) recognised this and launched a strategic development programme in 2015 to locally beneficiate manganese as cathode materials for lithium ion batteries.

South Africa has 80% of the global high grade manganese ore reserves. The University of Limpopo was appointed to

host this programme at a new development facility in Nelspruit (Mbombela) in Mpumalanga.

Delta EMD Ltd was a global leader in the production of cathode materials for alkaline batteries and had specialised manganese beneficiation skills. Delta closed its business due to market conditions in the alkaline battery industry and the University of Limpopo retained the technical skills and expertise of Delta and incorporated its staff in its Cathode Materials Programme. It also took over the Delta laboratory equipment and pilot plant facilities. The new facilities are at the Delta EMD premises in Nelspruit.

The mandate of this programme is to develop and commercialise local cathode precursor materials to be used in lithium ion batteries. These materials will be supplied to selected global lithium ion battery customers.

The Cathode Materials programme forms part of an Energy Storage Hub under the leadership of the DST. The role players in the hub are:

- The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR): Research into cathode materials;
- The University of Western Cape (UWC): Battery construction and testing; >>

- The Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU): Battery testing;
- The University of Limpopo: Computational modelling of battery materials and mechanistic modelling of cathode materials;
- The South African Nuclear Energy Corporation: Stabilisation of the cathode materials by means of fluorination.

The Cathode Materials group has also engaged in technology partnerships with international leaders in co-precipitation processes for cathode materials based in the USA, China and South Korea. This will strengthen the group and ensure that the latest technology is incorporated in this development.

A joint steering committee consisting of the University of Limpopo, the DST, the Industrial Development Corporation and the Department of Trade and Industry meets on a quarterly basis to provide guidance on this project.

The new offices, laboratory and pilot plant facility in Nelspruit was Launched on 11 October 2017. The event was hosted by the Vice-Chancellor and Principal of the University of Limpopo,



Professor Phuti Ngoepe



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Prof N Mokgalong, and the Minister of Science and Technology, Mrs Naledi Pandor, delivered the keynote address. The launch was followed by a two-day international workshop on Energy Storage. Global technology leaders in the rechargeable battery space, such as Argonne National Laboratories (USA) and Beijing Easpring (China), attended the launch and participated in the workshop.

The SA International Energy Storage Workshop was convened by the Department of Science and Technology, with the assistance of the University of Limpopo, and took place on 12 and 13 October 2017 at Greenway Woods Resort, White River in Mpumalanga. It was facilitated by Professor Phuti Ngoepe of the University of Limpopo and Dr Jason Croy of Argonne National Laboratory.

A presentation on policy was made by the Director General of the Department of Science and Technology, Dr Phil Mjwara,

and on the state of energy storage in SA and worldwide by the Industrial Development Corporation, Eskom and the Council for Geoscience. International presentations were made mainly by Argonne National Laboratory and Beijing Easpring. Most local presentations were made by the SA consortium on energy storage, which mainly focused on manganese based cathodes, starting with precursors, through materials to products such as battery packs.

The University of Limpopo is part of the consortium. It hosts the precursor pilot plant and conducts research on computational modelling. Deliberations on the way forward pertaining to energy storage in South Africa were held.



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Stalwarts prepare with talk of **‘SECOND REVOLUTION’**

By *Ben and Mary Turok*

Ben and Mary Turok, venerable ANC stalwarts and long-time members, attended a pre-conference meeting of the veterans held in November 2017 to raise the concerns of ANC veterans and stalwarts. They report on the veterans pre-conference discussion.

INTRODUCTION

Reflecting on the mood of the National Consultative Conference (NCC), and the current upsurge of exposure and criticism of the ANC leadership, it seems that whatever the outcome of the ANC elective conference, the Stalwarts and Veterans have an ongoing role to play, either in assisting the process of correcting and re-constructing the current flawed system or in continuing to expose and mobilise against corruption and for development and respect for democratic values.

BACKGROUND

The ANC Stalwarts and Veterans first met as the 101 Veterans two years ago and publicly raised their concerns about the moral and political crisis within the ANC, which was affecting the country as a whole. They tried to engage with the leadership to evolve a programme that would halt the demise, but they were rebuffed.

As concern grew about the need to address the crisis, the ANC Stalwarts drew up a founding document in October 2016, titled “For the Sake of our Future”. This was presented to the President and the top five officials

of the ANC. It declared that the ANC had abdicated its historic leadership role. Its leaders were accumulating ill-begotten wealth and were engaged in a cycle of infighting, thus eroding ANC electoral support. It called for a consultative conference before the 2017 ANC conference to address critical issues and lead to the rebuilding and renewal of the movement.

Several meetings with the ANC Top Six followed, but without a positive outcome. The leaders of the Stalwarts and Veterans therefore decided to go ahead with the NCC on the ANC, which was held before the ANC elective conference in December.

It was held in a number of large tents on Constitution Hill in Johannesburg. Present were not only ANC veterans but also representatives of civil society. Familiar faces from the ANC were there, including former presidents Thabo Mbeki and Kgalema Motlanthe, Ministers Derek Hanekom and Lindiwe Sisulu, former Ministers Pravin Gordhan, Blade Nzimandi and Bheki Cele, and former members of parliament and other leading political figures.

Well-known academic NJABULO NDEBELE presented the Keynote Address. He spoke as an independent observer and someone deeply concerned about the state of the

country. He raised key moral questions about the ANC, which were taken up throughout the conference, and asked whether the present leadership of the ANC had been finally compromised.

His speech was published by Independent Newspapers and the Daily Maverick. It is worth quoting from it at some length:

“What has happened in South Africa today is that the government that was elected to support and promote law, order and constitutional rule, has abdicated that responsibility. Formidable sounding names such as ‘the security cluster’, ‘the national joint operational and intelligence structure’ have become a cloak behind which criminal government transgressions can take place with calculated impunity. That is why it has become a matter of absolute importance that all South Africans recognise the necessity to rescue their country and themselves from a parallel, secret, security-driven state that has consolidated in the last 10 years into an organised criminal order that wilfully defrauds the state. It performs outward gestures of legitimacy but with diminished public trust. This enables me to make the following statement: the ultimate threat to South Africa’s ➤

achieved constitutional democracy is the loss of freedom through the near total collapse of state capability. Regaining that freedom, that capability and the collective genius of the South African people to flourish through a sustainable constitutional democracy is what makes it imperative to embark on a second revolution. What to struggle for may have been revealed to us by the current national crisis. It is this revelation that has brought this gathering together today.”

Presentations on diverse subjects followed:

1. The Religious Community: An input was made by the General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, Bishop Malusi Mpumlwana, and responses came from Rabbi Dovid Hazden, Moulana Igsan Abrahams and Tebogo Thothela from the student movement
2. Sustainable Economic Development: Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA) presented an input and responses came from the Chamber of Mines, the Banking Council, AgriSA and youth leader Phindile Kunene
3. Non-racialism and Nation Building: with inputs from former justice of the Constitutional Court Yvonne Makgoro, academic Mark Hayward, local community leader Gugu Nzima and student activist Sarah Mokwebo
4. The Constitution and the Law: The input was from prominent anti-apartheid activist and former Justice of the Constitutional Court Zak Yacoob and responses from Advocates for Social Change, the Black Lawyers Association, Lawson Naidoo from the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution and Yusuf Peer from law firm Edward Nathan Sonnenberg.



Chikane said the time had come to say “no further”. Calling on the NEC to act decisively, he said the ANC had to recapture the movement and liberate state enterprises, even if that meant going back to the trenches.

PEGGY PILLAY of Johannesburg Against Injustice then engaged with NCC delegates, asking the Stalwarts what they were going to do to address the problems that had been raised.

Although it was late in the day and the session was due to end, the large tent remained half full. In response to a request by a speaker from Wits University, the Chair agreed that discussion of the day’s proposals would continue into the first session of the following day.

The next day SNUKI ZIKALALA, as the Chair for the formal opening of the conference, spoke briefly on the state of the ANC and the country, stressing that the NCC must have an impact on both.

FRANK CHIKANE then spoke, and asked how had the ANC allowed itself to be hijacked? He said the publication of “For the Sake of our Future” was an attempt to reclaim our country and our movement.

He referred to those veterans who had passed away during the last 10 years, and asked had they died with heavy hearts, asking themselves if it had all been worth it. Chikane said the time had come to say “no further”.

Calling on the NEC to act decisively, he said the ANC had to recapture the movement and liberate state enterprises, even if that meant going back to the trenches. We need clear strategies, he told the gathering, and these must be taken to the masses and the ANC members in the branches.

The crowd rose in song to praise Tambo, but the atmosphere was punctuated by pertinent questions from young people. A young woman, Carla, asked what Tambo would have expected of the youth and wanted to know why they were unable to access rights. “Beware of the wedge-driver with a bag of money,” she warned.

The plenary opened on Saturday amid the singing and enthusiastic reunions of old comrades. It was pointed out that there were 13 NEC members at the conference, 12 former MPs and 9 former Ministers. Overall, the atmosphere contrasted with the rigidity of previous ANC national conferences.

MAVUSO MSIMANG made introductory remarks and moved on to serious matters. Comrades must take note of Ndebele’s comments, he said, and prepare to define a new course based on an active civil society that must claim back its mandate from parties.

SANCO raised concerns about disrespect being shown to old members who are being rejected (by the ANC). Moreover, it warned against attempts to capture the alliance. SANCO made it clear that it was not captured and there are still disciplined members in the ANC. SANCO also emphasised that gatherings like the NCC must continue to ensure the ANC stays in power and the country never falls to the DA.

COSATU declared that it was participating in order to reclaim and unite the ANC. It asked if today’s alliance is still true to the original alliance. COSATU warned that signs that the ANC is moving away from

its people were being ignored, with the result that three elections have been lost. To stay in power we need the support of our people. The conclusions of this conference and how COSATU will align to them were to be deliberated upon at the November meeting of its Central Executive Committee.

A young woman from the SACP made an impassioned speech, saying the revolution has entered uncharted waters. The instruments of revolution have been hijacked and looted in the current crisis of government and mismanagement and there was a need to deal with the rot. She said the State was now family-owned with power concentrated in the President, while the ANC was undermined daily by tribal loyalty and attacks on its critics. The National Democratic Revolution was stagnating, she said.

If the ANC flounders someone else may take over, which is of concern to the alliance. Efforts to engage the President have been rebuffed and Zuma should step down or we must call for his removal, she said. He has violated the Constitution on many occasions, she added. The ANC cannot be under the patronage of one individual. The party challenged Zuma on the removal of Pravin Gordhan, and she demanded Tom Moyane step down. We cannot have a president who defies his party and we must do whatever it takes to arrest this. The SACP speech stirred the crowd into a renewed round of song.

PEGGY PILLAY, in her reflections on the Civil Society Session, called on the Stalwarts and Veterans to show the way and to demand of our leaders to say no to the nuclear deal. She stressed the need to listen so that discussions don't come to nothing. We need to deliver a new culture of politics, she said.

SYDNEY MUFAMADI said that the ANC today is in crisis. He described it as anti-transformation. Public authority

is now defending personal interests at the expense of the people and the poor. He lashed out at the authoritarianism within the organisation that is enabling checks and balances to be bypassed.

He warned of harmful consequences, with violence re-emerging and provinces serving as fiefdoms of the powerful. He feared the issue of corruption was taboo with some leaders refusing to engage in discussion on it. The leadership, he said, has become spineless and moribund.

He added that history has taught us that crisis can be a turning point. It is an opportunity for the ANC to undergo introspection and mobilise popular engagement. This needs fresh discussions of the Constitution and the democratic practice and revolutionary morality embedded in the ANC. Mufamadi described this as a point of departure and called on all to be ready for the long haul.

The plenary was followed by discussion in the following commissions:

1. Organisational renewal;
2. The role of the state in fostering sustainable economic development;
3. Politics of the Constitution today;
4. Electoral reform, accountability and leadership with integrity;
5. The challenges of building a non-racial society; and



COSATU declared that it was participating in order to reclaim and unite the ANC. It asked if today's alliance is still true to the original alliance.

6. The relationship between civil society, ANC and the state.

Not all commissions could be covered in this report (see note at end), but the following is a report of Commission 2:

COMMISSION 2: THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN FOSTERING SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The Commission was attended by about 100 delegates with Alec Erwin as the presenter. He said the ANC-led government had some success in stabilising income disparities, but worsening inequality presents a threat to stability. Without a strong state, development is not possible. In 1994, we were too preoccupied with the existing economy, and the issues of high costs, lowering tariffs, no jobs, powerful, racially concentrated capital. In this time of global capitalism the State must actively engage capitalists to make productive investments. The economy is shrinking, and this has been made worse by corruption. It had been a serious mistake to ally with Zuma. Now we have to rebuild roads, electricity and water. The Commission decided that the following steps need to be taken as a matter of urgency:

1. Immediately mobilise the masses/mass movement to stimulate economic activity;
2. Extricate ourselves from the crisis, with a top team to rescue Eskom, SAA, etc.;
3. A huge cabinet is useless and there is a need to clean up the state;
4. A massive development drive is needed (with a focus on local government which is the weakest). We also need an infrastructure drive. We have a manufacturing sector, but it has been weakened;
5. We must take Africa seriously and rebuild relationships with the rest of the continent, with South Africa taking the lead. >>

THE COMMISSION CHAIR, SIHLE MOON, summarised the pressing issues as the role of the state, regional development, communities, spatial planning, agriculture and land reform. The following came up for discussion:

1. What went wrong? We have done this before, but must focus on implementation. What is lacking is a driver. We lack immediate plans for revival and implementation by local authorities.
2. Emergency measures are needed.
3. What actually needs to be done? We need to emphasise what and when?
4. An inclusive economy is needed, with a protection mechanism against immigration in townships.
5. What about an economic CODESA?
6. We need a strategy for the future that engages young people, as well as groups from different generations, to plan together.
7. Our education is not focused on development. Rural villages used to be clustered around development but that has now gone.
8. Which agencies will take this forward? Mbeki had a policy advisory sector on monitoring but that has gone.
9. How do we bring in the private sector, and what sort of financing is needed?
10. The ANC is putting too much money into white areas. More needs to be spent in rural areas. For example, farmers need to be taught the value of selling cattle.
11. Foreign workers are competing and undercutting South African workers.
12. Our economy has not changed. We have failed in all the areas that we agreed to regulate. What has changed in the last 20 years? We are still confining our people to townships.
13. We must move economic opportunities to townships. We need to have one South Africa. This means integrating neighbourhoods.

