NEW AGENDA ISSUE 43 THIRD QUARTER 2011

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NEW AGENDA

SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY

FIXING THE PUBLIC SERVICE

BY RICHARD LEVIN
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ISSUE 43 THIRD QUARTER 2011

Institute for Co-operatives Development

The Department of Economic Development and Environmental Affairs (DEDEA) has sponsored the Institute of Co-operatives Development to address the establishment, support and growth of co-operatives in the province, and proactively identify viable markets, products and service niches for the co-operatives.

Envisaged in the Province's Strategy for the Support and Development of Co-operatives in the Eastern Cape (2008) was an Institute for Co-operatives Development that will play a key role in:

- building the requisite knowledge and institutional base to enable the launch and sustainability of the community and co-operative enterprises as well as the institutional infrastructure that supports them;
- establishing its secretariat at the University of Fort Hare (UFH), while also establishing satellite offices in participating institutions that will manifest its shared identity;
- growing the Institute into a flagship project through which the investment of the Provincial Government budget can also yield learning and resources that can be shared widely across South Africa, illuminating and animating our shared quest for a vibrant, inclusive economy anchored around organised, capable, productive and self-sustaining communities;
- including institutions and organisations in the envisaged network of centres to comprise universities, further education and training (FET) colleges;
- developing education centres, municipality co-operatives development and support centres, and other related organisations; and
- establishing a number of select institutions with primary responsibility for the knowledge development needs of the initiative; this to include curriculum development, research, and the training of a cadre of knowledge-workers who will anchor the co-operatives movement in this province and the broader South Africa,
- develpoing the Institute for Co-operatives Development to become a centre of excellence in the field.

The core purpose of the Institute will be to build and support the human resource and knowledge capabilities, the support systems of learning and research institutions, co-operatives and other community enterprises, as well as other organisations working to build co-operatives as an important component of the local, provincial, national and regional political economy.

The key objectives of the Institute are the following:

- to assist in the establishment of democratic sustainable co-operatives movement;
- to lend material, technical and intellectual support to existing co-operatives;
- to establish the Institute for Co-operatives Development;
- to train co-operatives managers and operators as well as supporting emerging and existing co-operatives to ensure sustainability; and
- conducting training of members of the co-operatives, both existing and emerging ones.

Institute for Co-operatives Development, Bhisho

On the 25th – 27th May 2012, the Institute for Co-operatives Development will be hosting the Social-Economic Architecture of Co-operatives in the 21st Century: Inaugural Colloquium of the Co-operative Movement, at the University of Fort Hare, Bhisho, South Africa. This will be under the theme "Building Developmental and Adaptive Capacities of Cooperative Enterprises".

Abstract papers for this colloquium are requested and should be submitted to Professor Sipho Buthelezi on **sbuthelezi@ufh.ac.za** between **2 August** and **31 October 2011.**

For further enquiries please contact:
Prof S Buthelezi on **sbuthelezi@ufh.ac.za** or Ms Thandile Zondeki on **tzondeki@ufh.ac.za**

DIPHUKA CONSULTING

Diphuka is a Tswana name for wings and symbolizes an organization that is poised for growth and destined to soar and fly within the infrastructure sector

Diphuka Consulting (Pty) Ltd is led by Lambert Lobelo (CEO and shareholder). He acquired his extensive experience in the management of key public and private infrastructure projects and where he has held management positon within varoius companies operating in South Africa and our neighbouring countries.

He has played a pivotal role in the consolidation, development and growth of Tau Pride Projects, Diphuka Consulting and Peolwane Properties. His expertise have seen him involved with the management of infrastructure programmes in excess of R3 Billion to date.

He continues to give insight to the industry through his various interactions with key stakeholders in the infrastructure public sector space.

Turnkey Solutions:
- We offer turnkey solutions that integrate the processes of design and construction through the engagement of a single service provider, thereby mitigating the delivery risk on the project.

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- What sets us apart is our ability to understand and resolve key issues, to deliver innovation through creative design, to optimise value throughout the supply chain and to align design requirements with commercial objectives and economic realities.

Programme Management:
- As a professional programme management team, we take a holistic approach to programme management. Our thinking goes beyond projects, sub-projects, scope and cost. How will this programme affect the community? Will this programme be sustainable?

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- Through a commitment to professional excellence and continuous learning, Diphuka Construction has established a reputation as one of South Africa's foremost construction management firms. We are creating the next generation of high-performance buildings for the global business community.

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- We are experienced in working with all types of public sector organisations, to ensure that budgets, timelines and regulatory protocols are adhered to. We have an enviable track record in the public sector, having delivered building solutions in the educational, health, judicial, sporting, and transport sectors. This experience has given us insight into the unique aspects of public sector work, such as government procurement practices, budget practices and priorities.



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

Riviera, Mafikeng

South Africa, Botswana and SADC Region

Construction Projects
- New Upington Referral Hospital, a 250-bed hospital in Upington
- New head office for the Department of Health and Social Services (North West Province)
- Moses Kotane Hospital
- Ventersdorp surfacing contracts
- Civil and building works

Consulting Projects
- New Community Health Centre – Tlhabane
- PMU for Botswana Local Government
- New De Aar Referral Hospital, 200-bed hospital in De Aar
- New Community Health Centre – Rustenburg
- PMU for North West Department of Health
- North West Department of Health

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Books available for review

The following books have recently been received

Interested reviewers should contact Helen Douglas at mwnewagenda@mweb.co.za

Barchiesi, Franco. *Precarious Liberation: Workers, the State, and Contested Social Citizenship in Postapartheid South Africa*. UKZN Press: Scottsville; SUNY Press: Albany, 2011. 331 pp

Bingham, Tom. *The Rule of Law*. Penguin: London, 2011. 213 pp

Carmody, Pádraig. *The New Scramble for Africa*. Polity Press: Cambridge, UK; Malden, USA, 2011. 244 pp

Dietz, Tom, Kjell Havnevik, Mayke Kaag, Terje Oestigaard (eds). *African Engagements: Africa Negotiating an Emerging Multipolar World*. Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2011. 389 pp

Durrheim, Kevin, Xoliswa Mtose and Lyndsay Brown. *Race Trouble: Race, Identity and Inequality in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. UKZN Press: Scottsville, 2011. 234 pp

Feminist Alternatives. *My Dream is to be Bold: Our Struggle to End Patriarchy*. Pambazuka Press: Oxford, 2011. 262 pp

George, Susan. *Whose Crisis, Whose Future? Towards a Greener, Fairer, Richer World*. Polity Press: Cambridge, UK; Malden, USA, 2010. 307 pp

Gibson, Nigel C. *Fanonian Practices in South Africa: From Steve Biko to Abahlali baseMjondolo*. UKZN Press: Scottsville, 2011. 312 pp

Lodge, Tom. *Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and Its Consequences*. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011. 432 pp

Mosoetsa, Sarah. *Eating from One Pot: The Dynamics of Survival in Poor South African Households*. Wits University Press: Johannesburg, 2011. 176 pp

Nest, Michael. *Coltan*. Polity Press: Cambridge, UK; Malden, USA, 2011. 220 pp

Plaatjies, Daniel (ed). *Future Inheritance: Building State Capacity in Democratic South Africa*. Jacana: Auckland Park, 2011. 321 pp

Ruiters, Greg (ed). *The Fate of the Eastern Cape: History, Politics and Social Policy*. UKZN Press: Scottsville, 2011. 352 pp

UN-DESA. *World Economic and Social Survey 2011: The Great Green Technological Transformation*. United Nations Dept of Economic and Social Affairs: New York, 2011. 211 pp

Zuern, Elke. *The Politics of Necessity: Community Organizing and Democracy in South Africa*. UKZN Press: Scottsville, 2011. 242 pp

Cents and Sustainability: Securing Our Common Future by Decoupling Economic Growth from Environmental Pressures

Reviewed by **Ivan Turok** (HSRC)

Michael H Smith, Karlson "Charlie" Hargroves and Cheryl Desha
Earthscan: London, 2010. 450 pp

Economic growth has traditionally been considered incompatible with environmental sustainability. Growth is perceived to have degraded the environment and over-exploited non-renewable resources. And environmental gains have been seen as a cost to business and an impediment to economic progress.

Yet it is now recognised that physical growth is the real problem, rather than economic growth per se. It is therefore argued that economic growth must be "decoupled" from the consumption of natural resources. Growth is necessary to generate jobs and to cut poverty, but it must be delinked from material and energy flows to prevent runaway climate change and extreme pressure on primary resources.



Decoupling will require human ingenuity and innovation to develop new green technologies and to improve resource productivity – learning to do more with less. More efficient use of resources should reduce environmental damage from the continuing expansion of production. It may also lower business costs and improve competitiveness by positioning companies at the forefront of one of the next waves of innovation: the green economy.

The purpose of this ambitious book is to draw together the evidence which shows that economic growth can be significantly decoupled from environmental pressures. The book also argues that this constitutes a plausible strategy to achieve sustainable development if combined with a renewed effort to reduce global poverty. It advocates a new "low-impact, low-carbon" form of development that others have termed "green growth".

The heart of the book consists of six chapters that review the arguments and evidence that decoupling is both technically possible and economically affordable. They cover greenhouse gas emissions, the loss of biodiversity, freshwater extraction, waste production and air pollution. These areas are singled out by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as requiring urgent action.

The authors have devoted considerable effort to identifying the key literature, policy documents and empirical research on each theme. Many examples of good practice are also uncovered, including countries that have used the global downturn to justify a strong green stimulus package, such as South Korea and China.

Rural areas have often been the major beneficiaries of schemes for reforestation, restoring soils and cleaning waterways to provide a sustainable base for livelihoods dependent on agriculture and fisheries. Poor communities are particularly dependent on their local environment, so efforts to protect or improve ecosystem services can be vitally important for them. There are useful lessons here for South Africa.

The book also discusses the various obstacles to adjustment to a more resource-efficient economy. It develops an interesting argument that the effectiveness of price signals and (dis)incentives, such as a carbon tax, depends on society's ability to respond to them. A major global problem at present is the lack of skills and knowledge within the private and public sectors to introduce new environmental and energy management systems, reflecting the slow response of the education system to these new demands.

Overall, this is a valuable synthesis of current environmental ideas and policies. The level of repetition is slightly frustrating – the same flagship reports get quoted over and over again – but there is still a great deal of worthwhile material between these broad covers. The issues are highly relevant to South Africa, where the environmental agenda needs to go beyond resource efficiency and conservation if it is to capture the public imagination and high level political support. By linking economic and environmental objectives, there may be exciting possibilities for promoting cleaner and more inclusive growth.

The Struggle for the Eastern Cape 1800–1854: Subjugation and the Roots of South African Democracy

Reviewed by **Kwandiwe Kondlo** (Centre for Africa Studies, University of the Free State)

Martin Legassick
KMM Review Publishing: Sandton, 2010. 152 pp

Given the multiple transitions and crossroads defining the South African polity today, the issues raised in this book reach beyond the Eastern Cape. It implicitly calls for collective reflection and challenges us to think about how to pull together what is good from the past (the humanism of the Cape liberal tradition and the humanness of African communities) in order to face the future with hope.

Our rampant political debate currently lacks proper grounding. The spat between Jimmy Manyi and Trevor Manuel and others is a good example, as it did not locate the historical basis of racialised ethnic relations in South Africa. *The Struggle for the Eastern Cape* explores the construction of identities among various groups of black people. Legassick's analysis of the Kat River settlement, the Bethelsdorp mission and the Cape Mounted Rifles shows how divisions between the Khoisan were fashioned to build allies for the British settler project. These allies also included groups of Africans, commonly referred to as Mfengus, and trek Boers, the ancestors of today's Afrikaners. (It's a pity that the book does not examine more extensively the rise of Mfengu identity.)



The issues arising from a careful reading of this book – issues which have a fundamental bearing on current political discourses – include the evolution of the state in South Africa in the context of an early agrarian capitalism and how capitalism acquired a racial character in order to meet labour demands.

According to Colin Bundy, the three elements of the settler-colonial state are "the military, the market and the magistrate". On the basis of Legassick's work, I would argue that there is a fourth element: the church and its provision of education. In the subjugation of the Xhosa people, missionaries played the role of an ideological vanguard smoothing the way for the army and the market. The forces of the school, the church and language worked towards "an inner realignment of beliefs". In Nguwi Thiong'o's words, an outward reformation of manners and clothing ensured spiritual subjugation, while the bullet was the means of the physical subjugation.

The missionaries were not a homogenous force. They belonged to competing factions united only by the belief of white supremacy. Within the London Missionary Society (LMS), for instance, there were differences about how the "civilising" mission of the white man could be advanced in the Cape with minimum violence to the native populations. Missionaries also had differences regarding the colonial administration. Before 1820, some LMS members, led by Dr Van der Kemp, saw themselves as champions of the cause of native people and opposed many measures aimed at their subjugation. After 1820, with the slow rise of agrarian capitalism and the movement for self-government within the colony, a growing convergence of views emerged among the elites of the missionary fraternity and the political administration.

Legassick's detailed exposition of the Frontier Wars in the Cape clearly shows the violent foundations of the state in South Africa. The military was at the very centre of the embryonic state. It ensured the surrender and dispossession of the Xhosas. HD Lasswell's notion of a "garrison state", where the specialists in violence are the most powerful group in society, is a useful theoretical tool.

The Struggle for the Eastern Cape makes an important contribution with its systematic examination of how racism and capitalism shaped the rise of the state in South Africa. The reader is left with the question of whether this kind of state, by its very nature, could be transformed into a tool for people-centred development.

The Curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War

Reviewed by **Christopher McMichael** (PhD candidate, Political and International Studies, Rhodes University)

Adekeye Adebajo
UKZN Press: Scottsville, 2010. 414 pp

In *The Curse of Berlin*, Adekeye Adebajo tracks the long-term consequences of the 1884–85 Conference of Berlin, in which European powers portioned the continent into a series of quasi-states for the purposes of dispossession and extraction. For Adebajo, this cynical act of cartographic plunder has served to shape Africa's international relations since the late 19th century. His book uses this backdrop to explain how African states have attempted to establish regional and continental security in the aftermath of the Cold War.



The first section is concerned with the security roles of the African Union and the United Nations. The often dry focus on the structures and deployments of these bodies is leavened by a fast-paced chapter on Africa's two UN secretaries-general: Egypt's Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Ghana's Kofi Annan. Despite their differences in leadership style, a combination of personal flaws and external power politics – in particular meddling from the US – in both cases derailed their ambitious security agendas for the continent. Adebajo gives us a backstage look into the Byzantine plotting, double-dealing and backstabbing at the UN, providing a level of anecdotal detail often lacking in books on international relations.

