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BY KGALEMA MOTLANTHE

CHALLENGES FOR THE LEFT

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Picasso Headline

SATAWU continues to wage progressive worker struggles

The 1994 democratic breakthrough was yet another crucial stage of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), as a route pursued by the South African working class towards a better life for all South Africans (socialism being the ultimate, logical end state). This route required, and still requires, a formation of tactical and strategic alliances with various class forces aligned by a common vision of freedom and equality, as enshrined in the Freedom Charter, our national blueprint.

The dominant force arising out of the historic antagonist nature of the South African apartheid state and its comprador capital against the people's camp has always remained, and still remains, the working class, organised by various progressive trade unions in the different national industries, and further mobilised under a legitimate body in the form of COSATU.

At the pinnacle of these formations there remained a political leadership of these forces in the form of the ANC, as a liberation movement, and the SACP, a political party for the vanguard of the working class.

Under COSATU leadership, progressive trade unions have adopted the federation's main strategic objectives, broadly being: material improvement of workers' conditions as a whole; organisation of the unorganised workers; and workers' participation in democratic processes (Brief History of COSATU; http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=925). At its formation in 1985, COSATU committed itself to the following core principles that are binding to all of its affiliates:

- Non-racialism;
- Worker control;
- One industry one union; and
- International worker solidarity.

SATAWU is one of the unions that (through its forbears TGWU and SAHRWU) has witnessed and participated in the formation of COSATU, therefore embracing the federation's principles, values and commitments as critical success factors towards achieving the historic mission of the Freedom Charter. As a consequential appreciation of the key principles of COSATU on one industry one union, the transport and allied workers recognised the need to create one united form of SATAWU by merging SAHRWU, TATWU, BLATU and TGWU.

> "Today SATAWU remains a militant, democratic, fearless trade union pursuing the National Democratic Revolution as a means to attain the Freedom Charter"

Today SATAWU remains a militant, democratic, fearless trade union pursuing the National Democratic Revolution as a means to attain the Freedom Charter and socialism through non-racialism, worker control, one industry one union and international solidarity.

To achieve those strategic objectives, SATAWU is leading a strong membership of 230 000 militant workers in the workplaces in more than seven sectors of the transport and allied industries. These sectors include, but are not limited to, aviation, cleaning, hospitality, road passenger (bus and taxi), road freight and logistics, passenger rail, goods rail and infrastructure services, security and guarding, and retail and related industries. The industry combined has over two million workers, and SATAWU is currently on the up-curve to achieve its medium-term target of reaching 600 000 workers as members of SATAWU.

Since 2000, SATAWU has grown its capabilities and skills to become an articulate, vibrant, assertive and competent trade union to take on workers' struggles in an effort to improve their material conditions. These were means through which SATAWU could strengthen its muscles to become a voice of the voiceless, an ear for the deaf and a limb for the paralysed.

As a result, SATAWU invested most of its recourses in establishing over 50 offices around the country, for workers to access the organisation. There was careful and clear recruitment of capable organisers, educators, administrators, negotiators and coordinators, as critical human resources that would constitute a sound organisational structure that could execute the political mandates of the workers.

Investment into political, worker and shop-steward education and training, as a means to deepen democracy, consciousness and worker solidarity, became the main focus, and remains so. It has managed its finances prudently so as to invest in sustainable assets, support democracy and participate in international worker solidarity structures with little donor funding or patronage.

As a result, a capable SATAWU has won strategic and tactical gains as major yardsticks of progress towards concluding the National Democratic Revolution that must dictate a new, caring, fair, non-racist, democratic South Africa and the world. It has exposed and led campaigns against corruption at public institutions, prevented humanitarian crises by refusing to facilitate movements of weapons destined for oppression of workers, and influenced the legislative framework to express its support to the most exploited and vulnerable workers, such as security and cleaning.

SATAWU is driven by the COSATU policy of worker control, where all of its committees – from the shop floor to the head office of the union – are driven, determined, managed and overseen by the workers. It has clear democratic principles guiding its conduct and posture in the workplace and society at large.

It has transformed the bargaining chambers to reflect the demographic dynamics of the country, and has included in the bargaining agreements critical benefits, such as medical aid, housing allowance, overtime, danger allowance, maternity leave, shift allowance, pension funds and many more.

It has democratised many workplaces that previously were kingdoms of apartheid comprador capitalists and had no regard for human and worker rights. There are still hardships, but its relentless fights will overcome them. Its participation in legislative structures and policy-formation tentacles of the state, such as NEDLAC and parliamentary consultative processes, enables members to enjoy the benefits of participatory democracy, therefore giving the state some legitimacy.

Not all is fine and rosy

SATAWU is among the unions that have suffered heavy setbacks as a result of privatisation, cronyism in state tendering systems, corruption in public and private institutions, collusion by monopoly industries, and mismanagement of workers' pension contributions. These setbacks resulted in massive retrenchments, liquidations and closure of factories and plants that employed most of its members. In instances where workers were retrenched, they still struggle to get their pensions paid on time, and this is a serious setback.

The ANC-led government also still fails to intervene decisively on behalf of the working class when managing the contradictions between workers and capital. The ANC, by heart and will, and its ideological current, is totally aligned to the workers, as opposed to the liberal DA and all other crisis-ridden political parties in the country.

The ANC, however, through its deployees in government, still

> "Investment into political, worker and shop-steward education and training, as a means to deepen democracy, consciousness and worker solidarity, became the main focus, and remains so"

leans towards the interests of monopoly capital. This is expressed through its management of the national fiscus by adopting neoliberal conservatism and refusing to radically spend for the working class, in terms of a basic income grant. The monetary management policy of inflation targeting therefore restricts workers from accessing necessary capital and credit to improve their lives, and there are also rising costs on basic necessities as a result of that Reserve Bank intervention.

The crisis of unemployment has reached another level, and this has aggravated the conditions of workers, as they now have to support many of their family members who are unemployed. Imagine a security guard or a cleaner who earns a basic wage of R2 000 per month and has to support a family of over seven people! This in the context of the state social intervention deficit in the areas of education, health, housing and related amenities, which constitutes a major crisis for the working class, is a breeding ground for social discomfort, and is a major weapon for the current waves of service-delivery protests around the country.

The state is not the only culprit, and in this case we must look critically at the conduct of big business and monopoly industries. Their biggest crime today is the rate of executive pay; CEOs of big companies are paid an average of over R4 million per annum, excluding shares and dividends. These CEOs are paid for creating and worsening the conditions of income inequalities, such as anticompetitive behaviour and collusion in pricing of commodities, therefore transferring the costs to consumers. In the transport industry we see more trucking companies creating more accidents, killing workers, damaging national infrastructure and not taking accountability for their actions.

Way forward for SATAWU

At its last congress, SATAWU decided unanimously to continue its pursuit of the National Democratic Revolution, however noting that in the current phase, the enemy of the people's camp has now hidden and is no longer visible. The enemy is still apartheid capital, and it has now manifested itself in the form of BEE fronts, reactionary civil movements, private large and multinational corporations, the DA and all other reactionary and counter-revolutionary political parties.

This must not be misconstrued as political intolerance; this is a reality reflected by the amount of opposition and lobbying we are witnessing towards the progressive legislative framework and state interventions by these entities.

SATAWU has therefore strengthened its organising and mobilising capabilities, heightened its international solidarity campaigns and taken prime position of leadership in the International Transport Union in Africa as president and global vice-president, as represented by the SATAWU general secretary. It draws and imparts important lessons on worker struggles and campaigns in ensuring that it achieves the maximum benefits for workers of the world, and unites them in the fight towards socialism.

Through all of its previous CEC and other constitutional gatherings, it has remained committed to the ANC as a vehicle to deliver the aspirations of the poor and the workers in the political front. But this objective will be met if it remains critical and active members of the ANC and SACP, but not a sweetheart trade union. It will campaign for a national and provincial majority victory of the ANC, and will remain supportive of the current leadership of the ANC until the right time comes for it to express its preferences that it believes could assist the cause of the working classes and all progressive forces toiling towards socialism.

Its support for the ANC does not mean that it neglects the bread-and-butter issues facing workers in the transport and allied industries. It is currently waging three simultaneous struggles that would, at the end of this year, see workers' lives improve:

1. Wage negotiations and mandate-seeking for a double-digit percentage increase;
2. Democratic worker-controlled shop-steward elections in all provinces across all industries where SATAWU organises; and
3. Relentless support and campaigns for a two-thirds majority victory for the ANC in the 2014 general and provincial elections.

Therefore, SATAWU remains a necessary vehicle and force to champion the interests of the working class through progressive working-class struggles that would see the conclusion of the National Democratic Revolution and, ultimately, the realisation of the Freedom Charter.

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Where do we stand?

By **Ben Turok**

As we go to press two months before the general election, we will resist the temptation to predict percentages for different parties. Suffice it to say that the ANC will return to office with an adequate majority. More important than this kind of speculation is the content of what the government has done and intends to do.

While even *Business Day* confirms that South Africa has changed since the advent of democracy, we are still plagued by serious social and economic deficiencies, some of which are discussed in the first section of this issue. Joel Netshitenzhe gives an overview of inequality, which is among the most serious dangers, and the converse of the vision in the Freedom Charter and the ANC's intentions when coming to power. Unfortunately, inequality features globally and raises the most serious question of all: are we allowing global capitalism to penetrate everywhere without the mitigating features of earlier decades?

South Africa's present performance is also assessed in an interview with Deputy-President Kgalema Motlanthe that focuses on black economic empowerment. As is now widely recognised, the government's efforts to empower black business via handouts from state-owned enterprises and private corporations have distorted our social values. The encouragement of greed and undue expectations has led to negative social, political and economic costs in the country. Stuart Theobald reveals the consequences of these distortions for investment. Simphiwe Sesanti's essay on Marikana shows the consequences of failing to address inequality and the seemingly blind pursuit of economic gain with no attention to the cultural consequences.

Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies talks with us about the government's new direction for BEE and Ian Goldman and his colleagues from the DPME round up this section with a useful overview of the government's emerging systems for performance monitoring and evaluation.

CHALLENGES FOR THE LEFT

In response to these socio-economic conditions, here and elsewhere, the second major topic in this issue is the organisational and ideological challenges facing political formations on the left.

The ANC has historically claimed to be "a disciplined force of the left", making its alliance with the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) a natural arrangement. There have also been complaints that, since coming to power, the ANC has absorbed, neutralised and diminished the SACP and the Party's role as the vanguard of the working class and the left generally. Whether this accusation holds water will emerge in the coming period, as new parties come onto the scene to stake their own claims as the true voice of the left.

At the end of 2013, we convened a small seminar to discuss the role of the left in South Africa. Here we publish two unvarnished articles to capture the essence of the discussion, one an overview of the contributions and the other featuring comments from COSATU's Zwelinzima Vavi. It is also our hope that these notes contain sufficient ideas and perspectives to inspire others to explore the role of the left in our complex political situation. We also include an essay on the origins of the Black Consciousness Movement, which arguably also holds a place in the broad category of the left.

One thing is clear: the legitimacy of any new parties claiming the mantle of the left tradition must come from their theoretical foundations and the policies they pursue. While populist sloganeering may win some votes, our electorate is far too sophisticated to be satisfied by slogans alone. If these parties are to gain a foothold in the working class and beyond, they must clearly state how their policies are different from those of the ANC and its alliance partners.

New Agenda is willing to provide space for considered articles on these new developments.


By the people, for the people

Inequality matters:
South African trends and interventions

By **Joel Netshitenzhe**

The author is executive director of the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA). This is an edited version of his keynote address to the Concerned Africans Forum in Johannesburg on 25 November 2013. The full text is available at www.mistra.org.za

The dynamics of inequality in South Africa have evinced various trends since the advent of democracy. While income inequality between the races may have somewhat declined, this is not necessarily the case with regard to the income gap among various social strata within the population as a whole. Rising income inequality is not unique to South Africa; it finds expression in most OECD countries, and even in countries such as China, where poverty has been reduced. Yet Brazil seems to have succeeded in the past few years to buck the trend. What are reasons behind these global trends, and what are the lessons that South Africa can draw from these experiences?

The burden of inequality falls inordinately on the poor and the marginalised. Yet, as Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) demonstrate in their book, *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone*, inequality has a negative impact even on the rich. Social inequality affects such issues as violent crime, educational performance and even teenage pregnancies among both the rich and the poor. It also affects the magnitude and quality of economic growth. It is therefore in the interests of all sectors of society that inequality is addressed.

In trying to identify holistic approaches to do so, it is necessary to look beyond income inequality and interrogate indicators such as assets, access to services and opportunity, and social capital. These indicators articulate with one another in virtuous or adverse ways, depending on the effectiveness or otherwise of the interventions applied. How does South Africa fare in this regard?

Measures required to deal with inequality include the absorption of more people into economic activity, quality education, efficient public services, progressive taxation and appropriate spatial settlement patterns. While economic growth is critical to dealing with inequality, such growth should be pro-poor, and pro-poor economic and social interventions should be pro-growth.

It is appropriate that public policy should target both the reduction of poverty and inequality, proceeding from the understanding that the reduction of poverty may not necessarily result in the reduction of inequality.

SOUTH AFRICA: DISTILLING 19 YEARS' EXPERIENCE

Since 1995, real economic growth in South Africa has averaged just over 3 percent per year. In this period, about 3.4 million net new jobs were created. During the phase of rapid economic growth from 2003 to 2008, "the number of jobs created started to outstrip the growth in the labour force. The official unemployment rate – which peaked at 31.2 percent in March 2003 – dropped to 23 percent in 2007, despite the fact that the economic upturn had encouraged more people to look for work" (NPC, 2011: 14). Since the advent of the global economic downturn, the unemployment rate has ticked to just above 25 percent. Between 1996 and 2011, growth in per capita income was roughly 1.16 percent per annum (extrapolated from StatsSA, 2012b).

All things being equal, South Africans have got richer in real terms over 15 years. But the functional distribution of national income – i.e. how such income is shared among various strata in society – is critical for understanding trends in any society. In the words of David Ricardo, it is the fundamental question of political economy.

Justin Visagie (2013b) finds that 79.6 percent of the population received income of less than R1 400 per person per month in 1993 (after tax in 2008 prices) and that this income group had declined to 75.9 percent of the population by 2008. Those earning between R1 400 and R10 000 had increased from 19.3 percent of the population to 21.3 percent, while the proportion of the population earning above R10 000 had increased from 1.1 percent to 2.8 percent.

It is when we examine the share of total income among these groups that the stark trends in income inequality come out in bold relief. The income share of those earning over R10 000 increased from 17 percent to 32 percent, while that of the rest decreased from 83 percent to 68 percent (Visagie, 2013b).

Disaggregated in racial terms, the number of Africans earning above R10 000 grew by over 10 times, from 19 000 to 257 000, while their share of the "middle class" (between R1 400 and R10 000) increased by some 2.4 times to become the majority in this segment. Whites earning above R10 000 doubled to about 888 000 (Visagie, 2013a).

What messages do these and related data communicate?

First, *income poverty has been declining* since the advent of democracy. Poverty headcount (at R524 per person per month) decreased from 53 percent of the population in 1995 to 49 percent in 2008. This is a consequence both of larger numbers of employed people and access to social grants, the take-up of which has increased from 2.4 million in 1996 to 15.5 million in 2012 (Presidency, 2011and 2012).

Second, *functional distribution of national income has worsened*. The share of national income of the richest has grown massively. Today, just over 50 percent of national income goes to the richest 10 percent of households, "while the poorest 40 percent received just over 5 percent of income" (Presidency, 2012).

Third, *the change in the share of national income has not favoured the "middle class"*. Despite the fact that their proportion of the population increased by some two percentage points, their share declined from 56 percent in 1993 to 47 percent in 2007 (Visagie, 2013b). The per capita expenditure "growth incidence curve" has a U-shape, reflecting the impact of social grants among the poorest sections of society and greater share of income among the highest earners.

Fourth, according to StatsSA's *Labour Market Dynamics in South Africa (2012a), being employed does not, on its own, guarantee an escape from poverty*. The bottom 5 percent of those employed earned about R600 per month and half earned R3 033 or less, while the top 5 percent earned R21 666 per month. As with rates of employment, these figures show a bias against low educational attainment, rural location and women.

Fifth, *these trends account for high levels of income inequality* in South African society. The Gini co-efficient has been hovering in the mid-to-high 0.60s over the past 20 years. By this measure, South Africa is currently placed at the second-highest level of income inequality in the world.

Sixth, using AMPS data, *the inequality measures show a declining trend between races, while it has shown a rising trend within races*. Further, even between race groups, inequality "has tended to increase during the... period of high economic growth. In other words, after the base changes with the elimination of apartheid, it seems that those historically well off, in terms of income and assets, have taken better advantage of the benefits of growth" (Presidency, 2008: 102).

Seventh, inequality in South Africa's labour market is *aggravated by skills shortages,* which add a premium to salaries while the oversupply of unskilled workers pushes wages down at the lower end (Van der Berg, 2013).

GLOBAL TRENDS

Rising income inequality is not unique to South Africa. The International Labour Organisation summarises these trends thus:

> During much of the past century, a stable labour income share was accepted as a natural corollary or "stylised fact" of economic growth. As industrialised countries became more prosperous, the total incomes both of workers and of capital owners grew at almost exactly the same rate, and the division of national income between labour and capital therefore remained constant over a long period of time, with only minor fluctuations... An outpouring of literature has provided consistent new empirical evidence indicating that recent decades have seen a downward trend for the labour share in a majority of countries for which data are available. (ILO, 2012: Part II 4)

This trend has been much in evidence in most of the developed countries. The Gini co-efficient among members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has increased on average from 0.28 in the mid-1980s to 0.31 by the late 2000s (OECD, 2011). This "trickle-up effect" is illustrated by the relative magnitude of executive pay. In 1998, the chief executive pay of FTSE 100 companies "was 47 times that of average employees... but had risen to 120 times by 2010" (Groom, 2011).

Combined with these trends are also issues of gender, age and location. A 2012 ITUC report called "Frozen in time: Gender pay gap unchanged for 10 years", found that "worldwide, women are paid 18 percent on average less than their male counterparts at work". Commenting on the worldwide "youth unemployment bomb", Peter Coy (2011) writes:

> [A]n economy that can't generate enough jobs to absorb its young people has created a lost generation of the disaffected, unemployed, or underemployed... While the details differ from one nation to the next, the common element is failure – not just of young people to find a place in society, but of society itself to harness the energy, intelligence, and enthusiasm of the next generation.

EXPLANATORY HYPOTHESES

A number of hypotheses have been proffered to explain these trends. Each has an element of truth, but none alone would clarify the issues:

- globalisation and trade manufacturing shifted to low-wage countries
- union density: as inequality worsens, worker organisation declines
- skills-biased technological change
- global financialisation
- "superstars" in economic competition are richly rewarded.

Paul Krugman (2002) fells some of these hypotheses:

> [A]s more evidence has accumulated, each of the hypotheses has seemed increasingly inadequate. Globalisation can explain part of the relative decline in blue-collar wages, but it can't explain the 2 500 percent rise in CEO incomes. Technology may explain why the salary premium associated with a college education has risen, but it's hard to match up with the huge increase in inequality among the college-educated, with little progress for many, but gigantic gains at the top. The superstar theory works for Jay Leno, but not for the thousands of people who have become awesomely rich without going on TV...

[I]t's a matter of corporate culture. For a generation after World War II, fear of outrage kept executive salaries in check. Now the outrage is gone. That is, the explosion of executive pay represents a social change rather than the purely economic forces of supply and demand. We should think of it not as a market trend, like the rising value of waterfront property, but as something more like the sexual revolution of the 1960s – a relaxation of old strictures, a new permissiveness, but in this case the permissiveness is financial rather than sexual.

Another hypothesis, one not unrelated to union density, should be added to the mix. The growing permissiveness of inequality coincided with the weakening and collapse of the Soviet Union and other 'socialist' countries that, at least at the level of social policy, pursued a more equitable sharing of the benefits of economic activity. Whatever their other weaknesses, competition between them and the market-based economies served as a restraining influence on profligacy. Related to this, the political left in the advanced countries, including social democratic parties, lost their focus on social equity and their organisational power and appeal as a counter-balance to the rapacious licence of unbridled market economics.

LESSONS FROM THREE COUNTRIES

The experiences of three countries reflect instructive nuances, one of which is surprisingly and helpfully counter-intuitive.

CHINA: Poverty reduction and rising inequality

Among the major global advances of the past 30 years has been the lifting of some 200 million people from abject poverty in China. However, this has been accompanied by growing inequality, with the Gini co-efficient having risen from near zero to 0.474 in 2012. Last year, it was estimated at 0.61, which would place China at the top end of income inequality across the globe. The government has introduced an income distribution plan to lift more people from poverty, including ratcheting-up the minimum wage to 40 percent of average salaries (Rabinovitch, 2014).

GERMANY: Low unemployment and rising inequality

Germany's low unemployment rate is the envy of most of its OECD peers. The *jobwunder* is a product of its youth training programmes and labour market flexibility designed to absorb as many of the unemployed as possible. However, this obscures another reality: the country "now has the highest proportion of low-wage workers relative to the national median income in Western Europe" (Posen, 2013). Temporary workers have increased almost threefold in the past 10 years. At the same time, real monthly wages remained flat, while productivity increased by about 22.6 percent (ILO, 2012: 46). Income inequality has been ticking up, and it's little wonder that a minimum wage was a central issue in the 2013 elections.

BRAZIL: The counter-intuition

Unlike most countries, Brazil has managed to reduce income inequality from an estimated Gini co-efficient above 0.60 in the early 1990s to the mid 0.50s by the late 2000s. In the 2000s, the income of the poorest 20 percent increased at about 6.3 percent per year, while that of the richest 20 percent increased by only 1.7 percent. By comparison: China increased 8.5 percent and 15 percent respectively; India had 1 percent and 2.8 percent; and South Africa, 5.8 percent and 7.6 percent (Vieira, 2011).