14. We also need a 4th industrial revolution with South African firms moving in. Our organisational culture is archaic.

FORMER PRESIDENT THABO MBEKI addressed the final session, saying that the ANC had been captured by a dominant faction, which is not the ANC, but the rot had infected the ANC as a whole.

“What do we do to liberate the ANC from a dominant group?” he asked. The conference declaration should be distributed to all ANC members and their decisions must be pursued. The National Executive Committee had done itself and the rest of the ANC a great disservice by disassociating itself from the NCC leadership.

THE NCC DECLARATION

The Declaration expressed profound commitment to the ANC and pride in its role in the achievement of democracy but deep concern at the abandonment of its historic values, which has undermined popular confidence in government. The current elected leadership is “paralysed and unable to deal with ill-discipline, incompetence and corruption that point directly to the highest office in the land.

“In short, the ANC has relinquished its leadership of society and plunged itself into an untenable political crisis. We believe that the ANC can and must be saved,” he said.

While acknowledging that “our failure to address these issues timeously contributed to the political crisis, we are convinced that our movement, with rigorous, serious and genuine introspection can self-correct.

“We therefore call for the following:

1. The ANC conference in December 2017, in accordance with rule 11.5 of the ANC, must result in a plan of

action and a thorough renewal of the ANC structures, including the branches.

2. The Integrity Commission must be an independent constitutional structure within the ANC with the capacity to act independently of the NEC or any official, including the president of the organisation.
3. We must introduce one member, one vote for the direct election of the NEC.
4. The number of deployed NEC members in government must be capped.
5. The Tripartite Alliance must be revitalised, strengthened and respected.

This National Consultative Conference furthermore:

1. Calls on all women and men of honour and integrity within the ANC and government to stand up against all forms of corruption and expose, reject and isolate the dishonest elements that seek to undermine and destroy our organisation, government and reputation.
2. Calls for an open and fair election of the new ANC national leadership at the forthcoming elective conference.
3. A principled new leadership will be expected to heed the call for an urgent, all-inclusive conference that will get the process of correcting the wrongs within the ANC underway.
4. Calls upon President Zuma, for the sake of our future, to resign with immediate effect as State President and as President of the ANC.”

Note: This report does not cover the entire conference. It is based partly on our experience and otherwise relies on the programme and reports on the sessions that we missed. It only covers in some detail the Commission 2 on Sustainable Economic Development which we attended – authors. **NA**

Participation of Women in the Information Technology Sector in South Africa

By Dr Alex Dandadzi, Ms Ntsoka Mathiba, Ms Senate Mafike

Dandadzi is the head of the Computer Science Department. Mathiba and Mafike are Lecturers in the same department, School of Science and Technology, Sefako Makgatho Health Sciences University.



Dr Alex Dandadzi



Ms Ntsoka Mathiba



Ms Senate Mafike

Staff in the department of Computer Science embarked on a research study to investigate the participation of women in the IT sector and their roles in order to propose possible interventions.

Enrolment figures of female students majoring in Computer Science (CS) at third year level has been on the rise in recent years at Sefako Makgatho Health Sciences University (SMU). In year 2015, departmental records show that 45% of the final year students who graduated from the program were female. That number improved in the year 2016, with 57% of the graduates being female. It is clear that there is a growing trend in female graduates with a qualification in CS, but where do these female CS graduates end up in their post-graduation stages in South Africa?

LITERATURE REVIEW

The field of Computer Science has grown into different specialties (Glass, 2012) such as Computer Engineering, Information Systems Management, Information Technology, Computer Technology, to name a few, making it more of a challenge in determining women's participation. Several studies on the same subject have been done in other countries with interesting results. A study in the USA shows that there is a drop in female students majoring in Computer Science and other related IT programmes (Coder et al., 2009; Redmond et al., 2013; McKinney et al., 2008; Khan & Luxton-reilly, 2016). An international study made similar observations in the drop of female



students taking up Computer Science as a major at undergraduate level in New Zealand and Iceland (Adams et al., 2003). In Israel, where the study had a focus on High School level, it was found that there was a decrease in female learners taking up Computer Science as a subject (Adams et al., 2003). However, a study done in India was quite the opposite. The study found that there has been an increase of female students taking up Computer Science at Universities in India (Kakkar & Bhandari, 2016).

The reasons for the decline in female students taking up Computer Science varied from country to country. These ranged from job insecurity (de Palma 2001), lack of mentors for female students or learners (Adams et al., 2003; Khan & Luxton-reilly, 2016; Ross et al., 2012; Vardi, 2015;) to perceptions that IT was only for males (Khan & Luxton-reilly, 2016). The reasons for an uptake by female students in India was that there were good career prospects with high salary as well as favourable working conditions. (Kakkar & Bhandari, 2016; Varma et al., 2015).

Certainly, the low numbers taking up Computer Science at universities have a direct impact on women's participation in the corporate world. The gender disparities will remain if no intervention is made (Ross et al., 2012; Coder et al., 2009; Baroudi, 2016; McKinney et al., 2008). Such interventions might include examining existing organisational structures, practices, and policies at governmental level which seek to attract women into the profession (Quesenberry & Trauth, 2012), and undertaking awareness campaigns (Ross et al., 2012). However, it would be wise to mention that such interventions would differ from country to country. Accordingly, this study sought to understand the level of participation of women in IT in South Africa.

METHODOLOGY

A questionnaire was designed and emailed to female candidates in the Gauteng province, to get answers based on the following themes: company size, demographic profile, employment type, job role, job role challenges, motivation, reasons for female underrepresentation, and suggestions for attracting females into the IT sector.

FINDINGS

The findings of the 19 responses received for each theme are discussed below.

Company size


67% of the respondents work for large organisations, while 33% of the respondents work for small companies, 56% of which were IT companies. The remaining 44% was split evenly among these sectors: government, telecoms, finance, and education.

Demographics

The majority of the respondents were between the ages of 26 and 30 followed by those between 36 and 40 years of age. Those older than 41 years of age amounted to only 6%.

Age range


The majority of the respondents were black Africans (76%). Whites made up 12%,



and the remaining 12% were split evenly between Indians and Coloureds. It is interesting to note that those respondents older than 41 years were white, indicating that they have been involved in the IT industry longer than any other race group.

65% of the respondents were single while 29% were married and 6% divorced. 50% of the respondents do not have children, while 38% of the respondents had one or two children and 13% have more than three children.

Qualifications



All the respondents indicated that they have at least one or more qualification. The majority (53%) of the respondents hold a university bachelor's degree. Those with a PhD were over the age of 41 and have been in the IT industry longer than other age groups.

Employment

Eighty two percent of the respondents indicated that they are in permanent employment with the organisation they currently work for, while 18% indicated they work on a contract basis. The majority of respondents (29%) were employed as Systems or Business Analysts with only 6% employed as Project Managers who happen also to be in the 41 plus age group. The Systems or Business Analysts were in the 20 to 35 age band. Results show that females do not feature highly

as developers (17%) among respondents, which is almost half of the 29% of those who are Business or Systems Analysts. There was an even spread among those who are testers, educators, and developers and these happen to be in the 30 to 35 age group showing that these occupations require more experienced people.

Duration of employment

The majority of respondents were in employment for between 2 to 5 years in their current position.

On the issue of travel, all the respondents (100%) indicated that their current position does not require them to travel overseas.

Job role challenges

26% of respondents indicated that the work environment and resources remain their biggest challenge.

Salary was the second biggest challenge (24%). Many felt that male counterparts get paid more.

Eighteen percent of the respondents feel the industry is still dominated by males. However, they feel the tide is turning slowly in their favour despite the lower pay they receive.

Sixteen percent see the industry as offering good opportunities for work in IT. Five percent indicated that the industry is evolving at a rapid rate which makes it difficult to cope.

There was an even split of three percent among respondents on the issues related to; strained relationship with manager, lack of respect, and recognition of female potential.

Only two percent of the respondents indicated that females are still discriminated against.

Motivation

The theme on motivation had diverse opinions from the respondents. A majority of the respondents (35%) indicated that they are very passionate about being in the industry and that it is a scarce skill that offers excellent career prospects.

Interestingly, 4% of the respondents indicated that their parents had a role in making them follow a career in IT.

Reasons for under representation of women

The reasons given for under representation were diverse. A majority of respondents (26%) pointed to stereotyping as a major reason.

Eighteen percent cited the domination of men in the industry while 13% felt they are discriminated against. Family responsibility came in fourth at 10%, while 8% feel there is a lack of succession plans earmarking women for promotion into higher posts within organisations. There was an even split of 5% on lack of career guidance in schools, lack of females supporting one another in the profession, and long working hours. Three percent felt that women lack self-confidence and 2% felt that the traditional roles like motherhood and being a wife plays a role.

Suggestions to attract females in IT

Several suggestions were made with the majority (26%) expressing a need for mentorship or coaching as well as career guidance. Exposing women to the IT field at an early age was a second major suggestion. Eleven percent felt that there should be flexible working hours in the IT industry as they have other family responsibilities. There was an even split of 8% of respondents saying women must be given an equal opportunity as their male counterparts rather than patronising them. Another 6% felt that women are not being recognised for their achievements and that there are currently no support structures for women in the workplace. There was an even split of 3% on issues of having day-care facilities at places of work, giving bursaries to women attending university, admitting more women into IT at university, recruiting more women for IT as a form of redress, and making the IT working environment more stimulating. Some respondents feel that promotion must be based on merit.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The IT sector in South Africa is growing. Government should therefore consider



The theme on motivation had diverse opinions from the respondents. A majority of the respondents (35%) indicated that they are very passionate about being in the industry and that it is a scarce skill that offers excellent career prospects.

policies to attract more women. Among the recommendations to be considered are:

- introduce IT as a compulsory module in all public schools in order to create awareness early in the educational careers of learners
- offer bursaries to women taking IT as a major at public universities
- introduce a quota system in the industry to address the gender imbalance
- make it compulsory for the industry to groom women into management positions
- criminalise any form of discrimination against women in the IT workforce

CONCLUSION

Through this short survey we hope that government and private industry will make appropriate interventions to address the issue of under representation of women.

A good starting point would be to adopt some of the recommendations made here.

More survey research should also be undertaken to gain a deeper understanding of the reasons why larger numbers of women don't enter the industry and why fewer women occupy positions in software programming and development.

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MOTLANTHE WARNS OF DANGERS OF INEQUALITY

By Kgalema Motlanthe

Former President and Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe gave the opening address of IFAA's conference on Confronting Inequality organised in collaboration with the Royal Netherlands Embassy. Motlanthe is chairperson of the IFAA board.



Kgalema Motlanthe

“Countries around the world provide frightening examples of what happens to societies when they reach the level of inequality toward which we are moving. It is not a pretty picture: countries where the rich live in gated communities, waited upon by hordes of low-income workers; unstable political systems where populists promise the masses a better life, only to disappoint.

Perhaps most importantly, there is an absence of hope. In these countries, the poor know that their prospects of emerging from poverty, let alone making it to the top, are minuscule. This is not something we should be striving for.” - Joseph Stiglitz

It is not difficult to relate the South African present to this picture of a vastly unequal society. Frequent descriptions of contemporary life are rooted in a ‘tale of two cities’ narrative that reveals the stark differences that underscore life within our borders.

This is a bleak depiction. But rather than being weighed down by the morass it represents, I am emboldened by a shared belief that a better future is possible.

Professor Ben Turok, Director of the Institute for African Alternatives, wrote in a paper for the conference on Confronting Inequality an unambiguous exploration of the consequences of inequality. It is founded in the belief that when

societies, for a vast array of reasons, begin to take the shape of the contours defined by Stiglitz, the threat of violence invades every day realities and threatens to engulf the better part of the affected world in its long shadow.

Professor Turok emphasises this fact, drawing on the work of French economist Thomas Piketty, who states:

“We also know from historical experience, that extreme inequality of the kind of levels we observe in South Africa is not good for development and growth, and it can also lead to violent reactions and violent events. And we all have in mind the very violent episodes at Marikana three years ago, and we know from historical experience that if inequality is not addressed through peaceful means and peaceful democratic institutions it’s always potentially a source of violence. And, of course, this can happen again.”¹

The echoes of these statements are found in a recent Oxfam report that noted: “Left unchecked, growing inequality threatens to pull our societies apart. It increases crime and insecurity, and undermines the fight to end poverty. It leaves more people living in fear and fewer in hope.”²

Frequently violence is evident in what have been termed 'service delivery protests', but takes a wider form. It is evident in continuing commuter bus and taxi unrest. It rears its head in the responses to student protests at our universities. There are numerous ways in which it invades every day, and reveals societal rifts that blur the distinctions between the past and the present, perhaps because the past is so present.

A dual economy, in which a formal and informal economy exist side-by-side and creates vastly distinct experiences of citizenship, marks our reality. As a result, we find that the task of fully realising freedom is still one that we have to ardently pursue.

Economic marginalisation remains a pressing challenge. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now say that in the initial democratic days, the following question should have been phrased: 'How do we define the new national cause beyond 1994 and which array of social forces should be mobilised to pursue it?'

There is a simple saying that states 'when you know better, you do better'. While it can be up for critique, perhaps we can rephrase this as 'when you know better, you have the capacity to do better'.

In briefly considering present research and the gaps that require address, Professor Turok identifies that little research exists on wealth – as analyses of poverty has overwhelmingly been the post-democratic focus.³

This is backed by Piketty who stressed: 'we still know too little about inequality' and that our aim should be to 'contribute to a more informed democratic discussion about inequality'.

Similarly, Anna Orthofer states that: 'despite the concerns about the persisting economic disparities since the end of apartheid, existing research has focused almost exclusively on income inequality'.

We need to consider income and wealth in relation to poverty, and reflect on how this affects employment opportunities, movement and residence, access to adequate healthcare and education and the way business is conducted.

As we strive to address this and factors mentioned above and their racially skewed dimensions, it would be remiss not to consider the roles and responsibilities of the institutions of democracy.