The book's middle section deals with the attempts made by various countries – South Africa, Nigeria, the United States, China and France – to create a hegemonic position for themselves in Africa. The disproportionate influence that foreign powers still exert on the continent's future shows that Africa has not yet escaped Berlin's curse. From a South African reader's perspective, it is interesting to note that the country's aggressive (and in many cases overbearing) defence of its political and business interests has generated resentment within the continent. Adebajo notes that South Africa's drive to become a continental power has overshadowed its attempts to drive forward a progressive security agenda for Africa.

In the final segment, Adebajo sketches the significance for Africa of six historical figures: Cecil Rhodes, Mahatma Ghandi, Kwame Nkrumah, Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Barack Obama. Although this section provides rich detail, it is overburdened by Adebajo's insistence that these figures each fit some archetypal mould of African leadership: Mandela the Saint, Mbeki the Prophet, and so on.

Despite the book's underlying focus on the effects of Berlin, it is more of a collection of articles about contemporary Africa's role in the world than a sustained argument about the long-term impacts of that shameful conference. This is by no means a bad thing. Adebajo's enjoyable prose and breadth of reference make for a stimulating read.

It's a shame that the book relies on elite conceptions of security instead of exploring how this contested term may have very different meanings for ordinary Africans – but this is a general problem with the discipline of international relations rather than a failing specific to Adebajo. While hardly a path-breaking study, *The Curse of Berlin* summarises complex issues in a concise and entertaining way, and is a worthwhile introduction to the complexities of Africa's place in the world.

The Historical Roots of the ANC (Vol 1. Understanding the ANC Today)

Reviewed by **Luli Callinicos**

Ben Turok (ed)
Jacana Media: Auckland Park, 2010. 132 pp

As commentators increasingly speak of a "new ANC" that has strayed from its original non-racial vision, it is important that its members and the public become familiar with the roots of the organisation. Eight chapters by leading ANC intellectuals trace its evolution and provide a valuable overview of the influences that have shaped it.

The reader is introduced to African politics prior to the ANC's launch in 1912 through two intellectuals who were prominent from the 1880s: John Tengo Jabavu and WB Rubusana. Jabavu founded his own newspaper, *Imvo Zabantsundu* (Black Opinion). He favoured electing sympathetic liberal whites to promote the cause of black people. Rubusana's *Izwi Labantu* (The Voice of the People) had a different approach: black people should enter the corridors of power themselves; in 1911, he successfully ran for the Cape Provincial Council.



The foundational idea of the ANC, stressed by Pallo Jordan, is national self-determination. Secondly, Jordan importantly emphasises the tradition of human rights and the fact that the ANC's first programmatic statement in 1925 was called "The African Bill of Rights".

The national liberation movement was fed by two streams: one led by a modernising, educated elite and the other coming from the working class. This led the ANC to develop itself as a movement of ordinary working people led by the elite. After the First World War, black workers began to form their own organisations. The most successful example in the 1920s was the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU).

In a joint contribution, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Ben Turok show how the ANC began to transform itself into a mass organisation in the 1940s and '50s, firstly when women were allowed to join in 1943, and then with the formation of the Youth League in 1944. In 1949, the ANC accepted the Youth League's programme of action and committed itself to directly challenge white power. Early Youth League leaders included Anton Lembede, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, AP Mda and Oliver Tambo.

Adekeye Adebajo provides a perspective on the anti-colonial struggle at the time of the 1955 Bandung Conference. He draws our attention to key figures in the "the Afro-Asian revolt against the West", such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Kwame Nkrumah and Gamal Abdel Nasser, and identifies ways of rekindling the "spirit of Bandung" to foster greater Asian-African co-operation.

The book ends with two excellent chapters on Marxism and social democracy. Turok provides a masterful summary of Marxism-Leninism but leaves the reader unclear on how the ANC sees the relationship between national and social revolution. Febe Potgieter-Gqubule makes an interesting case for the dominant influence of social democratic thinking on the Freedom Charter and other documents. She argues that it balances political rights with socio-economic rights, acknowledging that "you cannot have the one without the other".

Although the ANC has been involved in the Socialist International (the international arm of social democracy) for many years, social democracy has been treated by the ANC as the "ideology that dare not speak its name". Opening up a debate could lead to a creative synthesis between these two powerful left traditions.

Inevitably, there are going to be gaps in a short book such as this. A glaring one is the lack of attention to feminism and its influence on ANC practices and policies. It is often said that political education is neglected inside the ANC. As the first of a series produced for the ANC Parliamentary Political Education Committee – six have already been published – this book is an ideal point of departure for its revitalisation.

The budget would then be disbursed through the following provincial anchor projects:

PROVINCE	PROJECT	AMOUNT
KwaZulu-Natal	1. Nongoma – Dabhazi – Hlambanyathi – Hlabisa corridor 2. Eshowe – Ntumeni – Kranskop – Vryheid corridor	1. R270 million 3. R2 billion
Mpumalanga	1. Maintenance of the R33 Road between Stoffberg to Belfast (42km) 2. An upgrade 40km road project from White River to Ntsikazi	1. R24 million 3. R16 million
Limpopo	1. Household routine maintenance engaging some 27 contractors attending to some 8100 km 2. Fixing access roads 3. Pothole patching project on some 220kms of roads	1. R237 million 3. R60 million 5. R174 million
Gauteng	1. Reseal on N14 from Krugersdorp to Klieveskraal 2. Reseal of Ben Schoeman - Pretoria to the N1 3. Upgrade on P126 (M1) on some 8.54km	1. R55.8 million 3. R10 million 5. R11 million
Northern Cape	1. Household Road Maintenance-Bathloaros to Maphinik 26km 2. Road Maintenance: Victoria West Calvinia 387km 3. Re-seal of Douglas-Kimberley 18km	1. R7 million 3. R18 million 5. R22 million
Western Cape	1. Overberg regravelling 2. Malmisbury to Hopefield reseal 3. De Rust to N9 reseal	1. R43 million 2. R51 million 3. R54 million
Eastern Cape	1. Household Contractor programme 2. Emerging contractor and consultant development	R200 million (Over 3years) R500 million (Over 3years)

Monitoring Delivery

Department of Transport is required to regularly report on a quarterly basis to National Treasury on the performance of this grant. We will monitor the creation of jobs and expenditure to ensure emerging contractors are created in numbers. The transport forums will become another layer of civil society which will contribute to the monitoring and evaluation of S'hamba Sonke.

Infrastructure Defines Development

A key element of **S'hamba Sonke** is ongoing stakeholder consultation in all projects and programmes which will be articulated in the following forums:

- (Rural) Road Transport Forums, where they do not exist, must be formed
- Strong stakeholder institutions for the economic empowerment of South Africa's rural poor must be rolled out
- Commitment to the development of a national co-operative movement and a national emerging contractor council.

Furthermore, **S'hamba Sonke** consists of the following elements:

- A Pothole Repair Programme, involving road-users and the private sector
- The establishment of provincial road-asset registers which record the condition of roads, traffic counts and life-cycle maintenance requirements
- Asset management systems for authorities to **"know your network."** Engineers and Superintendents will drive through stretches of road to determine the daily condition of the network
- Reducing the percentage of roads in poor to very poor condition from the current 30% to 10%
- Reducing vehicle operating costs and thus overall transportation costs.

Road Beautification

Road beautification across our country, especially on our national and major provincial roads and approaches to cities, will be embarked upon. Constructing spaces for relaxation, traffic calming, planting, flowering, shrubbing will translate into a significant number of jobs at a local level in relation to maintenance.

S'hamba Sonke! Re sepela ka moka! Re tsamaya rotlhe! Re tsamaya mmoho! Ons loop saam! Vamos juntos! Building together

transport
Department: Transport
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Minister of Transport
The Honourable Sibusiso Ndebele



S'hamba Sonke

Building Roads. Maintaining Roads. Creating Jobs

The 18th of April 2011 marked the official birthday of the S'hamba Sonke programme nationally. The launch was attended by the entire transport family - the national Department of Transport, provincial departments responsible for roads and transport, local government including district and local municipalities. Also present were public transport passenger associations, road transport forums, established contractors, emerging contractors, Zibambele-Siyatentela and similar formations, engineers, AmaKhosi and Road Safety Councils.

The conditions of a country's roads indicate its development, thus establishing a correlation between the condition of roads and economic growth.

No doubt, there is a huge outcry over the state of our country's road network that has in most cases deteriorated beyond its 20 year life design. In mitigation to this problem, Minister of Transport Sibusiso Ndebele noted during his keynote address in KwaZulu-Natal at the launch of **S'hamba Sonke**, that the transport family has adopted the **Road Infrastructure Strategic Framework for South Africa (RISFSA)**, led by national Department of Transport together with provinces to identify and to establish uniformity in the development and management of road infrastructure in South Africa.

The **S'hamba Sonke Programme** is an initiative based on a study commissioned by the Department in 1996/97 called the **Community Access Roads Needs Study (CARNS)** authored by planners, engineers and development specialists. S'hamba Sonke seeks to develop and maintain South Africa's provincial secondary road networks and at the same time, place the rural economy on a labour absorptive growth path.

It centralises the importance of corridor development within the context of general, improved road access and transport mobility through the construction and maintenance of feeder roads by labour based methods. Minister Ndebele believes that by centralising corridor development within the context of integrated rural access, **S'hamba Sonke** proposes to maximise the use of skilled engineers cost effectively.

S'hamba Sonke embraces the policy principles of the New Growth Path and intends to develop a routine road maintenance contract system designed primarily to create much needed jobs. It is a far more comprehensive development intervention which will focus on the establishment of co-operatives and the creation of new and sustainable income streams.

Another key element of this rural road maintenance and construction programme is that it will include a road safety component in line with the Moscow Declaration 2010, which commits all signatory countries to allocate 10% of all road maintenance and construction budgets to an ongoing road safety programme such as the **Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011- 2020.**

To translate the **S'hamba Sonke Programme** to tangible deliverables, in line with the National Growth Path policy, the Department will, starting from this financial year allocate an amount of R6.4 billion, R7.5 billion next financial year and R8.2 billion by 2014. The allocated budget for the programme will total some R22 billion by 2014 and for the first time in the history of the country, this entire amount is ring-fenced for the maintenance of our roads.

Within the financial year 2011 and 2012 the budget would be allocated as follows:

KwaZulu-Natal:	**R1.2 billion**
Eastern Cape:	**R1 billion**
Mpumalanga:	**R1 billion**
Limpopo:	**R934 million**
Gauteng:	**R566 million**
Free State:	**R447 million**
Western Cape:	**R411 million**
Northern Cape:	**R308 million**
North West:	**R501 million.**

- explains the *causes* of the crisis – how it came to be that in 2008 our nation was forced to choose between risking the collapse of our financial system and economy, or committing trillions of taxpayer dollars to rescue major corporations and our financial markets
- ties together many aspects of the crisis in a way that has not been done to date
- is based on documents never before made public
- includes substantial new facts and data on issues and events of the financial crisis.

WORK OF THE COMMISSION

The Commission conducted research into broad and sometimes arcane subjects, such as mortgage lending and securitisation, derivatives, corporate governance and risk management. To bring these subjects out of the realm of the abstract, it conducted case-study investigations of specific financial firms – and in many cases specific facets of these institutions – that played pivotal roles. Those institutions included American International Group (AIG), Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Countrywide Financial, Fannie Mae, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Moody's and Wachovia. The Commission also looked more generally at the roles and actions of scores of other companies.

The Commission studied relevant policies put in place by successive congresses and administrations. It also examined the roles of policy makers and regulators, including at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (and its successor, the Federal Housing Finance Agency), the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Treasury Department.

> This crisis was avoidable – a result of human actions, inactions and misjudgements. Warning signs were ignored.

The Commission's report is not the sole repository of what the panel found. The Commission's website at FCIC.gov will host a wealth of information beyond what could be presented in its report. It will contain a stockpile of materials – including documents and emails, video of the Commission's public hearings, audio recordings, summaries and transcripts of interviews, testimony and supporting research – that can be studied for years to come.

This crisis was avoidable

By the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

The US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission released its report on the causes of the financial and economic crisis in Washington on 27 January 2011

The Commission concluded that the crisis was avoidable and was caused by:

- widespread failures in financial regulation, including the Federal Reserve's failure to stem the tide of toxic mortgages
- dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance, including too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much risk
- an explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that put the financial system on a collision course with crisis
- key policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, lacking a full understanding of the financial system they oversaw
- systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels.

"Despite the expressed view of many on Wall Street and in Washington that the crisis could not have been foreseen or avoided, there were warning signs. The greatest tragedy would be to accept the refrain that no one could have seen this coming and thus nothing could have been done. If we accept this notion, it will happen again," said Phil Angelides, chairman of the Commission.

The Commission's report also offers conclusions about specific components of the financial system that contributed significantly to the financial meltdown. Here the Commission concluded that collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the mortgage securitisation pipeline lit and spread the flame of contagion and crisis; over-the-counter derivatives contributed significantly to this crisis; and the failures of credit-rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction.

The Commission also examined the role of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), with Fannie Mae serving as the case study. The Commission found that the GSEs contributed to the crisis but were not a primary cause. They had a deeply flawed business model and suffered from many of the same failures of corporate governance and risk management seen in other financial firms but ultimately followed rather than led Wall Street and other lenders in purchasing sub-prime and other risky mortgages.

The Commission's report, which was delivered to the president and congress, contains the data and evidence collected in the Commission's inquiry, the conclusions of the Commission based on that inquiry, and accompanying dissents. The conclusions were drawn from the review of millions of pages of documents, interviews with more than 700 witnesses, and 19 days of public hearings in New York, Washington, DC, and communities across the country that were hit hard by the crisis. The Commission also drew from a large body of existing work about the crisis developed by congressional committees, government agencies, academics, journalists, legal investigators, and many others.

The Commission's statutory instructions set out 22 specific topics for inquiry and called for the examination of the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government. In addition, the Commission was instructed to refer any person that the Commission found may have violated the laws of the United States in relation to the crisis to the attorney-general of the United States and any appropriate state attorney-general. Where the Commission found such potential violations, it referred those matters to the appropriate authorities.

While much has already been written on the financial crisis, this report

- is the first official government report on what caused the crisis



Feedback from participants who have attended these classes is overwhelmigly positive. A recent participant from the DRC commented "I have just completed a level 3 English course. I realy (sic) enjoyed it and would like to say tanks (sic) to all who gave us this opportunity. I hope to come again as soon as possible." The participants who attend these classes are diligent and enthusiastic in their approach to learning English. Many of them are professionals in their own right, but unfortunately lack the language skills required to find employment in their profession. They are popular amongst the Language Teacher Education unit staff and teacher trainees. "Despite the terrible experiences many of the students have had in the past and difficulties they face on a daily basis, they are eager to improve their English language skills and are a pleasure to teach," one staff member said.