In Brazil, a combination of factors played a central role, including the expansion of job opportunities and the introduction of a minimum wage, expanded access to social grants, regional economic interventions and increased consumption demand. Whether such interventions are sustainable over a long period of time is subject to debate, given the economic and social difficulties that Brazil is currently experiencing. Or are other factors responsible for those difficulties: creaking infrastructure, heightened expectations, corruption, and such specific issues as fiscal allocations for transport and education?

DOES INEQUALITY MATTER?

Common sense has it that inequality is bad for social cohesion. Extreme inequality is morally reprehensible. But it goes far beyond issues of taste, sensibility and morality.

Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) demonstrate the impact of inequality on various measures of human development and wellbeing. They find that drug use, mental illness, life expectancy, educational attainment, teenage births, violence and prison population are worse in countries with higher levels of income inequality – even in instances where these countries are at the same level of development. They come to the startling conclusion that:

> the relationships between inequality and poor health and social problems are too strong to be attributable to chance; they occur independently in both our test-beds; those between inequality and both violence and health have been demonstrated a large number of times in quite different settings, using data from different sources. (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010: 190)

Moreover, they showed

> that it was people at almost all income levels, not just the poor, who do worse in more unequal societies. Even when you compare groups of people with the same income, you find that those in more unequal societies do worse than those on the same income in more equal societies. (ibid: 192)

Beyond social indicators, inequality can constrain economic growth:

> many of even the poorest countries have succeeded in initiating growth at high rates for few years. What is rarer… is the ability to sustain growth. The question then becomes: what determines the length of growth spells, and what is the role of income inequality in duration? We find that longer growth spells are robustly associated with more equality in the income distribution. (Berg and Ostry, 2011: 3)

The World Bank (Perry et al, 2006) similarly asserts the correlation between poverty and economic growth, arguing that Latin America's pedestrian average economic growth may be a consequence of high levels of poverty. Among other reasons, this is because poor people have limited access to financial services, attend low-quality schools, and are more risk averse. Inversely, the poor have a high propensity to consume, which has many positive spin-offs for various sectors of the economy. They suggest that a 10-percent increase in income poverty lowers the growth rate by about one percent in an average country and "reduces investment by 6 to 8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in countries with underdeveloped financial systems".

South Africa's macrosocial indicators – such as violent crime, poor educational performance, teenage pregnancies, low levels of social trust and the large prison population per capita – do correspond with trends in the more unequal societies, particularly Latin America. Before venturing into the panoply of policies and programmes, let us briefly examine other manifestations of inequality – not income-related – in South Africa's experience over the past 19 years.

INEQUALITY AND THE SOCIAL WAGE

[W]e have to recognise that deprivation with which we have reason to be concerned is not just the absolute lowness of income, but various "unfreedoms", varying from hunger and prevalence of preventable or curable illness (and even premature mortality) to social exclusion ... Income is but one determining influence among many others in dealing with deprivation. (Amartya Sen, "Endemic insecurity and deprivation", 2002)

Indeed, poverty and inequality cannot be measured merely by income. Thus, any interrogation of inequality should also assess the provision of a "social wage", which addresses, in the words of Sen, the various "unfreedoms" that the poor experience. How does South Africa fare in this?

To begin with income redistribution: besides progressive taxation, the government has massively expanded access to social grants. The process of racial equalisation has meant that state expenditure on social grants has hovered around 3.4 percent of GDP, which has ensured the sustainability of the expenditure. Combined with inflation-based increases and the fact that the categories of beneficiaries have now reached saturation, this should be sustainable going forward.

Assistance to the poorest households has included reprioritisation of educational expenditure, such as the introduction of no-fee-paying schools, now at 60 percent of public schools; local-level indigence programmes that include a basic minimum of water and electricity free of charge, and free access to public health facilities (for households with income of less than R50 000 per annum), to which will be added a form of national health "insurance" in the medium-term.

Besides these interventions, the following improvements have been made to community assets:

- the number of households in formal dwellings has increased from 64 percent in 1996 to 77.7 percent in 2012, with some 3.4 million subsidised houses built since 1995/6
- access to potable water ("RDP standard": a pipe within 500 metres of dwellings) has improved from around 65 percent in 1995/6 to 95.5 percent
- provision of sanitation has improved from about 52 percent of households having such access in 1995/6 to 83.4 percent in 2012

- access to electricity has increased from around 52 percent to 76.5 percent in the same period (these administrative data record a lower figure than Census 2011) (Presidency, 2011 and 2012).

The redistribution of land has been a major failure in this period, with just over one-tenth of the 2009 target of 30 percent redistribution of agricultural land having been achieved by 2012. In addition are such outstanding issues as transferring legal title to new and old housing stock in poor areas, as well as the woeful quality of health services, education infrastructure and teaching, and the intermittent flow of water in many disadvantaged communities.

Overall, though, there have been discernible improvements in non-income welfare since 1994. Pro-poor service provision has resulted in a decline in non-income poverty as well as in non-income inequality (Bhorat et al, 2006). That study shows that the Gini co-efficient based on the asset index declined from 0.32 in 1993 to 0.24 in 2004. However, with regard to housing, for instance, one must take account of the fact that the wealth effect during years of high growth tended to favour the well-off.

A COMBINATION OF INTERVENTIONS

The dynamics outlined above, which are manifest in South Africa and other parts of the world, already suggest the variety of interventions required to deal with inequality. A few are listed below, as indications of the combination of measures that would start to address the challenge.

Economic growth. Addressing inequality does not suggest an equal sharing of poverty. It needs to be tackled with high rates of sustainable economic growth, but the issue is what kind of growth, and how the benefits are shared while improving productivity. As the World Bank study referred to above argues, it is possible to achieve pro-poor growth and pro-growth poverty reduction. This should entail a focus on economic sectors in which a country has comparative advantages, but with emphasis on labour-intensive sectors that are able to absorb the mass of the unemployed in the short- to medium-term. There may be instances where short-term pro-growth policies have a negative impact on the poor – in such cases, there should be direct assistance to the poor and SMMEs. Fiscal measures such as a youth employment incentive and business set-asides for youth and women can help launch the marginalised into meaningful economic activity.

Education and skills training. These are among the most effective measures to tackle inequality. However, as the global phenomenon of youth marginalisation shows, such interventions should be combined with other policies to ensure economic growth and the opening of economic opportunities. Improving quality in the areas of most need – among the poor – should be emphasised. (Ironically, the current poor performance and disruptions conspire to reproduce poverty and marginalisation in South Africa.) This should be combined with vocational guidance and improved formal and informal networks (social capital), which are critical for accessing opportunities. This will help break the cycle in which the poor experience lower, late and uncertain returns on education.

Employee stock ownership plans. Attention should be given to the weighting of this element in the context of the broad-based black economic empowerment programme (BBBEE). Many of the complications can be addressed through appropriate representation in decision-making structures, financial education, and the building of trust between workers and their representatives and between these and the company boards and executives. This should also be considered in a more systematic way in relation to communities where enterprises in sectors such as mining and farming are located.

Incomes policy and minimum wage. Given that one of the critical drivers of inequality across the globe is the “trickle-up effect” of executive remuneration, this issue has to be addressed, whether either through appropriate regulations or taxation or both, in a manner that does not undermine incentivisation for management performance. With regard to taxation, the legitimacy of the state – informed by its efficiency and ethical conduct – is critical. A national wage policy should seek to regulate the gaps between ordinary workers and the middle strata on the one hand, and the senior executives on the other. It should include a liveable minimum wage, as distinct from the current sectoral wage determinations. While there may be instances where mass absorption of the marginalised may dictate lower entry thresholds, such interventions should be temporary. Research has shown that reasonable increases to the minimum wage do not necessarily lead to job losses but that compliance in vulnerable sectors is often poor (Bhorat and Mayet, 2013). Policy should seek to progressively minimise atypical work and the introduction of a minimum wage should be combined with requisite monitoring capacity to obviate breaches.

Reducing the cost of living of the poor. The issue of the cost of living is fundamentally important. The inflation rate experienced by workers and the poor is often much higher and more volatile than that of the rich. This applies to such basic needs as food, transport and administered prices (e.g. electricity, water, municipal rates, education and healthcare) on which the poor spend the bulk of their income. Many of these elements can be managed through appropriate interventions such as volume-based sliding-scale pricing and adjusting the floor of free services. While complex, the issue of food pricing can be tackled through value chain management, taxation, incentives, household food production and other measures. Changing the spatial settlement patterns is also fundamental to reducing the cost of transport for the poor.

Social wage. Added to these measures should be the panoply of social wage interventions identified above, with the necessary quality and efficiency.

Public discourse. South African society should also raise its level of policy and political discourse, and ensure that it takes place around matters of substance rather than a huckster's paradise where obfuscation – whether thinly veiled attempts to defend the status quo or shadow-boxing with leftist slogans – confounds the real issues. The maladies that attach to the conduct of politics, such as reliance on the state for rapid personal accumulation, cannot be divorced from the reality of income inequality. Combined with this is the level of indebtedness of the new elites as they seek to emulate the lifestyles of the established white economic elite – without the benefit of their historical assets. The "fear of falling" in a highly unequal society generates conduct that can imperil the polity overall.

At the same time, template-based economic responses to the global economic crisis (especially in developed countries), which ignore the impact of these policies on working people, demand a coherent articulation of alternatives. The role of the media in this is also quite critical.

Social compact. Finally, dealing with inequality is a responsibility of the political leadership through public policy, but it is a task that requires the involvement of all sectors of society. Government, business, labour and civil society all need leaders with the strategic acumen to identify the common interest and forge a social compact for mutually beneficial economic programmes and humane social relations.

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POWERING SOUTH AFRICA'S GROWTH

One of the most notable and earliest achievements in South Africa's 20 years of democracy has been in the area of electricity supply.

National power utility, Eskom along with South Africa's municipalities, has made significant progress in providing first time access to electricity for many South African households across the country. According to Statistics South Africa, access to electricity in South Africa increased from 35% of households in 1990 to 84% in 2011.

Approximately 53 600 homes were electrified during the first half of the 2012/2013 financial year, compared to 32 216 during the same period in the 2011/2012 fiscal year. By December 2013 a total of 4.4 million homes had been electrified since 1991.

A major contributor to enable access to electricity is the provision of Free Basic Electricity (FBE). Launched in 2003 and administered by municipalities, FBE aims to support indigent households in meeting their basic energy needs. By the end of 2013, 800 000 households were collecting their FBE subsidy.

This is undeniable progress. However, there is still a lot that needs to be done to meet the target of universal access to electricity for all South Africans. This depends heavily on the availability of funding and the ability to collect revenue for services rendered.

Both Eskom and municipalities are facing the challenge of lost revenue due to electricity theft, a serious crime that has taken root in all sectors of society. In addition, the persistent culture of non-payment for services further exacerbates this challenge.

Electricity theft generally occurs through meter tampering and bypassing, illegal connections, and the buying and selling of illegal pre-paid electricity vouchers. This crime does not only rob the country of more than R5.4 billion every year - money that could be used for much needed developmental projects and further electrification of households - but also results in the loss of lives, especially those of children who unwittingly touch illegally connected wires.

This loss of revenue and energy has a severe impact on the country's economy and the financial viability of municipalities. It grossly hinders service delivery to the public as Eskom and municipalities lose what is a large portion of their revenue stream.

Operation Khanyisa is a national joint effort to curb electricity theft lead by Eskom and partners such as the South African Local Government Association, Business Against Crime South Africa, Proudly SA, Business Unity South Africa, and Crime Line. This behaviour change campaign aims to fight electricity theft and to mobilise South Africans behind legal, safe and efficient electricity use. Operation Khanyisa engages with municipalities, businesses and residential communities to ensure that South Africa's power is protected, valued and used responsibly.

Since the launch of Operation Khanyisa in October 2010, over 8 000 anonymous tip-offs on suspected acts of electricity theft have been received from the public, helping Eskom to recover more than R243-million in revenue. This is equivalent to the cost of bringing electricity access to around 10 000 homes.

This is by no means a small feat, but it does not even come close to what can be achieved with the billions that are still lost to electricity theft each year. Operation Khanyisa calls on municipalities to partner with the campaign, in a bid to enhance energy loss management and revenue recovery.

For more information about the Operation Khanyisa campaign visit:

www.operationkhanyisa.co.za
www.powernews.co.za
info@operationkhanyisa.co.za

The role of emerging black business:
An interview with **Kgalema Motlanthe**

Motlanthe is the deputy-president of South Africa and former deputy-president of the African National Congress

Ben Turok: Charles Dickens' novel Hard Times depicts what the new manufacturing business class in England did to the poor in the Industrial Revolution. Wherever capitalism has emerged historically, the new capitalist class had to fight vigorously for their position and often adopted unscrupulous and harsh measures. I wonder whether we could start with your broad view of this, in historical terms. Is the emerging African business class in South Africa different?

INTERRUPTED DEVELOPMENT

Kgalema Motlanthe: In South Africa, the process unfolded with the discovery of diamonds and gold. Many, many fortune hunters came to South Africa to pursue those interests. The need for labour meant that they had to impose political power on African communities that were living off the land at the time, that were organised as primitive communal societies. They imposed certain taxes and set the number of cattle that a young man had to pay as lobola, as dowry. It was aimed at ensuring that they would go out to the mines, to offer their labour to earn the money to buy such cattle. The dog tax and the poll tax were introduced as part of that. The pass system was also imposed very stringently to manage the movement of people from rural to urban areas – influx and outflux control laws. A lot of legislative instruments were introduced to proselytise Africans, to turn them into wage earners on the basis of selling their labour power. It was pioneered for the mining industry. The migrant labour system was introduced for that purpose. Wenela [the Witwatersrand Native

Labour Association (WNLA)] was established as an agency to recruit [labour] – across southern Africa, actually, not just the back roads and villages of South Africa alone.

I'm leaving out the long wars of dispossession and so on, but the Native Land Act of 1913 basically ensured that Africans were dispossessed of the land. Those who had livestock and wagons that they used for transport, commercially, were now forced to perform those activities for the benefit of the new landlords. So, beyond dispossessing Africans of the land, the Act also dispossessed them of other means of earning revenue.

BT: That was the nucleus of small business.
KM: Yes. So these legislative interventions interrupted the evolution of an African business class. Only small numbers really survived that.

Education also tells us the same story and confirms what I am saying. You would find that the children of those Africans who were already in business, whose parents could afford it, are the ones who ended up getting education. And of course the mission schools assisted a great deal as well. So you get an educated elite among Africans, who had exposure outside of South Africa and tended to be the leading lights of the native congresses. But the congresses still relied on the "landed gentry": those Africans who were still in possession of land and livestock. Because in the [native] reserves, there were very few who could be regarded as well off.

BT: The colonial state institutions actually blocked the path of accumulation. A country like Nigeria or Ghana had colonial rule, too, but somehow the small entrepreneurs managed to continue. There was an emerging business group, even at a low level. Today, if you go to those countries, you can see small business everywhere. And that's because colonial rule didn't stop it in the same way it did in South Africa.
KM: Because of this period of economic development that excluded the Africans, the South African economy developed into a world-class economy on the backs of cheap African labour. But I think it's important also to look at the political development. South Africa was a colony, but it became a republic in 1961. In terms of constitutional evolution, 1961 is an important milestone – even though the republic still excluded Africans.

By the time of the democratic dispensation of 1994, Africans by and large had already been removed from the land to such an extent that they were no longer tilling the land on a commercial basis at all. By 1994, it was easier for the ANC to seek a correction of these years of deprivation through the demand for inclusion of Africans in the economic arrangement, as opposed to postcolonial developments in sister countries on the continent, where the national economies still had to be established because, in the main, the colonial economies were based on extraction, raw resources, and so on.

> "If you'd had the production of millionaires from among those who were previously oppressed soon after independence or liberation in other countries, it would have raised very serious class questions. In South Africa it didn't."

In South Africa, the economy was diversified by 1994, even from mining, which was its backbone: manufacturing had evolved to such an extent. That's why the main content of the ANC is the working class, like nowhere else on the African continent, with well-established trade unions and so on. The majority of the African people were now working class people, having to take part in the money economy.

And you've correctly pointed out that in other Africa countries the process of dispossession of the land had not been as thorough as here in South Africa. Even today, one of the things that make it possible for Africans to take part in the global economy is that they have property. In countries like Nigeria, the people in the urban areas have relatives who own land in the rural areas.

If you'd had the production of millionaires from among those who were previously oppressed soon after independence or liberation in other countries, it would have raised very serious class questions. In South Africa it didn't. Because South Africa already had the Oppenheimers, the Ruperts, and so on. There was logic in saying that the main aim of liberation is that the dividends would take the form of inclusion, that Africans should be included. That is why, when some people become millionaires, it really doesn't raise any eyebrows.

ELITE FORMATIONS

BT: Can we explore this inclusion? I think it's the heart of the whole thing. When I was in parliament's trade and industry portfolio committee, we began to talk about providing shares from state enterprises. That was the first BEE [black economic empowerment] legislation. It was actually a gift system; the state would allocate certain shares to African business. By the way, I think we should talk about "African

EE", not BEE. Indian and coloured people are not really beneficiaries. And also President [Thabo] Mbeki wanted to create a black business class. It was a deliberate policy. You are saying that inclusion on the basis of historical exclusion was a legitimate idea. But the consequence of it was to create a new class.
KM: Not to "create a new class", but to expand an already existing class. Class stratification in South Africa happened without political inclusion of the Africans, but it was there. When we say inclusion, it means that liberation must flow to those who were previously excluded.

BT: But it's not an even flow. And because it's uneven, it enriches the few.
KM: In fact, the formula was such that it could only benefit a few Africans.

BT: Thereby creating an African business or capitalist class.
KM: Yes, to join in. The reason I am saying that, anywhere else, people would have been shocked – you know, "Only yesterday, we were here together in the struggle and now you people are millionaires" – but that kind of shock never happened because the acceptance of social stratification had been there for years. And so it came as no shock. If you don't get this inclusion, then you will be sustaining the exclusion. At a political level, everyone has the right to vote now, but, economically, if you say this inclusion is wrong, then you would be easily dismissed as someone arguing for continued exclusion.

BT: That's fair.
KM: But it was all muddled up politically, because there was no clarity on the formula to ensure that this dividend would flow to the broadest cross-section of those who had been previously excluded.

BT: In the name of justice, Africans had to be included at all levels in the economy. I think that's understood. But there's another side to creating a new class of African business, some of whom are very wealthy. Harking back to my original question, the emerging capitalist class is often quite consumptionist, exploitative and greedy. You said that creating this inclusion at the higher level of the economy was a bit muddled up – was that because it created this kind of grouping? Or what did you mean?
KM: The creation of this elite in itself, as you correctly point out, could pass as part of the correction of exclusion. The point I am making is that the absence of a formula for how this dividend would flow to the benefit of a broader section of those who had been previously excluded was in itself elitist and ensured that only a few would benefit from that.

Remember that affirmative action – affirming those who had been excluded for no reason other than skin colour, people who had skills – also meant there was a dividend from this now non-racialist system. People could now, particularly in the public service, move into positions of responsibility, and therefore into better conditions and earn more. That also served to buttress the feeling of a correction taking place, when in fact, in the areas where it matters most, in terms of ownership and operation of economic enterprises, it wasn't happening.

In fact BEE, as I understand it, was the brainchild of the mining industry, which deliberately went out to select blacks who could serve as insurance against possible nationalisation. They basically went out in search of blacks who were "connected" and therefore could guarantee some kind of protection. And that is why they had a small pool of people that they could rope into the first BEE deals. And they were debt-funded – the deals were structured such that payment for those shares would have to come off the profits.

For instance, the price of platinum at that time was about $400/oz. So anybody who was given a stake on the understanding that, as profits improved, they would have to pay for that stake, actually got a good deal, because the price went above $1 000/oz. With that upside, it was possible to pay the debt off. But the people who were given those shares didn't even have an interest, didn't know the operations, didn't have the patience, and so they would have sold that much earlier. They would take the money and leave.

The major beneficiaries were the financial institutions. Those were the people who made a killing out of that first generation of economic empowerment. There were companies that were huge success stories – NAIL [New Africa Investments Limited], for instance – and it was based on a pyramid structure. They actually owned 3 percent or something like that, because of this A share/B share structure. At the end, those who possessed the B shares, the institutions, said "Well, now B shares have the same value as A shares, and we want to vote." It collapsed. NAIL disappeared from the face of the earth because it was not operational.

And that's why the BEE formula actually didn't work that well, when you look at it from the point of view of getting people who firstly have an interest in the sector or enterprise and who will become operational. So that there's skills transfer and so on.

BT: You believe that BEE failed because it wasn't broad?
KM: There's a whole hierarchy of competing needs of Africans who had been excluded. To me, the

biggest crime of apartheid is in education. Given that hierarchy of competing needs, if we are to spread the dividend of liberation evenly, we then have to invest in education. We then have to ensure that we get a fundamental correction of the effects of Bantu education by investing in training colleges. They have to produce a new cohort of African teachers, capable of dealing with IT [information technology] and natural sciences. The government will not have the money to do that and, at the same time, create the basic infrastructure that is needed in the townships and the rural areas.

So, if empowerment deals were aimed at financing and ensuring the correction in education, if this whole thing was done and channelled in a way that was aimed at correcting the skills deprivation – I think we would be a different country.

BT: I agree entirely.

RENT-SEEKERS

BT: This group that emerged through this BEE process – they're a bit problematic. On the one hand, they seem to be patriotic, some of them are members of the ANC, and the ANC includes them in the motive forces in the Strategy and Tactics [discussion document prepared for national general conferences of the ANC]. Yet, on the other hand, they are actually – as you indicated – beneficiaries of a special type. So can we really regard them as part of the motive forces [of the national democratic revolution (NDR)]?