The current state of our institutions is shaped by historical forces. It has become evident that we are faced with a crisis of institutions that affects multiple sites. These include government, public universities and the private sector.

The term 'state capture' continues to dominate public discourse around governance, which delineates how the interference of nepotistic relations and tainted business transactions can affect the workings of the state and inability of government to meet its social responsibilities.

Any interventions that seek to address inequality cannot ignore this reality. We are required to both question and critique the government's role in alleviating poverty, inequality and unemployment, as well as considering our collective responsibility and agency in contributing towards rebuilding our society on new terms.

We also know, from the work of many economists and social theorists, that multiple factors influence the present state of local and global inequality. These include the state of the global economy; the present design of the economic system; historical and structural features; and unearned benefits that accompany various forms of privilege. What then, could be the possible way out of the bleak picture painted by the economists above?

As Professor Turok writes: "Current mechanisms of welfare

grants and public spending are not doing enough to confront inequality in our economy. Other more ambitious solutions may be needed to resolve the structural constraints that continue to frustrate inclusive development."⁴

Our current policy framework clearly fails to fully comprehend and address present challenges in inequality.

In keeping a solutions-oriented mind-set, I offer one site that must be considered: education.

The Statistician General report on the social profile of vulnerable groups between 2002–2012 revealed a startling decline in educational attendance beyond 15 and 16 years of age. This reality significantly affects the country's Black and Coloured communities.

In thinking about inequality, basic education demands our direct address. Failure to access and sustain adequate education skews access to opportunities long after initial enrollment. It could be said to touch every aspect of life – having effect beyond generations.

In conclusion, we cannot map out solutions emboldened only by a set of untested assumptions. This makes today's conference profoundly meaningful – as it seeks to understand the present data set and interpretations as well as consider inequality from multiple angles, in pursuit of more democratic alternatives.

Our conversations must be underscored by the realisation that there are real, human lives beneath data and academic terminology. The people most affected by the scourge of inequality must be kept in mind, as we seek to 'normalise freedom' and create a country that can truly claim freedom, justice and equality as its reality. NA

NOTES

- ¹ <https://www.nelsonmandela.org/news/entry/transcript-of-nelson-mandela-annual-lecture-2015>
- ² https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-economy-for-99-percent-160117-en.pdf
- ³ Turok, B., 2017
- ⁴ Turok, B., 2017. Background Paper on Inequality Conference

Confronting Inequality: Thoughts on Public Accountability and Policy Resonance

By Thuli Madonsela

The writer is Founder and Chief Patron of Thuma Foundation, South Africa's former Public Protector and a 2017 Harvard Advanced Leadership Fellow. Advocate Madonsela was unable to be at the conference but submitted the following paper for inclusion in the proceedings and record.



Thuli Madonsela

Ms Madonsela highlights the effects of inequality on the social fabric of South African communities and how this has been exacerbated by the corruption of government, most notably the litany of recent revelations of state capture. As the most prominent face and voice behind the statutory process

to get government to adhere to its constitutional obligations, she implores South Africans – civil society in particular – to demand an end to the policies that have led to this ignominious state of the nation and create institutions that serve all of South Africa's people.

The dialogue on inequality is timely as inequality and poverty in our country and the world are at their highest. Extreme poverty and inequality are not only unjust but also a major threat to peace and stability. The response of the United Nations (UN) is to rally countries around Sustainable Development Goals. Providing the platform for deliberating on inequality in all its forms, must be applauded. My gratitude for the privilege of participating goes to Professor Ben Turok and the Netherlands Embassy, though regretfully I was unable physically to be present.

A POLARISING CAMPAIGN

Closer to home, confronting inequality seems to have been the focus of a recent UK-engineered vicious and racially divisive campaign that caught the imagination of many South Africans, particularly black people, who remain structurally unequal to their white counterparts, regarding income, wealth and access to private social services and social capital.

Using catch phrases such as “White Monopoly Capital” (WMC) and “Radical Economic Transformation”, the campaign ran mostly on social media platforms and Gupta-Zuma-owned mainstream media channels such as the ANN7 TV channel and the New Age newspaper. Some politicians caught on to the phrases and regularly incorporated them into their speeches. The impact made increasingly fragile race relations more tense.

The campaign, that seemingly confronted the systemic economic exclusion of black people, surfaced just after allegations of state capture emerged and a Public Protector investigation of the same commenced. The reason for the investigation was the allegation that the Gupta family,

which arrived in South Africa from India on the eve of democracy, was engaged in systematic capture and repurposing of the presidency, State-Owned Enterprises and other organs of state, particularly those responsible for law enforcement and state security. The family's purpose was their own rapid economic advancement at state expense and the evasion of accountability. This they would achieve through leveraging their social and economic relationship with the President and his son, with whom they co-owned key companies.


I am certain that many are now breathing a sigh of relief that Bell Pottinger has been held accountable by the UK PR peer agency and is reportedly in the process of being liquidated. Many now believe that we can now go back to "normal", whatever that may be.

COLLATERAL VALUE

But can we go back to normal? What is normal?

Are we not at a risk of similar attacks on our democracy through the exploitation of raw feelings around socio-economic exclusion particularly as a result of race and gender based accumulated socio-economic advantage? In other words, is inequality a problem we should all be concerned about? The UN and the African Union, among others, say yes, we should all be concerned about inequality.

There is a growing body of data showing that extreme inequality and poverty is not only a threat to peace and stability but also impedes development. That makes sense to me. Structural inequality translates into structural inefficiency in the utilisation of human capital. Regarding gender inequality, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, among others, have conducted studies that prove conclusively that leaving women behind socially and economically weighs down a country



thus undermining its GDP. I hope you agree with me that we don't need rocket science to extend the same logic to other forms of socio-economic exclusion including race, disability and age.

It seems to me that we could draw collateral value and lessons from the toxic campaign on economic inequality. A possible lesson is that racial reconciliation remains fragile at the level of relationships and integration. We must also admit that structural and systemic inequality remains a reality.

The overwhelming response to Bell Pottinger's incitement (which in reality was the proverbial "dead cat" aimed at deflecting attention from the serious state capture allegations) tells us that poverty makes it easier to ignite extremism. Who will forget the young people acting as a vigilante group, hounding the Public Protector's office and hysterically demanding that the State Capture investigation be dropped or at least broadened to a meaningless search for anything and everything against white businesses that have engaged with or lobbied state functionaries.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) recently announced that extreme

poverty and inequality are growing in the country and remain a challenge. Of greater concern is that the number of persons said to be living in extreme poverty (that section of our population who live on less than R441 per person per month), rose from 11 million people in 2011 to 13.8 million in 2015. This is a step back to the level of extreme poverty that obtained in 2007. Statistics further show that more than 30.4 million, that is, more than half of the country's 55 million people, live in poverty, which increased from 53.2% to 55.5% between 2006 and 2015. Unemployment is at its peak at about 28% officially and about 36%, unofficially. The statistics show that the most vulnerable are children below the age of 17. But poverty statistics don't do justice to the ugly reality of poverty. They don't provide visuals, the human face of it. A visit to Tidimala lower primary school about 45 kilometres from Pretoria brought us face to face with the impact of poverty, its indignity and how it contributes to long-term underdevelopment of children from poor households. At Tidimala and Sizabantwana Primary Schools which we visited under the auspices of the Tutu Desk Foundation, we were confronted with the harsh reality of how the other half lives. This extreme poverty is juxtaposed with the fact that some of our country's business luminaries, including from ➤

historically disadvantaged groups, proudly feature in the global Forbes magazine list of dollar billionaires.

I am deeply concerned though that there was not enough interest on the issues of poverty and inequality.

DEFERRED DEMOCRACY DREAM

In chapter 4 of her book, *No longer whispering to Power*, Thandeka Gqubule, with whom I was detained without trial during apartheid, nostalgically refers to the dream of “another country” that propelled us to step out and push back against apartheid. While the story is about the beauty of the dreams that drive the struggle, the narrative is also an indictment of the sad reality of similar excesses of the powerful that we thought would be buried with apartheid.

The outcome of the struggle was supposed to be a democracy that works for all with no one left behind. Part of the deal was also that no one would be above the law and no one would be deprived of equal protection under the law.

“The people shall govern” boldly declared the Freedom Charter, a document developed by diverse progressives from the African National Congress and its allies in 1955 to outline the vision of the new country beyond apartheid. The Freedom Charter gathering on its own was an act of courage as was the boldness of the vision behind its provisions. It embraced the notion of democracy being about the government of the people by the people for the people.

It is worth noting that in a true democracy, the power must lie with the people. *Demos* is a Greek word that means people and *cratos*, in the same language means power. Democracy, accordingly, should translate to people’s power exercised

collectively directly or through people’s representatives equally chosen by the people. Equally important and often forgotten is that, “for the people” means fruits of democracy must be enjoyed by all. Ultimately democracy should expand the frontiers of human freedom. It should give everyone optimum conditions to be the best they could be and in return, to serve the group and humanity at large, the best way they can.

BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN THE DREAM AND REALITY

Kwame Nkrumah spelt out the ideal manner in which the fruits of freedom from colonialism and democracy should be enjoyed by all, in a 1957 broadcast, where he said:

“We shall measure our progress by the improvement in the health of our people; by the number of children in school, and by the quality of their education; by the availability of water and electricity in our towns and villages, and by the happiness which our people take in being able to manage their own affairs. The welfare of our people is our chief pride, and it is by this that my Government will ask to be judged.”

Broadcast to the Nation. 24 December 1957

He later added that:

“We have the blessing of the wealth of our vast resources, the power of our talents and the potentialities of our people. Let us grasp now the opportunities before us and meet the challenge to our survival.”

This promise is similar to the one in the preamble to the South African Constitution which seeks to build a united nation where everyone’s potential is freed and life improved.

There is clearly a gap between reality and the Constitutional promise. Can we legitimately blame apartheid as many politicians do and particularly did at the height of the White Monopoly Capital Campaign?

Elsewhere I have admitted that the past continues to influence the present. The accumulated socio-economic advantages for white people and accumulated socio-economic disadvantages for black people, women and other disadvantaged people undoubtedly remain with us.

GETTING A SOCIETAL BUY IN REGARDING COMPENSATORY MEASURES

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission did great work in healing key wounds inflicted by apartheid brutality. But in my considered view that reconciliation project was abandoned too soon.

Part of racial polarisation today is reflected in white anger and despair over affirmative action and Black Economic Empowerment. Apart from the fact that both are often cover-ups for nepotism, cronyism and plain corruption, many, particularly from historically advantaged communities, do not appreciate the rationale behind some of the remedial measures that seek to redress systemic historical disparities, on the grounds of race, gender and disability.

A friend of mine demonstrates accumulated socio-economic inequality to young people by using a race between two groups. One group wearing one colour is forbidden from starting while another group wearing a different colour is allowed to run as far and fast as they can and is assisted and supported by the managers. At some point both groups are told to stop where they are and it is announced that they are now equal and everyone can now run as fast as they can to the finishing line, regardless of where they



started from. I have used this example effectively to help economically privileged groups to understand the cry behind the #FeesMustFall protest and the anger it generated among students.

Maladministration, including the wastage regularly identified by the Auditor General and the Public Protector, is also a factor behind failure to significantly reduce poverty and inequality. Without maladministration and corruption, there would be money for basic minimum education infrastructure in all schools and other constitutional promises. For every public Rand dishonestly and unlawfully siphoned into private pockets, as alleged for example in state capture, there is less available for the inclusive development agenda that improves the quality of life for all and unleashes the potential inherent in all our citizens.

We should be particularly concerned about the apparent weakening of the rule of law. While our courts, as led by the Constitutional Court, have done a sterling job in upholding their role as ultimate guardians of the Constitution, the same cannot be said about the appetite of law enforcement agencies such as the Hawks, Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) and the NPA, to bring alleged corruption culprits to book. A

particularly shocking example is the time it is taking to limit potential state capture damage, including possible permanent loss of stolen state funds and erosion of evidence trails, despite a report of the Public Protector released almost a year ago and numerous media exposés, particularly under what has been termed “Gupta Leaks”.¹

WHAT ARE WE TO DO?

The long-term view requires a review of policies to assess the extent to which they have the capacity to reduce poverty and inequality.

Reducing inequality and poverty will require helping the marginalised to earn incomes and reducing wealth and income inequality between groups. For income to be generated, there must be growth. But I do not believe either must come first. They should happen concurrently. A reinforcing process will be the pursuit of equality between nations, including arresting illicit capital outflows and reviewing trade deals that disadvantaged the country. In this regard, careful examination of BRICS import-export deals, is important to ensure the country does not become a footstool of its partners.

I’m sure we can all agree that this can’t be government’s sole

responsibility. Is it not high time that we all joined hands to craft and execute an M-Plan like the post-world war II one, to advance socio-economic inclusion in a systematic way? Such a plan would supplement, and elaborate on, the National Development Plan (NDP).

Women who gathered this year under the themes, Women Leading the Healing of the Division of the Past and Women Leading Socio-Economic Inclusion on August 9th and 26th respectively said yes to this idea. The two meetings produced a draft road map.

The process sought to leverage social capital in civil society, including business, to voluntarily reduce inequalities and poverty. It pointed out that we need to arrest corruption urgently. The starting point in this regard should be to claw back the money from state capture allegations where there is clear evidence that public funds have been dishonestly siphoned for personal enrichment or gain. Civil society, particularly academia, also needs to help boost the capacity of the state to design and implement impactable policies regarding inequality and poverty. This includes systematic implementation of Sustainable Development Goals.

It is my sincere view that the call to confront inequality is one of the most critical calls at this stage of our hard-earned constitutional democracy. I further believe that confronting and reducing inequality is everyone’s business while good governance, including ending corruption and strengthening accountability and the rule of law, is a must. I am convinced that if we don’t act urgently, the next challenge we will face will be worse than the toxic “dead cat” which sought to deflect attention from state capture. **NA**

EDITOR’S NOTE

¹ Since Advocate Madonsela wrote her input to the Confronting Inequality conference action has been seen by the Asset Forfeiture Unit, for example, and there has been progress in establishing an official inquiry into state capture.