Not only do the refugees and asylum seekers benefit from the classes. For the teacher trainees on the TESOL course teaching English to refugees and asylum seekers provides them with invaluable practical experience where they can develop their teaching skills and have a rewarding opportunity to make a difference to the lives of many people. The Language Teacher Education unit staff have learnt a lot about other African countries, cultures and languages through their interaction with the participants of these classes.

The Wits Language School English programme for refugees and asylum seekers has proved to be successful in assisting these individuals to develop their language skills and integrate more effectively into South African society. This programme is a model that could be adopted by other tertiary schools of education and private language institutions throughout South Africa to assist those in need to develop the vital skills required to integrate into society. In the harsh economic times we are faced with, where funding for charitable organisations has been cut, we need to use our resources more carefully to uplift and develop individuals to become economically and socially stable. As South Africans, we have a responsibility to make a difference and be part of the solution. Wits Language School through its refugee and asylum seeker English programme is making a difference.

Georgina Ma

Georgina works as the coordinator of the Language Teacher Education unit at Wits language School. She has a BA (English, Law) and Honours degree (English) from the University of KwaZulu Natal. She completed her Master's degree (English Language Teaching) at the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom and is currently doing her PhD at the University of the Witwatersrand. Georgina has more than 10 years experience in teaching English as a second and foreign language in South Africa and abroad, where she has taught in Taiwan, China and the United Kingdom. She has been involved in teacher training and development since 2003. Georgina is a member of IATEFL (International Association of Teachers of English as a Foreign Language) and a member of the Teacher Training and Development special interest group.

For further information, please **contact Georgina Ma** on 011 717 4154
email Georgina.Ma@wits.ac.za or **visit** www.witslanguageschool.com

ASSISTING REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS TO INTEGRATE INTO SOUTH AFRICA THROUGH ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROGRAMMES

Georgina Ma

A 2011 UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) report estimates that there are approximately 470,800 refugees and asylum seekers living in South Africa. Other reports estimate the number of refugees and asylum seekers at between 550,000 and 850,000. These numbers are expected to continue to climb due to the continued instability of the continent and South Africa's elevated economic status (Landau, 2007). The majority of refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa come from other African countries such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. Although some individuals are resettled in their countries of origin, a large proportion of individuals is destined to remain in South Africa as a result of the protracted nature of conflicts that have forced them to leave their countries of origin (Khan, 2007).

All refugees and asylum seekers enjoy free movement within South Africa and most settle in large cities within local communities. Although they have the right to seek employment and make use of basic social services, high levels of unemployment, limitations on social services and factors affecting integration are major constraints (UNHCR South Africa report, 2011).

Khan (2007:2) defines integration as 'a process of development of human potential that allows the refugee or asylum seeker to lead a meaningful existence within the host [country].' The National Centre for Social Research in the United Kingdom identifies time spent in the host country, age and language skills as crucial factors for refugees and asylum seekers to integrate into society. A lack of English skills results in many of these individuals not being able to obtain full economic and social participation in South Africa by finding employment, utilising social services and becoming accepted members of society. Being able to speak a local language is one of the greatest tools an individual has for achieving integration. For refugees and asylum seekers language learning becomes the means of achieving integration and self-sufficiency.

Alison Fenney of the Refugee Council in the United Kingdom argues "The main barrier to refugees learning English is not lack of will but rather the lack of suitable language courses." Various host countries, such as Ireland and the United Kingdom provide various services, such as English as a Second Language (ESOL) classes, to assist refugees and asylum seekers to integrate into society; however in South Africa services are limited to meeting basic shelter, food, health and educational needs. Language tuition for refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa has largely been provided by religious organisations, educational institutions and members of the public.

Wits Language School has been providing language classes for refugees and asylum seekers since 2005. The English programme for refugees and asylum seekers was initiated as both a social outreach programme and a core component of the initial language teacher education course in Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages (TESOL). Wits Language School works closely with Papillon Foundation to provide language classes to refugees, asylum seekers and members of the public who are unable to afford more formal language tuition. These classes aim to develop participants' vocabulary, grammar, reading, writing, listening and speaking skills. Not only do these classes provide participants with an opportunity to develop their language skills, but provide them with important opportunities to meet and interact with South Africans. Where many refugees and asylum seekers have been affected by discrimination and recent xenophobic attacks, these classes provide them with a safe environment in which they feel welcomed and experience a sense of community.

An English lesson taught by a trainee teacher

Classes are taught by trainee teachers registered on the TESOL course on a part-time and full-time basis throughout the year. Participants pay a nominal administration fee that covers their access card for the University of the Witwatersrand. The programme is funded by the Language Teacher Education unit at Wits Language School, with teacher trainees contributing by providing copies of learning materials and teaching resources. The courses are well subscribed and participants often attend more than one course, with some having attended classes for more than one year.

A trainee teacher assisting two students from the Democratic Republic of Congo

So there is no reason to think that Latin American democracies have been precarious because of their youth! The reason lies instead in their inability to produce democratic results and improve living conditions for their people.

OLD PARTIES

The long history of ideals and republican governance in Latin America is also reflected in its political parties. Colombia's *Partido Conservador* and *Partido Liberal* were both founded around 1849. The former followed the ideas of Simón Bolivar, the "Liberator", while the latter continued the work of his liberal rival, Francisco de Paula Santander. The split between partisans of order and authority, on the one hand, and liberties and laws, on the other, led to the emergence of conservative and liberal parties throughout the region in the second half of the 19th century. Some of those parties continued to play a leading role in political life until very recently: e.g. until the elections of Tabaré Vásquez, of the *Frente Amplio* in Uruguay (2005), Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2008) and the controversial Honduran government of Manuel Zelaya, who was overthrown in 2009.

Socialist, communist, Christian democrat, nationalist and other parties began to appear only later in the 20th century. Until recently, therefore, the landscape of Latin American political parties was similar to that of Europe (although in recent years it has been more influenced by the US party model, with increasing dependence on special economic interests in a context of privatisation and growing media influence in political life).

Nowadays, there is public disenchantment with all the parties, both old and new. This is a universal phenomenon, but it is more serious in Latin America, where governments and parties in general have fallen short of the expectations that accompanied the restoration of democracy. Poverty has not decreased drastically. Education, health, access to justice and public safety have become chronic problems. And above all, the Latin American countries remain the most unequal in the world, with growing inequalities.

NOTE

[1] In his classic work, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso, 1991), Benedict Anderson showed that forms of nationalism emerged in the Americas (both North and South) before they appeared in Europe, and that it was a "creole" nationalism: exclusive and fearful of uprisings by Indians or slaves.

Latin America: Old democracies, old parties

By **Rafael Roncagliolo**

The author is with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), where he is senior political advisor for the Andean Region Programme and Head of Mission for the Peru Programme

Unlike many democracies in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe, Latin America's democracies are neither new nor young. They are weak and unstable, however, and most have been re-established since 1978. Many countries in the region have had more military than civilian governments in the two hundred years since independence. And all 20, with just three exceptions (Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama), had socialist guerrilla movements in the last decades of the 20th century. In fact, the heirs of those movements govern today in El Salvador (the Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional *), Nicaragua (the* Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional*) and Uruguay (the* Frente Amplio*).*

The longevity of democracy may be also predicated on Latin America's political parties – some of which, such as those in Colombia, Honduras, Paraguay and Uruguay, are among the oldest in the world.

OLD DEMOCRACIES

There is a great difference, of both epoch and ideological orientation, between the wars of independence in the Americas and those in most of Africa and Asia. The former occurred early, at the beginning of the 19th century, even before the great colonial expansion of the European powers, and were inspired by the emerging liberalism of the time. They did not and could not have been the fruit of the 20th century socialist school of thought that nourished the anti-colonial movements of the last century, although the Latin American independence movements had also a significant and crucial nationalist undercurrent.[1]

The independence of Latin America, at the beginning of the 19th century, was the fifth chapter in the universal history of liberal revolutions, following the 80 Years War of the Netherlands against Spanish domination (1568–1648), the English revolutions (culminating in the bloody Glorious Revolution of 1688), the revolution of independence in North America in 1776 and the French Revolution in 1789. In Latin America, the United Provinces (now Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Nicaragua) gained independence from Spain in 1821. This served as the model for the United Provinces of Central America, the United Provinces of New Granada (Colombia) and the United Provinces of South America, which soon became the United Provinces of Río de la Plata (Argentina), all of them created at the beginning of the independence.

Contemporary historians maintain, with good reason, that independence was partially the fruit of the liberal insurgency that occurred in Spain in reaction to the Napoleonic invasion and the subsequent overthrow of the Spanish monarch. Similarly, Brazil's independence was proclaimed in 1822 by the Portuguese emperor, who had moved to Brazil in flight from the Napoleonic invasion. The Hispano-American nations were thus born of the collapse of the Spanish Empire, just as the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 20th century gave birth – or rebirth, in some cases – to a group of new states.

Latin American independence was markedly liberal and republican. Except for Brazil, which remained imperial until the late 19th century, and the very brief Iturbide monarchy in Mexico, all of the new Latin American states chose to create liberal republican constitutions from the start. Throughout the 19th century, along with the United States and Europe, Latin America adopted increasingly democratic practices, including the expansion of suffrage.

One of the platoons of the SA Army 2011 University Reserve Training Programme, Basic Military Training, Bloemfontein



Students being addressed by Major General R.C. Andersen, Chief Defence Reserves

Female University Reserve Training Programme students, Basic Military Training, Bloemfontein

medical fitness, leadership potential and academic achievement. Students in their second or third year of study may apply for enrolment and must be prepared to complete the prescribed medical and psychometric tests and appear before a selection board.

As the training programme is presented on a modularised basis, the students must be prepared to undergo their military training during certain university vacations and week-ends. This poses a challenge to these students as they will have to manage their academic and military commitments in such a way that neither of the two disciplines is neglected.

The programme is not only to develop the military skills of the participants, but more importantly to develop individual management skills, establish self-awareness, self-discipline and self-confidence. The challenging programme of military training and additional complementary social activities, adventure and cultural activities will broaden their outlook on life.

The short-term objective of developing junior military leaders for the Reserves is eventually to provide senior commanders to the SANDF and executive leaders for the country, with positive attributes including national core values and a code of ethics.

After the SA Military Health Service completed a pilot programme in 2008, the SA Army became the first service to roll out the programme. In June/July university vacation, 60 selected students of the University of the Free State and the Central University of Technology reported for training at De Brug near Bloemfontein. These students will complete their basic military training by March 2012. After the successful completion of the basic military training, selected students will be offered the opportunity to undergo officer training in the future.

PART-TIME SOLDIERS
FULL-TIME LEADERS

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE DEVELOPS YOUNG MILITARY LEADERS FOR THE FUTURE


Major General R.C. Andersen

In support of the government's initiative concerning job creation, the Department of Defence (DOD) recently introduced a training programme known as "The University Reserve Training Programme" (URTP). Since the cessation of conscription in 1992, the Reserve has become short of leaders at the junior officer level and it is for this reason that the DOD has initiated this programme.

This initiative also enables the Department of Defence (DOD) to support government's Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) outcomes, which is a government priority. As stated in the *MTSF Outcome 5*, through this programme the DOD envisages producing; "a skilled and capable workforce to support an inclusive economic growth path". It also seeks to fulfil *MTSF Outcome 12*, which states; "an efficient, effective and development-oriented public service and an empowered, fair and inclusive citizenship".

One of the main objectives of the programme is to develop young citizens with both leadership and academic potential into disciplined military leaders.

The programme will be implemented in phases at various academic institutions in accordance with the requirements of the four services of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), namely: the SA Army, SA Air Force, SA Navy and the SA Military Health Service.

The Reserve Force is the volunteer and part-time component of the SANDF and students who would like to be considered for selection to participate in the programme while completing their studies.

Prospective candidates must be registered students at the identified universities where the SANDF will source junior leaders from the "best and brightest" of the undergraduate and postgraduate student bodies.

The programme is open to all students at the specific institution. The main criteria for selection are

LDCs lose revenue due to capital flight caused by big western firms.

Alemayehu says this happens in different ways:

- through falsified invoicing, or the inflating or undervaluing of prices to increase costs and diminish tax liability
- through transfer mis-pricing, a phenomenon in which companies sell to each other at inflated prices, inflating costs in intra-corporate financial transactions
- through "round-tripping", where companies operating in a country send their money offshore and bring it back as "foreign investment" to get preferential tax treatment.

According to Malawi's ministry of finance, the country lost US$125 million in tax allowances in 2008–2009 alone. This equals what the government spends annually on its national grain subsidy, which has over the years helped Malawi maintain a grain surplus.

"Multinationals come to invest in African countries on the back of so many investment incentives that are packed into our tax regimes," Benjamin Chikusa, a Malawian parliamentarian, told IPS.

Malawi offers as much as a 100 percent investment allowance on qualifying expenditure for new buildings and machinery; an allowance of up to 40 percent for used buildings and machinery; and a 50 percent allowance for qualifying training costs.

Manufacturing companies can deduct all operating expenses incurred up to 25 months prior to the start of operations in Malawi and pay zero duty on raw materials used in manufacturing.

Many countries offer such incentives in anticipation of returns through personal income tax, foreign exchange earnings and employment. But to what extent do such benefits accrue in reality?

> "The failure by multinational companies to declare profits translates into capital flight. Moreover, companies in the extractive industries enjoy far too many benefits through unnecessary tax relief."

"Most of the employment benefits come in the form of low-paid jobs at a level where income taxes do not recover what has been lost through tax allowances," says Chikusa.

Experts recommend that African countries design effective tax systems that allow them to track tax evaders beyond their borders, and that parliaments play a stronger oversight role when it comes to taxation.



Tax could be the way out of aid dependence

This article was published on NGO Pulse

(IPS Africa) Africa cannot free herself from poverty by relying on development aid. In reality, African countries spend more on paying off foreign debts than the inflow of aid to the continent. At the same time, multinationals take money out through tax breaks or illegal tax evasion. African governments' lack of capacity to put in place tax systems has created opportunities for companies not to be properly taxed. Effective tax systems will enable these countries to track tax evaders beyond their borders.

Many African countries struggle with debt and finding money for national budgets because they fail to recognise taxation as a sustainable source of funding. Moreover, multinational companies are too easily given tax breaks while siphoning off money through illegal tax evasion.