KM: My view is that they are really not a factor. What I mean is that they don't have an impact among the blacks, as it were. Their impact is minimal. It's why they channel their support, to curry favour directly from the ANC. In a sense, if we were brutally frank, they're rent-seekers who extend that role to the ANC as an organisation and therefore are very central in corrupting the ANC, as it were. And so, for them to be described as part of the motive forces can only mean that they will vote for the ANC. That's all. But they are not a factor, as I said. You can't rely on them to play a meaningful role, for example, in discussions on transformation of the economy. They have no ideas. They've no brainpower, are not engaged in research. They are not a factor, as I see them. Instead, I think, they've been included in an already existing business class, which determines the voice of that business class and the views and ideas of that business class are determined by a different set of people.

BT: But Strategy and Tactics says that because these people are still going to benefit from transformation, they are part of the motive forces. That's the argument. You don't agree with that.

KM: To mention them as a category, I think, is just being too generous.

BT: Then there is the question of the value system of conspicuous consumption. It seems to me that these people do have trend-setting importance. The lavish, expensive weddings and all that. Even if they aren't a [motive] factor, there is a political effect of that lifestyle. For example, they import everything. They drink foreign whisky, not South African brandy. It actually has a quite substantial impact. What about the commitment to transforming South African business at the higher level? What is your experience? How do they see the ANC and the "second stage" [of the NDR)]?

KM: The business community established BUSA [Business Unity South Africa] as its umbrella group. Some of the black people there, like Sandile Zungu, pulled out to establish the BBC, Black Business Council. They say BEE and BBBEE are not working the way they ought to work. The main thrust of their policy proposal is for "set asides" [e.g. for a portion of government tenders to be set aside for black companies]. And the first project that they targeted is the acquisition of rolling stock at Transnet.

BT: Even though they don't have the capital, the machinery or the track.

Let me tell you a story. When I was in jail, there was a guy who had been working with the Broederbond who was in the cell with me. He told me that under the National Party, the brother of the minister would get a letter from the minister to say, "I want so much set aside". This man would go to the bank with the letter. That letter was enough, as a letter of credit, for him to build a factory and get all the capital needed. Are we doing the same?

KM: Well, close to that.

BT: So when you say "set aside", these BBC people actually want letters of agreement from government – that is, tenders – even though they don't have the capabilities to make it work.

KM: Basically they say, "we can't go and submit proposals for the project because the white corporate world will always out-bid us there." So, say a certain percentage is set aside for black players.

BT: Even if they don't have the capital or the capability.
KM: Well, they'll go to the same white corporates.

BT: Then it's as a subordinate partner.
KM: No, they'll have the contract.

BT: They'll share.
KM: "We have the contract. You have the capability."

BT: So it's fronting.
KM: No, they don't call it fronting! [laughter] Of course they get offended if you ask those questions.

BT: So their commitment to transformation is only limited to set-asides.
KM: Yes. Remember, they have to couch their pursuit of their own interests as being consonant with the interests of blacks in general.

BT: It has to have a "progressive" character.
KM: That's right.

ANC STRUCTURES, ANC GOVERNMENT

BT: In broad terms, would you say that ANC's current policies are taking account of these developments in any way?
KM: No. I think the ANC is disadvantaged because there is no ANC brainpower outside of government. The ANC is incapable of monitoring what government is doing. When the ANC has policy conferences, the government leaders come and become the ANC leadership, to then debate and fashion policy. All the NEC [national executive committee] sub-committees are chaired by ministers, and therefore policy is determined by the same people.

If you look at, say, the Communist Party of China, the prime minister will be in charge of the economy, and he would therefore be a member of the politburo and central committee. But the brainpower would reside in research institutes outside of the central committee. And so, there's a way in which the central committee benefits from the inputs of this brainpower.

BT: The SDP [Social Democratic Party] does the same in Germany. It has independent research outfits that submit documents and papers. You would recommend that the ANC should develop independent separate capacity?
KM: Yes. Some ministers individually link up with universities, researchers and so forth. By and large it's the bureaucrats. If there's a good relationship

> In a sense, if we were brutally frank, they're rent-seekers who extend that role to the ANC as an organisation and therefore are very central in corrupting the ANC, as it were.

or the DG [director-general] has been around for a long time. Like Phil Mjwara in [the department of] science and technology, for example. He'll already have a relationship with researchers in universities and so the minister would benefit from that. But the ANC would rely on the minister. In the [NEC] subcommittee, it would be the minister; and the minister would be fed all that information through the departmental structures. But the ANC would have no such researchers who link up with universities.

BT: A final question about the ANC, the poor and the working class. The ANC claims to be the leader or vanguard of the poor, the poorest of the poor, and so on. From what you've been saying – because of the way inclusion has happened – there are very strong influences that are not pro-poor and pro-working class. Would you like to say anything more?
KM: The structures of the ANC have been bureaucratised to such an extent that I think there's a confusion of roles in communities, at local level. You have the ANC branch, the Youth League branch, the Women's League branch, SANCO branch, SACP branch, SACP youth branch. And then on government's side, there are community development workers and constituency offices.

So you have eight structures that are strategically located within communities – and communities are going without water. For weeks on end, with no response. Of course, these structures' leaders were otherwise in council. The role of these structures is to demobilise communities. It's not to convey the feelings of the community, not to convey the problems that are faced by the community. And so a matter like that is not elevated by any of these structures until the community burns down a library. It says to me that these structures have a different purpose. There's a confusion there.

BT: It's a control system.
KM: Yes, and renewal would mean confronting this kind of insensitivity, the numbness, and revitalise. When there is a cry, the ear should be able to hear that.

COMMUNITY CHEST

When freedom fails its children

27th April 1994 was a day of keen anticipation, fear, excitement and hope. It was a rainy day in Cape Town. South Africans would cast their vote, whites and blacks – equal for the first time since 1948. Casting a vote to end the racial injustice; casting a vote for freedom and for the freedom of our children.

My wife and I and our one-year old daughter left our home to walk to the polling station in Woodlands, Mitchell's Plain. There was an eerie silence across the neighbourhood. As if someone had flipped the mute switch. We set out, uncertain as to whether we will celebrate the next day or face a country further immersed in the blood of the martyrs for our elusive freedom.

I recalled my journey as I stood in line in 1994 to cast my ballot. I replayed vivid images of being chased by police across the UWC campus, of spending a weekend in a Warmbad Bela Bela Prison and of being arrested by police in Darling street Cape Town, March 1985, the day after the Uitenhage massacre. And yet, in that moment, nothing could overshadow the joyous promise that 27 April 1994 held.

However, as we reflect on 20 years of democracy, an ugly reality stares us in the face – The failure of our freedom to protect our children. Daily we read of children between the ages of 0 to 15 who are indiscriminately abused, burnt, sold, raped and murdered. Countless more die in horrific road accidents. Traffic road incidents are the top causes of death in the 9 – 14 year age group (Debbie Bradshaw, David Bourne. MRC).

The South African Constitution under Section 28 provides an important benchmark in the protection of children in South Africa. These principles on children's rights are now enshrined in the highest law of the land.

When children die due to our failure to provide them with protection and freedom then no celebration can be justified. The decimation of children, which happens under the watchful eye of the constitution, parliament, and all the protection agencies in the country, should compel our political leadership call for action from all government departments to urgently address this carnage. It should galvanise communities, religious and moral structures into action against celebrating this freedom that does not protect our children.

The miracle of 1994 is that a country gave its word to its people and to the world.

Today, 20 years later, that hope is dashed and our children are still subjected to abhorrent abuse and violent deaths.

The Community Chest, one of South Africa's oldest philanthropic organisations, know and understand that by just being charitable we cannot solve or shift any problem. We are harnessing 20 years of democracy by embarking on a focused education strategy in 2014 to help mitigate our on-going and present-day struggle for freedom and economic prosperity for families in generational poverty.

We cannot guarantee nor celebrate a stable Democracy when our most vulnerable citizens, our children, are subjected to daily violence and abuse in South Africa. We must accelerate the educational imperative and make sure our children receive an education that advances them and a community that nurtures their childhood into adulthood. No Democracy can survive without its children.

Along with my colleagues at The Community Chest and with thousands of other citizens we pledge that we will not rest, we will not stop working and we will not stop striving and agitating for that day when we can truly celebrate our freedom – the day when we can say with dignity that our children have been made safe by that freedom.

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The good and the bad in empowerment deals:

A shareholder's perspective”

By **Stuart Theobald**

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What makes a "good" black economic empowerment (BEE) deal? This is a question shareholders are asking themselves. Some have been badly stung. For instance, investors who backed Gold Fields' deal to introduce new BEE investors into its South Deep mine are now ruing the day. That deal is now being probed by US investigators who suspect it may have included corrupt payments to politically connected individuals. If found guilty, the company could face big fines.

The Gold Fields deal was not unique. In 2012, ArcelorMittal SA made a similarly cynical attempt to buy out Imperial Crown Trading (ICT). At the time, ICT was alleged to have hijacked part of Kumba Iron Ore's mining rights to the Sishen Mine. The Constitutional Court later ruled that the rights were Kumba's alone. ArcelorMittal quietly dropped the proposed transaction with ICT.

Off the record, mining executives will tell you they come under significant pressure from politicians to do deals with specific people. And as of April this year, mining companies will be required to confirm that over 26 percent of their operations are owned by black investors or face losing their mineral rights. Because that minimum has to be maintained, when one black group sells, the company has to ensure other black groups buy in. There is thus a constant flow of deals and plenty of scope for individuals to use whatever power they have to ensure that the spoils go to favoured people.

Investors have a direct interest in such deals. For one thing, they come at a cost. However they are structured, newly introduced black investors are effectively receiving a discount on their shares, which has to come at the expense of existing shareholders. Gold Fields' notorious deal, for example, cost over R2 billion, which was a direct hit to the income statement of the company and therefore a real cost to shareholders.

There is obviously a serious problem when a R2 billion deal ends up getting the company into hot water with US regulators. The US Foreign Corrupt

Practices Act is a draconian piece of legislation that is now being rigorously enforced. Any sign of a company with any US presence triggers an investigation. Gold Fields was swept up because it has a secondary listing in New York. Unsurprisingly, foreign investors are now asking whether BEE deals are by definition corrupt and whether they should simply vote against them or disinvest from companies that do them.

The answer, of course, is no. But shareholders do have work to do to ensure that companies make the right empowerment deals that deliver on the objectives of empowerment. There are three key questions to ask:

- Is the deal structured to minimise the cost to shareholders?
- Are the deal partners going to bring genuine value to the company through their abilities to advance the interests of the company?
- Does the deal advance the project of transforming South Africa's economy?

These three objectives will sometimes clash, but in the best deals they do not.

SHAREHOLDER COSTS

On the first objective, empowerment deals come at a cost, but there are various ways to minimise this. One way is to only accept black investors who have some capital to contribute to the deal. Certain big names in empowerment circles – such as Mvelaphanda, Gold Fields' first empowerment partner, or Shanduka, which was until recently Cyril Ramaphosa's firm – have now built substantial balance sheets and can afford to put cash into businesses they invest in. But this approach concentrates deals in the hands of a few already wealthy individuals, which appears to be in tension with the third objective. To transform the economy, deals should uplift large numbers of people, rather than the few.

If cash contributions by the newly introduced investors are not feasible, then two other factors can effectively lower the cost to shareholders: the way the deal is structured and the sustainability of it. Logically, deals that have the largest implied discount to the market price are also the most sustainable because they are the most likely to generate sufficient return to cover the cost of capital. These deals are structured like options, but are technically different because they ensure beneficiaries have voting rights from the start. An option gives the right, but not obligation, to the holder to buy an asset at a future date at a locked-in "strike price". If the price of the asset appreciates, it then becomes sensible to exercise the option. For example, a R5 strike price for a share worth R10 at expiry would be exercised, giving the holder a R5 profit.

For the option to reach the end of its life with a positive value in an empowerment deal, the returns from the shares also need to be higher than the cost of finance. So the key issues that affect the sustainability of the deal are the cost of finance and the strike price. The bigger the discount between the share price now and the strike price, and the lower the cost of finance, the more likely the deal will end up with a positive value.

Options are common in many areas of corporate finance and are usually used to incentivise the holders to drive up the value of the company. They have been a popular way to motivate managers of companies. But do they create the right incentives for empowerment shareholders? In part, empowerment deals are done to ensure the company complies with requirements in order to tender for projects and other business. But, like any shareholder, empowerment shareholders can do more than simply open doors through their presence. They are able to play a strategic role in a business and contribute in many ways. Options do stimulate this – empowerment shareholders have an important economic reason to make sure their contribution is substantive because it is in their interests to improve the value of the company. This can be done through the strategic input that empowerment shareholders can bring, including helping a company to better cater to a diverse and transformed marketplace. Such strategic involvement of black shareholders also goes a long way to achieving the third objective of making black empowerment far deeper than the colour of corporate shareholders' skin.

When empowerment partners do contribute value in this way, all shareholders are better off and the cost of the deal is a price worth paying. For this to happen, shareholders must ensure that the empowerment investors are able to add genuine strategic input that improves the earnings power of the company. It is too easy to see this value cynically, as obtaining the right cover by having politically powerful people exposed to your company so that they protect your interests. From the look of it, this is how Gold Fields must have thought its empowerment partners would add value. That deal was also structured, not as an option, but as a donation of shares, so the incentives couldn't have driven a return to shareholders in the long run. All that was achieved was the short-term political cover for the mining group to obtain mining rights for South Deep. But cover of this sort can become a liability as the political fortunes of the partners change. Today's powerful political figure can tomorrow be a voice in the wilderness. Shareholders, though, can stay around for a long time.

In short, then, it is wise for shareholders to avoid deals with politically exposed people whose value is not in the form of real strategic input, but only short-term political cover. They should favour those who can genuinely add long-term value that will compensate for the cost of the deal to shareholders.

VALUED PARTNERS

Who could such people be? One obvious answer is a company's own black employees, who are well positioned to add value, loyalty and commitment to the company through the incentives of an option structure. Some of the most successful deals done to date – if not all – have used this approach, including those of Kumba Iron Ore and Standard Bank.

Kumba's empowerment scheme stands out as exemplary. Its 6 209 employee shareholders received over half a million rand each from it in 2011 and have since received R100 000 in dividends. They are due to receive a further lump sum this month [March]. This has had direct benefits for the company. It has relatively calm labour relations – although the employee scheme was both a help and a hindrance in this. Some employees are not members of the scheme, as they were not employed at the time it began. As a result, the large 2011 payout led to resentment and fractious relations among employees, which contributed to a 2012 illegal strike. On the whole, though, Kumba has lower labour militancy than other mines and lower staff turnover.

Kumba's scheme has other important elements. It benefits a trust that contributes to the communities around its operations, funding development and social services including healthcare and education. Such support helps the company maintain good community relations, which can be very important to ensure an effective operating environment. Fractious community relations can inflame labour relations as well as posing a threat to the security of the business. The Marikana tragedy is the worst example of how wrong things can go when a company doesn't maintain good staff and community relations.

The third important element of the Kumba empowerment structure is the participation of Exxaro as a strategic partner. Exxaro is the largest black-owned mining company in South Africa, with significant operations of its own in the coal industry. Its participation in Kumba has allowed it to also make significant payouts to its own employees, while senior management provide direct strategic input to Kumba.

The key factor behind the success of the Kumba scheme has been the growth in the Kumba share price and the company's large dividends (technically, the empowerment scheme is at the level of its mining operation, Sishen Iron Ore, but it is Kumba's largest asset and the main driver of its performance). The share price has more than doubled over the past five years and has paid out a further 30 percent of the share price in dividends over the same period. This performance was both a function of strong global demand for iron ore and also the fruit of an efficiently run operation that has managed to meet its production targets. The returns have allowed all of the elements of its scheme to benefit handsomely.

It doesn't always work that way. Schemes can end up with depressed share prices, no dividends, and no money in the hands of beneficiaries. When that happens, things can go badly wrong – employee expectations are dashed, along with morale and labour relations. Companies have little choice in such a scenario but to start again and create a new scheme with reset prices that will have better prospects of delivering real value. While this amounts to another cost to shareholders, it can be worth incurring when the deal has the potential to provide good value to the company.

To some extent, share prices are set by forces beyond the control of a company or its shareholders. Resource prices, for instance, are determined by international markets and reflect demand by global consumers as well as the supply that reaches the markets from other sources. But three things are within its control: the strike price, the cost of finance and the strategic value the empowerment partners can deliver to the business. Shareholders need to focus on all three in order to satisfy the first two issues that matter.

UNDOING APARTHEID'S LEGACY

The third of my three questions is also important to consider. Companies should engage in undoing the legacy of apartheid by helping to change the racial makeup of the economy. This is both for independent moral reasons, in that empowerment plays a part in redress for past wrongs, and also for reasons of enlightened self-interest: a transformed economy would be more stable and offer a much larger market. Shareholders care about these things too. While foreign investors are often painted as disinterested profit seekers, many institutional investors have mandates from pension funds that instruct them to consider moral issues in their investing. Empowerment is an issue of both redress and sustainability and many international investors are willing to back it.

When does a deal not advance the project of transformation? When it is narrowly focused on a handful of already well-off black shareholders, it seems less empowering of black South Africans than a very broad deal that includes a vast number of people. However, there is an argument on the opposite side: concentrating wealth in a few black hands creates large and powerful black investment trusts that can drive black interests more effectively. It depends on who in particular would benefit from the narrow deal and whether this concentration of resources would be useful. For instance, a black investment firm with a strong record of driving change within companies and using its resources to wield a wider impact on the economy could be a strong contender. A narrow group of beneficiaries interested only in short-term wealth accumulation and no further transformative impact clearly would not be.

To my mind, a single good deal can achieve multiple effects. It can empower staff, ensure their loyalty and motivate them to contribute to the value of the company. It can ensure a good relationship with the communities within which the company operates. And it can also help black capital gain traction in the South African economy. All three of these effects are good for companies and good for the overall transformation project.

So it is remarkable that the Gold Fields deal and others like it can even be done. Whatever pressure Gold Fields was under to take the route it did, it did not serve its shareholders' interests. Shareholders have made their views clear, and will serve as a backstop against such pressure from unrelated parties. Politically connected individuals are likely to be rejected, even if they have the power to make a company's life very uncomfortable. That is as it should be.

Marikana in the media: Projecting Africans as the "child race"

By **Simphiwe Sesanti**

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On 16 August 2012, 34 miners were shot and killed by members of the South African Police Service in what later came to be known as the "Marikana massacre". Ten days earlier, Lonmin's platinum mineworkers had gone on strike, demanding an increase in their monthly wages from R5 000 to R12 500. In earlier incidents, ten people – including two security police officers, two security guards and three National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) shop stewards – had been killed and their deaths blamed on the striking mineworkers (Seale et al, 2012:1; Segar, 2012:4)

SANGOMA MYSTERY

On 19 August, the *Sunday Times* reported that a "mystery" sangoma (traditional doctor) was "believed" to be behind the "foolish courage" that caused the workers to confront the police (Shoba and Mahlangu, 2012:5). The report further noted that the medicine man, allegedly from the Eastern Cape, had provided muti to the protestors and "made them believe it would make them invincible". *City Press* similarly reported that a medicine man had instructed the mineworkers to stand naked in a single file while sprinkling them with herbs. These procedures, it was further reported, were believed to be part of a process to prepare for battle and "to make the men invincible against the enemy" (Ledwaba, 2012:4).

Wondering why workers armed with spears and pangas had confronted the better-armed police, *City Press* reporter Lucas Ledwaba concluded that the answer might lie in the statement made by Lieutenant-General Elias Mawela: "We were dealing with people who looked possessed, or believed the bullets would not work on them".

The *Sunday Times* and *City Press* are singled out here because they simultaneously gave commentary as they reported. Both sets of journalists were asked for interviews, but only those from *City Press* responded.

It is unlikely that the full truth about the alleged sangoma will ever emerge. On 26 March 2013, the *Cape Times* reported that Alton Joja, 69, the Marikana sangoma and potential police witness was shot dead on 24 March – "execution-style", according to a police media consultant, Makhosini Nkosi. The article reported that,

> while Joja may not have personally performed the rituals on the miners, he was expected in his testimony to shed light on how people who had undergone the ritual would behave… Joja had only prepared the muti and sent his sons to do the actual work in Marikana. (Tau, 2013:4)

That it was now the "sons" of the sangoma who had administered the medicine was a new twist to the tragedy. According to the first *City Press* report:

Every morning, a group of men gathered on a hill… *under the instructions of a medicine man who allegedly hails from Eastern Cape*… stripped naked, stood in a file and waited to be sprinkled with herbs" (Ledwaba, 2012:4; emphasis mine). After Joja's killing, the *City Press* journalist reported a new version. It was no longer "[e]very morning", but "*[o]n a dark, early spring night*"; no longer "under the instructions of a medicine man", but "under the supervision of *two men believed to be the sons of the now slain Eastern Cape traditional healer*, Alton Joja" (Ledwaba, 2013b:30; emphasis mine).

The original *Sunday Times* report also explicitly mentioned the sangoma, not the sons:

> The surviving miners are not talking, but union officials, residents of Marikana and the police confirmed the p*resence of the unidentified sangoma*, who carried out rituals on the hill and dished out muti where workers gathered throughout the week. It is said *the man* from the Eastern Cape had provided muti to the protestors. (Shoba and Mahlangu, 2012:5; emphasis mine)

The story of the sons' involvement emerged at the Marikana Commission of Inquiry (Farlam Commission), and its source was a counsel for the police, Vuyani Ngalwana (Morkel, 2013:6). The latest information reveals strongly that the police used the claim of the existence of a sangoma to explain that they acted in self-defence at Marikana: the miners were a belligerent group of overzealous people spurred on by their belief in invincibility aided by a sangoma.

The story of the powerfully influential sangoma was so central in the Marikana discourse that the *City Press* editorial of 26 August 2012 asked, "Why did adults believe a concoction of herbs could make them invincible?" The impression was created that responsible, mature "adults" could not believe that they would be protected by herbs. Any adults who did believe that, it could then be concluded, were infantile and inane. The *City Press* seemed to echo the *Sunday Times* report that reduced the mineworkers' motivation to "foolish courage".