Building a sustainable business



Professor Pauline Dibben and Gareth Crockett, University of Sheffield, UK

It is really important to treat employees fairly, use appropriate accounting practices and have ethical procurement practices in order to sustain a good reputation and win business within South Africa and abroad. Professor Pauline Dibben and her team carried out research in South Africa and Brazil to find out how (and whether) companies were checking on their suppliers' HR and accounting practices.

What is the research?

The main aim of the 'SCA-Emp' study was to explore how automotive and clothing and textile firms in South Africa and Brazil used employment practices and accounting down their supply chains, and whether they monitored suppliers and promoted labour standards. The research involved: a detailed survey of over 100 automotive and textile firms; in-depth interviews with HR managers, CEOs, accountants, finance managers, supply chain managers, sales and marketing managers, production managers and trade unionists in textiles and automotive firms in both countries; and interviews with senior personnel within professional bodies, NGOs, trade unions and employer organisations.

Who was involved?

The team was led by Professor Pauline Dibben, with Professor John Cullen, Professor Phil Johnson, Dr Juliana Meira, and Gareth Crockett from the University of Sheffield, together with Professor Geoffrey Wood (University of Essex, UK), Caroline Linhares (University of Leicester, UK), Dr Debby Bonnin (University of Pretoria, South Africa), and Professor Luiz Miranda (Federal University of Pernambuco, Brazil). Their Advisory Board of 10 people included academics such

as Professor Richard Haines from Nelson Mandela University, South Africa, and support by representatives from employer bodies such as CIPD and CIMA from the UK, FIEPE from Brazil and SABPP, the professional body for HR practitioners in South Africa.

What are the key findings of the research?

There were some examples of good employment practices. For example, the survey showed that most companies (70%) had an equal opportunities policy which usually included gender, age, race and disability. However, in practice, diversity was less often present in terms of the numbers of people employed, especially in management roles. In terms of accounting, many companies shared information on manufacturing processes, but not costs or employment practices (such as training, recruitment, performance management and diversity) unless there was a problem.

In the automotive companies, while companies in South Africa and Brazil had tried to employ workers fairly (including quite progressive disabilities policies in some cases), knowledge flows of suppliers' employment practices rapidly diminished down the supply chain. In Brazilian automotive companies, relationships with tier one suppliers remained strong with strategic alliances in place, but cost cutting pressures had led to arms' length contracting with suppliers of basic components further down the supply chain. This was accompanied by a lack of knowledge of employment practices, with basic components sourced via intermediaries in Asia. In South African

automotive companies, tier one suppliers were used to fulfil key parts of the final production process, but these were often outsourced, enabling labour to fall under a different industry's inferior collective bargaining and wage rates.

In clothing and textiles firms, although there were some examples of good practice, with one company offering lifetime employment, jobs tended to have weak job tenure, employment conditions and health and safety, and not be unionised, leading to a lack of effective worker voice. In rural areas, there was a tendency toward informality. Exceptional cases notwithstanding, the sector faced an acute crisis of competitiveness in the face of cheap imports from China and South Asia.

What is the SCA-Emp diagnostic toolkit and how can it be used?

The research led to the development of the 'SCA-Emp' diagnostic toolkit which aims to help companies to achieve sustainable, ethical supply chains while balancing people and profit. It is freely available from www.sca-emp.com in an excel version or to complete online. The toolkit includes sections on supply chain management, employment practices, accounting and monitoring of suppliers.


Companies can use the toolkit to check current practices within the firm, as a strategy planner across departments, or to benchmark existing suppliers and evaluate potential suppliers. The research team are happy to work with companies to produce customised versions of the toolkit or arrange training sessions for the companies or their suppliers.

How can organisations benefit from using the SCA-Emp toolkit?

Organisations from South Africa, Brazil and the UK have benefitted from using the toolkit through: increased employee productivity and profits; better communication with employees; improved relationships with customers and suppliers; a better focus on ethics and quality in a time of crisis; improved knowledge of the supply chain; and better integration of departments within the organisation.

How can I find out more?

The 'SCA-Emp' toolkit is freely available at: www.sca-emp.com. If you wish to know more about the research project or the toolkit, please visit the website or email Professor Dibben: p.dibben@sheffield.ac.uk.




MINING INFRASTRUCTURE, INDUSTRIALISATION AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

A summary of an IFAA Research Report

By **Ben Turok** and **Michael Nassen Smith**, with **Zunaid Moolla**

Professor Ben Turok is Director of the Institute for African Alternatives (IFAA) and editor of its publication, *New Agenda*. He is a former Member of Parliament. Michael Nassen Smith is Deputy Director of IFAA and Zunaid Moolla is Deputy Editor of *New Agenda*.

The Institute for African Alternatives (IFAA) research team completed a research report in 2017 titled: “South Africa’s Industrial Outreach in Africa: Infrastructure, Industrialisation and Community Development.” Here we share the findings, conclusions and recommendations of this report. This research was commissioned by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA).



FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The infrastructure gap in Africa is large, yet filling it is crucial to economic development. Infrastructural needs vary from country to country and we have highlighted conditions in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique,

2. Mining remains an integral part of the African economy, with infrastructural spend tied to the industry, either directly or indirectly.
3. All countries surveyed in this report suffer from commodity dependence and have economies that are not diversified. This has led to skewed and volatile growth paths.
4. Minerals-based industrialisation is a norm being championed by all

of Africa’s economic institutions and a number of its progressive economists.

5. A lack of coherence and clear policy objectives related to mining and industrial development in the region poses difficulties in realising minerals-based industrialisation.
6. Infrastructure build related to mining has traditionally been enclave and non-developmental. Yet there is growing recognition of the importance of facilitating spatial linkages through the promotion of “shared-use” or “open access”.
7. Although mining can play a transformative role in Africa’s economy, the industry continues to engage in practices that devastate local communities. There is growing acceptance by both the private sector and government, with pressure from local and international NGOs, that mining needs to acquire its licence from the community. This means that the concept of “infrastructure for community development” needs to be added to “infrastructure for industrialisation” to get the ➤



Infrastructure build related to mining has traditionally been enclave and non-developmental.

industry to play a developmental role.

8. South African industrial firms have a growing presence in Africa in general and within the countries surveyed in this research. Both the private sector and South African and African governments have welcomed deeper trade and investment relations. The latter is particularly the case in infrastructural development, with African countries calling on South Africa to participate in filling the infrastructure gap.
9. South African industrial firms are optimistic about the business operations on the continent, but complain about a lack of South African government support.
10. South African mining and related firms are, in principle, committed to localisation, procurement and community development.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Develop a comprehensive picture of Africa's infrastructural challenges from the perspective of business, local governments and communities.
2. Embrace the minerals-based industrialisation agenda and consider funding mining-related infrastructure projects. These projects may become the engines for much-needed economic diversification and the structural

transformation of Africa's economy that can lead to inclusive and sustainable growth.

3. Developmental mining-related infrastructure will require a shift from the "enclave" approach to an "open access" agenda. The DBSA should assist in the conceptualization and development of "shared-use" financing models for mining-related infrastructure.
4. Promote the acceptance of "shared-use" norms on the continent in relation to infrastructure spend in general, and mining-related infrastructure in particular. This can be facilitated through public dialogues and research support. Development finance institutions have not been proactive in promoting shared-use norms in the region.
5. Engage in policy formulation and participate in capacity building at regional and national levels to enforce and support "shared-use" infrastructure plans. This would involve sponsoring research activity to become familiar with the infrastructural landscape in regions and countries and to develop models that enhance the developmental, and not the extractive, dimension of infrastructure projects.
6. Assist with financing potential "shared-use" infrastructure projects in mining-related activities. This



... the industry continues to engage in practices that devastate local communities.

will stimulate industrialisation and development.

7. Contract CSOs to monitor corporate social responsibility initiatives as it relates to mining.
8. Target infrastructure projects that will deepen regional integration for developmental gains
9. Establish closer ties with South African industrial entities to advance a South African Inc. approach to the continent that would be mutually beneficial for partner countries and in alignment with the broader continental industrialisation agenda. This requires understanding the commercial interests of South African industrial firms in Africa and their experiences and challenges.
10. However, any support given to South African firms should consider the developmental implications of their operations. Here the monitoring of South African business in relation to localisation, procurement and community development is vital. Encourage South African mining companies to embrace "shared-use" norms in relation to infrastructure development.
11. In general terms, South African companies should be encouraged to link their commercial interests with a developmental strategy as part of their normal business procedures.

At a broader level, consensus needs to be forged around a people-driven developmental and capable state in Africa. Failure to achieve this is bound to impede Africa's industrialisation and development plans which will increase social and political instability. The DBSA should assist in the diffusion of developmental norms through sponsored research and capacity-building projects in African countries, including South Africa. NA

ONE MILLION CLIMATE JOBS

Alternative Information Development Centre (AIDC) Staff

The AIDC produces and promotes alternative knowledge and analysis to enable popular movements for social, economic and ecological justice to engage with a wide spectrum of organisations of civil society, opinion shapers and policy makers on strategies for sustainable development.

The prospects of changing our methods of production can look extremely bleak if its business as usual unless we come across a vision such as laid out in this article. But it is not merely a vision. It is backed up with solid research on the costs of changing to renewable energy sources and the impact that will have on the living conditions of the poor, job creation, our social relations and our environment.

We have been living through a persisting global economic crisis. A global crisis of climate change is taking place at the same time. A South African reality is a jobs crisis. We need solutions to all three. Urgently.

A new 64-page report by the Alternative Information & Development Centre (AIDC) provides the detail and extensive research showing how this can be done and financed. The focus is on South Africa, but the remedies are broadly replicable across the globe.

NO FALSE CHOICES

The whole world is full of voices saying

there is a stark choice between jobs and action on climate. In South Africa, they tell us to choose between jobs for coal miners and saving the planet.

The either/or choice is misconceived. There are many immediately available alternatives – with (insufficiently recognised) money available to finance them.

These alternatives include:

- (a) A decent public-sector job or monthly government grant for everyone who loses their job because of a shift to renewable energy.
- (b) Monthly government grants for every subsistence farmer who loses their livelihood because of climate change.
- (c) Creating a million jobs by tackling climate change.

THE URGENCY OF CLIMATE CHANGE

This makes meeting these needs urgent. The most serious climate changes include the following:

1. Drought, heat and storms kill – and will increasingly kill – crops. In the economic system we live in, that means famine.
2. Rising sea levels and terrible storms flood and ruin – and will increasingly flood and ruin – many of the world's cities. The recent floods in Johannesburg and Durban and the havoc in Durban Harbour are timely harbingers.

3. Climate change means – and will increasingly mean – economic suffering. The governments who have done nothing about the climate for so long will say we must all sacrifice together to save the Earth. We will sacrifice. The elite will not.
4. Climate change means – and will increasingly mean – hundreds of millions of refugees globally, as they flee droughts, famines, floods and wars. They will increasingly drown in the seas, or walk to borders defended by machine guns.
5. Climate change means – and will increasingly mean – an orgy of racism and xenophobia. On one side of the border, the mass of hungry and homeless; on the other side new racism as justifications for keeping them out. And everywhere, amid chaos and want, governments and the elite will look for scapegoats.
6. Climate change means – and will increasingly mean – war. In Sudan and Kenya, we have seen poor people killing each other for water and grass for their animals. That is only a beginning.

RURAL PEOPLE ON THE FRONT LINE

The recent drought in many parts of the country killed animals and crops; in the Western Cape, the killing >>

continues. This is climate change. Conditions might get better but in the long term, they will get much worse.

But it is not just drought. Temperature increases, on their own, reduce crop yields and pasture grass. This is climate change. Some people do not want to say this to farmers. But farmers and poor people deserve the truth. They have been lied to, and their livelihoods are being taken away. They have every right to be very angry.

Action by rural people is required to force government to give them what they deserve. Monthly government grants – like those paid to pensioners and the disabled – are the first of their needs. And, as climate change bites, poor rural people will need more land, and better land. Land reform is their second requirement.

WE CAN CREATE JOBS

Everywhere, there is the need for jobs. Private companies and the market have created unemployment. A publicly-driven attack on climate change can create a million climate jobs.

Here's how:

- We need to cut emissions from burning coal, oil and gas by 90%. Instead of cutting back on production and consumption – the standard expectations – we can stop burning coal and gas. We can make almost all our electricity from wind and solar power.
- We can provide buses and cars that are comfortable, fast, reliable and cheap. While taking many cars off the roads, we can run cars, buses and trains on renewable electricity, not oil.
- We can insulate houses so they lose less energy. We can heat homes with solar energy. We can build millions of new public houses that are heated and cooled with renewable electricity.
- We can transform industry and agriculture to use less energy.

And to do all this will create at least a million jobs.

Renewable Energy	250,000 jobs
Public Transport	390,000 jobs
Construction	200,000 jobs
Agriculture	100,000 jobs
Waste, Industry and Education	110,000 jobs
TOTAL	1,000,000 jobs

With those jobs, research shows we can cut South Africa's climate-changing emissions by at least 75% in twenty years.

And those jobs could be in South Africa. The wind turbines, solar cells and electric vehicles could be made in factories here. Sometimes, when people talk about renewable energy, they just mean wind farms. But most of the jobs in renewable energy are in making the equipment, not in maintenance. These are factory jobs. They are needed here.

And, all the above is without any mention of water. Yet, tackling the many urgent water-related issues creates both an enormous number of jobs, along with the economic and social benefits of the local industries waiting to be developed.

The following are illustrative

- **WATER LEAKS:** In the midst of the devastating drought that grips various parts of South Africa, precious water is lost to leaks. And lost in enormous quantities. The latest number for documented leaks is: Four hundred and forty four thousand million litres, lost at a huge direct financial cost of R6 799 314 000.00. Fixing leaks is labour intensive involving large numbers of semi-skilled workers.
- **RAINWATER HARVESTING (RWH):** As with water leaks, harvesting rainwater is not rocket science. Imagine if every South African home, structure and building, other than shacks, were obliged, by law,

to collect and store rainwater off roofs. Eighty per cent of South Africa's approximately 10 million houses are formal dwellings. This means that, apart from all the other buildings in the country, some 8 million are available to be considered for RWH. This means a lot of water that would otherwise be wasted. It additionally creates more than sufficient demand to sustain a large growth in the local RWH market. And it means the creation of a large number of jobs.