Taxation plays an important role in determining the distribution of benefits to citizens. It also acts as a connection between state and citizenry.

But "there is no mobilisation of national resources for national development in African countries, which is why we are seeing agitation among ordinary people", Percy Makombe, programme manager at the Cape Town-based Economic Justice Network (EJN), told Inter Press Service. EJN is a project of the Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa (FOCCISA).

Attention to the tax issue has generally been lacking.

"History proves that no country will march out of poverty through aid, but effective local resource mobilisation can aid development of African countries," declares Alvin Mosioma, co-ordinator of the Tax Justice Network–Africa, based in Nairobi.

The politically independent Tax Justice Network was launched in Britain and does research and advocacy on taxation.

It co-hosted a roundtable discussion in Johannesburg on 14–15 September 2010 with the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) and the Institute for Democracy in Africa (Idasa) to discuss ways of using tax as an instrument to reduce Africa's dependence on aid as a tool for development.

The majority of African governments spend large percentages of their annual budgets paying off debts while big foreign companies take money out of their countries through tax breaks or illegal tax evasion.

Multinational companies are also not properly taxed due to the lack of capacity of African authorities to put tax systems in place.

According to Christian Aid figures, the Democratic Republic of Congo received a mere US$86 000 from mineral rights in 2006 while Tanzania lost at least US$265.5 million dollars in recent years as a result of an excessively low royalty rate.

A 2008 Christian Aid report, *Death and Taxes: The True Toll of Tax Dodging*, states that illegal tax evasion deprives least developed countries (LDCs) of 160 billion dollars a year. British-based Christian Aid works towards the eradication of poverty.

"The failure by multinational companies to declare profits translates into capital flight. Moreover, companies in the extractive industries enjoy far too many benefits through unnecessary tax relief," argues Obert Gutu, a Zimbabwean parliamentarian.

"When a government relies on the resources of its donors it is less responsive to citizens," Gutu adds.

Christian Aid defines capital flight as the unrecorded and untaxed illicit leakage of capital and resources out of a country. Dr Dereje Alemayehu, manager at Christian Aid East Africa, told IPS that many

	COURSE	COURSE CO-ORDINATOR	DATE	CONTACT INFO
		FRUIT PRODUCTION		
32	Deciduous Fruit Production	Ms. Odette Beukes	ON REQUEST	021 809-3402
33	Basic Business Skills	Ms. Odette Beukes	ON REQUEST	021 809-3402
34	Cultivation of Subtropical crops: Avocado, Citrus & Macadamia, Banana, Guava, Mango & Litchi	Ms. Estelle Niewerhuis	ON REQUEST	013 753-7081
35	Propagation Of Subtropical Fruit Crops	Ms. Estelle Niewerhuis	ON REQUEST	013 753-7081
36	Table Grape Production	Mr. Danne Van Schalkwyk	ON REQUEST	021 809-3156
37	Tissue Culture of Subtropical Crops	Ms. Estelle Niewerhuis	ON REQUEST	013 753-7081
		GRAIN CROPS		
38	Introduction to Grain Crops Production	Mr. Justinus Mashao	ON REQUEST	018 299-6276
39	Grain Post Harvest	Mr. Phanuel Malebane	ON REQUEST	012 808-8176
40	Dry Beans Production	Dr. Deidre Fourie	ON REQUEST	018 299-6312
41	Groundnut Production	Dr. Jan Dreyer	ON REQUEST	018 299-6327
42	Maize Production	Mr. Justinus Mashao & Mr Cedric Baloyi	ON REQUEST	018 299-6276
43	Sorghum and Millet Production	Dr. Nemera Shargie	ON REQUEST	018 299-6284
44	Wheat Production	Dr. Eric Morojele	18-20 Oct	058 307-3427
		INDIGENOUS TEAS		
45	Honeybush Tea Production	Ms. Marlise Joubert	ON REQUEST	021 809-3331
		INDUSTRIAL CROPS		
46	Basic Literacy for Cotton Plant Protection	Ms. Jody Terblanche	ON REQUEST	014 536-3150
		LIVESTOCK		
47	Aquaculture	Dr. Mary-Jane Thaela-Chimuka	21-24 June; 11-14 Oct	012 672-9325
48	Beef Cattle Management	Ms. Annelize Loubser	16-19 Aug	012 672-9153
49	Beef Production	Ms. Leslie Bergh	3 May (E); 4 May (A); 3 Aug; 9 Oct (E); 10 Oct (10); 3 Feb 2012 (A)	012 672-9145
50	Beef Cattle Bup Course	Dr. Helena Theron	13-15 April	012 672-9070
51	Beef Schemes Course	Mr. Ben Greyling	3 May (E); 4 May (A) 2 June (A); 2 Aug (A); 7 Sept (A); 8 Oct (E); 2 Feb 2012 (A)	012 672-9052
52	Beekeeping	Ms. Elize Lundall-Magnuson	ON REQUEST	012 356-9809
53	Pig Production	Ms. Annelize Loubscher	7-10 June; 8-11 Nov	012 672-9153
54	Poultry Production	Ms. Annelize Loubscher	10-13 May; 4-7 Oct	012 672-9153
55	Small Stock Management	Ms. Annelize Loubscher	23-27 May; 5-9 Sept	012 672-9153
		MUSHROOMS		
56	Shitake Mushroom Production	Ms. Estelle Nieuwenhuis	ON REQUEST	013 753-7081
57	Oyster Mushroom Production	Ms. Jessica Maimela	ON REQUEST	012 808-8132
		SOIL & WATER MANAGEMENT		
58	Basic soil analysis & interpretation	Dr. Dave Turner	ON REQUEST	012 310-2597
59	Basic Soil Properties	Mr. Garry Paterson	ON REQUEST	[illegible]
60	Conservation Agriculture Training	Dr. Hendrik Smith	ON REQUEST	012 310-2506
61	Soil Classification & Mapping	Mr. Garry Paterson	ON REQUEST	012 310-2601
62	Soil Microbiology	Ms. Corrie Swanepoel	ON REQUEST	012 310-2630
63	Water Harvesting	Dr. Jacobus Botha	Aug/Sep	051 861-1172
		VEGETABLE PRODUCTION		
64	Hydroponics Vegetable Production	Ms. Erika van der Heever	11 Apr	012 841-9640
65	Vegetable Production	Ms. Erika van den Heever	ON REQUEST	012 841-9640
66	Vitamin A Rich Food Production	Ms. Surette Laurie	ON REQUEST	012 841-9639

For more information please contact: Dr Yolisa Pakela-Jezile, 012 427 9740, pakelay@arc.agric.za

ARC TRAINING SERVICES

ARC • LNR
Excellence in Research and Development

Lack of knowledge, information and skills are key factors contributing to poor agricultural productivity.

The Agricultural Research Council (ARC) Training Services Unit addresses the information gap between research and development (R&D) and the end user of the research output. ARC researchers have developed more than 120 short courses to address various skills needed for a thriving agribusiness, incorporating those specific to a commodity as well as generic business skills. Courses are customised to meet the needs of the various clients in the agricultural and related sectors.

The ARC is an accredited Agricultural Education and Training provider and some courses have been accredited by the Agricultural Sector Training & Education Authority (AgriSETA). Courses are scheduled throughout the year and clients may request and enrol for scheduled courses as individuals or as groups attending specific courses. Courses are also prepared for specific clients taking to consideration literacy levels and language options.

	COURSE	*COURSE CO-ORDINATOR*	*DATE*	*CONTACT INFO*
	AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERING			
1	Irrigation Design and Evaluation	Mr. Felix Reinders	ON REQUEST	012 842-4009
2	Mechanisation planning for crop production	Mr. Sipho Sibanda	New: July - September	012 842 -4048
	AGRO-PROCESSING			
3	Beeswax and Candle Making	Ms. Elize Lundall-Magnuson	ON REQUEST	012 356-9809
4	Dairy Products Manufacturing (Cheese & Yoghurt)	Ms. Elize Kruger	11-14 April; 23-26 May; 27-30 June; 29 Aug -1 Sep; 17-20 Oct	012 672-9222
5	Fruit Processing	Mr. Chris Hansmann	ON REQUEST	021 809-3448
6	Meat Processing	Dr. Beryl Zondagh	20-24 June;17-21 Oct	012 672-9363
7	Processing of sub-tropical fruits	Ms. Estelle Nieuwenhuis	ON REQUEST	013 753-7081
8	Vegetable Processing	Ms. Mmathaha Mosala	ON REQUEST	012 841-9620
	BIOMETRY			
9	Additive Main Effects and Multiplicative Interaction Model	Ms. Mardé Booyse	ON REQUEST	021 809-3527
10	"Data analysis with MS Excel 2003 as basis"	Mr Frikkie Calitz	ON REQUEST	012 427-9819
11	Guidelines for Choosing Research methods, Sampling methods and Experimental Designs	Mr Frikkie Calitz	ON REQUEST	012 427-9819
12	Introduction to multivariate statistics	Ms. Marieta van der Rijst	ON REQUEST	021 809-3526
13	SAS IML Course	Ms. Nicolene Thiebaut	ON REQUEST	012 427-9814
14	WORKSHOP in the "R"-package	Ms. Mardé Booysens	ON REQUEST	021 809-3527
	COLLECTIVE AGRICULTURAL INNOVATIONS (ARD)			
15	Introduction To Collective Innovations in Agricultural Research	Mrs. Cofalah Chiteka	June/September	012 427-9919
16	Collective Agricultural Innovation And Systems Approach	Mrs. Cofalah Chiteka	June/September	012 427-9919
17	Generating Knowledge for Agricultural Innovations	Mrs. Cofalah Chiteka	June/September	012 427-9919
18	Screening Strategies and Stakeholder Participation for Collective Innovations	Ms. Cofalah Chiteka	June/September	012 427-9919
19	Systems Thinking For Agriculture Research For Collective Innovation	Ms. Cofalah Chiteka	June/September	012 427-9919
	DISEASE & PEST MANAGEMENT			
20	Basic Nematology	Ms. Nancy Ntidi	ON REQUEST; preferably Jun/July	018 299-6341
21	Diagnosis of Avian Influenza	Dr. Phelix Majiwa	ON REQUEST	012 529-9441
22	Fungal Taxonomy	Dr. Elna van der Linde	Jun 2011	012 808-8288
23	Fusarium Identification	Dr. Riana Jacobs	25-27 May 2011	012 808-8256
24	Introduction to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy	Dr. Stephen Njiro	ON REQUEST	012 529-9184
25	Introductory Cell Biology	Dr. Riana Jacobs	17-19 Oct 2011	012 808-8256
26	Introductory Molecular Biology	Dr. Riana Jacobs	19-21 Oct 2011	012 808-8256
27	Introductory Mycology course	Dr. Elna van der Linde	Jun 2011	012 808-8288
28	Safety of Pesticide Use	Dr. Barbara Sereda	ON REQUEST	012 808-8145
29	Stored Grain & Rodent Management	Mr. Frikkie Kirsten	ON REQUEST	012 808-8217
30	Tick Identification	Ms. Heloise Heyne	ON REQUEST	012 529-9187
31	Zoonotic Diseases	Dr. Stephen Njiro	[illegible]	012 529-9184

These courses are delivered on the premises of one of ARC's Research Institutes, farms, satellite offices and partner institutions located in all nine provinces.

ARC Courses targets a wide range of clients in the agricultural value chain; including primary producers, agro-processors, extension officers, animal health technicians, NGOs, community workers and the general public. A comprehensive list of ARC courses and targeted beneficiaries can be accessed on the ARC website: www.arc.agric.za

The catalogue of courses displayed in the tables is scheduled for 2011-2013

to Beirut, Antwerp, Dubai and Mumbai via Hezbollah-aligned Lebanese dealers. Similarly a Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) report suggested Lebanese involvement in the smuggling of rough diamonds out of Zimbabwe to Dubai and Mumbai. While ruling apparatchiks drew benefits from this illicit trade, their people languished in poverty and their democratic aspirations were suppressed.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah received tremendous economic largesse from these criminal endeavours. Exact figures are unknown, but it is said to amount to tens of millions of dollars per annum. Some insight into this occurred on 25 December 2003 when a charter flight – UTA 141 – from Cotonou, Benin to Beirut crashed, killing all the passengers including senior Hezbollah members. They were carrying US$2 million in cash. In recent years Hezbollah criminal activities have encompassed drug-trafficking from South America to West Africa and from there into Europe. Money from Hezbollah's criminal arm then serves to fund Hezbollah's terrorist operations.

What is the larger game plan behind the financial imperative? Here we need to understand that Hezbollah is not an independent entity but part and parcel of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (VEVAK) and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The underlying objective of Hezbollah's activities seems to be an attempt by Iran to create multiple fronts from which to strike at Western (largely American) and Israeli targets in the event of a military strike on its nuclear facilities. They hope the

existence of such an unconventional capability would also serve to deter any such attack.

Understanding the nature of the threat is one thing, eradicating it is much harder. While Washington has attempted to disrupt the financial activities of Hezbollah supporters like Kassim Tajideen and Abd Al Menhem Qubaysi, these networks will continue to grow as long as corruption remains endemic in Africa. Moreover, Dubai, Antwerp and other such diamond hubs need to do more to minimise terror-financing opportunities. Combating global terrorism demands truly global co-operation. In addition to the financial front, more needs to be done by the West to beef up Africa's state capacity on a variety of fronts. It is precisely the African state's weakness which allows its penetration by terrorist entities such as Hezbollah.

The globalisation of terror:

Hezbollah in Africa

By **Hussein Solomon**

The author is a senior professor in the department of political science at the University of the Free State

The globalisation of terror networks is a reality. Lakshar-e-Taiba emerged to challenge New Delhi on the issue of Kashmir, but its demands have expanded increasingly, its operations have gone global, and its list of enemies has grown. Similarly al-Shabaab's activities have not been confined to Somalia or the Horn of Africa: its pernicious influence has spread as a far afield as Copenhagen, Cape Town and Minneapolis.

However, neither of these terror networks can compete in scope, magnitude and variety with the malignant cancer that is Hezbollah. An early indication of Hezbollah's global reach came in July 2000 when law enforcement officials came across a cigarette smuggling ring in Charlotte, North Carolina. Some of its profits were being channelled back to Hezbollah in Lebanon while others were used to purchase night-vision goggles, cameras and scopes, surveying equipment, global positioning systems, mine and metal detection equipment, video equipment, advanced aircraft analysis and design software, laptop computers, stun guns, radio and laser finders. This equipment was also sent to Hezbollah.

While this US example demonstrates Hezbollah's criminal activities, South America demonstrates its lethality. It was here on 17 March 1992 that Hezbollah operatives, with the assistance of Iranian "diplomats", bombed the Israeli embassy, killing 29 people.