THE MEDIA AND CITIZENSHIP

Against this background, this article places the Marikana tragedy in both a historical and cultural context. Seeing Africans as "foolish" when their actions are incomprehensible to those who do not share their cultural worldview is nothing new. Christian missionary education dismissed African belief systems as irrational superstition. Consequently, African products of a Eurocentric education may internalise these teachings and become desensitised. Consciously and sometimes unconsciously, Africans in the media perpetuate stereotypes about African cultural values.

Thus, to take a historical perspective, "with all its implications for people in society, is in fact an indispensable approach to the understanding of present realities" (Davidson, 1994:3). Invoking the history of Nongqawuse, an Eastern Cape traditional-doctor trainee, this article will demonstrate how Africans' belief has been used to mislead them with dire consequences, leading to being condemned as "foolish". Using the Marikana massacre as a case study within this historical context, it is argued that African cultural beliefs were vilified by some sections of the South African media without giving a platform for the community concerned to contextualise their cultural beliefs. This is contrary to the media's normative role with regard to citizens in a democracy.

Both the media and citizenship figure prominently in most appraisals of democracy today (Dahlgren, 2000:310). Cognisant that citizenship is a contested concept, this article defines it as the right to participate fully in social life and to help shape the forms it might take in future (Murdock and Golding, 2005:65). It specifically addresses itself to "cultural citizenship" (Dahlgren, 2000:317) as the right to have one's own traditions articulated in the media.

Citizens should have access to information, advice and analyses that enable them to know their rights and to pursue them effectively (Murdock and Golding, 2005:65). In a democracy, the media is expected to create an enabling environment for different groups of citizens to debate issues of social identity, group interest, political strategy and social-moral values within their terms of reference (Curran, 2005:137). This means, as Murdock and Golding (2005:65) observe, that cultural citizens should have their experiences, beliefs and aspirations represented without distortion or stereotyping.

Noting that, in practical terms, citizenship is central to the fundamental issues of social belonging and social participation, Dahlgren (2000: 318–19) further observes that citizenship thus serves as "an analytic entry into the study of the dynamics of social inclusion and exclusion". If media and citizenship theories stipulate that all members of society should be given a platform to freely articulate their cultural beliefs and have a sense of belonging, the South African media failed the Marikana miners. They failed to locate the alleged sangoma until he was reportedly executed. Instead of providing space to African culture scholars to give an informed analysis about the beliefs of the people of Marikana, those Africans were portrayed as victims of their "foolish" beliefs – just as it was done to Nongqawuse's followers.

THE "FOOLISH" BELIEF IN PROPHECY

In April 1856, in what is now the Eastern Cape, a 15-year-old girl named Nongqawuse was reportedly instructed by "strangers" to tell her community that deceased ancestors would rise from the dead and that all cattle should be slaughtered because they had been reared by "contaminated hands", where people dealt in witchcraft (Peires, 1989:79). Another instruction was that there should be no cultivation of the fields. On learning that the message had been dismissed, one of the strangers – through Nongqawuse – summoned her uncle, Mhlakaza, a traditional doctor. The strangers told Mhlakaza that they would aid amaXhosa in driving colonial whites out of their land. If these acts were carried out, there "would rise cattle, horses, sheep, goats and every other animal that was wanted and everything they would wish for to eat… and all kinds of things for their houses should come out of the ground".

Though received with suspicion initially, the instruction to kill cattle and destroy crops was ultimately carried out by many amaXhosa. On 18 February 1857, the day when the departed were supposed to rise from death, nothing of the sort happened. The sun rose and set like any other day. Instead, as Mostert (1993:1215) observes:

> [t]hey watched the waning moon and the dawn of every sun, until gradually the most vulnerable, the aged, the infirm, the very young, began to topple from hunger. One old man was found dead with his head overhanging his corn pit. He had gone with his last breath… to see if it had been filled, and lacked the strength to rise again. Others climbed down into the deep new corn pits to see if any corn from the spirit world had materialised there. They were, however, too weak to get out again and died slow, agonising deaths from both hunger and thirst.

Mostert (1993:1215–16) goes on to describe in detail how animal bones that had been cast away when carcasses lay rotting in the veld were collected and gnawed by impoverished amaXhosa. Throughout the bushes, heaps of one, two and even twelve people were found at one place, covered with animal hides, "crouched together for their last sleep" (Mostert, 1993:1216). Mostert further notes that the hungry ones who reached the soup kitchens and other relief centres were living skeletons. Many collapsed yards from where a meal was being offered or even as they put food into their mouths. The land of amaXhosa became desolate, the kraals standing empty, their occupants dead. In a land that was previously full of "thousands of bellowing cattle, its joyful children and singing women" stillness descended and there was not even "a cock left to crow" (Mostert, 1993:1216).

The question is: how could adults kill the cattle that were their life-blood? What drove the cattle-killing movement to the extent that its adherents were prepared to allow divisions among amaXhosa that tore families apart, to the extent that the cattle-killing movement people were not prepared to eat or drink in the company of the "unbelievers", let alone eat their food? Why were women prepared to divorce husbands who refused to join the cattle-killing movement (Mostert, 1993:1209)? Historical records reveal that the amaXhosa code of obedience to the chief was broken in this division, when those who owed loyalty to "unbeliever" chiefs ignored commands to cultivate and not to kill (Mostert, 1993:1205). Mostert further notes that the sons of Maqoma and Mhala (both amaXhosa chiefs) defied their fathers, while wives defied their husbands and refused to cultivate. Sutu, the mother of chief Sandile, and his wives threatened to desert him for refusing to join the cattle-killing movement (Mostert, 1993:1211).

Arguing that it is unhelpful to dismiss the cattle-killing movement as "delusion" and "superstition", Peires (1989:123) suggests that it is better "to look rather more closely at the central beliefs of the movement".

AFRICAN BELIEFS: A CULTURAL CONTEXT

Peires (1989:30) notes that religion of amaXhosa is primarily a "this-worldly" religion, more concerned with guiding people's behaviour in the existing world, and that, although there were no priests as such, traditional doctors played a similar role as they were the ones in touch with the departed ancestors. Departed ancestors are experienced in their interactions with the living: with reward for those who venerate them and punishment for those who neglect them (Wiredu, 2003:23–4). Mostert (1993:1191) is very helpful in shedding light on why Nongqawuse won the people's hearts in an ominous situation.

> Ancestral spirits occupied the most important position in Xhosa religious thinking. There was no worship of them. They were regarded as mediators between the living and the great unknown deity whose existence the Xhosa accepted. The Xhosa always thought of the dead as those who had gone on ahead to join the majority, who were all very much alive in the realm of the shades and who were closely interested in the well-being of their successors in the world. It was the startling force of the revelation of their return that fired expectation, an innovative prophecy that went far beyond anything spoken of before, and that helped to bring the wondering pilgrims to Nongqawuse.
>
> Mostert further records that, many years later, survivors of the cattle-killing movement revealed that their "excitement arose from hearing that the departed were near at hand".
>
> When the "revelation" came to Nongqawuse, two promises were made to amaXhosa if they complied. One was that they would receive new and healthy

cattle, unlike those they had, which were suffering and dying from lung sickness. The second was that whites would be driven away from their land. Both Peires (1989:124–25) and Mostert (1993:1190) note that the cattle-killing movement was strongest where the lung sickness was rife. AmaXhosa had blamed the sickness on witchcraft (Peires, 1989:125), but when the execution of witches failed to halt its spread, they concluded that the ancestors must have been displeased with them. Against this background, Nongqawuse's call – to kill their cattle as a sacrifice to rectify a wrong – made sense. When the promise failed to materialise, Mhlakaza reasoned that the failure was due to people selling their cattle instead of sacrificing them, and this view was accepted (Peires, 1989:104).

According to Mostert (1993:1185), the greatest longing of Sarhili, the Xhosa king and a cattle-killing supporter, was to see the end of British presence in South Africa and the end of the "white man's most intrusive and destructive influence upon Xhosa life, customs and territorial integrity". King Sarhili had seen his father, King Hintsa, shot dead by British colonialist soldiers and his ears cut off as military souvenirs, something he "never forgot and… never forgave" (Peires, 1989:85). Nongqawuse's message that the ancestors would help amaXhosa drive away the white colonialists held promise for the fulfilment of King Sarhili's quest.

Taking this historical background into consideration, Mostert (1993:1195) notes that those who failed to appreciate the force that drove the cattle-killing movement had failed to see the phenomenon as being, at bottom, a consequence of territorial confinement, the national despair of a people who saw no way out of their losses and defeats and the cultural onslaught of the past half century, and who, confronted additionally by the havoc of the lung sickness, had turned, as Christians themselves did in dire extremity, to the shades.

This observation is very useful for two reasons. The first reason is its recognition of the "national despair" that drove the cattle-killing movement. The second reason is the appreciation of the central role of traditional healers (or seers) among Africans. These two factors are also present in the Marikana tragedy. Failure to contextualise these beliefs historically would render an analyst unable to appreciate the cattle-killing movement or the Marikana tragedy, in which despair is a common factor.

MINERS' DESPAIR

This despair of the Marikana casualties was highlighted by the *Sowetan* report of a defiant mineworker, lying on the ground bleeding from a gunshot wound, who kept on swearing at the police and urged them to finish him off, saying "Kill us, too, please, *abelungu* [white people]" (Mabuza, 2012:2). Just like the cattle-killing supporters, who were frustrated by white domination, the bleeding Marikana man expressed his vulnerability and defiance simultaneously.

The same *Sowetan* article reported that the mineworkers felt that the leaders of the NUM, to which they once belonged, were "collaborating with their enemy, the employer". Adding to the perception of betrayal by the NUM, the president of the rival Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union, Joseph Mathunjwa, told the workers that "journalists who are covering the strike are controlled by NUM" (Mabuza, 2012: 2).

While the *Sunday Times* report appeared indifferent to the Marikana workers' despair, the editorial showed sensitivity. It claimed that "the state is no longer trusted by the poor", pointing out that poor people continue to live in conditions of abject poverty with inadequate service delivery and little prospect of economic advancement. Their children attend schools where even the cynical 40% pass rate is unobtainable due to the collapse of the education system. Their hospitals and clinics fail to deliver on the promise of basic health care. *Sunday Times*, 2012: 4)

To its credit, the *Cape Times* was sensitive towards the Marikana casualties and highlighted the despair of the miners, giving a historical context. Its editorial noted that the "anger of the miners and their families has been building up since last year, reflecting growing frustration with Lonmin's wages, safety record and employment policy and with the conditions under which mine employees live" (*Cape Times*, 2012: 8). The editorial recalled that 9 000 Marikana workers were dismissed in May 2011, and many of them also lost their lives. In the area around the mines, roads had been damaged by mine machinery, rivers were polluted and, in spite of huge amounts budgeted for corporate social investment, researchers found little evidence of spending.

The *Cape Times* also cited a 2012 Bench Marks Foundation[1] report, which noted that the level of fatal accidents at Lonmin was unacceptable. The report also found that the residential conditions of Lonmin and other mining company employees were "appalling", citing the spread of shacks, electricity cut-offs that lasted more than a month, broken drains, sewerage spills, bilharzia and chronic childhood illnesses.

If the Marikana mineworkers did allow themselves to be led or misled by a sangoma, it would be understandable considering their state of despair, as pointed out above, and Africans' historical relationship with traditional doctors, discussed below.

HISTORICAL BELIEF IN *IZANGOMA*

Historically, traditional war doctors were credited with the ability to "tie up" the enemy and nullify his weapons. If one believed that spears could be "rendered harmless", Peires (1982:67) notes, "it requires no great leap of faith to believe the same of bullets". If there was a sangoma who promised the Marikana strikers that they would be invincible to the police bullets, then their case is not unique at all.

History reveals that *izangoma* have played a great role in making and breaking people. Shaka, the Zulu king, noticed that, in times of crises, *izangoma* had falsely accused people of witchcraft and the accused were put to death (Kunene, 1979:162–63). Recognising that some were genuine and some were charlatans, Shaka smeared goat blood on the beam of his house and summoned diviners to point out the culprits. All accused innocent people, except for one who pinpointed Shaka for the misdeed. Shaka had the false *izangoma* themselves put to death. In Lesotho, a chief and seer by the name of Mohlomi, who was later to become King Moshoeshoe's mentor, warned people against deceitful diviners (Du Preez, 2004:52). Once Mohlomi hid his shield and reported it missing, and then called diviners to point out the thief. As in the case of Shaka, the diviners accused innocent people until Mohlomi exposed their lies. In later life, Moshoeshoe often played the same trick on some of his senior advisors (Du Preez, 2003:17).

While there are stories of charlatans being exposed, the truth has not been established in the cases of the cattle-killing movement and Marikana. In the former, it is known that when the believers were beginning to be wary of the claims, another prophetess, Nonkosi, confessed that Chief Mhala's councilor, Nkwitsha, had asked her to claim that she had met the ancestor spirits in the river and that they told her to tell amaXhosa to kill their cattle just as Nongqawuse had instructed (Mostert, 1993:1208). Nkwitsha himself confessed that he had walked in the rushes holding a pair of horns and bellowing like cattle for Nonkosi's benefit. He had dived into the water and, pretending to be the voice of the ancestor spirits, called out: "We are rising, we are rising." This shows that, even though there were sincere advocates behind the cattle-killing movement, there were also impostors and charlatans. Historians have helped to establish this fact.

Has journalism, as the first draft of history, helped to shed light on the existence or otherwise of the sangoma who was allegedly behind the "foolish" acts of the Marikana casualties?

CITY PRESS RESPONDS

Fikile-Ntsikelelo Moya, the *City Press* executive editor who penned the 26 August 2012 editorial that asked why "adults" believed a concoction of herbs could make them invincible, told this author that while he agreed that African culture has been used negatively against Africans, this was not the newspaper's objective. According to Moya, the editorial raised questions that were being asked widely. The newspaper "simply could not ignore it when highlighting some of the questions that had recurred in the aftermath. There was no value judgment placed on any of the questions" (Moya, 2013).

Lucas Ledwaba, the *City Press* reporter who covered the Marikana events, noted in February 2013 (five months after the shootings), that neither the media (including *City Press*) nor the police had been able to find the alleged sangoma, even though efforts were made to do so (Ledwaba, 2013b). According to him, one of the key reasons for *City Press*'s failure was the "volatility of the situation [that] made it quite dangerous for journalists to operate in this mining community, which is very differently structured from your normal residential areas". He said that the media "faced serious hostility which made operating in the area, i.e. venturing into hostels, squatter camps, a death-defying mission". In Ledwaba's view, "It would be incorrect to conclude that the medicine man didn't exist at all based on the fact that he has never been found, as there is enough evidence and information to suggest otherwise". His "evidence and information" was the "possession of videos and photographs" by the South African Police Services that showed "the men undergoing rituals under the supervision of a person presumed to be the medicine man" (Ledwaba, 2013b).

Pointing out that, up to the end of August 2012, the dominant media narrative had been "that armed workers attacked the police, who retaliated in self-defence after at least one miner shot at them", Duncan (2012:15) shows that journalists relied "overwhelmingly on official sources in the police and government, as well as the unions and their own eyewitness accounts for 'balance'". She notes that the "voices of workers who have important stories to tell have been largely silent".

USURPING THE RIGHT TO SPEAK

By referring to the victims of the Marikana massacre as "foolish", the media were re-inflicting a historical pain. For centuries, discourse on Africa has been dominated by non-Africans who unilaterally usurped the right to speak on Africans' behalf and to define the meaning of experience and truth for them, with the consequence that "Africans were reduced to silence even about themselves" (Ramose, 2003:1).

Delivering a Rhodes Memorial Lecture in 1929, former South African prime minister General Jan Smuts observed that the African is a special human "type" which "has largely remained a child type, with a child psychology and outlook" (quoted in Mamdani, 1996:5). In the mid-1940s, the chief social administrator of the Belgian Congo, Léopold Mottoulle, echoing Smuts, observed that "the coloniser must never lose sight of the fact that the Negroes have the minds of children, minds which are shaped by the methods of the educator" (quoted in Davidson, 1994:10).

Those were the days when white men in Africa were contemptuous of Africans, insisting on their own superiority and believing that "Africans had no history, culture, or civilization of their own" (Davidson, 1973:25). So powerful was this generalised assumption that the pioneering scholars of African history "had to begin somewhat defensively; it could barely have been otherwise" (Davidson, 1994:5). As Asante (2003: 50) observes, since "Europe was the centre of the world and European people the centres of history in these constructions, Africans did not have any agency except as it was granted by Europe or by contact with Europeans". For the descendants of African slaves in America, the consequence of this attitude was that "African-American communities became important because whites developed an interest in them and decided they must be studied, modified, or eliminated" (Asante, 2003:50).

If, as pointed out above, media and citizenship theory argues that all members of a society should be given a platform to freely articulate their cultural beliefs and to have a sense of belonging, then the South African media failed the Marikana miners. They failed to locate the alleged sangoma until he was reportedly executed. They did not create a platform for scholars of African culture to give an informed analysis of the beliefs of the people of Marikana. Instead, just as in the case of Nongqawuse, the Africans in Marikana were projected as victims of their own childish and delusional beliefs.

NOTE

1. The Bench Marks Foundation is an international coalition whose local partners are the South African Council of Churches, the Ecumenical Service for Socio-Economic Transformation, the Industrial Mission of South Africa, and the justice and peace department of the Southern Africa Catholic Bishops Conference.

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Bee retooled:
Steps in the right direction
An interview with **Rob Davies**

South Africa's minister of trade and industry. Ben Turok interviewed him on 5 November 2013

BEN TUROK: Let's talk about black economic empowerment (BEE) and the perception of how effective government strategies have been so far. I'll start with a favourable comment by Thami Mazwai, who says, "BEE reverses the effects of [discriminatory apartheid] policies and gives blacks special opportunities to enter the economy. Since its inception, BEE has produced scores of successes, but we need hundreds more." ("Treasury continues to fail black business", *Business Day*, 16 October 2013).

That's a very positive statement. Do you think it's a fair one?

ROB DAVIES: When this administration took office and President Zuma appointed the BEE Advisory Council, we looked quite critically at what had been achieved. It is true that there have been some successes in BEE, but we found in 2007 that the overall level of performance of the private sector in South Africa was BEE Level 7, which is almost non-compliance. It's just off the bottom: Level 8 is completely non-compliant.

Also we found that there was far too little performance in those parts of the programme that were intended to support black entrepreneurs through "enterprise development" and "supplier development". And yet, that part of the [BEE] scorecard is actually quite critical. To create productive entrepreneurs in this economy, we actually do need to have relationships, not just in supplying government, but also in supplying bigger companies, to develop something of the symbiosis there is between big and small companies in successful Asian economies.

On the other side, we found a considerable amount of – what I can say – "passive shareholding": deals that shaded over into fronting. The stereotype of fronting is that the cleaner or the gardener is called the CEO and the company presents itself as black-led, while the real control is in the hands of some white executive somewhere. That very crude form of fronting doesn't exist much anymore. What we've got is more complex fronting, where people enter into a deal thinking that they're going to be significant players on the board and then find themselves pushed into some subordinate role. The company concerned is entering into this deal because it wants to present

itself to government for some benefit as a black-empowered company.

Sometimes, too, we found that, if you pay a bit more to the verification agency, you can go up the scale. And all of this was detracting from the impact that BEE could have.

AMENDING THE BEE ACT

So we introduced an amendment bill, and one of the main things it does is to introduce a statutory definition of fronting. Up to now, the only way to deal with a case of fronting is through the common-law definition of fraud. Of course, it is fraud – because you're presenting yourself as something you're not in order to gain economic benefit – but it's difficult to follow through with that sort of criminal process. So we've introduced a statutory definition of fronting. We're also introducing a commissioner who will receive complaints about fronting. The commissioner can try to find solutions, but in the case of out-and-out fronting, the commissioner can also resort to legal remedies, take people through a judicial process. If convicted, they can go to jail. They can also be barred from doing business with government. So that's one of the main things that we've introduced there.

We're also regulating the verification industry, which has not been subject to regulation up to now. We're also bringing the [sector] charters into line with the [BEE] codes – something that's been long outstanding. We've also made some changes in the codes themselves, which are secondary legislation. The gist of them is to say, "Well, you've been able to earn points for all these sorts of things, but we don't see enough performance." And that refers to three priority areas. One is a new category called *supplier development*, which was previously "enterprise and supply development". We're saying that you actually have to achieve 40 percent of the target. You have to do the same in *skills development*. And then you can't just perform there and not deal with ownership, so we're going to do *ownership*, as well. And if a company doesn't achieve 40 percent of the target in those three categories, then it goes down one level. So if you were BEE Level 4 and you don't achieve the minimum, you go down to Level 5.

Another thing we found was that small black companies looking to perform with big companies have often been told they must go to a verification agency and spend R30–40 000 to get a certificate to say that they're black-empowered. We're saying this is nonsense. This is red tape, bureaucracy gone wild – private bureaucracy, if you like.

From now on, what will happen is that a 100-percent black-owned company will automatically be recognised as Level 1; if it's 50-percent-plus-1, it will be Level 2. Anybody who deals with these companies will have to accept an affidavit. If they think you're lying, they go to the commissioner instead of making you get an expensive verification certificate. So we've eased the burden for small black-owned companies.

Those are the main changes that we've tried to bring about. We think that BEE has scored some successes, but not enough in the areas that we have tried to focus on. And also we need to align BEE with the direction we're trying to move, in terms of business development.

The president has asked, "Where are the black industrialists?" and this is actually the next big project for the BEE Advisory Council: to work on a broader package of measures to support the emergence of black industrialists on a much more substantial scale in this country.

> Everything that we're doing is to support the emergence of real productive entrepreneurs among black people who can be suppliers of real value-added goods and services to both government and the private sector. And where they do participate in big companies, that they are part of effective management and decision-making leadership in those companies.

BT: It seems to me that this is a very elaborate way of making BEE more effective. People will say it's very bureaucratic, very rule-based.