- **CAPE TOWN AS A WATER CATCHMENT AREA:** Three times more rain falls in this catchment area than is actually used! But most of this huge amount of additional water goes unharvested in a City that faces running out of water in the next few months. Local industries – and jobs – are waiting to catch this huge volume of wasted water.
- **SOLAR WATER HEATERS (SWH):** Apart from the previously mentioned several million households waiting to harvest rainwater, there are the large number of public and private buildings in need of SWHs. Reducing the use of electricity saves huge amounts of water. Water, in colossal amounts, is used in the life-cycle of electricity. Installing SWHs wherever possible can't be done without creating jobs. In large numbers. Moreover, this installation creates more than sufficient local demand for even profit-maximising industries to be attracted.
- **CEILING INSTALLATION.** Houses are still being built, in 2017, without ceilings. This means a huge waste of energy for people needing to make their houses less cold. Saving energy simultaneously means saving water while creating jobs.

DECENT JOBS

Most of the water-related work ought to be the responsibility of the public sector, especially if climate change is viewed as something more important than being a lucrative business opportunity. Being the direct responsibility of the state has additional advantages. Job creation is inherent in tackling climate change. Climate Jobs, however, are also decent jobs. This means Climate Jobs are permanent, relatively well paid, with formal contracts of employment and related benefits. Climate Jobs accordingly invite the large scale insourcing of the outsourced services and jobs that have characterised (partially BEE-driven) public procurement for two decades. The return of Public Works also and equally means a massive reduction in the space open to corruption.

THE MONEY IS AVAILABLE.

We estimate that one million decent jobs will cost the government R346 billion every year. But the government will get two-thirds of that money back.

- Some of the money will go to producing renewable energy for electricity. Companies and people will pay for that electricity. That will raise about R149 billion a year.
- Some of the money will go for public transport, and people will buy tickets. That will raise about R67 billion a year.
- People who did not have a job will be making money. We estimate the government will get back about R85 billion in taxes.

That leaves R112 billion a year for the government still to find. That's a lot of money. But there are many ways they can find it: increased company taxation, taxing high incomes, taxing bond sales, closing tax haven loopholes and prescribing assets. Changes to

the Unemployment Insurance Fund, pension funds and eliminating corruption are still further options.

Almost all these measures rely on taxing corporations and the elite. It is fair to make the elite and the corporations pay to help solve a problem they have created. When the banks are in trouble, governments find the money, however much it takes. When a country goes to war, they find the money, however much it takes. If the Earth was a bank, or at war, the governments of the world would find the money.

TWO POSSIBLE CLIMATE FUTURES

Why should South Africans do this alone? We didn't make this problem. Why not wait for the rest of the world to act?

One answer is that there are campaigns and unions in many other countries fighting for Climate Jobs.

The bigger answer is that there are two possible climate futures for South Africa:

In one future, at least a million people leave the countryside for the cities, food production falls, and the country has trouble feeding itself. A crisis in minerals production and export means that there are fewer jobs in the cities. Much larger numbers of people come south from climate devastation affecting the more rural countries to the north. Some of these climate and economic refugees will be stopped at the border, shot or deported. There will be even worse competition for jobs than there is now. Racism against fellow Africans is already common enough. It will grow much stronger. War and famine will become common in the countries to the North.

There is another possible future. In that future, retrenched workers are either provided with government jobs or grants, and subsistence farmers in South Africa receive grants to replace the crops and animals they lose to climate change.

And this will serve as an inspiring example to the rest of Africa and the world. Millions of rural Africans could stay alive and at home. Such a Climate Jobs strategy offers the prospect of taking advantage of technological change to create large numbers of jobs and livelihoods, whilst at the same time combating climate change, which is already causing suffering, especially for poor people, and threatens far greater suffering.

ONE MILLION CLIMATE JOBS CAMPAIGN

The One Million Climate Jobs campaign is an alliance of unions, environmental organisations, faith and community groups. It was formed in 2011 and remains a core component of the AIDC. Cape Town-based organisations and individuals are welcome to attend monthly Climate Jobs meetings that have been running for almost seven years. The meetings are unique in bringing together academics, researchers, specialist NGOs, trade unions, community groups and the unemployed. [NA](#)

The Climate Jobs book upon which the above article is based – One Million Climate Jobs: Moving South Africa forward on a low carbon, wage-led and sustainable path – is freely available at <http://aidc.org.za/download/climate-change/OMCJ-booklet-AIDC-electronic-version.pdf>. Hard copies of this booklet are available on request from info@aidc.org.za

AIDC will soon be launching a cartoon version of this booklet.

This is an expanded version of an article, under the same title, published in Amandla! Issue 55/56, December 2017

THE INSIDE STORY OF MUGABE'S DOWNFALL

By *MacDonald Dzirutwe, Joe Brock, Ed Cropley*

Amid the confusion and chaos that surrounded the five-day long non-coup that eventually brought Robert Mugabe's decades-long rule to an end, the international media were battling to get the story. This article can now reveal much of what took place behind the scenes.

Inside State House in Harare, Robert Mugabe was in the tightest spot of his 37-year rule. Tanks were on the streets and troops had occupied the state broadcaster, from where the army had announced it had taken control of Zimbabwe.

Mugabe, 93 years old but still alert, remained defiant. The only leader the country had known since independence was refusing to quit.

At a tense meeting with his military top brass on November 16, the world's oldest head of state put his foot down: "Bring me the constitution and tell me what it says," he ordered military chief Constantino Chiwenga, according to two sources present.

An aide brought a copy of the constitution, which lays out that the president is commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Chiwenga, dressed in camouflage fatigues, hesitated before replying that Zimbabwe was facing a national crisis that demanded military intervention.

Mugabe retorted that the army was the problem, according to the sources present. Then the beleaguered president indicated that perhaps they could find a solution together.

The meeting marked the start of an extraordinary five-day standoff between Mugabe and Zimbabwe's



supreme law on one side, and the military, his party and Zimbabwe's people on the other.

The generals wanted Mugabe to go, but they also wanted a peaceful "coup," one that would not irreparably tarnish the administration aiming to take over, according to multiple military and political sources.

The president finally accepted defeat only after he was sacked by his own ZANU-PF party and faced the ignominy of impeachment. He signed a short letter of resignation to parliament speaker Jacob Mudenda

that was read out to lawmakers on November 21.

Mugabe, who had run Zimbabwe since 1980 and overseen its descent into economic ruin while his wife shopped for luxury goods, was gone.

The country erupted into ecstasy. Parliamentarians danced and people poured onto the streets in their tens of thousands to celebrate a political downfall that sent shockwaves across Africa and the world.

To many, the end of Mugabe had been unthinkable only one week before.

Reuters has pieced together the events leading up to Mugabe's removal, showing that the army's action was the culmination of months of planning that stretched from Harare to Johannesburg to Beijing.

BITTER RIVALRY

Drawing on a trove of intelligence documents from within Mugabe's feared Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), Reuters reported in September that the army was backing Emmerson Mnangagwa, then vice president, to succeed Mugabe when the time came.

The report detailed how Mnangagwa, a lifelong friend and former security chief of Mugabe's, might cooperate with Mugabe's political foes in order to revive the economy. It caused furor in Zimbabwe's media and political circles.

Bitter rivalry intensified between Mnangagwa and Grace, Mugabe's 52-year-old wife, who also hoped to take over as president and had the backing of a ZANU-PF faction known as G40.

In early October, Mnangagwa said he had been airlifted to hospital in South Africa after a poisoning attempt in August. He pointed no fingers – but he didn't need to.

Grace's swift response was to deny it and accuse her rival of seeking sympathy; she belittled him as nothing but an employee of her husband, according to a report in the state-run Herald newspaper.

As the pressure built, Mugabe became increasingly paranoid about the loyalty of army chief Chiwenga, a career soldier and decorated veteran of Zimbabwe's 1970s bush-war against white-minority rule.

Mugabe's spies, who permeated every institution and section of society in Zimbabwe, were warning him the military would not accept Grace as president.

"Mugabe is very worried of a coup," one intelligence report, dated



In early October, Mnangagwa said he had been airlifted to hospital in South Africa after a poisoning attempt in August. He pointed no fingers – but he didn't need to.

October 23, said. "Mugabe was openly told by senior CIOs that the military is not going to easily accept the appointment of Grace. He was warned to be ready for civil war."

Reuters reviewed the document, and hundreds of other intelligence reports dating back to 2009, before the coup took place. The documents come from within the CIO, but Reuters could not determine for whom they were written. The CIO is split into factions, some pro- and some anti-Mugabe.

In late October, Mugabe summoned Chiwenga to a showdown, according to another of the documents, dated October 30. It said Mugabe confronted the army chief about his ties to Mnangagwa and told him that going against Grace would cost him his life.

"Chiwenga was warned by Mugabe that it is high time for him to start following. He mentioned to Chiwenga that those fighting his wife are bound to die a painful death," the intelligence report said.

At the same meeting, Mugabe also ordered Chiwenga to pledge allegiance to Grace. He refused.

"Chiwenga refused to be intimidated. He stood his ground over his loyalty to Mnangagwa," the report said.

Reuters put questions about this exchange and other aspects of this article to Mugabe's spokesperson, George Charamba. In an enigmatic text message dated November 23, he replied: "Enjoy Reuters copy. Goodnight."

Two spokesmen for Chiwenga declined to comment.

After another tense meeting with Mugabe on November 5, Chiwenga left Harare on a pre-arranged official trip and traveled to China, which wields significant influence as a major investor in Zimbabwe.

A day later, Mugabe sacked Mnangagwa as vice president and purged him from ZANU-PF, the liberation movement that Mnangagwa had served since his youth and for which, as a young militant caught bombing a train, he had nearly been executed.

For the generals, Mugabe had gone too far. The military immediately activated a "Code Red" alert, its highest level of preparedness, a military source said.

ASSASSINATION PLOT

Moments after Mnangagwa was ousted on November 6, the security details assigned to him and his house were withdrawn, according to a statement he issued later. He was told his life was in danger.

"Security personnel, who are friendly to me, warned me that plans were underfoot to eliminate me once arrested and taken to a police station," Mnangagwa said in a November 21 statement. "It was in my security interest to leave the country immediately."

From Harare, he managed to escape over the border into neighboring Mozambique, where he caught a plane to China, according to one source familiar with his movements. There he met up with Chiwenga, the source said.

Reuters could not confirm the account; but an intelligence report from November 13 indicates that ➤

Mugabe suspected some of his generals of preparing to overthrow him from China.

“A number of generals are now in China ready to plot Mugabe’s ouster with Mnangagwa,” the report said. It was not clear which generals, and whether their travel to China was authorized.

Mugabe’s spies suspected old allies had turned against the aging president. An intelligence report, dated October 30, said Beijing and Moscow both supported regime change out of frustration at Zimbabwe’s economic implosion under Mugabe.

China and Russia are after change,” the report said. “They are after change within ZANU-PF as they are sick and tired of Mugabe’s leadership.”

“The two countries are even ready to clandestinely supply arms of war to Mnangagwa to fight Mugabe.

Neither China’s Defence Ministry nor Foreign Ministry responded to a request for comment. The Foreign Ministry had previously said Chiwenga’s visit was “a normal military exchange mutually agreed upon by China and Zimbabwe.”

Reuters sent written requests for comment to the Kremlin, the Russian Defence Ministry and the Russian Foreign Ministry. None of them responded.

China has long taken an interest in Zimbabwe, having supported Mugabe’s forces during the liberation struggle. After independence it developed connections there in mining, security and construction.

Russia has also had ties to Zimbabwe since the early 1980s, and in 2014 a Russian consortium entered into a partnership to develop a \$3 billion platinum mining project in the country.

Chiwenga’s trip to China culminated in him meeting Chinese Defence Minister Chang Wanquan in Beijing on November 10.

Two sources with knowledge of the talks told Reuters that Chiwenga



Increasingly concerned, Grace put in a call shortly after 7 p.m. to a cabinet minister asking to get WhatsApp and Twitter shut down, according to one source familiar with a recording of the conversation.

asked if China would agree not to interfere if he took temporary control in Zimbabwe to remove Mugabe from power. Chang assured him Beijing would not get involved and the two also discussed tactics that might be employed during the de facto coup, the sources said.

Reuters could not establish whether Mnangagwa met Chang.

Having got wind of the talks in China, Mugabe summoned his still-loyal police commissioner, Augustine Chihuri, and his deputy, Innocent Matibiri, to detain Chiwenga on his return to Harare, government and security sources said.

The pair assembled a squad of 100 police and intelligence agents. But the plot leaked and Chiwenga supporters managed to pull together a counter-team of several hundred special forces soldiers and agents as their commander’s plane approached.

Some were disguised as baggage handlers, their military fatigues and weapons hidden beneath high-visibility jackets and overalls, one security source said.

Realizing they were outnumbered and outgunned, Chihuri’s police team

backed down, allowing Chiwenga to touch down without incident, the security source said.

Mugabe’s spokesman did not comment on the incident.

“VERY ALARMED”

Two days later, Chiwenga and a group of military commanders demanded a meeting with Mugabe at his official State House residence in Harare, an ornate colonial villa complete with stuffed leopards and thick red carpets, according to a government source.

They said they were “very alarmed” at the firing of Mnangagwa and told Mugabe to rein in his wife and her G40 faction, whom they accused of trying to divide the military, according to the government official, who was present at the discussions.

“What do you think should be done?” Mugabe demanded of the soldiers as he sat slumped in an armchair.

The generals asked him to give assurances that they too would not be purged. Mugabe’s response was lukewarm, the government source said. Chiwenga told Mugabe he would be making his concerns about the G40 faction public.

Hours later, Chiwenga summoned reporters to the military’s main barracks near Harare to issue a statement.

“We must remind those behind the current treacherous shenanigans that, when it comes to matters of protecting our revolution, the military will not hesitate to step in,” he said, reading from a prepared text.

The following afternoon, Reuters reported six armoured personnel carriers heading towards the headquarters of Mugabe’s Presidential Guard on the outskirts of Harare. It was unclear whose command they were under.

At the time, the city’s residents were on edge but still unsure what it all meant.