It is in Africa, however, that a far fuller range of Hezbollah's activities is exposed. These include ideological indoctrination, military training, criminal activities, the setting up of local proxies, the destabilisation of existing regimes and support for other, more odious regimes.

This was graphically illustrated by Hezbollah's support for local organisations such as the radical Shi'ite cleric Shaykh Ibrahim Zakzaky's Islamic Movement

of Nigeria (IMN). IMN members audaciously attacked the motorcade of the emir of Zazzau, Alhaji Shehu Idris, who was on his way to a security meeting in Kaduna where the IMN was under discussion. It subsequently emerged that IMN members were instructed on religious and military matters in Iran. Military training by Hezbollah has also been undertaken on the African continent itself. As early as 1996, Israel lodged a complaint with the South African government regarding the existence of five Hezbollah training camps in the country.

Hezbollah's support for Africa's rogue regimes is seen in their proximity to Liberia's warlord president Charles Taylor, currently standing trial in The Hague; Zaire's (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) kleptocratic President Mobutu Sese Seko; as well as Zimbabwe's Mugabe. In all three cases, the cement which bound these parties together was not ideological conviction but rather the criminal enterprise around diamond smuggling. Consequently conflict diamonds from West Africa found their way



been misplaced. It has simply not worked; poverty is as real as ever across the continent. Many participants argued that, even though there have been worthwhile projects in various countries, aid processes were actually self-serving for donors.

There were also complaints that some donors prohibit access to aid funding where government projects include partnerships with the private sector, thus limiting access to additional capital. At the same time, this policy does not prevent donors from bypassing public institutions – rather than strengthening them as they are supposed to do under the Paris Declaration.

At the same time, the new emerging economies are seizing every opportunity to leverage Africa's mineral wealth, again without producing domestic development.

Rather than create the conditions for its own demise by mobilising domestic resources, both physical and human, aid has regrettably become indispensable for many African governments to balance their budgets, thus perpetuating a state of dependency. And so Africa's dream of independence fades into the distance.

Much of the discussion in Addis dealt with ways to promote indigenous development across Africa and dispense with foreign aid. Participants spoke of the centrality of capacity development, building effective public institutions, promoting good governance and democratic participation by citizens. The sense that decision making in Africa should be much more participatory, with parliaments being fully involved and civil society properly accounted to, touched a common chord.

The aid process should be a catalyst to support growth in the productive rather than the consumption sectors of the economy. It was pointed out that almost all African countries have mineral resources that do not feature in development plans. Nor do African regional institutions give sufficient emphasis to mutual cross-border co-operation for developing their natural resources. Instead, these resources are exploited in a value chain directly controlled by the developed countries and most value addition occurs elsewhere. Sponsors of proposals for development effectiveness need to make a close study of how value is added to primary commodities and how this could happen within the continent, thereby creating employment and enterprises and expanding the tax base.

Anomalies in trade relations between donor and recipient countries were also given attention. Fair trade seems a distant objective in a highly unequal world system.

ONE VOICE

Noting a new spirit of optimism in Africa, the head of UNECA said that the current plans had the full support of the UN system. In the concluding session, the host organisations and the participants agreed that Africa must go to Busan with a co-ordinated approach and one voice. The focus must be on development effectiveness with aid playing a subordinate catalytic role. Aid should be rapidly replaced by foreign direct investment.

Although South Africa was one of the key players in NEPAD's formation in 2001, we have heard little about NEPAD programmes for the last few years. It will be interesting to see how our government and civil society organisations will participate in the Busan process. Our role in promoting effective development across the continent is surely crucial.

Some government departments have supported various agencies with technical help, and our Treasury has conducted excellent pilot training programmes for a few selected countries. The business sector, particularly in banking and retail, has been actively penetrating African markets, although not much is revealed in public. All this is very far from what was anticipated when NEPAD was launched as the path to Africa's renaissance. Clearly that vision was too ambitious and required resource mobilisation beyond existing capacity and foreign assistance beyond what was forthcoming.

My impression is that there is a new commitment to co-ordinated development across the continent. If South Africa is to once again become a major player in this work, the government will have to ratchet up our present efforts and mobilise public opinion in and outside of our public institutions.

The revival of NEPAD:
What role for South Africa?

By **Ben Turok**

The author is a member of the South African parliament and editor of *New Agenda*

Every few years, international leaders manage to put aside their petty bickering and adopt a really useful policy document, usually through the United Nations system. It was thus with the UN Declaration on Human Rights, and many other conventions that have guided the world into democracy. In 2005, it was the turn of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – not renowned for enlightened policies – to surprise the world by calling a High Level Forum (HLF) to adopt the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. There, the donor countries conceded that fifty years of aid had not produced the desired results. The whole aid process needed to be reviewed. This was followed by another five years of HLFs, meetings and documents, with not much to show in poverty reduction and development for all the effort and expenditures.

Thus it was that the African Union (AU), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and a revived New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) convened a conference in Tunis in 2010 to declare a shift in paradigm: "from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness". The new African position was directed towards the Fourth High Level Forum (HLF4) to be held in November 2011 in Busan, South Korea. HLF4 will be attended by thousands of participants from governments, aid agencies, parliaments and civil society organisations across the globe.

THE AFRICA PLATFORM FOR DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

In March 2011, in Addis Ababa, the AU Commission, the UN Economic Commission for Africa and NEPAD launched a new programme called the Africa Platform for Development Effectiveness (APDev) to develop Africa's proposals for Busan and after.

Given the wide-ranging issues covered by the Paris Declaration and the complexities in aid processes, what will spearhead the African agenda at Busan? This was the question posed in Addis. At the risk of simplifying a long debate, the approach that emerged is captured in the phrase "from targeting poverty to wealth creation". All parties agreed that the original idea of using aid to reduce poverty had

AfDB president Donald Kaberuka spells out the positive message underpinning the bank's first aid effectiveness review.

that began in Paris. A key issue remains the tension between the desire of donors to use their own monitoring systems to gauge whether aid money is being spent effectively and the desire of recipients to use their own budgetary systems so they have "ownership" of the aid money. Britain favours giving recipient countries such ownership, but not to the extent that it could lead to fraud and corruption.

The review notes that only 10 to12 percent of formal trade is among African nations – barely half the level of integration in other regions.

African countries recognise the need to strengthen their accountability through civil society and a free press to their own citizens. For some, that sentiment has been reinforced by the tumultuous events in Tunisia and Egypt. One way of improving accountability would be to reinforce parliamentary oversight not just of aid but of the whole development process, African officials believe. Ghana, which is being held up as an example of effective use of aid, has trained development officials in its national budget system. When officials make the time to understand national systems, they are more likely to trust them, noted Mary-Anne Addo, a director at Ghana's ministry of finance and economic planning.

The key, African officials acknowledge, lies in accountability. "We must ensure that African societies are able to hold their governments to account for development results," they declared last November in a document called the Tunis Consensus, which said the real job of development aid is to do itself out of a job.



African Development Bank delivers bullish verdict

By **Mark Tran**

This article was published online at guardian.co.uk on 10 June 2011

Africa has bounced back faster than expected from the financial crisis and can expect a period of solid growth, according to the African Development Bank (AfDB). The bullish assessment came in the bank's first development effectiveness review. Released during the AfDB's annual meeting in Lisbon, Portugal, the bank's scorecard assesses aid effectiveness at four levels: Africa's overall development progress in areas such as growth, human development and governance; results from its operations, showing how the bank has contributed to Africa's development; how well the bank has managed its portfolio of operations; and how well the bank runs itself.

The exercise is part of the increasing focus on aid effectiveness since the 2005 Paris declaration on the principles of effective aid. Aid effectiveness is also high on the British government's agenda; foreign aid has been ringfenced from budget cuts, to the irritation of some ministers whose departments do not enjoy such protection.

The review uses a colour-coded system. Green signifies where progress has been made, yellow where progress is beginning to stall or regress, and red where progress has stalled or regressed. Under "overall development progress", red shows up on regional integration and trade. In terms of how well the bank runs itself, human resources also gets a red. Given the importance of regional integration as an engine of growth and as an alternative to aid, the lack of progress here will be particularly disappointing to the continent's leaders.

"Regional integration is being pursued by a complex architecture of regional economic communities, and positive steps towards common regional targets are underway," said the review. "But overall, progress has been disappointing."

The review notes that only 10 to 12 percent of formal trade is among African nations – barely half the level of integration in other regions. A key problem is poor infrastructure. "Road freight moves incredibly slowly, while major ports are choked for lack of capacity... all told, Africa would need to spend an additional $40bn a year on infrastructure to address current deficits, keep pace with economic growth and achieve its development goals," said the review.

The review indicated that governance, which gets yellow, remains Africa's Achilles' heel. "The continent has made modest improvements over the past five years, particularly in economic and financial governance, but it still ranks lowest of all regions on worldwide governance indicators."

Overall, however, the report is upbeat, concluding that Africa is becoming an attractive destination for private investment. Improvements in the business environment together with Africa's new potential as a consumer market are identified as major factors in this.

The review comes ahead of a key conference on aid effectiveness in Busan, South Korea in November, which will further refine the aid effectiveness agenda

Participants were drawn from all religious groupings throughout KwaZulu-Natal, and included Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus and followers of other indigenous religions.

The theme for the debate was The Role of Inter-faith Groupings in Strengthening and Deepening Democracy in a South Africa which Operates in a Global Environment.

Public Hearings

Public hearings remain one of the most important tools in enhancing public participation in law-making processes. During public hearings on pending legislation, interest groups, stakeholders and individuals are invited to make submissions. According to Section 115 (a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the Provincial Legislature or any of its committees may receive petitions, representations or submissions from any interested persons and institutions. The KZN Legislature has a mandate to hold public hearings on Bills or other pieces of legislation, and these public hearings aim at obtaining public input on legislative decisions regarding matters of policy, including Section 76 Bills which are those Bills that directly affect provinces.

Petitions

The KwaZulu-Natal Petitions Act, Act 3 of 2004, gives members of the public an opportunity to submit petitions to the Legislature. The Act allows for people to submit their petitions as an individual or a group. The Standing Committee on Public Participation and Petitions plays a prominent role in ensuring that all petitions which are received are duly processed and finalised.

Legislature Tours

The Legislature conducts a number of tours annually. Most visitors to the Legislature are school pupils. Groups of school children are taken on tours of the Legislature to learn more about how the Legislature functions. People are also encouraged to come and listen to sittings when politicians debate issues of importance.

Public Education

The Legislature conducts a number of public education initiatives in the form of educational workshops and outreach initiatives. The Legislature recently launched community radio education campaigns. These programmes are broadcast on seven community radio stations every Thursday. This initiative has created awareness among communities regarding the role and function of the KZN Legislature and also reaches out to the rural population in far-flung areas. The response from the targeted audience to this programme has been overwhelming.

KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature
Private Bag X9112 | 239 Langalibalele Street
Pietermaritzburg, 3200 / 3201
Tel: (033) 355 7600 | Fax: (033) 345 2803

KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature
Administration Offices | 244 Langalibalele Street
Pietermaritzburg, 3201
Tel: (033) 355 7600 | Fax: (033) 345 2803

Delegates at the Workers' Parliament held in May 2011 at Umzinto South Coast.

Hon NP Nkonyeni (Speaker), Hon D Skosana (Chairperson Status of Women, Children , Youth and People with Disabilities) Hon M Ntuli (Chairperson for Women's Caucus and Public Participation and Petitions) during the launch of Women's Caucus at KwaMbonambi in 2011.

Learners visiting the Legislature.

Members of public attending Sector Parliament in 2010.

Public Participation in the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature



The Legislature has a mandate to promote public participation. Public participation is defined as the involvement of members of the public or communities in the following legislative processes: oversight, issues of governance affecting their lives, the content of Bills (legislation), public hearings and activities performed by committees of the Legislature. This commitment by the Legislature to involve the public in its processes is strengthened by Section 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

Public participation can also be viewed as a political, voluntary and consultative process which members of the public directly or indirectly share in the process of governance.

Public participation gives a public face to the Legislature. Members of the Provincial Legislature (MPLs) are given the space in which to become familiar with the public whom they have been mandated to represent, and it also gives the public an opportunity to express their views and be informed about government processes and programmes.

In order for the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature to fulfill its constitutional mandate, it has come up with a number of public participation initiatives:

- Sector Parliaments
- Taking the legislature to the People
- Symposia
- Public hearings
- Petitions
- Legislature tours
- Public education initiatives

Sector Parliaments

Sector Parliaments are an important tool for enhancing public participation and deepening the process of democracy. Sector Parliaments were established with the aim of providing sector parliamentary debates among the youth, women, workers, senior citizens and people with disabilities. These debates coincide with national days of recognition of these sectors. Such sessions provide for representative structures to convene and conduct mock parliamentary debates, assuming the roles of parliamentarians in order to raise issues of concern that confront them.

Participants are encouraged to formulate a debate based on an identified theme. At the end of the debate, participants are encouraged to formulate resolutions. These resolutions are then forwarded to the relevant members of the Executive Council (MECs) for their attention. At the following sitting of a particular Sector Parliament, the relevant MECs will then give responses to resolutions raised in the previous sitting of the Sector Parliament.

This approach has effectively eliminated the possibility of Sector Parliaments becoming mere "talk shops". Sector Parliaments in KwaZulu-Natal are held as follows:

- The Workers' Parliament is held in May.
- The Youth Parliament is held in June.
- The Women's Parliament which is held in August.
- The Senior Citizens' Parliament is held in September.
- The People's Assembly is held in September.
- The Parliament for People with Disabilities is held in December.

Taking the Legislature to the People

This initiative is aimed at taking sittings of the Legislature outside the legislative precinct. A venue is identified for a sitting of the Legislature and MECs are invited to interact with members of the public. Members of the public are actively encouraged to raise service-delivery issues pertinent to them. Members of the Legislature conduct their debates in a venue that has been identified away from the Legislature precinct. This gives members of the public an opportunity to get to know the people who represent them in government.

Symposia

The Legislature has introduced symposia to reach out to other sectors that fall outside the sphere of influence of Sector Parliaments. The KZN Legislature held an Inter-faith Symposium for the first time in April 2011. The aim of the Inter-faith Symposium was:

- to provide a platform for inter-faith leaders to be heard on issues affecting them;
- to determine the role that inter-faith leaders can play in deepening democracy through public participation in all legislative processes;
- to identify challenges that inter-faith leaders face in deepening democracy;
- to promote a culture of mutual acceptance and socio-religious cohesion among the citizens of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal;
- to realise the importance of peace-making, peace building and peace preservation, as well as the promotion of social stability and national reconstruction;
- to achieve socio-economic, environmental and gender justice.