RD: Well, there were codes in place already. Those codes were being worked on by companies, who were scoring themselves or getting scored by verification agencies…

BT: With the help of many advisors and consultants. It's spawned an industry.

RD: We've reduced the number of categories from seven to five. We've tried to make it easier, for example, for small black contractors.

INCUBATORS FOR ENTERPRISE

The point I want to make is that we don't see BEE as the only tool to achieve those kinds of transformation. We've been rolling out incubations and an incubation-support programme. We now have approved 30 projects. I rolled out the first of these in Sasolburg, the SASOL ChemCity …

BT: What is an incubator?

RD: It brings together a group of entrepreneurs who are beginning to develop a particular line of business.

It involves access to machinery and equipment in their sector, and a physical location to access informal mentoring from more-established people. They probably also get some formal training. And basically they go through the process of setting themselves up as a real productive-sector entrepreneur.

BT: And these are black businesses?
RD: They are. These programmes have been very successful in many parts of the world, even in South Africa. But we have far too few of them. The Small Business Development Agency has increased the number that it is supporting – but it's not the only support we're providing.

This is now what we want to use the [BEE] codes for. We want supplier development. If a bigger company wants someone to supply an input, they don't want bad inputs, and so they get involved in supporting those companies to become effective suppliers of what they need.

I went to a place in Japan called Toyota City, where you see a whole range of small companies that supply into Toyota dotted around the Toyota plant, all integrated into its supply chain. That's the sort of model that we need. In South Africa, we have far too much monopolisation – the "same old same-olds" – and far too little opportunity for new suppliers to enter the supply chain.

BT: There are many countries where small enterprises are abundant.
RD: The problem that we have in South Africa is that small business among historically disadvantaged black people was not just neglected under apartheid: it was actively discouraged, discriminated against and disadvantaged. That's the point. So when we talk about small business development in South Africa, we've actually got quite a backlog.

BT: How do you overcome the absence of skills and business culture?
RD: The DTI [the department of trade and industry] has latched on to the incubator programme. We need to increase that. The other thing we're focusing on now is township entrepreneurship. We've had too much of a "ladder" mentality: that it's all about people graduating out of the informal and into the formal sector. But actually, if people improve their productive capacity and their income-generating opportunities while still remaining in the informal sector, that can be a huge boost to inclusive economic growth. That's our next big project in small business development.

Again, we try to use the tool of BEE, and earning BEE points, as a lever to encourage greater involvement in active supplier development. Because we think that small black businesses should of course be suppliers to the state – but they shouldn't just see their horizons as limited to the state. They should also be in supplier relationships with private companies.

BLACK BUSINESS CRITICS

BT: Let's turn to an article in *Business Report* (4 August 2013) by Hlengani Mathebula, chairperson of the Black Business Executive Circle. This is a rather damning article. He complains about the apologetic nature of BEE, that it's an afterthought and not a central policy of government.
RD: I haven't read the article, so I don't know how the conclusions are reached there.

I would make the simple point that BEE is a matter of equity, social justice and a political imperative – but it is also an economic imperative. If our economy is going to be managed, organised, led by people drawn from only a proportion of the population, and if the access to jobs and everything is going to be limited to that part of the population, then we're going to deprive ourselves of an economic opportunity, of drawing on the talents, the abilities and the spending power of a much larger part of our population. That's the economic imperative.

Has BEE lived up to what it promised, or should have delivered? Well, I said already that we made a critical review and we don't think that it had enough of an impact, or the right impact. Which is why we've introduced changes in the law and in the codes.

BT: First of all, Mathebula says that BEE is a threat to the local retail industry. He says that business should wake up and be part of the global market, the huge overseas market. And that this is something that should spur BEE. Do you think that BEE threatens local retail?
RD: The retail sector in general? I think we are looking to encourage the retail sector to work with the local productive industries, so that the retail sector becomes a tool of development of the productive forces of our country. There are a number of dimensions to that. For example, some of the retail firms in the fashion and clothing industry are working with local clothing manufacturers, and this has led to something of a new revival. Those are the kinds of relationships we're seeking to build. I don't know what the other problems of the retail sector are, that are identified there [in the article], but we support the retail sector becoming a vehicle for much more support for local manufacturing.

BT: Well, he seems to suggest that government is trying to confine black people to tuck shops and hair salons. Is there any truth in that?
RD: Part of the thrust is for black people to become involved in the productive economy and we're responding to the call by the president for the creation of many more black industrialists. That's what the changes that we've made up to now are intended to

contribute towards. And as I said already, the next big project of the Black Economic Advisory Council is to look at a broader set of programmes to try to achieve that.

We would say that the ability of black industrialists to emerge and to become globally competitive exporters would actually be desirable. But let's start where we can start. We don't have tons of people who are poised to play that role right now.

BT: The next argument refers to the loan given to Luminance [Ndalo Luxury Ventures]. Mathebula says, "Luxury industries are not immune to empowerment. They're not the preserve of some and not others."

RD: We went in some detail through the Luminance transaction and we met with the [parliamentary] portfolio committee. We said there that there are no holy cows: we can't say that some parts of the economy are not areas for empowerment. Supporting a luxury goods sector is not a problem *per se* for the National Empowerment Fund. But we did say that we need to look at how that retail outlet relates to productive activities in South Africa. That transaction, even the work done by the NEF, led to improvements in the local procurement of that particular enterprise. Their shop was supporting co-operatives and locally made products.

We also were concerned that some part of that loan finance was going to import finished stock. Where [state] entities are giving grants, loans or support incentives for the import of finished goods, there has to be a higher barrier – and the DTI needs to be part of that, as the executive authority and accounting officer. We need to be part of that decision.

We've issued a new instruction to all the entities that the provision of resources from the DTI should not, in general, be made available to support imported finished goods. And if the entity feels there's an overwhelming case – in terms of some economic argument – that there should be a variation from that, they must approach us and we must be part of that decision. That's what we said in terms of the Luminance transaction, and it gets back to what I've been saying about retail. Retail can be a tool to support local production and manufacturing. If government is providing resources and support for retail, that is what we want to see in return.

BT: Going back to Thami Mazwai. His article objects very strongly to the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA), alleging that black business is heavily discriminated against by the Treasury. Speaking on behalf of the Black Business Council, he says the Council

> wants the Act scrapped as it negates the spirit of BEE. According to the Act, preference is given for BEE on the basis of an 80:20 formula for contracts worth R500 000 or less; and 90:10 for those worth more than R500 000. This means BEE will account for only 20 percent or 10 percent of contracts and the remaining 80 percent or 90 percent will be for pricing, expertise, competency, etc.... The Treasury argues that it must protect the taxpayer…

He uses some rather strong language: "It appears that the Treasury does not care a hoot what black business thinks." This isn't directed at your department, but Treasury is part of the cabinet and therefore there is a collective responsibility and you're part of those discussions.

RD: I know that the Black Business Council does support a change in that formula and they're very critical of the PPPFA. It's ultimately Treasury's call and it's work in progress.

But what we do need to safeguard is that, where we award preferential contracts and empower black-owned companies, we are actually empowering people to become real performers and real players. Not agents. I think that's going to be the thing. We don't want people who get a contract they can't carry out, then go to the white business and just add a premium for government. That model is not acceptable.

BT: How widespread is that?

RD: I don't know, but we hear many, many anecdotes about the price of things procured by government. We need, I think, to address that question frontally and substantially. The DTI is part of those processes, debates and discussions, which are not concluded at this point.

> The problem that we have in South Africa is that small business among historically disadvantaged black people was not just neglected under apartheid: it was actively discouraged, discriminated against and disadvantaged. That's the point. So when we talk about small business development in South Africa, we've actually got quite a backlog.

THE BOTTOM LINE

BT: I think that our readers would like some general observation from you about the feeling in cabinet concerning black entrepreneurs and the current style of doing business. Is there something generally worrying? Is there a considerable amount of genuine entrepreneurship that is productive and adding value? Is it a box-ticking system?

RD: Everything we're doing is to support the emergence of real productive entrepreneurs among black people who can be suppliers of real value-added goods and services to both government and the private sector. And where they do participate in big companies, that they are part of effective management and decision-making leadership in those companies. That's what all the work we've done is intended to achieve.

BT: How successful are you in promoting that?

RD: Again, it's work in progress. As we have been signalling that this is the direction we're moving, we see that there is a degree of progress – for example, in the research that was presented at the BEE Summit. We know that many black entrepreneurs who want to be productive do find themselves frustrated in one form or another, by fronting and things of that sort. That's what we're trying to deal with.

On the other hand, I don't know the extent or the numbers, but we know that there are people around – we come across them all the time – whose practice is simply to go to the established white-owned supplier to buy something, add a premium, and then sell it to government. We know that this is the case.

Government is unapologetically saying that we're not interested in that any longer. We're moving away from that model. You come along and say you can give us a value-added service? We will work with you to enhance your capacity to do that. We will support you in various ways. But the idea that we're going to come along and just allow you to rent-seek – which is what it amounts to – without in any way transforming social relations or ownership patterns or skills development? We're not interested.

BT: Are you able to actually build in and impose conditions like this?

RD: These are normally things that are built in by Treasury. I think their new Office of the Chief Procurement Officer is dealing those kinds of matters.

BT: But DTI doesn't build it into your contracts and programmes?

RD: As a department, we're not a big procurer. We don't have lots of tenders. But one of the things we have been pushing for is the designation of local content. We need consistency. So whoever is going to be a player – supplying to the infrastructure programme or regular services in government – is going to have to start adding more value in this economy. To a decreasing extent are we wanting to sit around and buy fully imported products, and even less do we want to buy fully imported products from people who are agents, who are just adding a premium.

BT: Your department has had a long history of engagement with BEE. It's had black advisory councils going back to the days of Alec Erwin. Standing back, do you feel that all this effort has helped to create a progressive, productive, black middle class or business class? Or has it in fact facilitated – let me use a simplistic term – a parasitic category in our society?

RD: For many years after 1994, BEE was a policy focus, but it didn't have any shape or framework. It was only in 2003 that the BEE Act came into force, so we're talking about ten years of BEE legislation.

Before that, there were many models developed in the private sector, and a number of those had some element of fronting, some were enriching people as individuals. A lot of "recycling" and so on. The Act was intended to avoid all the identified weaknesses of BEE, to broaden it, and to create a lever whereby entities that seek a tender or a regulatory or other benefit from government have to show some performance in BEE. As I said, we've identified a number of weaknesses, and we're trying to strengthen the framework in the direction of support for more productive black entrepreneurs who are capable of adding value in this economy. That's what we're trying to do. Will it achieve everything we want? I doubt it. Is it a step in the right direction? I'm sure it is.

The institution that I've mentioned a few times, the BEE Advisory Council, was provided for in the Act and did not come into existence until the start of this administration. It is chaired by the president, and has been the sounding board, the advice centre, which has underpinned all the work we've done in this administration to try to improve BEE.

BT: Given that the main objective of the government and the ANC is to transform the economy, and given that the economy is heavily dominated and heavily monopolised, does this whole BEE process – even the productive aspects – make a dent?

RD: We shouldn't overload what BEE is expected to achieve. It's one policy instrument, one policy thrust, among several others. We also need to industrialise our country; to support small business activity in other ways; to address concentration, particularly where it results in undesirable behaviour like the cartels in the construction industry. There is a whole number of other instruments that need to come together. Of course we have to combine empowerment with all the other objectives we're trying to achieve. That's really the challenge.

BOOK REVIEW

Unpacking South Africa's road to **democracy**













Every nation emerging from conflict, big or small, is faced with the almost obligatory task of telling the story of that conflict period. This may have to be to rectify distortions contained in the often propagandist messages disseminated by the conflicting parties, to fill gaps left wittingly or unwittingly in the narrative, to tell the story as a lesson for future generations, or simply to record the story for posterity.

The story of the South African struggle for liberation is no different. The intricacies of its meander through various phases, guises and forms needed to be told, and the initiative by the South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), through a history-book series aptly titled *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, filled the yawning gap in the telling of our history.

The series, consisting of six separate volumes, charts South Africa's often tumultuous passage towards democracy, gathering together a rich and varied tapestry of narratives, chronicling four decades of political struggle, from 1960 to 1996. The historical volumes provide a new dimension that reveals unique information, consisting of first-hand accounts of events that occurred during the liberation struggle.

Nobody could have put it better than struggle stalwart and SADET chairperson, Dr Essop Pahad, when he said the series 'contributes to enabling and empowering the oppressor and the oppressed, the exploiter and the exploited, to discover their common humanity as South Africans'.

Indeed, there can be no avenue more powerful for a nation chiselled from the power of a pen to redefine itself and shape a new destiny. What makes it even more powerful is that it is a history written by South Africans and Africans, and tells our story through the words of ordinary people who went on to do extraordinary things.

The series also ushers in the beginning of a partnership between Unisa and SADET. For Unisa, this venture not only provides an opportunity to play an active role in the rewriting of South Africa's history, but it also enables the university to demonstrate its key role as a producer of knowledge and a leader in initiatives aimed at helping South Africa and Africa reclaim their rightful place among the nations of the world.

The series is a riveting read that is guaranteed to leave you with a full sense of how South Africa's road to democracy took shape, including the forces that were at the forefront of this historic period.

To obtain copies of the series, contact Veronica Mkhabela on 012 429 8965 or mkhabv@unisa.ac.za, or visit www.unisa.ac.za/press.

UNISA university of south africa

NEW BOOK - ADVANCE NOTICE

With My Head above the Parapet

★★★★★

By

BEN TUROK M P

★★★★★

An Insider Account of the ANC in Power

Publication by Jacana, April 2014



**Why have South Africa's politics become so turbulent?
Is this a symptom of fatigue in the ANC government?
Is there scope for new political parties to the left of the ANC?
Given our substantial natural resources why is growth so elusive?
Can present economic policies lead to growth?**

This book attempts to answer these questions. It gives an insider account of the political developments in the ANC and in government since 1994 and goes much deeper than the media has, in particular on the way decisions are arrived at and how economic policy has emerged.

Ben Turok has been part of this history for 6 decades. He was a speaker at the launch of the Freedom Charter, an accused in the Treason trial, in the top leadership of the Congress Alliance in the 1950's, and a foundation member of Umkonto we Sizwe. Since 1994 he has been an ANC Member of Parliament serving in the Finance and Trade and Industry Committees as well as the Ethics Committee. He is the editor of the independent journal NEW AGENDA.

While Ben Turok remains a committed member of the ANC he has retained a degree of independent mindedness which he has expressed in public on various occasions. In this book he goes beyond that and analyses the weaknesses and failures of the ANC in government while yet acknowledging its achievements. On several occasions he has been taken to task by leading elements in the ANC but he remains committed to the broad mission of the ANC.

"There is no doubt that Professor Ben Turok is among formidable political thinkers in South Africa today; as is borne out by this book. He brings twenty years of parliamentary experience to bear on a comprehensive explication of South Africa today." **Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe**

"What any democracy needs is a class of people who are fiercely independent. Ben Turok is one of these." **Professor Jonathan Jansen, Vice Chancellor, University of Free State**

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Growing pains: the story of a young nation coming of age

By **Professor Mandla S Makhanya**

The year 2014 has arrived – and with it the marking of two decades since the advent of democracy in South Africa. Such a historic moment is worthy of a collective reflection. In fact, many a social commentator is having a field day dissecting the meaning of this epoch-making period, particularly since the release of the 20 Year Review Report this year.

While democracy dictates that we allow space for the expression of divergent views on the state of our nation, it is also critical to advocate for a balanced and less emotional assessment, so that we may grasp the full import of where we stand as a nation.

It is also key to remind ourselves that, since 1994, our experience does not differ from that of a child growing from infancy to adulthood. We have experienced the ups, downs and growing pains associated with progression to maturity and adulthood.

It may not have been all plain-sailing, but this country still has a story to tell. It is one of triumph over adversity, and a resilience matched by few nations.

Importantly, what remains etched in memory as our greatest achievement is the creation of a legitimate state, born of the relics of a fragmented, unequal and illegitimate regime. The new state, masterfully crafted by our founding father, Nelson Mandela, is the outcome of the peaceful settlement that has become the envy, aspiration and benchmark of the world. Today, we boast of a constitutional regime that provides a fertile ground for the expression of all human rights imaginable.

Looking at the 20 Year Review Report, backed by practical experience and broader national consensus, it is indisputable that we have indeed made many great strides. The last two decades have seen significant achievements in health, education, nation-building and other key priorities.

However, it would be remiss of us to imagine that this period has not been without challenges. On the contrary, we now acknowledge that over 360 years of damage caused by segregation can simply not be reversed in a mere 20 years. Not with the kind of machinery the new state inherited, which proved to be dysfunctional, inefficient and inadequate to cater for our new society.

Worse, the new state now has to grapple with new challenges such as a limited fiscus, slowness in service delivery, corruption and maladministration, among others.

However, one can say without equivocation that we have learnt many lessons in the last 20 years – lessons that have become quite instructive as we continue on a trajectory of bettering our society. The rampant service-delivery protests, voter apathy in the last local government elections and the growing despondency of our compatriots have necessitated a re-imagining of our quest for a better society.

Credit must go to the leadership of this country for reading the signs and making the necessary interventions. That we can today speak of initiatives such as the Dinokeng Scenarios and the diagnostic report of the National Planning Commission, for example, is irrefutable evidence of a leadership which has a finger on the nation's pulse.

The National Development Plan and the National Skills Plan, blueprints emanating from the diagnosis of South Africa's problems, will come to pass as the catalysts to the solution of the country's problems. Warts and all, they represent the best attempt yet by the democratic state to present South Africa with a master plan that possesses such great potential for success. What is left now is our commitment and will to make South Africa work.

Establishing a national monitoring and evaluation system

By **Ian Goldman, Ronette Engela, Ismail Akhalwaya, Nolwazi Gasa, Bernadette Leon, Hassen Mohamed, Tumi Mketi and Sean Phillips**

The authors are senior officials in the DPME, where Goldman heads the Evaluation and Research Unit responsible for developing the national evaluation system. This paper is adapted and updated from a paper produced in the World Bank's Nuts and Bolts of M&E series, published in September 2012.[1] The World Bank has given permission for the material to be used.

Collins Chabane

South Africa has a number of actors with legal or constitutional mandates for monitoring and evaluation (M&E). There has been a major shift in emphasis since 2009, in part stimulated by a political need to improve service delivery, as well as extensive exposure to international experience by both technocrats and political leadership. As a result, a ministry and department of performance monitoring and evaluation (DPME) were created to advance the M&E agenda. DPME has introduced a number of initiatives, including a focus on the government's 12 priority outcomes; the assessment of management performance of national and provincial departments; a new system of monitoring front-line services; and a national evaluation system. Two new systems are being piloted: a municipal performance assessment tool and a citizen-based monitoring tool. These represent a major increase in the availability of evidence for policy and decision-making. Rapid recent progress is due to strong support at the outset from the president, learning from international experience, and strong teams in DPME and National Treasury. Despite these positive developments, significant challenges remain to ensure the coherence of reform initiatives between central government departments, improving administrative data quality, and establishing M&E as a core role of management.

THE NATIONAL EVALUATION SYSTEM

South Africa's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) work in the 2000s focused on monitoring, although some departments undertook evaluations. In 2011 a study tour to Mexico, Colombia and the US led to development of a National Evaluation Policy Framework, adopted by Cabinet in November 2011. A strategic approach has been taken focusing on important policies/programmes/plans, and those selected are embedded in a National Evaluation Plan. The focus has been on utilisation: all evaluations will be made publicly available unless confidential, and they must have an improvement plan, which is then monitored. The approach emphasises learning rather than a punitive approach, so as to build evaluation into the culture of departments and not promote resistance and malicious compliance.

Evaluations can happen from prior to an intervention (e.g. a diagnostic evaluation to identify the root cause of problems, and the options that could be considered for addressing them), through understanding implementation to looking at impact – identifying the impact and attribution of interventions, and how they can be strengthened.

Evaluations are implemented as a partnership between the department(s) concerned and DPME, and DPME partly funds the evaluations (with an average of R750 000 per evaluation). Eighteen guidelines have been developed, as well as standards for evaluation and competencies for programme managers, M&E staff and evaluators. A series of six training courses has been developed and over 600 government employees have been trained in the evaluation system.

The first National Evaluation Plan was approved by Cabinet in June 2012, with eight evaluations, and National Evaluation Plans approved for 2013/14 and 2014/15. Thirty-eight evaluations are completed, under way or starting, from evaluations of nutrition programmes for Grade R under-5s to business process outsourcing schemes, rural development programmes and human settlements programmes. A similar process is happening at provincial level, where two provinces have developed provincial evaluation plans (Western Cape and Gauteng). DPME is currently working with five other provinces to develop provincial evaluation plans. Three departments have also developed departmental evaluation plans, and one metro (Tshwane).

MONITORING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Local government is performing poorly and at present there is no integrated set of minimum norms and standards of performance (administrative, political or service delivery). Drawing on the monitoring of management performance of national and provincial departments, DPME is working with key national and provincial partners to establish a similar process for municipalities, to provide an integrated and holistic picture of performance of each municipality. The objectives are to:

- enable strategic leadership of the local government sector and inform policy reform initiatives
- provide evidence for tailored and co-ordinated support and/or intervention measures to specific municipalities
- guide national and provincial departments to better support municipalities in identified areas of underperformance.

The municipal assessment tool is at a draft stage and covers planning, human resources, financial, service delivery, community engagement, and governance. It is being finalised and piloted in selected municipalities.

CITIZEN-BASED MONITORING

Citizen-based monitoring (CBM) is an approach to monitoring government performance that focuses on the experiences of ordinary citizens in order to strengthen public accountability and drive service delivery improvements. A CBM tool has been designed and, in August 2013, Cabinet approved the CBM Framework for Strengthening Citizen-Government Partnerships for Monitoring Frontline Service Delivery. By approving the framework, the South African government has, at the highest level, committed itself to measuring its performance through the experiences of citizens. The first phase of the CBM pilot process has commenced in two sites in the Free State and KwaZulu-Natal and will be rolled out to further sites during 2014/15, with the aim to develop and test a model that can expand to national scale.