THE LINE WENT DEAD

At around 6 p.m. on November 14, Mugabe's motorcade headed to his private "Blue Roof" residence, a heavily fortified compound in the capital's leafy northern suburb of Borrowdale.

Meanwhile, social media buzzed with pictures of armored vehicles driving along roads to Harare, sparking frenzied speculation about a coup.

Increasingly concerned, Grace put in a call shortly after 7 p.m. to a cabinet minister asking to get WhatsApp and Twitter shut down, according to one source familiar with a recording of the conversation.

The minister, whose identity Reuters is withholding for safety reasons, replied that such a move was the responsibility of state security minister Kembo Mohadi.

"No-one will stand for a coup. It cannot happen," said Grace, commonly referred to as Amai, which means Mother, according to a source who heard the recording.

Mugabe's voice is then heard on the line: "As you have heard from Amai, is there anything that can be done?"

The minister gave the same response, about the responsibilities of state security, and the line went dead, the source said.

Mohadi declined to comment.

Two hours later, two armoured vehicles rolled into the Pockets Hill headquarters of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), according to ZBC sources.

Dozens of soldiers sealed off the site and stormed into the studios where they accosted staff, snatching their phones and halting programmes. State-owned ZBC, widely seen as a mouthpiece for Mugabe, switched to broadcasting pop music videos.

Mugabe's inner circle, nearly all of them G40 loyalists, had no idea what was under way, according to four sources familiar with their conversations.

Information Minister Simon Khaya Moyo called Defence Minister Sydney Sekeramayi to ask if he had any information about a possible coup. Sekeramayi said no, but tried to check with military chief Chiwenga.

Chiwenga told Sekeramayi he would get back to him. According to the sources, Chiwenga never did.

Moyo was in hiding and at the time of writing was unavailable for comment. Sekeramayi declined to comment.

SECURITY DETAIL

As ministers in the G40 faction tried frantically to work out what was going on, Chiwenga's men closed in on Mugabe's compound.

According to a source briefed on the situation, Albert Ngulube, a CIO director and head of Mugabe's security detail, was driving home around 9.30 p.m. after visiting Mugabe. He met an armoured car on Borrowdale Brooke, a side road leading to Mugabe's house.

When Ngulube confronted the soldiers and threatened to shoot them, they beat him up and detained him, the source said. Ngulube was later released, but had suffered head and facial injuries, the source added.



On his release on November 24, he was hospitalised with injuries to his hands, legs and back, his lawyer told Reuters, describing the army's behavior as "brutal and draconian."

Spokesmen for Chiwenga and Mnangagwa declined to comment. Reuters was unable to contact Ngulube.

Other G40 ministers were also picked up by soldiers. Finance minister Ignatius Chombo was found hiding in a toilet at his house and beaten before being detained at an undisclosed location for more than a week.

On his release on November 24, he was hospitalised with injuries to his hands, legs and back, his lawyer told Reuters, describing the army's behavior as "brutal and draconian."

Soldiers used explosives to blow the front door off the house of Jonathan Moyo, the main brains behind G40, according to video footage of the house seen by Reuters. Others burst through the front gates of the residence of local government minister Saviour Kasukuwere, another key Grace supporter.

Both men managed to escape to Mugabe's residence. Contacted by Reuters shortly after midnight in the early hours of November 15, Kasukuwere was audibly stressed. "I can't talk. I'm in a meeting," he said, before hanging up.

For another week, Mugabe clung on to the presidency as Chiwenga and his forces tried to engineer a peaceful, and quasi-legal, exit for the long-serving leader.

But as parliament began impeachment proceedings on November 21, Mugabe finally gave up. After 37 years in control, during which much of his country fell into poverty, his letter of resignation said he was stepping down out of "concern for the welfare of the people of Zimbabwe."

Reported by MacDonald Dzirutwe, Joe Brock and Ed Copley; Additional reporting by Cris Chinaka in HARARE, Michael Martina in BEIJING and Jack Stubbs in MOSCOW; Editing by Richard Woods and Mike Collett-White. This article first appeared on Reuters website on 26 November 2017. NA

Trajectories of Accumulation: How neoliberal primitive accumulation is planting the seeds of suicide

By Issa G. Shivji

Prof Shivji was a distinguished professor in constitutional law in the University of Dar es Salaam's Faculty of Law for 36 years, has taught and worked in universities all over the world, written numerous articles and books, and has also produced a weekly column printed in national newspapers. He is a well-known legal scholar and Africanist, and has devoted most of his life to addressing issues regarding the exploitation of Tanzanians through both national and international economic and legal policies and orders.



Issa G. Shivji

The disparity we see between workers and owners, between rural and urban areas and between colonised and metropolitan countries is the result of a process of unequal exchange that goes back several centuries. Prof Shivji traces the wretched path of

expropriation that has shaped social and economic relations over this period and up to the present with a grim warning of how this mode of exchange threatens the very source of life on earth: the seeds we use to grow our food.

THEORETICAL BASICS

Accumulation lies at the heart of the capitalist production process. As the old man Marx said: "Accumulate, accumulate! This is Moses and the Prophets." Accumulation at once gives us the two poles of the capitalist mode of production. At one end lie the production, appropriation and expropriation of surplus labour and at the other lies accumulation. I use the words "expropriation" and "appropriation" as distinct concepts and not interchangeable terms. By expropriation, I mean

seizing of surplus labour without the appearance of equivalent exchange. In appropriation, the transfer of surplus is mediated through equivalent exchange. At the accumulation pole, we get two forms of accumulation corresponding to two forms of transfer of surplus – i.e. primitive accumulation (PA) corresponding to 'expropriation' and accumulation by expanded reproduction (EA) corresponding to 'appropriation'.

In between the two poles of 'accumulation' and 'expropriation/appropriation' lie various kinds of mediations – market, state, force, volition etc – and forms and factions of capital – merchant capital, state capital, rentier capital, financial capital etc. These in-betweens are historically and contextually specific. The character of accumulation and the form of expropriation/appropriation is also of course historically and socially specific. It is precisely the investigation of these specificities that allow us to characterise and understand social formations and help us to answer the big questions: Who produces surplus?

Who appropriates it? What happens to the surplus so appropriated? These are the big questions that underlie politics and express themselves in social/class struggles filtering through multiple layers of mediations – ideological, religious, cultural, etc etc.

Now my main thesis is – and I am not the first one to propose it – that PA and EA exist side by side and in contestation. For Marx, PA was the original state of accumulation by downright robbing – whether through enclosures in the centre or robbing of people and treasures of the periphery. Rosa Luxemburg extended this and argued that a non-capitalist periphery is essential for the capitalist centre to function and to reproduce itself. More recently, David Harvey is credited with reinventing Rosa Luxemburg. He wasn't the first one – some scholars in the South discussed this long before him but as the division and hierarchy of knowledge production goes, they have disappeared from the radar of dominant scholarship. But I think it is useful to bring back the concept of PA to explain and understand the trajectory of accumulation – especially in the periphery, more so in Africa – and its extreme polarising effect on society.

My argument is that the overarching characteristic of PA is that it cuts into necessary consumption of the producer. This is the argument I applied in my article on the exploitation of small peasants in the 1980s (see Shivji, Issa G. 1987. *The Roots of the Agrarian Crisis in Tanzania: A Theoretical Perspective*. Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review 3(2):111-134.)

So even though the productivity of small peasants is low, he/she still yields surplus to capital. Peasant exploitation by capital is predicated on super-exploitation and this is possible because the peasant exerts a super-human effort while living sub-human life.

Let me quickly cover in a few strokes the historicising of accumulation and

then focus on the application of this under the current neo-liberal phase of capitalism.

HISTORICISING ACCUMULATION

The Long Durée

For five centuries of encounter between European capital and African labour, the process of accumulation was dominantly PA. And the methods were classical. Robbing of human beings on the west coast – the ignominious Atlantic slave trade and the looting of ivory, gold etc on the East Coast, in the process destroying city-states of the Swahili civilisation – Mombasa, Malindi, Mogadishu, Kilwa, etc. Starting with the landing of two high seas pirates – euphemistically called explorers – Christopher Columbus on San Domingo in 1492 and Vasco Da Gama who rounded the Cape in 1497-98 and bombarding of the Kilwa city-state.

Under Colonialism

Under colonialism the dominant form of accumulation was PA – initially robbing indigenous people of their land and then establishing the labour system, the so-called migrant system of labour – in both peasant-plantations and settler colonies. (In Tanzania it was called *manamba* – the Swahili plural of *namba* – number – because the labour recruited by recruiting agencies were identified by number, not by name.) The migrant labour system is a classical illustration of how the system of exploitation based on cutting into necessary consumption operated in practice. First, much of the fertile land was alienated to settlers, for example, in Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa. This had a double purpose, first to create labour reservoirs to supply “cheap labour” and second, to ward off competition from small peasants. In a country like Tanganyika, as it was

called then, labour was recruited from labour reservoir areas to employment areas. The labour was bachelor labour. It was paid very little cash wage and a carefully computed food ration just to keep body and soul together (a *kibaba* of *dona* – coarse corn flour, a couple of ounces of salt, a couple of green chilies to supply vitamin A, perhaps half a pound of meat every month, etc.). Back home, the women became food-growing peasants to take care of the family – thus subsidizing capital. So at both ends, exploitation was by cutting into necessary consumption. The woman was peasantised while the man was semi-proletarianised.

This system operated across countries and within countries. This form of PA robbed the producer of the very sustenance of life – where starvation in both senses of calorie deficiency and malnutrition existed side by side. (Monoculture economies destroyed the variety of nutritious foods originally cultivated by peasants. When cotton was introduced in Sukumaland of Tanzania in the 1950s, for example, peasants shifted to cultivating cassava as a food crop which required less labour since much of the labour was deployed to grow the cash crop.) Another effect of the division of labour reservoirs and employment areas was extreme uneven development which in the post-colonial period supplied the material basis for regionalism and ethnic grievances.

The Post-Colonial Nationalist Phase

With independence, the three EA countries adopted what they called a high wage economy, abolished the migrant system and embarked on some kind of import-substitution industrialisation. My argument is that in fact during this nationalist period the idea was to make EA dominant in which labour power would be bought >>>

– theoretically at least – at its value, that is sufficient for its reproduction. This was done through raising monetary wages but also by adopting various welfare measures – free health, education, water, sanitation, old age benefits etc – thus augmenting the social wage. But the tension between EA and PA continued – and EA failed to develop fully fledged capitalism. In South Africa you would perhaps have to modify this narrative but I believe even here PA plays a very significant role – capitalist enclaves in fact of monopoly capital – notwithstanding. With neo-liberal reforms through Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) etc. PA is reinstalled.

New forms of primitive accumulation under neoliberalism

First, sale of public assets at fire-sale prices to corporate capital was a new kind of PA. For example, in Tanzania the state-owned National Bank of Commerce (NBC) was privatised to ABSA at a very low price – some \$15 million – which was lower than the value of real estate owned by NBC. NBC branches are all over the country. When Tanzania Breweries was privatised to South African Breweries (SAB), it came with prime urban lands and barley farms in Kilimanjaro. SAB sold one of their prime plots to Shoprite – I’m sure at a handsome price. TBL’s popular trade marks such as Safari beer were vested in a sister SAB company based in Geneva to which TBL paid royalties!

Second, under the argument of attracting investment, the state made a lot of concessions which in effect meant that the working people collectively through the state were subsidising capital and their own exploitation. When sisal estates were privatised in Tanzania, the state, which owns land, charged ridiculously low rents – in effect the landlord (the state) was ceding its right to rent to capital. Mining contracts were

typically extremely one-sided with outrageous provisions like the state binding itself not to make changes in law unfavourable to mining companies – in effect a sovereign parliament abdicating its sovereign law-making powers and the terms of a private contract overriding state legislation.

Three, privatisation and commodification of social and public goods. Education, medical care, water, energy, ecology, bio resources, etc – are all turned into commodities and have to be paid for. First, this almost abolished the social wage component in the remuneration of labour and second, created new sites of accumulation – PA – for capital. Outsourcing of services has a similar effect – whether this is outsourcing of cleaning of government buildings and offices or outsourcing of restructuring of government procedures, etc. Very soon we would be outsourcing prison services – as happens in the US – and, maybe, even outsource the civil service since it is considered inefficient and corrupt. Outsourcing has the added political effect of destroying trade unions and class solidarity of the working classes. The working site is separated from the employment site. The worker does not belong to the site where he/she works. To give one example: outsourcing of the cleaning and catering staff at universities, for example, destroyed the potential of building camaraderie and solidarity between workers and militant students.

Fourth, the whole range of financialisation in which money makes more money without even passing through the phase of producing a commodity – M (money-capital) – C (raw materials, machinery, labour power) – M’ (more money – M’ being greater than M). Now you have M-M’, that is you make more money from money without even producing any tangible commodity. This is what the dominant economic discourse recognises as the disjuncture between

the financial economy and the real economy. To cite one example: the commodification and privatisation of public/sovereign debts with far-reaching impact under which public debt is sold at a discount to a private entity. This is killing two birds with one stone. First, a new source for capital to reap profits, and second, remove political pressure on the states of the centre by the indebted states of the periphery. You may threaten a debt-cartel of the indebted states against the states or financial institutions of the centre and, at least, politically shame them, but how do you form a cartel against your disparate private creditors whom you may not even know until they come to enforce payment of the debt. You can shame the state but you can’t shame the faceless market.

Fifth, commodification of land – what Karl Polanyi long ago called an artificial commodity – is age-old but now it has moved to seeds. As seeds are commodified and production of seeds gets monopolised by corporate capital, it can cause havoc for small producers. Besides creating seed dependency, it becomes the means of extracting even more surplus from the peasant producer. India has been witnessing hundreds of thousands of suicides of indebted farmers who fail to repay their debts. God forbid, we end up in Africa with farmers committing suicides because they cannot afford to purchase seeds for the subsequent cycle. Nor can they save seeds from the existing crop because the second generation corporate (particularly genetically modified) seeds are terminator seeds, meaning they are sterile and cannot be used again. In fact, they are called suicide seeds.

We should be able to link our research with the larger framework if they are to yield insights on how to move forward politically.