Bearing in mind that, according to the Employment Equity (EE) Act (1998), the classification "black" includes coloured and Indian, and that UCT also probably includes non-South African blacks, UCT's performance in terms of the EE Act is probably much worse than the statistics indicate.

Black academic staff at UCT increased from 20.4 percent in 2004 to 27.7 percent in 2009. In the same five-year period, the proportion of white academic staff changed from 79.2 percent to 71.6 percent. "Undeclared" staff rose from 0.4 to 0.7 percent.

It is critical to stand back at this point and appreciate how the pieces of the puzzle come together to ensure that the status quo is generally maintained. If the pool of black undergraduates remains small in the "sea" of the student body of UCT and the success rate of black students remains inferior to that of their white colleagues, then UCT will always have an excuse when questioned about the poor compliance with the EE Act. This means that the academic staff profile will never undergo a significant change towards a meaningful process of transformation in the culture of UCT. It would be extremely ambitious for UCT, or South Africa at large, to expect such an institution to play a significant role in transforming higher education in South Africa as a means to socio-economic transformation.

A STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL APPROACH

1. Goals and objectives

1.1. Influence UCT management to acknowledge that the process of transformation, both within the institution and in the broader Western Cape and South African community, is not a conservative/natural process but rather involves navigation into uncharted territories, departure from long-held beliefs, and the abandonment of routine practices.

1.2. Influence UCT's admissions policy to become "results oriented" with regard to its performance in redressing past inequalities.

1.3. Get UCT management to acknowledge that the first year of undergraduate study has the highest attrition/drop-out rate across all demographic groups, with the African students performing worst. A functional, on-going programme of integration into university life is required to improve throughput rates.

1.4. Get UCT management to acknowledge that most of the academic support programmes across the faculties have failed and continue to fail. However, the intervention programme in the medical school boasts a graduate success rate in the 90 percent range. To this end, a standardised model for academic support programmes, which identifies and incorporates "best practices", should be developed and implemented across all faculties.

1.5. Influence UCT to draft a policy and guidelines on the appointment of tutors during students' senior years in order to create a demographically representative pool of potential members of staff, in line with the EE Act.

1.6. Get UCT management to recommit to the ends outlined by the EE Act and to adhere to the requirements of the Act in all aspects, including setting "reasonable" targets in an up-to-date EE plan, and annually reporting the plan's performance to the department of labour and the UCT community.

1.7. Influence UCT's student housing and residence life department to alter admission practices that create and perpetuate residences with a stereotypical composition of students. Such practices may be deemed a stumbling block to the creation of socially and academically diverse residences that would promote social integration within the residence system.

1.8. Influence UCT to exploit the power of sports and recreation to aid social integration, cohesion and the development of a community spirit, rather than as a tool for social exclusion and disaggregation. This should be reflected in appropriate policies and backed up by the implementation of relevant practices.

1.9. Influence UCT to embrace the promotion of access to information, with particular reference to the timely and effective dissemination of "important" information that would contribute to the promotion of corporative governance and improved democratic participation by members of the community at UCT and society in general.

2. Key focus areas

2.1. Undergraduate admissions policy performance

2.2. Orientation, local socio-economic context, and curriculum transformation

2.3. Academic support programmes and throughput rates

2.4. Senior students, postgraduate students, academic staff and employment equity

2.5. Promotion of diversity within the student housing and residence life system

2.6. Sports, arts and culture as a means to social integration

2.7. Improved transparency and efficiency regarding the communication of "important" information

3. Strategic communication and publicity plan

Clearly, there is legislation in existence that not only supports socio-economic transformation through higher education institutions such as UCT, but also highlights the political will available to support such much needed efforts in the context of our heritage.

Over the years, UCT has been eager to make statements of commitment to the process of redress for past inequalities and ultimately socio-economic transformation through channels and resources at the disposal of the university. Of course the UCT ANCYL, as the organisation that aims to champion the process of transformation within our immediate communities as well as the broader community, welcomes these.

AN INTOLERABLE SITUATION

However, the reality of the situation at UCT is far from what we would endorse. Statistics South Africa estimated in 2010 that 79.4 percent of the South African population were African. In 2009, only 26 percent of UCT students were African South Africans. This figure represents an unacceptably low change of 3 percent since 2001, when 23 percent of UCT students were SA Africans.

The enrolment of white SA students in 2009 was almost twice that of SA Africans at 47 percent, which shows a 7 percent decrease from the 54 percent enrolment in 2001. StatsSA estimated that 9.2 percent of the South African population was white.

Coloured SA students accounted for 16 percent of the UCT enrolments in 2001; this rose by 3 percent to 19 percent in 2009. At first glance, this appears to measure well against the 8.8 national percentage of coloured SA citizens, but that fails to take in the regional demographic of the Western Cape with its higher coloured population. The situation then calls for regional demographics to be considered. The enrolment of Indian South Africans at UCT rose by a mere 1 percent from 7 percent in 2001 to 8 percent in 2009, which compares well with the national estimate that 2.6 percent of the population is Indian.

These statistics are a cause for concern for transformation at UCT. We are currently in the seventeenth year of our democracy and an institution that was a pillar of the previous dispensation has not moved very far from the realities advocated and enforced by the legal framework of apartheid.

Furthermore, it does not seem likely that there will be any dramatic developments in the near future. Between 2005 and 2008, there was a mere 4 percent increase, from 24 to 28 percent, in the proportion of African first-time undergraduate students at UCT. This is again dwarfed by the proportion of white first-time undergraduate students in 2008, which stood at 45 percent – almost double that of their black counterparts. The increase of coloured first-time undergraduate students was 2 percent (from 16 to 18 percent) while Indian first-time undergraduates faced a 1 percent decrease (from 9 to 8 percent). If left unchallenged and unchanged, the structure of this growth simply means that UCT will never reach a point where the demographics of the student body fairly reflect the demographics of the country (or region, as necessary). This eventuality is quite clearly intolerable!

The picture drawn by statistics relating to attrition and the consequent graduation rates by ethnic group perhaps represents the greatest threat to the socio-economic upliftment of our people, our communities and our nation. A four-year study carried out on a cohort of 2004 freshman undergraduate students revealed an attrition/drop-out rate among African students of 36 percent –10 percent higher than the average rate across all ethnic groups of 26 percent. White, coloured and Indian attrition rates were respectively 14, 29 and 23 percent.

Just as one might expect, the graduation rates at the end of the study (2008) sketch the corollary that follows from the attrition rate. While only 50 percent of the original cohort of African students managed to graduate at the end of 2008, a staggering 79 percent of their white counterparts achieved graduation, while the average graduation rate (for all demographic groups combined) stood at 66 percent – a good 16 percent higher than the rate achieved by the cohort of African students. The Indian cohort achieved the average graduation rate of 66 percent, with the coloured cohort at a slightly poorer 58 percent. Only the white cohort managed a graduation rate higher than the average.

The cohort study data prove that white graduates are gaining entry to the labour market at a much higher rate than the other demographic groups. The net impact is that the current demographic profile of the economy is not changing to better reflect the demographics of South Africa. In fact it is regressing and taking the form of an apartheid-era economy, where the interests of the majority are sacrificed in favour of the interests of the minority.

The claim made above is reaffirmed (albeit on a smaller scale) by the fact that, in 2009, 71.6 percent of UCT's academic staff were classified white, while only 27.7 percent were classified black (0.7 percent did not declare their demographic information).

identifying key focus areas which we feel should be prioritised by management.

The performance of UCT to date in each of these focus areas will be outlined; the policies and programmes that are being pursued by UCT to address transformation in each of these focus areas will be analysed and critiqued; and eventually the stance (including recommendations) of the UCT ANCYL will be formulated ahead of engagements with SASCO over the matters arising.

Furthermore, an attempt will be made to develop a holistic communication and publicity plan that is designed to aid the branch in the furtherance of its goals, whether these are internal to the functioning of the branch or pertain to the broader community, including relationships with other structures of the ANCYL and the ANC in general.

It is critical at this moment in time to stress that this is a "living document"; ideally it should be reviewed on an annual basis by at least one branch general meeting (BGM) during each branch executive committee (BEC)'s term of office in order to ensure that the aims and objectives, as well as the strategies and tactics, pursued by the branch remain relevant to the life and times of the broader struggle for the socio-economic liberation of our people.

INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS

On 24 April 1996, the Assembly of the University of Cape Town adopted a mission statement formulated by the Working Group of the University Transformation Forum which opened thus: "Our mission is to be an outstanding teaching and research university, educating for life and addressing the challenges facing our society".

The mission statement goes on to assert that "Educating for life means that our educational process must provide... an active and developmental role in our cultural, economic, political, scientific and social environment". It is further stipulated that "addressing the challenges facing our society" translates to coming to terms with our past, being cognisant of the present and planning for the future".

The preamble to the Higher Education Act (101 of 1997) as amended by the Higher Education Amendment Act (23 of 2001) states:

> it is desirable to redress past discrimination and ensure representivity and equal access; provide optimal opportunities for learning and creation of knowledge; promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom...pursue excellence, promote the full realisation of the potential of every student and employee, tolerance of ideas and appreciation of diversity.

In June 2001, the UCT Council put forward a statement of values for the University of Cape Town and its members, which was endorsed by the Institutional Forum in September of the same year. It states that "we as the UCT community aspire to an ethos which preserves what is valuable in the history of the university and of the country, and responds to the challenges posed by past injustices and unfair discrimination. Furthermore, this ethos strives to achieve social transformation, empowerment and participative governance.

> Over the years, UCT has been eager to make statements of commitment to the process of redress for past inequalities and ultimately socio-economic transformation through channels and resources at the disposal of the university.

According to the current version of the mission statement, the university aims

> to produce graduates whose qualifications are internationally recognised and locally applicable, underpinned by values of engaged citizenship and social justice. UCT will promote diversity and transformation within our institution and beyond, including growing the next generation of academics.

Among the values to which the statement commits the UCT community are compassion, generosity, and concern for the needs and aspirations of others, and in particular for the changes faced by the less privileged in our society. In addition, the statement commits the UCT community to "actively promote social justice and equity".

Turning to more recent developments, Goal Two of UCT's Strategic Plan 2010-2014 is the "transformation of UCT towards non-racialism: redress, diversity, inclusiveness and the recognition of African voices". This is further elaborated: "UCT's goal is to achieve a more representative demographic profile in the staff and student bodies."

Moving towards a transformed UCT: Goals for 2014

UCT ANCYL strategy and tactics on transformation

By **UCT ANCYL**

We, the African National Congress Youth League branch at the University of Cape Town (UCT ANCYL), declare that we would have failed to make a meaningful contribution to the realisation of Aim and Objective Number 1 of the ANCYL Constitution (as amended in 2008), namely, to "strive to rally the youth of our country to support and unite behind the ANCYL and to actively participate in the struggle to create a non-racial, non-sexist, united, democratic and prosperous society"; as well as Aim and Objective Number 4, to "champion the general interests and rights of the South African youth in the socio-economic and political life of the country", if we failed to champion the course of transformation at the University of Cape Town.

To this end, the UCT ANCYL branch would like to recognise the special position in which it operates, wherein the direction given by the South African Student Congress (SASCO) is the cornerstone of the relationship between the two organisations in pursuit of the objective of catering for the needs and interests of students in general, and the special needs and interests of those students from a previously disadvantaged background in particular. It is therefore desirable to found this document on the aspirations articulated in the preamble to the constitution of SASCO:

- to organise students to work towards the transformation of higher education
- to organise students to play a meaningful role in the transformation of South African society, the southern African region, the African continent and the international community.

INTRODUCTION

It is a well known fact that the education system, and more importantly its institutions, made a significant contribution to the state of socio-economic affairs of our beloved country, as is crystal clear for the average South African today. The effectiveness of the education system may be attributed in large part to the persistence of the foundations of the system, namely the Bantu Education Act of 1953. Mr HF Verwoerd, then minister of native affairs, said:

> There is no place for [the Bantu] in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. It is of no avail for him to receive training which has as its aim absorption into the European community. What is the use of teaching the Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice? ...Education must train people in accordance with their opportunities in life, according to the sphere in which they live.

The Freedom Charter of 1955, under the heading "The doors of learning and of culture shall be opened", declares that "the colour bar in culture, in sports and in education shall be abolished".

The preamble to the supreme law of our land, the Constitution, compels all citizens to recognise the injustices of our past and to be united in our diversity so as to facilitate the process of healing the divisions of the past, establishing a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights, thus improving the quality of life of all citizens and freeing the potential of each person.

However, in 2011, some 17 years into democracy, it is quite clear that the "colour bar" has not been abolished in culture, and neither in sports nor education. The purpose of this document is to outline a short-term strategic and tactical plan to be pursued by the UCT ANCYL in an attempt to stimulate and accelerate the process of "measurable" transformation at UCT by funding for their child, they are required to pay the loan back over a period of 10 to 22 months. Repayment starts immediately in the form of salary deductions. We never deduct more than 25% of a person's monthly salary.

Who are some of your funders?
Our funders include Standard Bank, Future Growth and PIC. Our shareholders are Standard Bank, Circle Capital, Sasfin and Kopane/Old Mutual.

What are some of the biggest challenges facing students today?
The key challenges facing our youth are unemployment and access to education. According to the Status of the Youth Report 2003 commissioned by the Umsobomvu Youth Fund, 70% of our youth are unemployed, the most affected being people of colour. This is an extremely dangerous situation, given that black people comprise 85% of our population. To quote Zwelinzima Vavi, 'This is a ticking time bomb.' Even for those young people who are fortunate enough to have a degree or diploma, many are still ill prepared to enter the job market and there are insufficient jobs to absorb all of them into the formal economy.

What are the most important decisions you have made at the helm of Eduloan?
Since taking over as CEO, I have redefined who we are and why we do what we do. I have challenged our past measurement of success with the shareholders and the executive management team. In addition, I have reviewed both our leadership and management competencies to see if we can indeed deliver on the strategic intent based on the skills we have. This has demanded that we also review our organisational culture in order to refocus for the benefit of our customers and move our company from good to great. This has resulted in our changing people's roles and responsibilities. It has been difficult for some employees who for the first time have had to confront the reality that they have gaps which need to be closed through fast-tracked development programmes. In some cases we have had to let people go. That said, we are still nowhere near close to completing our exciting business transformation journey.