EMERGING SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES

Some initial impacts of the South African M&E system emerging include:

- increasing the strategic focus of government on achieving a limited number of outcomes. Quarterly reports provide Cabinet with a strategic agenda and a quarterly focus on progress in the key priorities of government
- introduction of whole-of-government planning linked to key cross-cutting outcomes, clearly linking inputs and activities to outputs and the outcomes
- a higher level of understanding of how the work of the different departments affects each other, and greater co-ordination between departments and spheres of government
- more systematic monitoring and evaluation is beginning to facilitate more efficient use of limited resources

- the emphasis on measuring results is working as a catalyst for change and some departments are embracing the approach, putting in place improvement plans, focusing on measurable results, and improving their data.

These successes have been supported by several factors. First has been presidential and high-level political commitment to a strong M&E system. Although the exact form of this has not necessarily been clear, has varied in focus, and has evolved in practice, this commitment has facilitated the rapid build-up of capacity, and DPME now has around 200 people on staff.

Institutional factors include

- a strong National Treasury, a well-established departmental planning and reporting system (even if there are some challenges with it), as well as support from Treasury to departments for improving financial management capacity
- capacity to undertake evaluations in some departments and the Public Service Commission
- the presence of the EU-funded Programme to Support Pro-Poor Policy Development (PSPPD)[2], promoting evidence-based policy-making. Having a flexible support facility has been crucial in supporting the emergence of DPME.

A very strong and high-quality team has developed in the DPME, which has enabled the rapid development and implementation of the system and the increasing credibility of DPME.

South Africa has sought to avoid re-inventing wheels, using study tours, research, exchanges and building on-going networks with peer countries to see what is useful. In addition reflective processes are being used to ensure that we learn as we go.

CHALLENGES

The challenges to be addressed in our next stages can be broken down into several areas. In terms of coherence and co-ordination, they include:

- strengthening the coherence of centre of government departments and their roles in the M&E system, ensuring a common conceptual base and that systems integrate better. DPME is currently considering introducing legislation to address some of the gaps and overlaps
- strengthening the role of outcome implementation forums in co-ordinating implementation of the outcomes
- improving the status of M&E as a key part of the strategic function, essential for planning and budgeting, tracking progress, learning, and improving implementation.

In terms of monitoring and reporting:

- avoiding duplication of reporting, and addressing the view of some actors that DPME is duplicating the work of the auditor-general, National Treasury, etc.
- strengthening the incorporation of monitoring as part of the management function, facilitating continuous improvement
- improving citizen feedback as part of the monitoring system, which can speed up improvement cycles
- strengthening monitoring of local government
- now that an evaluation policy framework has been developed, finalising a policy framework that includes monitoring.

In terms of planning:

- better integration of planning systems, and their linkage with M&E. A specific challenge is improving the planning of implementation programmes at much lower levels than budget programmes (including developing log frames with a matrix of indicators), which will facilitate programme implementation as well as M&E
- improving the ability to predict (and so hopefully avoid) problems – a key desire of politicians.

And in terms of support roles:

- strengthening the capacity to use evidence to support policy- and decision-making. This includes policy and data analysis skills and bringing in additional skillsets, such as operational analysts, to improve problem-solving
- improving the quality of administrative data and, where possible, getting single entry of data at field level.

SUSTAINABILITY

The measure of DPME's success will be when many of its functions have been internalised in departments. Key ways in which sustainability is being addressed include:

- moving from a directive style to a co-ordinating style, where DPME is a champion and shows leadership around M&E, but builds the involvement and commitment of partners
- enhancing the use of M&E information, e.g. for Cabinet, so key decision-makers see the value
- building alliances, e.g. through the national Evaluation Technical Working Group, pro-active work with Treasury, joint study tours, M&E Forums
- building forums which strengthen the M&E voice (e.g. national and provincial)
- strengthening capacity around M&E, using learning events, exchanges, training
- strengthening the perception of the value that DPME provides to help departments achieve their objectives, to internalise M&E and to use it for improving performance, in the process ensuring that departments take the credit for

success (This was a significant lesson from the UK experience.)

- looking to simplify systems, e.g. to reduce duplication in reporting, and so increasing the perceived value
- increasing responsiveness to politicians, so they see M&E as adding value to what they wish to achieve.

Areas where further work is needed include:

- continuing to improve the effectiveness of outcomes planning and M&E and ensuring it is adding value
- developing political consensus on the importance of internal monitoring as part of a broader public service reform and management development process, and that supporting continuous improvement is a key task of a central M&E co-ordinating body like DPME
- strengthening the legislative base around M&E to institutionalise the role of the Presidency, thus reducing the risk of relying on a single strong political champion who is vulnerable to political changes.

Overall, the system has evolved tremendously in the few years that the DPME has been in existence. The systems are developing credibility and should be fairly well established by the end of the current term of government. Stability in the DPME team is needed for the systems established to flourish and have impact.

CONCLUSIONS

South Africa is an example of rapid development and implementation of an M&E system within a sufficiently favourable situation, and also of how the use of international experience can speed up the process. Unlike its peers, South Africa has tried to establish the M&E system across both national and provincial levels, and is now developing the local government and citizen contribution components to the system. This reflects the reality that implementation happens at the local level, but it also increases the complexity of the process, with many different stakeholders who have to buy in to the system and change their behaviour.

The system is not yet consolidated across the multiple actors, and there is a long way to go in developing a culture of M&E in the government. The relationship between the key centre of government stakeholders, notably the DPME and the National Treasury, is a critical issue, and considerable work is under way to strengthen it through practical technical collaboration as well as higher-level relationship building.

The system is promising and much has been achieved in two years. However it is still emergent and not yet fully institutionalised, and it is too early to see extensive use of M&E information in decision-making. The next three to five years will see what contribution the M&E system really makes to improving performance and accountability, and it is an important experiment to document.

NOTES

1. The fully detailed 2012 article is available online at www.africa-platform.org/sites/default/files/resources/establishing_national_me_system_in_sa.pdf.

2. The PSPPD is a partnership between the Presidency and the EU. It supported a wide range of research and capacity development activities, including study tours, exchanges, seminars and conferences; supported the development of the M&E system (notably evaluation); and undertook some knowledge management.

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EMFULENI LOCAL MUNICIPALITY

Vaal River City, the Cradle of Human Rights

CELEBRATING 20 YEARS OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY

Cllr NG Hlongwane: Exetutive Mayor of Emfuleni

Emfuleni Local Municipality has made significant strides since democracy in improving access to basic services, says Executive Mayor, Cllr Greta Hlongwane.

A lot has been achieved in the extension of basic services since 1994 in turning Emfuleni around, but much more still needs to be done. At the dawn of our 1994 democratic government, the now Emfuleni Local Municipality's social fabric and economy has been affected by the impact of the political and economic transitional strategies of the Apartheid era forces. These are:

- the black society was emerging from an intensive violent offensive of the regime, including the Boipatong and Nangalembe massacres.
- the effects of a protracted political struggle to fight the Black Local Authorities and the tricameral parliamentary system epitomised by the September 3 (1983) revolution had taken its toll on the community.
- the effects of protracted legal battles, including the Sharpeville Six trial and the Delmas Treason trial and so forth, were still pervasive.
- the devastating impact of the privatisation of ISCOR (ArcelorMittal) and the resultant job losses, which created the Kwa-Masiza Hostel legacy and other single hostels, which became havens of unemployment, lawlessness and abject poverty, were daunting.
- the declining steel economy and flight economic investment, followed by the privatisation of SASOL and its job shedding, were pulling livelihoods down.
- spiralling and uncoordinated mushrooming of informal settlements due to immigration were stretching infrastructure capacity.

Over the past 20 years

- The social stability was steadily reinstated through democratisation of social engagement and governance.
- Transformation and merging of Apartheid era government structures was sustained.
- People-centered development and the delivery of basic services to all residents including indigents has been accelerated. ►

EMFULENI LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
Vaal River City, the Cradle of Human Rights

CELEBRATING 20 YEARS OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY

Emfuleni continues to retain its blue drop status over consetutive years

The formal trade bilateral: Quzhou and Emfuleni Municipalities

Social and economic change

Emfuleni Local Municipality consists of two major economic nodes, namely Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark. Vereeniging registered gross domestic product (GDP) of 2.6%, while Vanderbijlpark registered a GDP of 2.2% for 2004.

While it is indicated that Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark are the two main economic nodes, the statistics provided are that of the magisterial districts of Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark, Meyerton for example is part of Vereeniging magisterial district.

ELM's combined GDP per region (current price R1000) for 2004 was estimated at R23,445,216, and therefore contributed about 4.8% to the Gauteng GDPR in 2004, and contributed an estimated 93.8% to the Sedibeng economy based on GDPR for the same year.

The number of employed people has tremendously increased from 93 537 in 2001 to 202 543 in 2011. The unemployment rate has decreased from 45% to 34% in 2011.

The total ELM budget was estimated at R1.08 billion in 2002/2003 financial year and has increased to R4.35 billion in 2012/2013 financial year. About 60% of roads in Emfuleni are paved/tarred, which provide the residents with better access to public transport, whereas 40% are either paved or gravel.

Human settlements and social services delivery

- Government has built more than 46 000 houses in ELM since 1994.
- The number of ELM households have significantly increased from 186 926 in 2001 to 220 135 in 2011.
- There is a slight decrease on the average household size from 3.5 per household in 2001 to 3.3 in 2011.
- All formal and informal houses on formalised stands have access to basic services such as water, electricity, sanitation, and refuse removal.
- The number of concrete block structure has increased from 132 038 in 2001 to 166 909 in 2011, whereas the number of informal dwelling or squatter settlement has decrease from 17 190 in 2001 to 12 974 in 2011.
- There is 98% electricity coverage in the entire Emfuleni formal settlements.
- Free Basic Electricity (FBE) is made available to all registered indigents at 50kWh per month. FBE is provided to approximately 3 411 consumers on a monthly basis.
- There is 100% sanitation coverage in all formal settlements.
- There is 100% water supply coverage to all formal settlements, and

the informal settlements receive water in accordance with the RDP standards.

- Households with access to piped water increased from 129 485 in 1996 to 207 341 in 2011.
- The Municipality has been one of the leaders in providing safe potable water to its community by receiving Blue Drop Certification for the past two years, with an increase in compliance from 94.75% in 2011 to 96.87% in 2012.
- There is 95% refuse removal in all formal settlements.
- The tarred road network hierarchy comprises of 245km of primary roads, 204.4km of secondary roads, 206.1km of main tertiary roads, and 772.4km of tertiary roads, giving a total of 1,484km of tarred roads
- A total of 813 396 public health users had access to the comprehensive PHC core package through the clinics of Emfuleni Local Municipality. ELM manages 18 fixed clinics and three mobile clinics.

Economic Opportunities

Over the past five years major projects have been implemented in the Municipality. The following developments were achieved:

- construction of Makro wholesale next to Bedworth Park;
- construction of Evaton Plaza;
- construction of Vaal Mall;
- construction of Lethabong Mall;
- construction of Palm Springs Mall;
- construction of Three Rivers Mall;
- establishment of R42 Commercial Developments;
- upgrading of Dickinson Park;
- construction of Mandela Square in Sebokeng; and
- Lefelong Economic Centre in Bophelong.

In additional to these developments, the Municipality has managed to:

- spend all Municipal Infrastructure Grant to the amount of R221 million. This amount was made available by the National Treasury, to fund much-needed service delivery projects that included the construction of roads, sewer networks, water networks, electrification of low-cost housing, building of community amenities and facilities. The spending level or rate is currently at an overwhelming 99% with the Gauteng Provincial Treasury. The Municipality is thus regarded as one of the best performing municipalities in terms of spending all committed funds to projects.
- create 484 job opportunities through the above-mentioned infrastructure projects.
- create additional 1 386 job opportunities through the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) with its communities.
- establish eight sectoral forums and registered 160 cooperatives.
- train 100 people as an initiative to support small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs).
- develop 10 informal trading stores in Vereeniging.
- allocate 445 informal trading stores to various informal traders in the CBDs of Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark. ►

EMFULENI LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
Vaal River City, the Cradle of Human Rights

CELEBRATING 20 YEARS OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY

20 YEARS OF FREEDOM south africa 1994 - 2014

Improved local public services

- We have provided 100% access to water and sanitation to all households in our municipal area.
- We have provided 100% access to electricity and waste removal to all our households.
- We are under the top 12 municipalities in South Africa performing successfully well on the coveted Blue Drop status. We retained this prestigious award certification for the third consecutive time, scoring 96,8% against the national score of 98,1% by improving the water drinking quality of the institution. In 2010 we scored 95,74%, and 96,42% in 2011, and 98,8% in 2012. We achieved our drinking water quality summa-cum-laude for three consecutive years.
- We have partnered with our bulk water supplier Rand Water to ensure improved water infrastructure at Palm Springs to the amount of R15 million by fitting new pipes and pressure valves.
- We signed a three-year Private Public Partnership (PPP) agreement with our strategic partners SASOL/GIZ for the implementation of the Water Conservation Project.
- We commissioned a new sewer pump station in Johandeo to reduce sewer spillages.
- We have achieved an effluent compliance level on average of 97% at our three water treatment plants.
- We implemented the Bontle–ke–Botho programme to educate our communities on the beauty of the surrounding environment.
- We electrified 963 new low-cost houses in Tshepong, as well as an additional 1 350 houses in Tshepiso, Extension 3.
- We graded 1 027km of gravel roads in our municipality.
- We tarred 75km of road.
- We completed successfully 20 500 square metres of road marking.
- We upgraded the Evaton Library to the amount of R1,8 million through the Provincial Grant.
- We upgraded the Zone 13, Sebokeng Library to improve its access and usage.
- We hosted the annual Vaal River Carnival by attracting 121 000 participants.
- We upgraded Dickenson Park to the amount of R40 million to improve access to the recreational facility.
- We embarked upon a "Born-to-Read" programme by attracting 2 250 participants.
- We extended our closing operational times from 16h15 to 19h00 at our local clinics to improve access to community health services.
- We extended additional antiretroviral treatment sites to benefit people living with HIV/Aids by promoting access to treatment.

In the 2011/2012 financial year, ELM achieved an unqualified audit opinion for the first time since its formation and merger of former Lekoa Vaal Metropolitan Substructure and Greater Vereeniging Kopanong Municipality.

This has been a major milestone achievement for the present administration in office. It is a clear demonstration of positive progress made by the municipality. It is also an indication that we are on the right path to achieving good results for the 2014 audit opinion as announced by the Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs. We will always aspire to build a strong, responsive and accountable sphere of Local Government.

We will continue to raise awareness for the need of a collective consciousness of good governance, as well as understanding the importance of clean administration and ethical leadership.

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1900

Where does the left stand now?

Notes from a conversation

The following notes were taken at a small seminar held in Johannesburg in November 2013 to discuss the left political perspective after twenty years of democracy in South Africa.

BACKGROUND

What interpretation do we give to the transformation? The political left in South Africa has been wrestling with three conceptions of the democratic breakthrough of 1994. Many viewed it as a beachhead that the movement should take and hold, in order to be able to advance further; it was the start of the mandate of the ANC. Not to have done so would have meant interminable conflict. Those on the far left viewed the negotiated settlement as a sell-out or shoddy compromise, suggesting that nothing really changed. The conservative left viewed it as a major political revolution (which it was), but maybe it was the end game, so to speak, with no desire for socialism or social democracy.

What role has the left historically played in the movement for democracy and for change in this country? The historical interventions of the left propelled the movement forward, e.g. the 1946 African mineworkers strike, the Freedom Charter, the founding of *Umkhonto weSizwe*, the *Strategy and Tactics* document that emerged from the 1969 Morogoro conference, the strategy debates during the 1970s that culminated with Joe Slovo's contribution "No middle road", the late '80s and the insurrectionist strategies: the left is stamped on all of these, even if they were not successful.

A turning-point came in the late '80s. Between 1985 and '88 or '89, there was a shift away from the perspective of "No middle road". Once the prospect of a negotiated settlement came, it fell away. One argument at the time was we necessarily had to compromise; compromises characterised all revolutionary struggles of the 20th century and it should not surprise us in South Africa. But, having attained the beachhead, there were many other compromises – even beyond the debate about GEAR and policy directions since 1994. We can agree that the trajectory has been one of "retreat in order to advance".

What is the role of the left in the current situation? Who are the left in society today? Today, however, the left appears politically irrelevant to the transformation process. Witness the morbid symptoms of the disarray of the left: the rise of the EFF, the establishment of AMCU, etc.

THE CRITIQUE: SOCIOLOGICAL ILLITERACY?

Is there no need for a retooling of the left? Have the old tools of analysis (e.g. colonialism of a special type) changed in our present context? New tools might need to be developed to understand the present phenomena in terms of globalisation; changes in productive systems all over the world; changes in the global trade patterns and systems; the rise of a global and national bourgeoisie; the power of multinationals; the rise of China and its role in the South.

What is happening with the emerging African middle classes? This is dealing in highly general terms about a very specific stratum of society, and it is a problem. Debates in the '70s and the '80s about the emergent African middle class tended to assume that it would play a reactionary role, and would be co-opted into the new establishment. It was taken for granted that that this project would be successful, because it was the regime's strategy to co-opt the black middle class, and yet its success was not certain.

Believing that this view was simplistic, a study of NAFCOC [the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry] was undertaken to analyse the behaviour of the African bourgeoisie. The findings were different from what the slogans assumed – instead it leaned more to Fanon's analysis of the black petit bourgeoisie. More recently, the Goldman Sachs Report talks about the exponential expansion of African middle class, but no one is able to tell us anything about it. How does it behave? Does it own or control property, and how much? What are its interests? Are they window-dressing for white corporate power – are they Irish coffee? How is this class likely to behave and why is it behaving in the way it is at present?

Equally the working class: who are the working class today? People employed directly, or the class in its generic sense? There is also a need to understand the conflicts and tensions within the working class itself – NUM crisis and the platinum belt and so forth.

What does it mean to be pro-poor in our current environment? Also addressing the fact that poverty and inequality are not the same things, and addressing poverty does not mean addressing inequality. The danger of inequality is that it aggravates people's perceptions of their standard of living as determined by some reference point – their level of wealth, or lack thereof, in comparison to the next individual.

If you don't deal with inequality, you don't deal with people's confidence of their lifestyle. They become more prone to a whole series of challenges we see in society today. We are not meeting the societal demands. Poverty, not just inequality, is massive – the revolution is standing still. The trajectory of the ANC as a revolutionary force is at a standstill.

Self-interest drives society today, with intellectuals perhaps as the exception – either organically or as academics, so what does this mean for the left today?

The realisation of this self-interest means that each stratum of the working class requires very different things. The consumerism and materialism (not in the Marxist sense!) in our society results in people being led in very different directions than those to which they aspired.

The power of money is becoming a huge factor in the way in which we organise ourselves. The mechanism of money in political processes and campaigns, and within organisations (including trade unions), and the resultant corruption/shadiness within the alliance needs to be understood. What social forces and human tendencies were unleashed that we did not anticipate? We did not anticipate the ability of money to buy principle, or greed and corruption. What does this mean for the revolution?

What about the bourgeoisie? The capitalist classes in Taiwan are Chinese, those in Korea are Korean: they don't see themselves as "an outpost of Europe in Asia" and that makes a big difference. Unity among the people allows for a shared moral framework.

The people who benefited most are the capitalist class in South Africa – that is, Afrikaner capitalists. The much-despised BEE might be the way to go. Take the productive forces out of the white capitalists. *Are the black capitalists different from the white capitalists?* We have allowed the assimilation of the black capitalists into the white capitalist regime. There may be some exceptions like MTN, Vodacom and so forth, but how much of the post-1990s BEE been productive? We have a parasitic black business class.

THE UNCERTAIN CONJUNCTURE

Do we have an unfinished revolution? If it means eradicating everything apartheid bought, then, yes, it is unfinished. The only question now is: are we going to be able to finish it? And what vehicles are we going to use to complete it? Defining the progressive agenda as it exists today is important. Working-class organisations do not necessarily represent the poor, but rather their interests in relation to policy decisions.

What the media calls "the left" is in fact the populist left. There are a lot of gaps in the political domain for both right and left populism. One of the EFF's tactics now, for example, is to park on a corner, play loud music, have some drinks available and attract youngsters. Our style of politics, let alone the values in our politics, has given way to a dangerous populism. Argumentation, substance, values and context mean very little.

What do people see as the alternative to capitalism? We can talk about the social structure and how it has evolved over the last 20 years, but more importantly: where do we go from here?

People seem to think we are in a new moment, the moment of a preliminary revolution. Some – who are associated with the ANC and the tripartite alliance – describe it as 1905 Russia. Others see it more like the Weimar Republic of the 1920s, where there were large degrees of corruption and huge challenges in society.

What does social democracy look like, in this contemporary period in South Africa? What is your immediate vision? What are the basic things you need to do strategically and tactically to broker that vision?

At the moment it appears that we are administering late capitalism and desperately trying to de-racialise it. Are we succeeding even in that limited sense? What changes do we want to see occur if we want to go further than de-racialised capitalism?

FOCUS ON THE ECONOMY

The key issue is the economic issue, and this is where we are slipping. History will ask the question: what did you do to the economy after 20 years?

The polarisation of debate between capitalism and socialism is a critical challenge. But there are options historical moment? In these specific conditions, what can we construct, which may not be the end goal, but will allow us some advance in this season? We are in a market economy, but we can create a less unequal society.

The National Development Plan (NDP) is right to talk about a "capable state", but the commitment of the state to development is not present. There is no pressure as there was in Japan or South Korea. We don't feel the excitement and dynamism of an economy that is moving.

We need to define the nature of the political economy, the mixed economy, the state and its role. We are not clear. We have not yet established an economic force which can drive this economy around common objectives and a mixed economy.