The article is a talk that was given by the author to a PLAAS seminar at the UWC on 27 September 2017. NA

NOTES FROM ACROSS AFRICA

By Zimpande Kawanu

The writer is a former intern of the Institute for African Alternatives (IFAA) who now works for the Mandela Rhodes Foundation.



Zimpande Kawanu

Notes from Across Africa is a new column introduced by IFAA with the intention of keeping readers up to date on news from our continent. It will summarise a series of high points and events, most of which do not normally reach the public domain. New Agenda: South African Journal of Social and Economic Policy aims to publish these updates from Africa regularly. Contributions from readers will be considered for inclusion and publication.

ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA

The United Nation Commission for Africa (UNECA) reported in its 2017 Economic Report on Africa¹ that the world's emerging markets and developing economies have recorded subdued global trends, broadly owing to diminishing investment, low commodity prices, contracting trade, weak demand and rising inflation. This is framed within the global decrease of economic growth from 2.5 per cent in 2015 to 2.3 per cent in 2016, which reflects the decrease in households' final consumption growth as well as the decline in gross fixed capital formation (investment) growth. Focusing on particular regions, the report shows a precipitous growth slip in China (from 6.9 per cent in 2015 to 6.4 per cent in 2016), the Russian federation (from 3.7 per cent to 1.9 per cent) and Brazil (3.8 per cent to 3.4 per cent).

The levels of growth decline in Africa, 1.7 per cent in 2016 from 3.7 per cent in 2015, falls below the global rate (2.3 per cent) as well as the rates recorded in other developing regions. This arises from the broad weak global economic conditions, low oil and commodity prices and environmental contingencies such as drought. Ultimately, this follows from the gradual decline in commodity prices since 2014 which has created inflationary pressures. The UNECA report suggests that African countries adopt a counter-cyclical fiscal stance

(which means adopting an opposite approach: reducing spending and raising taxes during a boom period, and increasing spending and cutting taxes during a recession).

As from 2013, East African growth was the fastest on the continent, primarily driven by Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania. Public spending on infrastructure was the primary contributor of Ethiopian growth. Similarly in Kenya investment in infrastructure and continued household consumption drove the expansion. Rwanda saw its expansion from agriculture (despite the low commodity prices especially of tea and coffee) and the service industry. In Tanzania domestic demand and its continued growth services and manufacturing sectors were the key growth drivers in 2016.

West Africa recorded a sharp decline from 4.4 per cent in 2015 to 0.1 per cent in 2016, displacing Southern Africa as the slowest growing region. The report shows that this has been a consequence of the economic contraction in Nigeria, owing to depressed oil prices, falling oil production, energy shortages and price hikes, scarcity of foreign exchange and depressed consumer demand. However, Senegal and Ivory Coast performed better in this subregion, respectively registering growth of 6.3 per cent and 8.0 per cent. The UNECA report, in the case of Senegal, lists high private and public investment, specifically in energy, infrastructure, agriculture, fisheries, tourism, textiles, >>

information technology and mining as the catalyst for growth (despite the routine power shortages). As for Ivory Coast, there were increases in investment and infrastructure spending in transport and energy.

Southern Africa saw a drop from 2.5 per cent in 2015 to 1.0 per cent in 2016, of which the decelerating growth came mainly from South Africa and Angola. South Africa, being the region's largest economy, was beleaguered by low commodity prices, drought, load shedding, weak financial conditions and low business and consumer confidence.

Central Africa showed a moderate drop from 3.4 per cent in 2015 to 2.4 per cent in 2016. Cameroon's growth slipped (5.3 per cent) as a result of the fall in oil output and prices. Similarly, Gabon (3.2 per cent) and Guinea were affected by the low oil prices. North Africa registered a decline of 2.6 per cent in 2016 from 3.6 per cent in 2015. Morocco's agriculture sector was affected by drought, and spilt over into reduced private consumption and government spending. Algeria suffered from the low oil prices and Egypt saw a decline in foreign currency earnings due to a weakening tourism industry.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SMUGGLING IN LIBYA

Hundreds of African immigrants passing through Libya are allegedly being bought and sold in slave markets. These immigrants travel to Libya's coast, aiming to cross the Mediterranean into Europe, a route that has been described as the deadliest on earth. An intervention has ensued as Libya's UN-backed government has opened an investigation into the phenomenon.

Libya has long been used as a gateway by African refugees on their trek to Europe, and through this journey they have been prey to exploitation, abuse and now, trafficking. This gateway is reported

to have had at least 150,000 people attempting to cross it each year in the past three years. These immigrants, having fled war, poverty and economic hardships, travel across the desert under the guidance of smugglers. They arrive in Libya to find no receiving registration processes, and thus are open to exploitation.

Mahmoud Abdelwahed of Aljazeera, reporting from a detention camp in Tripoli, attributes the increasing human trafficking and smuggling to the collapse of the financial sector and the insecurity in Libya. In these desperate situations, that are often unsupervised, many refugees are subject to torture, rape and forced labour.

Leonard Doyle from the International Organisation for Immigration reports that people are being peddled for about \$400 per head. He says upon arriving in Libya the immigrants are robbed of their possessions, tortured and sold in public auctions by the smugglers. Women, who may be put to work in the sex trade, fetch more than the \$400 that a labouring man is valued at.

MNAGAGWA SWORN IN

Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was sacked as Vice President by Mugabe, was sworn in as the president of Zimbabwe on 24 November and has promised elections this year. Mnangagwa had fled to South Africa after his dismissal on 6 November.

Despite the overwhelming euphoria and celebrations, many Zimbabweans have continued to make their demands for employment, the stabilisation of the economy and the ending of corruption. There is hope that this change will be the catalyst for much-needed reform but many would be justified in asking to what degree this change in Zimbabwe should be considered revolutionary, as Mnangagwa and the army had backed Mugabe and been part and parcel of his tumultuous rule for 37 years.

The 75 year old Mnangagwa's political career shows him to have been mentored by Mugabe, and has occupied a number of roles in the ZANU-PF government, including minister of justice, minister of state security, chief election agent and vice president. Despite the overwhelming optimism, the newly sworn in president's credentials show him to be a part of the old guard.

DRC

The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) in the Democratic Republic of Congo has set a date for the presidential elections. These are due to be held on 23 December 2018, meaning that Joseph Kabila will remain at the helm for another 14 months. This information was released soon after US ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, visited DRC and made a public statement recommending that elections take place by the end of December 2018.

The original elections had been set to take place in November 2016. CENI stated that the delay is a result of violence as well as logistical setbacks. Kabila has had a 16-year reign, having taken power after his father's assassination in 2001, and was formally elected in 2006 and 2011. The constitution dictates that he cannot run for a third term.

Public sentiment has expressed anger at his apparent reluctance to step down. After CENI's announcement, oppositional leader Felix Tshisekedi and the activist group, Fight for Change (LUCHA), pleaded for peaceful public protests. Previous violence involving the militia has resulted in deaths, especially in the Southern Kasai region..

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<https://www.uneca.org/publications/economic-report-africa-2017>

FOOTNOTE

1. UNECA: Economic Report on Africa 2017, <https://www.uneca.org/publications/economic-report-africa-2017> 

The Employment Intensity of Output Growth: A Comparison of BRICS Countries

By Dr Njabulo Mkhize

The writer is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics at UNISA



Dr Njabulo Mkhize

The relationship between growth, productivity and employment is not always as plain as we would like to think. In this comparative analysis of employment in the BRICS countries, the writer shows how different sectors in a country perform with regard to job creation: some sectors show growth but fewer jobs are created while others record both growth and an increase

in employment. He explains these differences according to “employment elasticities” – the percentage change in employment that results from the degree of capital or labour intensive production and how this affects productivity in different sectors.

INTRODUCTION

A number of studies have investigated and analysed the empirical relationship between economic growth and employment. Most of these studies are a response to the immediate challenge of employment creation faced by a number of countries. In these countries, it seems that growth, generally regarded as the creator of employment, is not able to create adequate employment opportunities for the growing unemployed population. Therefore, both growth and employment creation have become imperatives that resonate in most countries today. Following the aftermath of the 2008/09 financial crisis, a number of countries have been faced with the challenge of strengthening

their weak recoveries and creating more jobs. There is a further recognition that even in countries that have experienced exceptionally high rates of economic growth, employment creation has declined. The reasons for this phenomenon are still not fully understood. These facts suggest that there is a strong need to better understand the employment-growth relationship.

During the past two decades Brazil, Russia, India, China and ➤

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Despite the declining employment levels, production in the agricultural sector continues to serve as the backbone of Brazil’s economy, with approximately 70 per cent of the country’s land being suitable for cultivation.



The economic transition achieved by Russia, from a command to a more market-oriented economy, resulted in vast regional differences in growth rates.

South Africa (the BRICS countries) have become important players in the globalisation process. Although some regard them as a highly heterogeneous group of countries with different sizes, populations and weight in the global economy, these countries enjoyed long and sustainable growth paths from 1990 to 2008, with the exception of South Africa.

The discussion below examines some of the BRICS country-specific estimates of employment elasticities for the main economic sectors, i.e. agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, wholesale trade and transport. However, India is excluded due to the lack of available data on employment and growth per sector. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to give a comprehensive review of the sectoral employment intensity of growth trends since the early 2000s in Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa, highlighting the periods during which these countries initiated important reforms that affected employment. In this light, it further examines the effectiveness of labour market and macroeconomic policies supporting sustainable employment creation.

BRAZIL

During the early 1990s, the Brazilian economy experienced a number of socio-economic transitions marked by significant macroeconomic reforms and a number of global and regional financial crises. One of these reforms was aimed at fighting hyperinflation, which only managed to stabilise in the mid-1990s at around 8% per annum (OECD, 2010).

Like most BRICS countries, the main challenge for Brazil has been to increase employment rapidly enough to cope with the high rates of growth in the labour force.

In Brazil there were three instances of negative employment elasticity or jobless growth. These were in the agricultural sector (-0.51), mining sector (-7.03) and construction sector (-8.05). The negative employment elasticity in the agricultural sector can be associated with structural changes away from agriculture into the services sector, as the country experienced a decline in employment in agriculture, despite positive growth in agriculture value-added. The economic reforms that were initiated in the 1990s were aimed at achieving greater economic stability by shifting labour from low productivity agriculture to the higher productivity industry and services sectors (OECD, 2010). Despite the declining employment levels, production in the agricultural sector continues to serve as the backbone of Brazil's economy, with approximately 70% of the country's land being suitable for cultivation. The production of sugarcane, for instance, increased from about 390 million tons in 2003 to more than 690 million tons in 2008.

In the mining sector, the relatively low employment elasticities and high value-added growth rates between 1999 and 2005 indicate that value-added growth has been driven more by gains in productivity than gains in employment. Although this sector employs fewer workers than in

agriculture, technological advances have greatly increased its productivity over time. The manufacturing sector, being the third largest employment sector, accounted for more than 13 million workers in 2007, from 10.6 million workers in 2002 (OECD, 2010). This sector contributed more than 13% to GDP in 2008 (Central Bank of Brazil, 2010). Although it was perceived as an important sector in terms of employment, the low employment elasticities, together with high value-added growth rates, particularly between 2002 and 2008, also indicate that Brazil experienced robust growth in labour productivity in manufacturing during this period.

In the construction sector, negative employment elasticity accompanied negative growth in value-added output between 1999 and 2002, implies that the falling employment could be attributed to a decline in output growth. However, 2002 to 2005 saw a gradual increase in value-added growth, together with a slight recovery in employment. In the most recent period, between 2005 and 2008, sector output grew by over 18% and the employment elasticity of 0.71% was high enough to translate into employment gains by the sector.

RUSSIA

The economic transition achieved by Russia, from a command to a more market-oriented economy, resulted in vast regional differences in growth rates. Between 1993 and 1997, annual average growth rates in real per capita income across the different regions ranged from -9.0 to 15.7% (Berkowitz and DeJong, 2001). A number of regions maintained barriers against inter-regional trade and opposed the adoption of economic reforms (Berkowitz and DeJong, 1999).

A weak response in the dynamics of employment to changes in output is an important feature of the Russian labour market. This legacy of low labour

elasticity was mainly responsible for the slow absorption of excess labour in post-Soviet Russia (Wolnicki, 2006). A number of studies on firms in transition economies have found low employment elasticity in the initial stages of the transformation process.

Despite a dramatic growth in value-added output in most sectors, the low employment elasticities are indicative of firms' failure to adjust employment levels commensurate with increases in sector output. During the period 1999 to 2002, the negative employment elasticity of -0.73, combined with high value-added growth rates of 28.1 in the agricultural sector, showed clearly how this sector experienced jobless growth alongside robust productivity gains. According to Linz (1998), the unsustainably low employment elasticities in Russia's manufacturing sector were as a result of inherited socialist production and employment patterns. The elasticity coefficient was found to be very low compared to other transition economies at a similar stage in the transformation process.

CHINA

China has enjoyed a long period of sustained economic growth since the late 1970s. Since 1978, when it began to



As with other BRICS countries, China's challenge has been to increase employment fast enough to cope with the high growth rate in the labour force.

implement its major macroeconomic reforms, real GDP growth has averaged around 11% per annum. From 1990 to 2008, China recorded an impressive economic performance, with its share of total world GDP increasing from 1.6% in 1990 to 7.1% in 2008, outperforming some of the G-7 countries such as Canada, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (World Bank, 2012). As with other BRICS countries, China's challenge has been to increase employment fast enough to cope with the high growth rate in the labour force.

Examining the historical sectoral employment elasticities, together with value-added growth rates, can be a useful indicator for measuring structural economic changes and labour market compositions. During the period from 1999 to 2008, the agricultural sector realised very low negative employment elasticities and rapid value-added growth rates. The negative employment elasticities, combined with high value-added growth rates, imply that the agricultural sector experienced a decline in the employment intensity of output growth and robust productivity growth. Because of the rapid urbanisation process, labour migration led to an expansion of low labour cost non-agricultural sectors, while increasing productivity in the agricultural sector.