What characteristic do you believe every leader should possess?
Self-awareness and self-management. You should know who you are – your capabilities as well as your blind spots. You should surround yourself with people who are different from you and smarter than you. This principle I was taught in my underground military days: in order to be a great commander, you have to surround yourself with good lieutenants. I believe in commitment, having a passion for what you do and working hard, and competence, which involves constantly growing your knowledge and skills. I'm happy knowing that I don't know it all and that it's the people I work with who will take Eduloan to the next level. As a leader it's important not to become arrogant; we need each individual to contribute to the overall organisational goals.

Eduloan is South Africa's premier education fund provider, bridging the gap between employers and South Africans who want to further their studies. Through partnerships forged with government, corporates and South Africa's tertiary education institution, we offer tailor-made and affordable loan agreements to its students. Eduloan is focused on empowering South Africans through learning, thus helping to build a globally competitive nation by creating access to further education. Eduloan has provided over 2.8 billion rand in educational loans to over 600,000 tertiary students over the past 16 years.

Through the management and dispersion of study loans, supported by a unique educational fund management programme, Eduloan ensures that the provision of funds for education is efficiently and successfully managed. Eduloan improves people's lives through financial access to education.

For more information, call Eduloan's Client Services Department on 0860-55-55-44 or visit www.eduloan.co.za.

Ms Memela-Khambula

EDUCATION
Unlocking the potential of future leaders

For 16 years, Eduloan has been making finance available to those unable to afford the cost of tertiary studies. *New Agenda* caught up with CEO Totsie Memela-Khambula to find out her vision for education in South Africa.

When did you take over as Eduloan CEO?
In October 2010.

What is the role of Eduloan within the education sector?
Our role is to unlock potential in the people of South Africa by providing access to finance for those who cannot afford it. We do this by partnering with funders who are willing to contribute to education, while we manage the risk and provide shareholder value. We also help students manage their funds through our card product called Eduxtra, which has a number of pockets (books, food, cash, accommodation, etc.), and thereby assists them with financial management.

What is your vision for education in South Africa?
Our vision is to consolidate both funders and bursars into one integrated platform with the use of technology. Students are often overwhelmed when considering who they should approach for bursaries and who they should approach for a loan. In this way, we want to provide them with a one-stop shop for study finance and bursaries. We believe enhanced public-private partnerships is the best way to complement each other's competencies. Our vision is therefore to work together to create better education for all.

What were your personal struggles in educating yourself?
I was born into a family of nine. My mother was a domestic worker and my father was a clerk at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. There were many mouths to feed and not enough money to go around. My mother often said that education was our ticket out of poverty. During the time of Bantu Education, she transferred us from a state school to a Roman Catholic School in order to improve our chances at a better education. Later, when I lived in Swaziland and Zimbabwe, I finished my tertiary studies thanks to bursaries made available to students in political exile.

Who would typically take out a study loan with Eduloan and how does repayment work?
Our current base of clients are those who are neither rich enough to qualify for a bank loan nor poor enough to qualify for a government bursary. The bulk of the students and their children that we have funded over the years include the police and security forces, including members of the military, teachers, doctors and nurses. When a parent approaches us for

This situation is further exacerbated by the institution's inability to provide sufficient time for the public to prepare oral and written submissions – often giving three weeks or less – which affects their capacity to make significant inputs in any legislative process. This is best exemplified by the short window period given for the public to make submissions on the Protection of Information Bill (the Secrecy Bill), which was also timed to coincide with the 2010 FIFA World Cup when national attention was distracted from pressing long-term issues. The lack of public consultation only heightened resistance to the Bill among community organisations who saw it as an attempt to inhibit poor communities' access to information.

In some instances, it is perceived that parliament is deliberately excluding the public from the legislative process. Out of exasperation, civil society organisations and ordinary members of the public turn to the Constitutional Court for remedy when laws are passed without thorough public consultation. An example of this is the 2004 Communal Land Rights Act. Four rural communities argued that they had not only been excluded from the law-making process, but that the outcome was unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court invalidated the procedure by which the law was passed, as provinces were excluded from playing their constitution role of passing legislation that affects their constituents.

Limited access to the media has also hindered some communities' ability to access information about parliament. Rural communities are in dire need of information concerning their rights and any new legislation that could have an impact on their lives. Accessibility to resources such as the internet still remains limited. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that parliamentary events, such as public hearings, are often poorly advertised – thus once again leaving insufficient time for public participation and thorough debates.

CONSTITUENCY CONTACT

The establishment of constituency offices and PDOs to enhance public participation and bring parliament to the people has had mixed results. Hicks (2003) finds that constituency offices do not liaise adequately with communities and are ineffective in gathering and channelling community concerns to designated MPs. In addition, the role of constituency offices is politicised by their links with political parties, making them inaccessible to certain groups within communities.

PDOs are situated in relatively under-resourced areas to ensure that marginalised groups are also able to take part in parliamentary processes. However, these offices also face some problems. One of these is the overlap of roles and responsibilities between the constituency office and the PDO. This will most likely lead to a waste of state resources due to the duplication of work.

Participatory programmes such as "Taking Parliament to the People" are vital to bridge the gap between the institution and its citizens, reaching rural communities and those who would otherwise be unable to participate in law-making and oversight processes. It is imperative that the contributions made by the public during these events are taken into account and communicated to the committees themselves, a dimension that is currently missing.

While it is evident that parliament has attempted to create a "parliament for the people", these initiatives become meaningless if parliamentarians don't have the will to enhance public participation through their active example. This is exemplified by MPs who visit their constituencies but do not share the feedback with the relevant government departments.

There are several issues of implementation that need to be examined in order to make these initiatives effective. Parliament should strengthen these to ensure broader public participation if it is to play a meaningful role in promoting accountability.

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Challenges to public participation in South Africa's parliament

By **Hopolang Selebalo**

The author is a junior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). This article was first published on the ISS website, 29 March 2011

In his 2011 State of the Nation address, President Jacob Zuma thanked South Africans who have used various social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, and direct contact to communicate their concerns and needs. Does this go far enough?

Increasingly, public participation in South Africa is being viewed as a dialogue between the executive and the people. A modern constitutional democracy should rather promote participatory governance between the electorate and their representatives in parliament, provincial legislatures and local councils. This would break a growing tendency for the president and the cabinet to be seen as the lone authority that can address the problems of ordinary people.

As a platform for public participation, parliament should lead the way in taking forward the concept of public participation. At present the institution's efforts appear to have stagnated. This is despite specific initiatives designed to ensure that parliament facilitates public involvement in all its functions in order to best represent the people of South Africa, as enshrined in the Constitution.

Public participation is imperative to facilitate parliament's role of oversight within the executive. It allows citizens to practise their Constitutional right to hold government departments and parastatals accountable for their actions. Parliamentary committees need to inform the public of the outcomes of their oversight visits, take into consideration input from the public about any discrepancies within their constituencies, and ensure that civil servants responsible for mismanagement and corruption are held to account.

Numerous challenges exist in terms of public expenditure, including qualified audits by the auditor-general and chronic under- and over-spending. Ministers are often either reluctant to disclose or unable to explain how funds have been spent within their departments. One example is Minister of Defence and Military Veterans Lindiwe Sisulu, who was recently rebuked for her failure to meet with parliament's Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) to clarify the dire state of her department's finances.

Public involvement is strengthened through various means, including the deployment of members of parliament (MPs) to constituencies, public hearings and calls for oral and written submissions on legislation being considered by portfolio committees. Parliamentary Democracy Offices (PDOs) have been created to facilitate the process of active participation. Public events such as the "Taking Parliament to the People" programme are also convened to enable dialogue between citizens and their representatives (Hicks, 2003).

IMPEDIMENTS TO PARTICIPATION

The primary factors that hinder the effectiveness of these initiatives are the socio-economic conditions of a large proportion of South Africans, and the manner in which these initiatives are implemented. Disadvantaged communities are often marginalised from decision-making processes due to factors such as time constraints, limited access to the media and lack of education.

Time plays a crucial role in the lack of public involvement in parliamentary processes. The *Report of the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament* (RSA, 2009) found that time is an important cost factor for poorer sections of the population, especially for women and those who are employed. Onerous time obligations preclude active participation in anything beyond basic survival and the maintenance of livelihood.

Strategic Human Resources Management Programme

apartheid reconstruction effort. In the immediate post-election period, it provided a mechanism for reconciling widely differing attitudes towards South Africa's development challenges, and its across-the-board support afforded added legitimacy to the new government's efforts to come to grips with these challenges.

But for all its positive features, the RDP ultimately failed on its own terms. First, the ambiguities about its role and scope were never resolved. It simply could not sustain its dual purpose as both a general vision for transformation and a strategic mechanism for change, and thus it became an empty shell.

Second, the RDP's political and institutional weaknesses severely undermined its credibility and led to serious failures of implementation.



Third, the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development published in November 1994 departed significantly from the original RDP document and resulted in its failure. A final nail was driven into the coffin of the RDP when the new ANC government encountered its first major currency crisis.

In order to calm domestic capital and foreign currency markets, the government embraced a conservative macro-economic strategy. Through GEAR, the government self-imposed an SAP that decreased the budget deficit and public debt burden to levels not even seen in developed countries. The government was also driven by the wish to demonstrate to foreign investors that it could be trusted with the economy and public purse. The GEAR policy emphasised a unidirectional causality running from prudent fiscal policy to human development via higher investment and growth. In contrast, COSATU argued that causality runs the other way: higher levels of development spending generate growth and investment, which lead to the creation of more taxable resources.

The AsgiSA document identified several important constraints on the long-term growth potential of the South African economy. These include problems in knowledge generation and absorption as well as the wider supporting structures for the commercialisation of knowledge. Although AsgiSA displays several shortcomings and lacks the focus or structure of the RDP and GEAR, its recognition of institutional shortcomings that hamper growth and employment creation represents an improvement over GEAR. Moreover, it was clear from the start that AsgiSA might not continue in its original form in the light of ongoing political changes within the ruling party. Indeed, when the new regime took over, there was no mention of AsgiSA but they introduced the New Growth Path (NGP).

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growth, and especially the employment targets, are realistic. Though the government never claimed that AsgiSA was an integrated programme, questions do exist regarding what binds the various interventions into a unified body (except the loosely stated growth and employment objectives). Put differently: is AsgiSA not just a collective acronym for a set of policies and interventions that already existed? Collecting them under one banner creates the perception, which is not necessarily accurate, of policy integration and focus. In short, AsgiSA lacks structure and fails to demonstrate clearly the nature of the link between its objectives and the interventions (Burger, 2007).

Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings AsgiSA does recognise key elements needed for growth and employment creation. For instance, regarding the shortage of skills the document states:

> For both the public infrastructure and the private investment programmes, the single greatest impediment is the shortage of skills – including professional skills such as engineers and scientists, managers and financial personnel, project managers; and skilled technical employees such as information technology (IT) specialists and artisans. (South Africa, 2006: 7)

With regard to investment, it states:

> There are reports that some investment projects have been held up by unnecessary bureaucratic delays. Government will ensure that investors have access to a one-stop trouble-shooting centre, probably located at Trade and Investment South Africa (TISA). (ibid: 12)

Therefore, although AsgiSA displays several shortcomings, and even lacks the focus or structure of the RDP and GEAR, it represents an improvement over GEAR in that it recognises many of the institutional shortcomings that hamper growth and employment creation. However, it was clear from the start that AsgiSA might not continue in its exact form in the light of ongoing political changes within the ruling party. After Mbeki's government left office, the new regime led by President Jacob Zuma made no mention of AsgiSA and it introduced the New Growth Path (NGP).

NGP: MOVING FORWARD/BACKWARD

In his political report to the 2010 National General Council (NGC) of the ANC, President Jacob Zuma said:

> The new growth path must start with the recognition that, on the one hand, we have had economic growth for a sustained period since the advent of democracy, with particularly high growth since the early 2000s and net job creation. On the other hand, poverty remains high, inequalities have remained the same or even grown worse, while some of the jobs created often brought low wages and poor conditions. (ANC, 2010)

This "new growth path" emerges within the context of the worst global economic crisis since the 1930s. South Africa lost over 1.1 million jobs between 2009 and 2010. This amounts to R35 billion worth of lost incomes, given the average wage of R33 773 (based on Statistics South Africa's *Quarterly Labour Force Surveys* (2009 and 2010) and *Quarterly Survey of Employment and Earnings* (2009)). This has plunged 5.5 million South Africans into poverty. The rate at which jobs have been lost and income distribution has worsened shows that the types of jobs created by past policies are vulnerable. These reports also show the failure of past policies to build a strong, internally cohesive productive base, to shift away from reliance on mineral exports, and to promote jobs as the first priority. The weakness of existing macro-economic policies to shocks is also apparent.

Since the NGP Framework was released in November 2010, there seems to be disagreement within the tripartite alliance. COSATU criticised it for failing to locate itself within the ANC's historical positions on economic policy: the point of departure should be the Freedom Charter and the RDP, but neither of these are mentioned. COSATU (2010) further argues that the NGP document:

- does not change anything in the macro-economic policy stance
- misses a number of important issues on industrialisation, e.g. priority sectors
- does not mention how to change patterns of control and ownership of the economy
- leaves the role of the state mainly indirect, e.g. in employment
- privileges the private sector in job creation, thereby making the profit motive the key driver of employment
- gives no clarity on the role of the state in directly delivering infrastructure
- conceives black economic empowerment (BEE) in terms that have to be urgently reviewed
- has a problematic idea of "social pact", given the massive income inequalities. (COSATU, 2010)

CONCLUSION

The paper explored South Africa's four phases of policy transformation since 1994. The RDP served initially as a powerful symbol and focus for the post-

allies argued that the causality runs in the opposite direction: growth will follow development, which may follow an increase in expenditure. To finance the higher expenditure, COSATU preferred to increase the tax rates on higher income groups and business, though it was also not averse to increasing the debt burden of government (presumably it assumed that debt can be repaid later when growth and the resulting improvements in revenue occur) (See PBC, 2007: 29).

DEMISE OF GEAR

If the GEAR strategy is judged in terms of its own targets, it has failed. Though government largely succeeded in decreasing the deficit and government dissaving (Dept of Finance, 2000; Terreblanche, 2003), GEAR failed to stimulate investment. Not only was private investment not forthcoming to the extent foreseen by GEAR (by the end of the decade it even decreased in the aftermath of the Asian crisis), but even government investment, instead of increasing, decreased. Employment also did not increase; the unemployment rate increased in the late 1990s.

Several reasons may exist for the failure of GEAR to increase investment and reduce unemployment, including the effects of the Asian and emerging market crises of the late 1990s and the reaction of the South African Reserve Bank to these crises. Moreover, the government might have been too hasty in expecting foreign investors to react positively to GEAR and its prudent fiscal policy. Many investors might still have been waiting to see whether the country could build a positive track record in terms of being democratic and market-friendly. Once these changes were made, and once the country established its reputation, the fruits of GEAR might be forthcoming – but only after its term had expired (Burger, 2007).