It seems that we have not been able to release the economic energy of the country because we have been mesmerised by fiscal austerity. The economy has not delivered to the mass of the people. The statistics look good, but the delivery has not been there. Somehow the whole idea of a paradigm shift, a second transition, has been left by the wayside. Notwithstanding all the great work that the Treasury is doing, there is no sign of the paradigm shift.

In Western Europe, a developmental agenda was constructed within the framework of the democratic discourse. That doesn't mean the elites were not scared, and so they came to the table to talk about the possibilities.

What is it that we can pull together? Our discussion indicates there is enough common ground to think along the lines of a minimum programme, and to spread this debate further into a national debate. That would force us to define how the interests of different sectors of society could be satiated by this minimum programme. We could win it even across the differences that exist.

Big business seems to be incoherent and disorganised. Is this because it is comfortable, because it is getting its way without confrontation? Or is it because it is divided? Could it be that big business is located overseas and doesn't need to confront the challenges it faces within the South African context?

If capital is fragmented, why isn't the left taking advantage of this? There are no social forces in place that can take hold of a disintegrated capitalist front. Frankly, even capital is beginning to realise that this is going to blow! A capitalist can get to the point of realising that fixing up the education system is in their interest. What are the basic interests to the benefit of everybody? There is a series of basic commitments that are actually in the interests of everyone.

How would this agenda deal with capital investment? Why do people still invest in China, and even change their policy as the state requires? The cost of doing business in China is actually quite high. Businessmen say that they are frightened far less by the radicalism of policy than the unpredictability of policy. Even if the rules are slightly left, they can work with that – but if the rules change regularly, or are not enforced, then they have no way of doing business.

Can we develop a new minimum programme in the public sector? We have argued about fiscal austerity before – there is money in the system. We have built up a debt of R1.3 trillion since 2008, but we have a totally ineffective state, most of whose members are also members of an alliance organisation. The developmental states in Asia were politically driven, but they also had a degree of authoritarianism. What is going to drive our people? We specialise in common division, not common passions.

FOCUS ON CONSCIOUSNESS

What is political consciousness, in today's terms? It is not merely an economic issue. There is culture and consciousness and the politics of that consciousness. Who are going to be the cadres that lead after us and what motivates this group? Can we re-create the selflessness that was present in the previous era? Perhaps a mistake we made in 1994 was to not lay down the moral attributes of public representatives. We did not anticipate the kind of corruption and moral corruption that we have seen today.

You cannot get anywhere without moderating expectations on all sides: those of capital and those of labour. How do you create the political management of this? When challenged, legislation is rapidly amended, leaving an impression of a repeatedly indecisive government.

The role of the facilitators between government and the people is critical: we need to think through how you do this, under what conditions, and why.

FOCUS ON THEORY

How do we take past theories and make them relevant today? A true revival of the left requires a deeper analysis of what is happening, of the balance of economic and political power. What is happening at the micro level: the practices, the thinking, the leadership?

We do not have a coherent theory to take us into the next 20 years, for example, on issues like the national question. We don't have a theory of incumbency: what does it mean to be in power? With political office come opportunities for patronage and ego-stroking that challenge human frailties, let alone ideological ones. There is no theory of human behaviour when you get into these positions. How does one provide the right incentives and disincentives to encourage leaders to remain moral? These challenges need to be addressed in relation to contemporary politics and not just articulated in general terms.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Why do we not learn from post-independence Africa? They have been through all of this. It's not too late to learn and anticipate.

How do we respond to the emergence of China as a potential hegemon in world affairs? This has great possibilities and great risks. Consider the Cold War period of 1945 to1990. You need to be able to play hegemonies against each other or the hegemonies will play themselves out at your expense. Also consider the crisis of world capitalism at the moment when the left is at its weakest in developed countries.

What can be learned from the Bolivarian revolutions in Latin America? The ANC is also affiliated with the Socialist International – what relevance or significance does that have at present?

THE YOUTH/BORN-FREES

Crucially, where are our youth? What are their views on politics? This is not a homogeneous category. ANC-aligned student organisations are losing seats in student representative councils. In the most recent SRC elections at Wits University, 7 seats out of 15 went to "Project W", an unaffiliated student group organised with the aim to "make Wits better". This is something to watch.

The people's camp in disarray

By **Zwelinzima Vavi**

The author is the general-secretary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)

A discussion of this kind is necessary in light of the country celebrating 20 years of democracy. I think it is perfectly timed to force us to look at the state of the left forces at this moment in South Africa. Are they providing leadership? What kind of leadership are they providing? You cannot have this discussion and fail to look at the policy space in the past 20 years. What has happened to policy? Who is driving policy 20 years on, to whose benefit? What is the impact on all classes, especially the poor and working class? What are the material conditions of the working class and the poor, at this point of celebrating 20 years of the democratic breakthrough?

Pix. Author, Mangaung NGC 2012, COSATU

ORGANISATIONAL WEAKNESSES

In this discussion, we have to look at everything from the organisational point of view. What is the state of COSATU and the rest of the trade union movement? This is the first question.

I am told that there are 179 registered trade unions in South Africa and the great majority do not belong to any of the existing four federations – and four federations, in a country with 53 million people and a labour force of 16–17 million people, represents the fragmentation of the working class. It also represents organisational weakness: even if there were possibilities opening up at a policy level, an incoherent, fragmented trade union movement would not be able to seize an opportunity to advance its narrow interests or the national interests of the working class and the poor.

It would be useful to study several issues, including how the AMCU (Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union) phenomenon emerged. Is it because of this weakness, or is the leadership losing direction? This is not a small matter in the South African context.

The second question we need to look at is the state of the SACP (South African Communist Party). What role is it playing: is it advancing class interests? We don't need to look at how many people wear a communist hat in different parts of society but rather at who is driving the transformation project from a left perspective. What is the role of the Party? Is it a force that the left can confidently rely upon to ensure that the advances of the left are defended and further advances are made?

The third question is that of the material conditions of the working class and the poor, 20 years down the line. When COSATU and SACP celebrated the first 10 years of the breakthrough, we came to a conclusion that, in economic terms, the main benefits of transformation in society have accrued more to capital than to workers and the poor. We are now sitting at the end of the second decade. The question that needs to be answered from a left perspective is: what happened? The declaration at the time was that the next decade must be a decade of the workers and the poor. Has this become the decade of the workers and the poor, from their point of view? This should be a great area of debate.

The ANC defines itself as a 'disciplined force of the left'. It can claim that because, since the 1940s, it has analysed our society from a class point of view. It has understood that there is an on-going class battle and there are two main forces in society that are at each other's throats to impose a hegemony based on their own interests. I think that analysis is necessary now. How far have we gone? You can do that by looking at the friends you keep, who define your character. If you are always seen among the dagga-smokers, there has to be a reason why they are next to you.

This analysis of the ANC itself from the historic point of view, as has been outlined by Pallo Jordan: from the Freedom Charter to the Morogoro Conference and to countless other conferences, up to the 'Ready to Govern' programme, the RDP, and all of that. Where are we now in relation to all of this? Are we making advances to consolidate the great Morogoro slogan that our struggle is not just about replacing (whites) in the exploitation and oppression of the working class, not just changing the chairs in terms of race, but about ensuring that we transform societal relationships, such that the working class will feel that it is not just not the motive force of that past but also the motive force of the present?

This is another of the organisational challenges that are facing us. Are the working class and the trade union movement in such a state that they can provide strategic leadership from a left perspective to the revolution as a whole? Or are we losing the plot altogether, in every respect? That type of analysis and discussion is something that I would say we must embark upon.

THE ROLE OF CAPITAL

Then there is a question of the role of capital. Do capitalist relations of production still have the positive function of expanding the economic base and the productive forces generally? In my view, this question has to be broadened to look at what has happened to the working class. I believe very strongly that the working class has already been restructured and segmented by the forces of production. There is a working class (segment) of the 18% who have medical aid, provident funds, better salaries. Sometimes we debate whether this is the working class or a middle stratum. A lot of those people are members of COSATU and work in the public, heavy chemicals, and automotive sectors, where the salaries are quite substantial.

There is another (segment of the) working class that is just coping. Those who are earning about R3000 to R6000 have their own battles, where they must fight for access to housing subsidies, medical aid, battling about taking their kids to township schools or moving them out. Then there is the phenomenon of the working poor, those who earn too little to live on, maybe below R3000, many of whom are employed by labour brokers. Finally, we have the 7.4 million who are unemployed.

I think we have to look at what that segmentation of the working class means to their political outlook and to how they relate to the progress, or lack of progress, that has been registered over the past 20 years. Sometimes you can see even in COSATU the divisions within the working class politically. The working poor tend to be much more radical. They tend to be more militant and they tend to belong to the group that says, 'Ag, we have seen nothing of real material change accruing to us'. And the public sector workers would not be able to say that without being contradicted by facts. Those things then do play a role politically in the divisions between the proletariat core and non-proletariat core, even within the trade unions. That is another organisational issue, together with the organisational paralysis that is creating the havoc we are seeing in the platinum belt now.

IT'S NOT JUST THE ECONOMY

What is actually in crisis for the left is not just divisions in COSATU. Those are symptoms of a larger-scale problem. The people's camp is in disarray, along with the project that they were supposed to be delivering to the masses. 'The people's camp' are those who are led by the ANC from the apartheid and colonial era into the phenomenon of a better life for all. That camp is in disarray because in the main we didn't push the morality questions at the beginning, and now I fear the train may have left us at the station.

The paper prepared by David Makhura in preparation for (the 2012 ANC national conference in) Mangaung brilliantly identified all these crises of corruption, greed and factionalism. At Mangaung, it was obviously a paper that was standing on the toes of everybody, including the leadership itself. If you compare the analysis – which was a perfect analysis of what is happening in the ANC and the congress movement as a whole – with the remedies adopted, you will see that all the serious things we should be doing were edited out. They were just systematically put on the side. Some things have come from there, such as the (integrity) committee in parliament, but nothing comes close to addressing the totality of the crisis that was properly analysed in that discussion paper.

You know why? Because, like the second phase of radical economic transformation, it got lost in the factional battles. And the factional battles that sidelined even that discussion were created deliberately to maintain the status quo in the economy: the status quo of 'the macro-economic policies we are employing is fine; let's proceed without any real change, without confronting the need for a real change'. It is something that we hear only in the speeches from the minister and the president.

Those things just disappeared at Mangaung because they were too truthful about the behaviour we are not prepared to let go. Now what do you have post-Mangaung? You have a quasi-thing that is not going to deliver this comprehensive radical economic transformation or force the movement to squarely challenge the rot. Morally, organisationally, factions, all of that.

We are now one year after Mangaung. You tell me whether you are seeing a change, seeing what you were calling for. There is no paradigm shift to say, 'It has been 20 years, what is happening with us, where do we go? What do we change, where?' That is what I fear. Waiting for another conference in 2017 and then going into the next elections with all the inhibiting nature that imposes. The fact that we must defend ourselves against the opposition doesn't give us an opportunity to look strongly internally at what is happening with our movement, with ourselves. The discussion about what is happening to the left movement is the most important one, because it will answer the question, 'What is this left that we are talking about?' Left of what?

The ANC is a liberation movement and it remains a liberation movement because it seeks to fight against colonialism of a special type and do away with the divisions created by apartheid. So this is a national struggle against the national oppression. We normally define it as 'black people in general and African people in particular' dealing with the three forms of oppression – all of that theory. But at the centre of any liberation struggle is the property question, and you cannot talk about the totality of the struggle without addressing that.

We have got to ask the question about the black middle class and black bourgeoisie and the building of the industrial working class among the former oppressed: how they should behave – in comparison to how the white oligarchies behaved over time? This is an area that we must address. If the struggle against colonialism was a struggle against land dispossessions, and against looting of natural resources by the colonisers for the benefit of the headquarters, and against the establishment of the big six monopolies that control everything that happens in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, then the critical question from the left is: what does that mean today? Are we addressing that and closing the chapter of a colonial era? How are we doing it?

It is a difficult question to answer. I don't think we are anywhere close. Look at land redistribution and how we are able to build new farmers and how they lose the land. The last statistics I saw showed that we have only hit 9% of the target of 30%, and that 70% of what we have redistributed is lying idle, not being used. This doesn't require changing the property clause (of the Constitution).

We need to look at the extent to which the South African economy remains externally owned. The reality we face is that the big six companies and every mining company are foreign-owned. This is where one finds people saying they can go to Australia or go to Canada, because those are equally their homes. It talks to the extent that capitalism has restructured over this period, to the possibility of having no home base. You can't say they are based in South Africa; they are based everywhere.

We do have the resources here that they need. That is our leverage, but we are not using it. Even in the platinum sector, the growth point of the economy, there is no leverage. The minister just mentions the issue of tax and you hear the pandemonium in the pages of Business Day, every article for two or three weeks!

VISION, CLARITY AND CONFIDENCE

To move forward we have to look at the vision. For example, if you say South Africa can only develop through building an industrial manufacturing base for South Africa like all other countries have to do, how do we achieve that? What will be the role of capital, the role of the state, the role of society, including labour?

Our biggest problem is that, even though we speak about the need for an active developmental state, I can see no reason for the state to drive anything. It is not just about the existence of IPAP (the Industrial Policy Action Plan): all of us agree that is the way to go. But I don't see capital being given carrots and sticks to ensure that we achieve [the goals] in any of those five 'job-driver' sectors. We have a Mining Indaba to address the current crisis, but we can't even move from the starting blocks to arrest people who are killing others. Leave the issue of building houses and infrastructures – we can't arrest the criminals. And therefore you undermine things.

I have a chance to meet with capital all the time, those who are coming into South Africa. The consistent message is, 'We want clarity on where the country is going. We want predictable policies so that we can adapt.' The real reason behind the investment strike is not that our policies are left-wing and radical. It is because there is a policy paralysis in the state. There are too many voices speaking in public and in contradiction to one another. For example, in my view, there is a serious contradiction between the programme of the ANC, which was adopted in Polokwane and endorsed in Mangaung, and big elements of the NDP (National Development Plan). Particularly the macroeconomic policy. It is just a contradiction; every investor can see that these are two different things. The ANC, because it will not take a strong leadership position, uses the policies to speak to different constituencies. It is this paralysis that is going to frighten any investor and, in this paralysis, the minimum programme doesn't emerge. The minimal action that must develop is just not there.

The state is central in all of this discussion: a state that has some capacity but also some leadership that can inspire confidence that these things are possible. This is one of the most critical discussions for us to have. In South Africa, we don't have that discussion because, every time you go there, it appears that you are taking on the leadership and they take exception to that. And then you have factions and demobilisation, and we are in disarray – but we are not addressing the fundamental issue. We need leadership which can inspire confidence that this minimum programme is available.

LUTHULI MUSEUM

A fitting memorial to Africa s first Nobel Peace Laureate, Chief Albert Luthuli.
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a man who fought intrepidly for equality, peace,
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the Luthuli Museum in Groutville, on the north coast of KwaZulu Natal, will leave you awed and humbled when you discover the challenges Luthuli (1898 – 1967) overcame as leader of the African National Congress (1952 – 1967) in the struggle against apartheid, repression,and racism.

Walk through the original 1927 home of Luthuli where he held secret meetings with other leaders of the Liberation Movement, including Nelson Mandela, then leader of the ANCYouthLeag ue.

Listen to Luthulis Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech made in 1961 in Oslo, Norway as you wander through theexhibitions .

Stroll through the museums manicured gardens where Luthuli hosted an unexpected visit by the late USSenatorRob ertKennedyin1966.

Visit the restored 1847 United Congregational Church to which Luthuli devoted his time during his banishment and where his grave is nowlocated.

View the life size bronze sculpture of Luthuli in nearby Stanger, KwaDukuza, where he forged enduring bonds with the local Indian community also engaged in the LiberationM ovement.

Leave with a deeper understanding of how South Africa became the free, democraticcountryweliveintoday.

The Museum is situated at 3233 Nokukhanya Luthuli Street, Groutville, formerly a mission station established in the 1800s by the American Missionary, Reverend Aldin Grout (1803 – 1894). The Museum is approximately 6 kilometres from exit 226ontheN2highwaynorthbound.

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The rise of the Black Conciousness Movement:

An enduring influence on the South African liberation struggle

By **Simphiwe Sesanti**

The author is a senior lecturer in Stellenbosch University's department of journalism

As South Africa celebrates 20 years of democracy, this article serves to highlight the history of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and the factors that contributed to its growth. As the twentieth anniversary is celebrated, as is often the case, some will fall into the temptation of promoting the history of their own party whilst denigrating that of others. This is an attempt to pre-empt such an unproductive act and to tell, to the best of one's ability, the history of the BCM without embellishment – which would be another form of distortion. It is impossible, in such a few words, to write comprehensively of the role of the movement in the struggle to liberate South Africa.

This is the movement, led by a 22-year-old student named Bantu Steve Biko, that would inspire 13-year-olds, armed only with stones, to confront a heavily armed South African police force, which led to an exodus of young people to swell the ranks of the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) and Umkhonto WeSizwe (MK), the military wings of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and African National Congress (ANC) respectively. This is the only liberation movement that has trusted a woman to be its president: Winnie Kgware, elected as the first president of the Black People's Convention (BPC) in 1972.

ROOTS OF BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS

The 1960s witnessed a strong wave of black consciousness or black nationalism in the USA, forcefully articulated by black revolutionaries such as Malcolm X, Angela Davis and Stokely Carmichael, to mention only a few. Whenever the philosophy of black consciousness (BC) is discussed in the South African context, it is attributed to the struggles of blacks in the USA. While such an analysis is partly right, it does not give a full picture if it removes the local African influence from the equation.

Biko leaves us in no doubt about this. In a 1972 interview with Gail Gerhart (2008), he notes that "the influence from Africa was very important" to the evolution of black consciousness in South Africa. He singles out Frantz Fanon, the Martinique-born psychiatrist and prolific author of *The Wretched of the Earth*, among many others, who was renowned for his participation in the anti-colonial struggle in Algeria. Biko also acknowledges the influence of Leopold Senghor, one of the leading figures of the negritude movement, and the first president of independent Senegal. He does not leave out Senegal's Cheikh Anta Diop, revered in Afrocentric scholarship circles and widely acclaimed for his book, *The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality*. Biko does not fail to recognise the African diasporic contribution either, openly acknowledging Carmichael, who later changed his name to Kwame Ture.

This should not give the false impression that there was no local South African influence. In his essay, "White racism and black consciousness", Biko quotes Aimé Césaire as he traces South African BC to "a group of angry young black men who were beginning to 'grasp the notion of (their) peculiar uniqueness' and who were eager to define who they were and what." (Biko, 1987: 67) These were the elements, Biko continues

> "who were disgruntled with the direction imposed on the African National Congress by the "old guard" within its leadership. These young men were questioning a number of things, among which was the "go slow" attitude adopted by the leadership, and the ease with which the leadership accepted coalitions with organisations other than those run by blacks. The "People's Charter" adopted in Kliptown in 1955 was evidence of this. In a sense one can say that these were the first real signs that the blacks in South Africa were beginning to realise the need to go it alone, and to evolve a philosophy based on, and directed by, blacks. In other words, black consciousness was slowly manifesting itself."

An examination of the history of the South African struggle would reveal that the young men Biko refers to, who registered their disgruntlement with coalitions and had a strong objection to the 1955 Freedom Charter, were the young African nationalists in the ANC who later broke away to form the PAC, under the leadership of Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe. Just as the African nationalists broke away from the ANC, due to resentment of perceived white domination, black consciousness students broke away from the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) and formed the South African Students Organisation (SASO), because of their perception of the elevation of white students' aspirations and the relegation of black students' frustrations. Of course, white students were the majority in NUSAS while Africans were the majority in Congress Alliance led by the ANC, but the nationalists of the 1950s and the BC adherents of the 1960s shared a common aversion to perceived white domination of the liberation struggle.

SELF-RELIANCE AND SOLIDARITY

Biko observed that the rise of black consciousness was largely "attributable to the sudden death of political articulation of ideas within black ranks, which came about as a result of the banning of all the political ideas" (in Gerhart, 2008: 21) when anti-apartheid political parties were banned in 1960. Its consequence was that "effectively all black resistance was killed, and the stage was left open to whites of liberal opinion to make representation for blacks, in a way that had not happened in the past, unaccompanied by black opinion" (ibid.).

In the aftermath of the banning of the liberation movement, organisations like NUSAS and the Progressive Party took centre stage. In Biko's eyes these

> "were in fact white organisations, white-dominated in terms of members, but open in terms of membership. The best blacks could do was just to be there, and to allow whites to speak on their behalf. And all blacks were doing all this time was just to clap and say "amen"." (in Gerhart, 2008: 22)

This was unacceptable to Biko and those who shared his view. Black people could not be spectators in a game where they should be players.

In "The definition of black consciousness", Biko speaks of "the realisation by the black man of the need to rally together with his brothers, around the same cause of their operation – the blackness of their skin – and to operate as a group in order to rid themselves of the shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude" (Biko, 1987: 49). Some – both within and outside of the BCM – have argued, and continue to argue, that black consciousness treated the issue of skin colour as irrelevant. This definition proves otherwise. How could the issue of skin colour be ignored when it was used as a criterion to politically oppress, socially degrade and economically exploit black people?

However, it is equally true that the BCM did not reduce "blackness" to skin colour or pigmentation. It was regarded as a "reflection of a mental attitude" (Biko, 1987: 48). Referring to oneself as "black" was a commitment to fight against all forces that sought to stamp a black person as a subservient person. Remember that this was a period when black people were identified as "non-whites", "kaffirs" and "Bantus". Racist whites had arrogated to themselves the right to name, rename and misname black people. Black consciousness sought to put a stop to that.

The philosophy and the movement focused on black solidarity and self-reliance. This meant that white people were excluded from participation in the BCM, a position that invited charges of racism from some white liberals. However, the rejection of white participation was not merely ideological. The SASO breakaway was informed by concrete experiences with white comrades in NUSAS who verbally expressed solidarity with black people but contradicted this with their actions. At a NUSAS conference in 1967, it emerged that black students would stay in one residence and blacks in another. The black students' response was that the conference should close. But it did not, and went ahead. Biko realised "at that stage that this was a dead organisation; it wouldn't listen to us, and that no useful and forthright opinion can be expressed from the aegis of this organisation" (Gerhart, 2008: 22).