The manufacturing sector showed a tremendous increase in value-added growth, coupled with positive yet very low employment elasticities during the entire period under review. In other words, in spite of the large influx of low-skilled labour surpluses from rural areas, growth in manufacturing has also resulted mainly from labour productivity growth, rather than employment growth. In fact, according to Ghose (2005), during the initial periods of labour productivity gains in manufacturing, particularly from 1996 to 2002, manufacturing employment declined at a rate of more than 3% per annum, while growth in



... the acceleration in migration of rural surplus workers as well as the process of rapid technological change in industry, have led to increased labour productivity growth and the worsening of employment conditions in urban China.

labour productivity was nearly 12% per annum. This suggests that the low employment effect of growth in the manufacturing sector was largely due to a rapid technological change involving a significant increase in the capital and skill intensity of output.

A similar pattern is also evident in all other sectors (i.e. construction, wholesale and transport), as these also show positive but low employment elasticities and high value-added growth rates. Given the effects of transformation from a dual economy to an industrialised country, multiple factors, such as the acceleration in migration of rural surplus workers as well as the process of rapid technological change in industry, have led to increased labour productivity growth and the worsening of employment conditions in urban China.

SOUTH AFRICA

Previous studies on employment and growth in South Africa have ➤

taken several forms. Some of these studies have adopted a narrative (or qualitative) approach (Nattrass, 1998; Loots, 1998; Mahadea, 2003; Strydom, 1996; Hofmeyer, 1996; Abedian and Schneier, 1987; Kingdon and Knight, 2005; Altman, 2008). Others have adopted a more quantitative and statistics-based methodology (Mahadea and Simson, 2010; Hodge, 2009; Bhorat and Oosthuizen, 2008; Simkins, 1977; Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 1998).

Within the construction sector it is clear that this sector experienced diverse employment outcomes. Between 1999 and 2005, the employment elasticity reflects the sector's very poor employment generation. This sector experienced employment losses, largely due to the contraction in activity with regard to residential construction, as financing costs increased and the weak housing market translated into fewer building plans being approved (SARB, 1999). During the period 2005 to 2008, the sector witnessed accelerated value-added growth rates alongside an increase in employment intensity. The recovery of employment performance



... South Africa has increasingly specialised in capital-intensive products, after having shifted production in favour of capital-intensive sectors to the detriment of labour-intensive ones.

was evidenced by the large number of jobs that were created as non-residential building activity countered the depressed situation in residential building activity (SARB, 2008).

The finance sector shows an almost opposite pattern to those of the construction sector. The employment elasticity values in the finance sector exceeded those in the construction sector during the initial periods. The sector experienced overall increases in value-added growth ranging between 3.23 and 7.65% throughout the entire period under review. During these four periods, growth in the finance sector averaged 5.6% per annum, thereby making a substantial contribution to real gross domestic production.

This is the largest and fastest growing segment of the South African economy (Altman, 2006). According to O'Connell (1999), developed economies that have succeeded in dealing with the challenge of high unemployment have relied on the expansion of high-value services such as finance, business and professional services. This is indicative of the sectoral shift that characterised the output structure of the South African economy from primary and secondary sector activities to tertiary sector activities (Bhorat and Oosthuizen, 2008). This dispels the concerns that the South African economy is overly resource-based.

Manufacturing has experienced low and declining employment elasticities. The issue of low employment elasticity amplifies the significance of the intensification of the changing structure of the economy, which is shifting away from both the primary and secondary sectors towards tertiary or service-based output. Between 2002 and 2005, value-added growth in the manufacturing sector declined from 3.66 to 3.10%, before rebounding to 5.13% during the period 2005 to 2008. The decline in manufacturing output growth between 2002 and 2005 coupled



... sectors that experience favourable economic conditions and increased output are more likely to create jobs than sectors that face less favourable economic conditions and falling output.

with an increase in employment elasticity of 0.18, implies that this sector experienced low productivity growth in this period. Also, it is important to note that even though the sector maintained positive value-added growth during the periods 1999-2002; 2005-2008 and 2008-2012, employment elasticity remained negative. This reinforces the fact that South Africa has increasingly specialised in capital-intensive products, after having shifted production in favour of capital-intensive sectors to the detriment of labour-intensive ones (Samson et al., 2001).

Based on the above discussion, it is clear that the response of employment generation to changes in value-added growth has been fairly heterogeneous across sectors. Changes in the level of employment creation could be related to general and sector-specific factors prevalent during a given period (Oosthuizen and Bhorat, 2004). Therefore, sectors that experience favourable economic conditions and increased output are more likely to create jobs than sectors that face less favourable economic conditions and falling output.



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Most studies that have investigated the empirical relationship between employment and growth are based on estimates of the output elasticity of employment. While some of these studies were a response to the immediate challenge of employment creation, others were aimed at addressing fears regarding reforms that may have weakened or even eliminated the positive correlation between growth and employment.

The employment elasticity trends among the BRICS countries have been heterogeneous across sectors, reflecting country-specific factors, such as the labour market structure and composition, as well as labour market regulations and policies.

In South Africa, the differences in employment elasticity outcomes identified in the studies reviewed shed some light on the country's production. The low and deteriorating employment elasticity reported by most studies indicate that production may have shifted in favour of capital-intensive sectors, to the detriment of

labour-intensive ones. Other studies were able to show that the challenge of joblessness in South Africa, was attributed to factors such as the comparatively weak long-term growth, globalisation and labour legislation, crime and corruption, as well as increasing capital intensity.

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Corruption has been a defining characteristic of ANC governance, whether it be serious allegations levied at the President or the annual Auditor General's findings of mismanagement of funds in our municipalities. State coffers have been looted at the same time as rampant service delivery protests took place and as students mobilised against the high cost of tertiary education. It is in the context of this dysfunctional order that Dale McKinley writes his critique of the ANC in power.

McKinley's book relies on two rhetorical devices; "the House metaphor" and a multi-faceted definition of "corporatisation". In the House metaphor, South Africa is described as being a house built on foundations of systemic racism, inequality and political oppression. The National Party (NP) became the political landlords in 1948. After years of struggle, the ANC won political control of the house and made cosmetic changes without attending to the fragile foundation. McKinley explains this period of the political transition as the ANC having corporatised the liberation project.

McKinley identifies this corporatisation as not being a recent phenomena but rather one that dates back to ANC's early days as a liberation movement. One example is the early ANC advocating for the inclusion of "civilised blacks" into higher echelons of the British Colony. This, along with a litany of quotes from individual leaders and official party documents, show an ANC who's primary concern was not dismantling capitalism but rather installing a "de-racialised capitalism". Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) followed by Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) are but the most prominent examples of the ANC's commitment to de-racialised capitalism. Its policies in general have served the interests of various factions

"South Africa's Corporatised Liberation: A Critical Analysis of the ANC in Power"

Dale McKinley

Jacana Media: Auckland Park, 2017. 198pp

Reviewed by Rekang Jankie (Institute for African Alternatives)

of capital, with the specific faction being context dependant.

For McKinley, the ANC's corporatisation is further exemplified by the party's structures. Its top down approach to governance strips it of any semblance of institutional democracy. McKinley sees this as a consequence of a vanguardist approach adopted by the party. The Party policy formulations are the clearest example of this authoritarian streak.

Among the worst of its policies flowing from the corporatised ideology of the past 23 years is the adoption of the GEAR strategy (Growth, Employment and Redistribution). The MERG (Macro-Economic Research Group) proposals and the ANC's own Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP), were thrown out without consultation. In their place, the ANC top brass, led by Mbeki, offered GEAR as a non-negotiable policy. GEAR was essentially a self-imposed structural adjustment program. This and many other decisions made by the ANC are to McKinley a manifestation of the ANC's Corporatised Liberation. The policy was adopted as though the ANC was a corporation with virtually no input from below and primarily serving the interests of various factions of capital.


The book is a valuable resource for anyone seeking a better understanding of the ANC in power. Every level of


government, from the local sphere all the way to the presidency are effectively assessed in line with the framework of corporatisation that McKinley offers. The book is well researched and written in an accessible language. McKinley does not limit himself to critical analysis but also offers a number of alternatives to the status quo, particularly in his advocacy of participatory democracy as an alternative to the ANC's

centralisation of power.

However, it does seem unreasonable to frame a seemingly consistent party position of "corporatisation" as a sell-out when the party acts in accordance with it when it finally assumes power. This is true whether it be in the case of pro-capital policy or the centralisation of power within the party. The line of

criticism would more be more accurate when referring to the ANC's alliance partners the SACP and COSATU. The cases where the SACP's undemocratic characteristics are highlighted or the inconsistencies in Trade Unions purportedly being anti-capitalist but playing the stock market to the benefit of senior leadership and many other critiques of the left in the alliance are some of the strongest aspects of the book. Such critiques of the 'left' in the alliance should open the eyes of many of us who look to these organisations for direction. McKinley deserves praise for developing this perspective. [NA](#)





Michael Gove, the Tory politician, declared during the Brexit referendum campaign that the British people had had enough of ‘experts’, by which he meant the economists who were predicting the disastrous consequences of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union. Gove was widely mocked at the time, and the present disastrous course of the Brexit negotiations suggests that, ultimately, the economists will have the last laugh, even though the damage awaiting the British economy will be far from a laughing matter. Even so, the thrust of John Rapley’s argument in *Twilight of the Money Gods* is that, however dishonest Gove may have been about the consequences of Brexit, he was right to query the credentials of economics as a discipline and the status of economists as prophetic seers. Under modern capitalism, he argues, economics has replaced religion and economists have become its priests. Yet rather than leading us to the promised land, they have led us down the garden path.

Twilight takes us on a fascinating journey through the history of

Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion and How it all went wrong

John Rapley.

London; New York; Sydney; Toronto; New Delhi: Simon and Schuster. 2017.

Professor Roger Southall (Department of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand)

economic thought. It’s a tour which, starting from Adam Smith and David Ricardo, takes us through the ideas of the ‘radical prophets’ such as Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin; their neo-classical critics who rejected their worldly apocalypse; the crisis in faith caused by the Great Depression which yielded



This ‘enlightenment’ allowed humans to feel they had more control over their lives. As a result, they ascribed to economists the powers that they had previously left to the gods. Economists then helped us to seemingly build a heaven on earth, a cornucopia of consumption, new inventions and new delights.

the new testament of John Maynard Keynes; and then the neo-classical reawakening led by Milton Friedman and Francis Hayek. He manages this in a remarkable manner, carefully spelling out the key ideas of the numerous (often obscure) economists he mentions, relating these to the problems and controversies of their age, and doing so in a manner that is fully comprehensible even to the more dull-witted non-economists among us. This is text thankfully devoid of graphs and all the statistical wizardry that has become the economists’ stock in trade. Accordingly, it should feature upon the reading lists of not only social science undergraduates but all those who want to understand the mess that modern capitalism has landed us in. In short, it’s a damn good read, and an easy one, even for those who would be usually daunted by any prospect of ‘A History of Economic Thought’.

Rapley’s argument rests upon two pillars. The first of these is the story of economics and its history is usually told from an Enlightenment narrative, in which science faces a heroic battle against ignorance and ultimately replaces religion in giving us codes to live by (p.10). His version is the functionalist argument that humans have always needed something to believe in. Accordingly, as the economies of Western Europe



Whenever economists feel certain they have found the holy grail of endless peace and prosperity, the end of the present regime is nigh

grew more steadily and rapidly over centuries, they posed questions which the old religions, which justified static, stratified societies, now found themselves unable to answer. But the economists seemingly could, providing guidance on how to reach the promised land of material abundance and endless contentment. This 'enlightenment' allowed humans to feel they had more control over their lives. As a result, they ascribed to economists the powers that they had previously left to the gods. Economists then helped us to seemingly build a heaven on earth, a cornucopia of consumption, new inventions and new delights – until it all went horribly bust in the recession of 2008, since when most of us have seen our living standards decline. In response, the priests retreated to their cloisters, bickering amongst themselves, leaving us to seek new creeds to light our paths to the future.

The second pillar of Rapley's book concerns the false status of economics as a science. Economists have sought to differentiate themselves from so-called 'soft' subjects such as sociology, anthropology and history, claiming a far greater capacity to predict human outcomes with conviction and accuracy. Yet 'if history teaches anything', writes Rapley, 'it's that whenever economists feel certain they have found the holy grail of endless peace and prosperity,

the end of the present regime is nigh' (p. 399).

Irving Fisher advised people to go out and buy shares on the eve of the Great Depression; the Keynesians claimed that they had mastered the tools to prevent another depression; and the evangelists of the neo-liberal era similarly assured us of their ability to deliver eternal stability in the run up to the crash of 2008.

Economics has aspired to become like physics. But whereas scientists will tell you that you can't change the laws of nature, and that all you can hope to do is to manipulate them as far as you can to human advantage, 'economists don't just observe the laws of nature, they help make them' (p.399). If the assumption is that greed is good, then don't be surprised if people act greedily, yet it's only the blindly



Adam Smith and his disciples wrestled, 'uncomfortably but honestly', with the issues of slavery and imperial exploitation. But their later descendants largely ignored them, presuming a free market in which individuals are liberated to pursue their self-interested goals will necessarily lead to just outcomes.

faithful who will really believe that this results in a better life for society as a whole.

Adam Smith and his disciples wrestled, 'uncomfortably but honestly', with the issues of slavery and imperial exploitation. But their later descendants largely ignored them, presuming a free market in which individuals are liberated to pursue their self-interested goals will necessarily lead to just outcomes (p. 411). Rapley suggests that the hubris in economics came not from a moral failing among economists, but from a false conviction that their belief was a science (p.400).

He is surely too generous. As he elaborates in convincing detail, economists have had a habit of cosying up to political power, and western politicians have shown little compunction in using their so-called scientificity when and how it suits them. Yet, today, as the direction of capital flows has switched from west to east, 'the pursuit of self-interest has led to tribalization in our politics – a politics of fear over hope, and of false hope over truth' (p.411).

Rapley covers much familiar ground, outlining how the investment banks transformed the Western capitalist economies into something resembling a raucous casino in the years leading up to the 2008 crash. It's a sobering read, and one which reminds us that 'like any church', economics does its best work in opposition, when it is challenging received wisdom and speaking truth to power (p.398). Yet while it is easy enough to preach the need for a new humility amongst economists, and for its purpose to become one of ethics rather than technocratic management, it is much more difficult to find an answer to his fundamental question: If we have lost our faith in economics as a religion that works for everyone and not just politically connected elites, in what should we now believe? [NA](#)



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