The following year, again at a NUSAS conference, another argument broke out about how to respond to the apartheid law that stipulated that blacks could be in a white area for no longer than 72 hours. Black students wanted to defy the law, but their white comrades appealed for compliance. Biko observes that

> "what made whites hysterical about what we were saying was that we said: all right, when the vans come to collect us, whites should all lie in front of the vans so that they don't move. The whites could not support this. They saw it as an extremely irresponsible, radical line that didn't take into account the interests of the students on the restricted campuses." (ibid.)

An intense two-hour debate ensued, with neither side willing to concede. Since black students were outnumbered, Biko realised that putting the issue to the vote would not yield a positive result. From these experiences, he learned that whites were not willing to listen to blacks – they wanted make the decisions, and blacks should be followers. It was time to call it a day and form an exclusively black students' organisation. That is what informed the birth of black consciousness and the formation of SASO in 1968.

In "White racism and black consciousness", Biko argues that, while it would be a "cruel assumption to believe that all whites are not sincere … one has to come to the painful conclusion that the liberal is in fact appeasing his own conscience" (Biko, 1987: 65). He impatiently continues: "Why then do they persist in talking to the blacks? Since they are aware that the problem in this country is white racism, why do they not address themselves to the white world? Why do they insist to talk to blacks?"

CLASS AND RACE

From another angle, white leftists argued that the BCM had misdiagnosed the ills of apartheid South Africa: the problem was not colour but class. Biko was suspicious of this use of class analysis:

"A number of whites in this country adopt the class analysis, primarily because they want to detach us from anything relating to race. In case it has a rebound effect on them because they are white. This is the problem. So a lot of them adopt the class analysis as a defence mechanism and are persuaded by it because they find it more comfortable." (in Gerhart, 2008: 34)

From a black consciousness perspective, the problem in South Africa was "not only capitalism… it is also the whole gamut of white value systems which has been adopted as standard by South Africa, both whites and blacks so far" (ibid.).

Biko was sensitive to the reality that, with the advent of colonialism, Africans could no longer run their own affairs. Instead, they were "tolerated simply because our cheap labour is needed" (Biko, 1987: 46). Clearly, he was aware of the economic exploitation blacks were subjected to. Continuing his observation of the cultural assimilation, Biko notes that Africans were thus

"judged terms of standards we were not responsible for. Whenever colonisation sets in with its dominant culture, it devours the native culture and leaves behind a bastardised culture. This is what has happened to the African culture. It is called a sub-culture purely because the African people in the urban complexes are mimicking the white man rather unashamedly." (ibid.)

He was very clear about the position African culture should occupy in a free Azania (the BCM's preferred name for South Africa): "a country in Africa, in which the majority of the people are African, must inevitably exhibit African values and be truly African in style" (Biko, 1987: 24). That is because "one cannot escape the fact that the culture shared by the majority group in any given society must ultimately determine the broad direction taken by the joint culture of that society" (ibid.). Black people lived in the shadows of white people: theirs was not just physical oppression, but a mental enslavement that reduced them spiritually. The battle site of values would need attention even in post-revolutionary society.

Biko wanted to address the black condition holistically, and he conceived of black consciousness as the best way to restore self-esteem in black people and to recognise that they did not need white tutelage to become free. The challenges experienced by blacks, he argued, would not be "solved completely when you alter the economic pattern, to a socialist pattern" (Gerhart, 2008: 34).

AFRICAN COMMUNALISM

Not focusing on capitalism was not the same thing as ignoring its existence and its effects. In order to understand the BCM's stance towards capitalism, as articulated by Biko, one needs to read his essay, "Some African cultural concepts". Here he observes that "[a]ttitudes of Africans to property show just how unindividualistic the African is", noting that "most things were jointly owned by the group" and that "there was no such thing as individual land ownership. The land belonged to the people and was merely under the local chief on behalf of the people" (Biko, 1987: 43). He states that "individualism… is the hallmark of the capitalist approach" (ibid: 42).

As if not to leave us in any doubt, his essay "Black consciousness and the quest for a true humanity" recognises that "the colour question in South African politics was originally introduced for economic reasons" (Biko, 1987: 87–8) and that capitalism is exploitative. His answer to the evils of capitalism was African communalism. But according to Mangcu (2012: 249), the Marxist-oriented branch of the BCM in the Western Cape "rejected anything short of a socialist/communist vision of the country… [and were] strongly opposed to the concept of black communalism proposed in the position paper as the basis for future economic policy".

In 1977, the Black Consciousness Movement suffered two severe blows. Biko was killed in September and the BC-aligned organisations were banned the following month. In 1978, the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) was formed and declared itself a socialist organisation. The organisation emphasised that black people were oppressed both on the basis of race and on the basis of class. Trade unions emerged that were inspired by black consciousness and addressed black people as workers.

In 1983, under the banner of the National Forum, AZAPO and organisations opposed to racist South Africa adopted the Azanian Manifesto. This document clearly identifies the BCM's stance at this juncture. Neville Alexander, in "An illuminating moment: Background to the Azanian Manifesto", notes that the "politics of the BCM as a movement was complex and constantly changing. At first sight, it was informed by an Africanist ideology that was closer to the views of a Robert Sobukwe than those of a Nelson Mandela" (Alexander, 2008: 159).

The Azanian Manifesto states that the

"black working class inspired by revolutionary consciousness is the driving force of our struggle. They alone can end the system as it stands today because they alone have nothing to lose. They have a world to gain in a democratic, antiracist and socialist Azania." (in Alexander, 2008: 168)

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Pan-Africanism:
Beyond survival to renaissance
By **Amina Mama**

The author is the director of women and gender studies at the University of California, Davis, founding editor of *Feminist Africa*, and former director of the African Gender Institute at the University of Cape Town. This is her address to the African Union 50th Anniversary Heads of States Summit, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 25 May 2013. It was published online at www.opendemocracy.net/print/73618

Honourable Presidents, your Excellencies, Madame Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Chairperson of the African Union, Honourable Chair Dr Carlos Lopez, ladies and gentlemen, fellow celebrants:

I salute you with respect for your dedication and commitment as our leaders. As our heads of state, you are the official embodiment of African people's collective aspirations for peace, prosperity and justice for all. The fate of Africa and all her peoples is vested in you and your power to sustain and advance the Pan-African vision through concrete and concerted action.

Deeply humbled by Madame Chairperson's invitation to share a few ideas, I will begin by drawing courage from the very many women whose courage and creativity have provided us with a proud, fearless and doubt-dispelling legacy of commitment to freedom and justice. Their examples locate our contemporary women's movements at the heart of the Pan-African project. I reflect on the unknown and unnamed millions of African women whose lives and struggles paved the path that Africa's women's movements tread today. I resolve to speak my humble truth to your political power.

FREEDOM AND SELF-REALISATION

I appeal to your Excellencies to honour all the hope that we ordinary African citizens have vested in you. Ordinary citizens fought and died to ensure that we would have independent governments of African people, by African people, and for African people. The will to political independence was not just a matter of pride, but also rooted in very clear material and political interests. African people hoped that having our own states would empower us to end the structural underdevelopment of Africa set in place by colonialism, as so clearly outlined by Caribbean scholar Walter Rodney. African people sought – and still seek – freedom and self-realisation, an end to poverty, ignorance, disease, discrimination and injustice.

The fact is that, after 50 years, Africa's millions are not happy. The date tells us our celebrations are due, but the data caution us. I appeal to you to stay alert to the discontents of women, youth, and many millions of marginalised others, inhabiting mining areas, oil drilling areas, our great savannah lands, forests and deserts, coastlands and highlands. This discontent clearly finds expression across the region in numerous protests, protests in which young people and women dissent and put themselves on the frontlines. Honourable leaders, please do not ignore the African Spring, and so imperil the future we seek.

Our late writer Chinua Achebe, once asked to present a presidential lecture at the World Bank in 1998, spoke like a seer under the title "Development is people". Why would this be necessary, if not for the fact that he spoke in the context of a misguided, externally imposed consensus that privileged markets over governments and profits over people, especially the devalued majorities of poor people, women people and young people who inhabit the African continent?

We all agree that, on this continent of huge land, mineral and resource wealth, our "beautyful people" are our greatest wealth and prospect, and deserve our highest respect. We are women people, men people, old people, young people, able-bodied and disabled people, from a rich variety of cultural, religious, linguistic backgrounds, who deserve economic, cultural, labour productive, sexual freedom and reproductive rights. We are those you are charged to govern and to protect.

About a half century ago, a young Nigerian writer – more assertive than most – encountered the largely French-speaking poets and philosophers of the negritude movement: Aimé Césaire, Léopold Senghor, Cheikh Anta Diop and others. Wole Soyinka's riposte was, "Does the tiger need to proclaim his tigritude?" My question to you, decades later, is this: "What if the tiger has been flogged mercilessly, stripped of its stripes, and brutalised to a state of caged confusion so that it bites its tail, attacking its mate and killing its children? What if our proverbial tiger had been through what Africa has been through?" Soyinka's question revisited today, 50 years into political independence, invokes the historic conditions that have us professing that we are African, we will serve Africa, and do our best to use all the vast human and material wealth to recover and protect our stripes.

Looking across the world and comparing the variously genocidal histories of imperialism, slavery and colonisation, *his* tories that all but destroyed the indigenous civilisations of the Americas and Australasia, provokes a basic question that we might consider as we celebrate the fact of our survival: "How have the people of Africa survived – and in such numbers, with such vibrancy?" It is nothing less than a miracle of human civilisation that we survive, *despite* this history of subjugation and our unfavourable positioning in the global order.

EMERGENT WOMEN

I respectfully submit that the secret of African resilience is something we take so much for granted that we too easily overlook it, and fail to value and cherish those who have thus far sustained us – at our peril. I speak of the quiet power of African women, manifest in extensive subaltern farming, trading and provisioning networks through which African women sustain our families, communities and societies, no matter what.

This has been African women's invisible work for centuries – and it still largely is. Today, 60–80 percent of our food is produced by women and these low-level networks still sustain the people inhabiting the worst of our conflict-ridden man-made disaster zones.

Today, let us be alert to the implications of the fact that African women, like our lands before us, have now been "discovered". Our silence will no longer protect us. Women's labour is no longer shielded by the gender blindness of the colonisers or exploited by the gender blindness of developing nation-states. Let us be alert to the challenges posed by this hard-won visibility, situated as it is in a world economy that has been premised on the exploitation of gender divisions since the very dawn of modern capitalism. The European-style social contract is premised on a sexual contract: a gendered division of labour that we should discard, for our own good.

What does it mean to describe women as "the world's third-largest emerging market", when Africa's location in the global terms of trade remains unfavourable? Will African women becoming an "emerging market", like China or India, allow us to realise our potential, free ourselves and our dependents from abjection?

The terms of African women's integration into development have been based on a flawed premise – that we sit around as a vast underused reserve army of labour. Inclusionary "women in development" strategies have thus added work to the already overworked women doing double shifts between their homes and farms. Economic reforms have simultaneously sapped (or SAP'ed) state efforts to address poverty, ignorance and disease through the public health, welfare and educational services that are necessary to sustain and reproduce labour in a wage-based economy.

African women are no longer ignored, and we celebrate a new level of hard-won recognition and global consensus on the importance of gender equality and women's empowerment. This takes nothing away from men whatsoever, while adding great value to our understanding of ourselves as women and as men.

Recognition demands redistribution of resources. The new recognition of poor African women's productive and reproductive labour may be celebrated as a positive development, but we must be alert to the fact that it also means that Africa's care economy – including its productive aspect – is up for a new round of global grabbing.

Economic reforms have been based on an unsustainable assumption of the infinite elasticity of women's work. Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) stretched the hidden fabric of Africa's resilience to breaking point. This is what is reflected in the seemingly intransigent problem of maternal and infant mortality. Women are in crisis. Globalisation has created conditions under which it is simply too dangerous to keep our heads down and our noses to the grindstones.

Perhaps this explains the proliferation of feminism, of increasingly radical women's movements in so many of the world's poorest and most exploited regions. Growth without development has been a reality for most of Africa's long-suffering people, particularly for women who experience the brunt of poverty, violence and the general precariousness that characterises their lives. GDP goes up without trickling down unless governments take concerted action to resist the uncounted, gendered human costs of superficial and unsustainable models of growth.

Fifty years ago, Kwame Nkrumah – Pan-African visionary extraordinaire – called for a political kingdom and promised an economic one. Sadly, he has been proved wrong. We now have 54 political kingdoms and our union is now 50 years old, but our economies are still as deeply unequal as they are falling short of the Pan-African vision. We need to recover our economic sovereignty: the freedom to organise our economies to suit ourselves, to organise labour, production and consumption however we choose.

FACE OF POVERTY

"In Africa, poverty has a female face," declared the World Bank in 2009.

Africa's rising gross domestic product is good news, but how should we react when crisis leads rich countries to turn once again to the Africa they had only a decade ago condemned as "lost"? I think we should give them a tough time when they once again look to the region. At least we should make them beg a bit and define our terms more assertively at the age of 50.

We must turn this renewed interest around, make sure that we work this new interest – in including poor women in the global economy – to our advantage, so that we do not simply find African women split open for a new and even deeper round of predation and exploitation. For example, while we can recognise that micro-credit may help some women to do what they already do, it also marks a minimalist strategy for inclusion in the global economy at the bottom of the informal sector. But why should it be *micro*-credit for women? More serious support would enable women to scale up and become captains of industry and run transnational corporations.

Unless we negotiate better terms of engagement for Africa, including for African women, our people – especially women and the next generation – will continue to be as exploited, poor and vulnerable to abuse as we have been. The global construction of African women as "poor, pregnant and beaten" contains a germ of truth. Women work harder than ever but remain poorer than ever. But we also continue to struggle for more just economies, which can support women beyond mere survival – to build on the way women continuously improvise and innovate, invent and create new ways of doing things.

I am concerned rather than excited by the global call to entrepreneurialism as *the* answer to poverty, underdevelopment, and even violence. After all, women in Africa have always been entrepreneurs, in the sense that I have argued: creatively fending for themselves and their dependents through farming and trading before, during, and since colonialism, *despite* colonialism, and with minimal government support. The feminisation of poverty has occurred *despite* our long traditions of entrepreneurialism.

SYSTEMIC INJUSTICE

"Women are the third largest 'emerging market', after China and India," declared *Forbes* magazine.

Given what the market has so far meted out to Africa, and to African women in particular, this statement should place us on alert. What happens to the African economy – buttressed as it has always been by the feminised survival economy – when women are "discovered" and redefined as an "emerging market"? Who and what will be brought and sold, and for whose profit? We will need to be fully conscious of what we are buying and selling, lest we find ourselves further incorporated into a global market that has not favoured our collective interests, or those of our continent. For all the talk about poverty alleviation, poverty remains endemic, a scourge that is here to stay until we stop being fooled by global-village talk and tackle the structural transformations that are now on the table.

Structural violence – poverty, absence of social protection infrastructure, chronic insecurity and precariousness of livelihoods – manifests at interpersonal levels: in our homes and on our streets. Male frustration and stress taken out on the tender bodies of women marks the worst dispossession of all – our dehumanisation, the loss of our selves and our capacity to care for and support one another.

I appeal to all of you to *end this now*.

Let us make it clear to the world that violence and tolerance of violence are *not* endemic, *not* an "African tradition", nor simply what black men do to women. Rather they are the results of systemic injustices. Focusing, for example, on "rape in war time" without understanding this as intrinsic to the practice of war is bad enough. It is not enough to address the disturbing abuse of women without understanding this as a function of our location within a global, racialised, gender regime that has never been kind to Africa, or to Africa's women.

It is a regime that is premised on gender divisions and relies on the continued devaluation of women and their work. The systematic rape and abduction of women in the colonial Congo was a deliberate "management tool" during King Leopold's time, used to force men to labour on rubber plantations. It is was the unjust, imperialist and racist gender regime that laid down the historic and material conditions of pain and dispossession. This is the source that lies behind the scandalous data on rape, harassment, abuse, femicide, sex trafficking, child marriage and other harmful practices.

Let us not leave this intimate but systemic problem and its unseemly display of self-hatred to "external forces" to appropriate for their own agendas, while the systemic causes persist. Ensure the implementation of the declarations and resolutions you have already signed on to. Provide the legal, medical and social facilities to protect and attend to women's basic human rights. And above all, address the systemic inequalities that render us vulnerable to abuse. These systemic injustices and gender inequalities intensify as societies move into fully fledged conflict, but the conflict in our homes persists long after peace has been officially declared.

QUESTION MILITARISM

Land. Homes. Decent work. Security for women. Human security for all. "The real security need for Africans is security from poverty, ignorance and disease," wrote our brilliant social analyst, Claude Ake.

Africa's independent states arrived at independence fully militarised by their significant involvement in the two world wars. With the colonial and militarist history of our continent, we urgently need to place the good of our people first, and above the acquisition of guns. The horrors of postcolonial conflicts leave no one untouched. These now feature 90 percent civilian casualties – up from 10 percent in the wars of the early 20th century – and 20–40 percent involvement of women as fighters, not to mention their prominence as victims and casualties of war. The realities of resource inequalities, gender injustices, and sexual and identity politics in Africa's wars need to be kept at the centre of Africa's future security architecture. This will require more than adding women to security forces. It requires changing the militarist paradigm of statecraft we have inherited and which has afflicted us through the Cold War era, during which Africans continued to die in vast numbers. Since 9/11 and the US declaration of the global war on terror, the US has pursued significant war efforts that affect us deeply.

Despite our human development failures, Africa is still increasing its military expenditure, long after much wealthier nations have started to reduce theirs. Why? Why continue to serve as an out-dated weapons dump, when we all know that the largest portion of the debt we carry was accumulated by discredited military regimes? Spending on weapons that kill other Africans has been allowed to displace our development agendas, retarding long-term investment in human security.

We resist military re-occupation, to the extent that the AFRICOM idea has been pushed back from George Bush's original poorly conceived idea of a fully fledged base on this continent. Instead, under the Obama government, it has evolved into a series of new "partnership agreements", complete with regular training exercises all over the region and numerous operations with grandiose names. What would a future-oriented regional security strategy that was grounded in prioritising African interests and concern look like? If we open our internal frontiers to facilitate the mobility of people as well as resources, will we still need so many national armies?

Do we need the many armies that we have, given the weakness of some and the threat that others have posed for democratic governance? Let us at least have the sense to question the direction of the last fifty years – in which the cost of war has significantly retarded development and exacted huge costs, leaving collective traumas that are yet to be healed – as we move towards the idea of sustainable peace and the human security that we can then address instead of purchasing the next rounds of weaponry.

FIFTY YEARS FROM NOW

Imagine a continent in which no child has been raised in fear, subjected to abuse, poverty, hunger and the physical and emotional scarring that drains creativity. In which all the mothers survive pregnancy and we no longer know what it is to bury a child. Imagine a world in which Africa's billions are freed from the burden of survivalism, freed to lift themselves up and pursue the immeasurable creative potential that freedom from overwork and over-exploitation would unleash for us.

Africa in 2063 will have undergone the paradigm shift we seek. We will have used our maturity at 50 to radically alter the terms of our integration into the world order. Africa in 2063 will be a place where Africa's wealth enriches all of Africa's people. It will be a place that has pushed back the land-grabbing of the early 21st century to reclaim the 30 billion hectares appropriated by foreign and private interests in the last five years. We will have transformed land use, access and ownership, so that our vast wealthy lands are used in sustainable, collectively intelligent and environmentally sound ways, enabling women and men to move beyond indebtedness and pursue much higher goals and dreams.

The global regime of trade and tariffs will have been overturned. Our elites will have stopped lining their pockets and ensured that Africa's people benefit from Africa's wealth. The inhabitants of our oil zones will no longer have to plead to "leave the oil in the soil" Instead, our rich bio-diverse ecosystem and the livelihoods of local peoples will be protected for the common good.

What will inspire the radical systemic change that will lift us – liberate us – to think beyond survival? *Renaissance* is recognition, redistribution and cultural freedom, backed up by structural change that allows people to benefit from a more judicious and accountable use of our resources.

ARTS OF LOVE

Ama Ata Aidoo, the Ghanaian feminist novelist, once said, "For us Africans, literature must serve a purpose: to expose, embarrass and fight corruption and authoritarianism. It is understandable why the African artist is utilitarian." As a young woman, the freedom fighter Ama Ata Aidoo vowed never to write love stories. Let's delight in the fact that, over the years, she has changed her mind about the value of writing about love, as her edited anthology of highly original and diverse *African Love Stories* demonstrates. She has travelled her path and had the courage to grow and change while retaining her deep commitment to Pan-Africanism. Love flourishes, after all is said and done.

By 2063, our creative writers will still inspire and rally us all and call governments to account. But they will never doubt the need to stay in love with Africa, to be renewed daily in our love for Africa – for all Africa's "beautyful ones" (Ayi Kwei Armah), born and unborn, and our descendants will have more love and more joy to share every single day.

What is abundantly evident is that we women and men of Africa are not lacking in vision, creativity or imagination, although at times we've lost touch with Africa's genius or suppressed and denied the talent that resides among women, the poor and the oppressed. Amilcar Cabral saw this potential, and so should we.

In 2063, strong and well-resourced research, cultural and educational institutions will be there to inspire and challenge us, enabling us develop the intellectual and emotional capacities to dream of an even better future. We look forward to a future in which our talents and creativity are no longer wasted and frustrated by the exigencies of survival and hampered by the lack of access to resources.

I humbly appeal for our African Union to be a people's union that will support the establishment of strong and inclusive Pan-African culture, media and research institutions, and strengthen those that have already been established in response to the challenges of our times. I appeal for us to facilitate the redistribution of our material wealth among our people for our collective liberation, for democracy, for equality, and for justice.

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

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