RISE AND FALL OF ASGISA

In February 2006, the South African government introduced another economic plan: the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). According to President Mbeki's 2006 State of the Nation address, AsgiSA was "not intended to cover all elements of a comprehensive development plan". Rather, it was a "limited set of interventions" to serve as a catalyst for accelerated and shared growth. The AsgiSA background document (South Africa, 2006:1) said that government had consulted widely and AsgiSA should be seen as a nationally shared growth initiative and not just a government programme. Its explicit claim that AsgiSA "contrasts with a Washington Consensus approach" provided further evidence that it wanted to differentiate AsgiSA from GEAR.

The main objectives of AsgiSA were to increase the economic growth rate to 4.5 percent during 2005 to 2009 and 6 percent during 2010 to 2014 and to halve unemployment and poverty by 2014 (to fit with the Millennium Development Goals). The AsgiSA document argued that the South African economy suffers from two sets of imbalances. The first is a current account deficit resulting from an economic upswing driven by commodity prices, capital inflows and consumer demand. The second imbalance results from a lack of participation in the economy that excludes a third of the population from a direct share in the economic improvements. These imbalances, the government argued, must be countered to ensure that it would reach its objectives (Burger, 2007).

The AsgiSA policy programme identifies six "binding constraints" on long-run economic growth in South Africa:

- volatility and level of the currency
- transport infrastructure problems
- labour skills and cost
- limited competition
- regulatory environment
- government administrative failures.

The government devised selected interventions to address these constraints. Note that these interventions do not address the constraints in a one-to-one relation; the package of interventions needs to address the package of constraints:

- infrastructure. This includes expenditure to the value of R370 billion, mostly on power generation, power distribution, rail transport, harbours and an oil pipeline
- sector strategies. In particular these strategies should encourage business-process outsourcing and tourism
- education and skills. The focus should be on the quality of education, adult basic education and training (ABET) and the training of artisans
- intervention in the second economy. The government wants to build bridges between the formal and informal sectors so as to integrate the informal into the formal sector, thereby eliminating the second economy
- public administration. The aim is to improve public service delivery and to improve skills levels on local government level through project consolidate
- macro-economy. The government wants to find ways to reduce exchange rate volatility. A further objective is better co-operation between fiscal and monetary policy to ensure better growth. It also wants to address the problem of overestimating expenditure and underestimating revenue collection. The government furthermore wants to improve expenditure management. (South Africa, 2006)

Criticism against AsgiSA may be raised on several levels. First, there is the question of whether the and thus would generate considerable internal disagreement within the Tripartite Alliance.

THE ROAD TO PRUDENT POLICY: GEAR

Essentially, GEAR was a neo-classical macro-economic stabilisation policy along the lines of the so-called Washington Consensus. It had a five-year term, from 1996 to 2000. Given that it was explicitly a "macro-economic strategy", social issues received less attention than in the RDP. The GEAR policy envisaged the elimination of dissaving to release more resources for public and private investment, with a preference for private investment (Dept of Finance, 1996:2). By this neo-classical logic, higher investment would in turn lead to a higher national income and employment. Thus, GEAR saw a prudent fiscal policy as a means towards the ultimate ends of development, poverty reduction and the reduction of inequality (Burger, 2007).

> It was clear from the start that AsgiSA might not continue in its original form in the light of ongoing political changes within the ruling party.

As part of the prudent fiscal policy, GEAR also aimed to reduce the budget deficit:GDP ratio to 3 percent by 1999–2000 (Dept of Finance, 1996). Through deficit reduction, the government wanted to stabilise and even reduce the public debt:GDP ratio. It succeeded in stabilising this ratio at approximately 50 percent by 2000 (Burger, 2007). The reduction of the debt burden would have the added benefit that interest payments claimed less government revenue, leaving more room for expenditure in other categories, such as social expenditure. When the debt burden was at its highest, interest payments constituted the second largest expenditure post on the budget, exceeded only by education. The government took direct aim at this interest burden and reduced it to below 20 percent of total government expenditure in the 2000–01 budget (National Treasury, 2000; 2001).

GEAR aimed to reduce tariffs and to restructure, and possibly privatise, state assets. It also argued for a commitment to moderate wage demands, prudent monetary policy to contain inflation, and larger infrastructure investment. Though South Africa did not borrow from the IMF or the World Bank, all these proposals fitted well with the type of conditions that the IMF placed on countries that participated in its conditional loan and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). Hence the conclusion that GEAR could be seen as a self-imposed SAP. Government hoped that this would demonstrate to foreign (and domestic) investors that it could be trusted with economic policy (Burger, 2007).

In addition, the government did not want to borrow offshore for large-scale investment projects. Fears of the exchange rate risk that exists when borrowing in a foreign currency, as well as a lack of management capacity, might have been additional reasons for not borrowing offshore (Hirsch, 2005: 75). Burger (2007) argues that, although all these reasons are valid, the downside of not borrowing to create infrastructure in the mid-to-late 1990s is that, by 2007, the country was suffering from several infrastructure bottlenecks. These range from a short supply of electricity, limited capacity of the Durban harbour and other transportation infrastructure, and a lack of broadband telecommunication capacity. Though there are now plans to expand the infrastructure, these constraints already hamper growth, suggesting that the plans are ten years too late.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST GEAR

Although government and the business sector supported GEAR, it encountered significant resistance from COSATU and its social partners: the SACP, the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and the South African National Non-Governmental Organisation Coalition (SANGOCO).

The basic philosophy behind GEAR was concisely summarised by then Finance Minister Trevor Manuel in his 2005–06 budget speech:

> Over the past decade we have laid the macroeconomic and fiscal foundations on which increased investment and a stable business environment rest. In the years ahead we must see more rapid expansion in the productive capacity of our business, creating jobs for work seekers, while also growing the revenue base that makes possible an expanded envelope on public services.

COSATU (2000) argued that instead of growing the economy, GEAR placed a damper on it: "Cuts in government spending mean a smaller market for business as well. Under GEAR, falling government spending reduced demand for goods and services; this depressed economic growth." In addition, it argued that "higher social spending... is a necessary precondition for development and rapid economic growth". Thus, while the government view proclaimed causality from disciplined fiscal policy to economic growth and then to development, COSATU and its

As its basic point of departure, the RDP held that economic growth and development were interdependent and that the South African government would focus on both. The main objective was to foster sustainable human development and to eradicate inequality and poverty. To reach these objectives, the RDP foresaw an increase in the government's expenditure on education, health, welfare and housing. However, it was also an explicit objective of the RDP to reduce the deficit and debt burden of South Africa and to ensure that recurrent expenditure did not increase in total. Another objective was the reduction of government dissaving and an increase in the proportion of government investment expenditure. These objectives were to be met by shifting towards social expenditure while keeping total recurrent expenditure unchanged and decreasing the deficit. The need to train civil servants and for labour market reform to establish central bargaining was also included.

By the end of the first year in office, the programme experienced challenges, both practically and politically. Although some criticisms were unjustified, there was no doubt that the GNU's actual delivery record was poor. From the beginning, the government lacked the capacity to implement it. Because RDP staff lacked proper implementation skills, huge backlogs in providing access to basic services occurred, including provincial maladministration of primary nutrition programmes. For example, by 5 March 1996, only R5 billion of the R15 billion allocated for reconstruction and development had been spent (Visser, 2004). The RDP had not spelled out a detailed programme for attaining its main aims.

Visser also cites Patrick Bond's view that the RDP was "fatally undermined by timid politicians, hostile bureaucrats and unreliable private sector partners". RDP Minister Naidoo did not command the respect of his ANC parliamentary colleagues and did not always see eye to eye with President Mandela on RDP issues. Also, implementation of the RDP had to cater too much to capitalist interests.

The deathblow to the RDP was dealt by a White Paper on Reconstruction and Development published in November 1994. The White Paper departed significantly from the original RDP document. It introduced fiscal prudence not as a means of attaining RDP objectives, but as an added goal. The notion of redistribution was dropped, and the government's major role in the economy was reduced to the task of managing the transformation. Given the ANC's commitment to fiscal discipline and macro-economic balance, no fiscal space was available for proper implementation of the RDP, the redistributive implications of its poverty alleviation programme and its emphasis on meeting basic needs (Terreblanche, 2003:109).

A final nail was driven into the RDP's coffin when the new ANC government encountered its first major currency crisis, starting in February 1996, when the value of the rand plummeted by more than 25 percent. In order to calm domestic capital and foreign currency markets, the government embraced a conservative macro-economic strategy named Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). It was developed by a technical team of 15 policy makers from different institutions, including the World Bank and the South African Reserve Bank. The ministry of the RDP was abolished in March 1996 and the office of the RDP was transferred to the office of then Deputy-President Thabo Mbeki. In contrast with the RDP, GEAR was not the product of consultation with COSATU and the SACP,

New growth path and the transformations of ANC government policy

By **Richard M Mthethwa**

The author is a lecturer at the School of Public Management and Administration of the University of Pretoria

It has been 17 years since the dawn of democracy in South Africa and the transition has been remarkable. The country can boast progress on several fronts since 1994, but faces significant discrepancies both politically and economically. The most urgent and the most daunting policy challenge is to regenerate rapid economic growth while simultaneously alleviating the poverty and deprivation affecting the majority of the black population. A failure to produce tangible benefits for the poor will render hollow the political stability of the new order and, hence, the opportunity for long-term economic prosperity.

The current problems confronting many citizens in South Africa are not simply the result of historical factors, but a crisis of service delivery that results from pro-market policies adopted by the government following first democratic elections. Policy developments in South Africa since 1994 can be divided into four phases: the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP); the Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme (GEAR); the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative – South Africa (AsgiSA) and the New Growth Path (NGP).

RDP MILESTONES

Leading up to the election of 1994, the democratic movement in South Africa, headed by the ANC, released the RDP as its main policy platform. Formulated before the political transition, the document represented a consensus in the tripartite alliance of the ANC, SACP and COSATU. Indeed, this consensus was crucial in securing an election victory for the ANC. According to Marais (2001: 239), the RDP was also an ideological reference point that seemed to confirm the political and historical continuity between the Freedom Charter and post-apartheid South Africa. Former ANC president Nelson Mandela noted that

> the RDP was not drawn up by experts – although many, many experts have participated in that process – but by the very people that will be part of its implementation. It is a product of consultation, debate and reflection on what we need and what is possible. We are encouraging local communities to begin developing their own priorities. Within this framework we are able to organise and develop further the vast amount of research and information available to us in the developing of detailed policy (ANC, 1994).

The RDP originated from labour's attempt to produce an accord that would tie a newly elected ANC government to a labour-driven development programme. As a "growth through redistribution" policy, the RDP's first priority was "[to begin] to meet the basic needs of people: jobs, land, housing, water, electricity, telecommunications, transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, healthcare, and social welfare" (Terreblanche, 2003).

The RDP soon became the paradigm within which all development policies were to be discussed – an extended wish list in which the homeless, the landless, workers and even international bankers could take equal comfort. From 1994 to 1996, the RDP became the guiding document of the government of national unity (GNU). The RDP was located within President Mandela's office, under the immediate authority of a minister without portfolio, Jay Naidoo – himself a former general-secretary of COSATU.

Eden Fire Fighter Deon van Wyk *saves the day* at Bergplaas



On the 6 June 2011, Eden Fire & Rescue participated in a film recording of a re-inactment of an rescue operation that took place in 2010.

A fire broke out on 21 October 2010 at Berg Plaas near Knysna and Eden Fire Rescue responed to an alert notification. The fire fighters were busy fighting the flames when suddenly the fire went out of control due to the wind increasing. This put both teams in serious danger.

Deon van Wyk from the Eden District Municipality, who was the chief in charge, came onto the scene and saved 17 of the Fire Fighters involved in the fire breakout.

In recognition of the bravery displayed by Deon van Wyk, Eden District Municipality nominated him for the Centrum Guardian Angel project and he was announced the National Winner on 23 August 2011.

Eden District Municipality salutes and congratulates Deon van Wyk on this achievement.

Eden hosts third round of Culinary Training

Eden District Municipality has given young up-coming chefs an opportunity to be involved in the third leg of the Culinary Training Programme. This programme is a joint partnership between Absa Bank and the Eden School of Culinary Art. We spoke to 10 of the learners who started with the programme on 9 May 2011 about their goals in life as young chefs. These young vibrant learners are all from the Eden Region.

Front from left to right: Gillme Prinsloo, Doretha Roman, Crizelda Rothman, Chef Francoise Ferreira, Merilize du Plessis, Doreline Everts, Chantel Afrika.
Back from left to right: Raphel Giewelaar, Shayna Maart, Ferguson Bell, Wendy Davies.

Commitment and devotion pays off

Individuals and groups that made a contribution to the South African environmental conservation and environmental education sector were formally acknowledged by the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA) at a special ceremony held on Thursday, 18 August 2011 at Kirstenbosch Botanical Gardens.

The annually-presented regional WESSA Awards attracted many nominations this year of which Vernon Gibbs-Halls – Environmental Officer of the Eden District Municipality, received an award for his dedication in seeking informed and sustained solutions to both environmental and social challenges in the Eden district.
As part of the award, he was recognised for his active participation on numerous environmental committees, and practical support for Civil Society endeavors and eagerness to promote the wise management of natural resources.

Laypeople believe that their concerns are not addressed by government. On the street corners, locals say that the government causes their fate and does not care about their plight. They believe that foreign media and governments have more appeal to the South African government.

MISLEADING MEASUREMENTS

The measurement of HIV/AIDS can never be accurate as long as it is not compulsory to be tested. HIV-positive people who decide not to test are not counted. What of those who test positive and do not disclose their status, or say they are negative?

Also, none of the top leaders who took the test say they are HIV-positive. So far, they have either said they are negative or that the results are not for the public. Are they all negative? And so we, the laypersons, are the only ones who suffer from HIV/AIDS! So much for the talk that HIV/AIDS can affect anyone, regardless of their status.

Certificates of AIDS-related deaths show the causes as "natural". What does that mean for health departments? How does it help them plan to offset HIV/AIDS? How does it help politicians to tell the public about HIV/AIDS? How do they get the facts? How can we measure the real impact of HIV/AIDS when it is not recorded as itself?

These failures – to record AIDS deaths, to test everyone, to disclose status, and to test and record those coming to this country – prevent us from capturing the real impact of HIV/AIDS. Surely we can't get it right if we don't do it right.

THE RIGHT TO...

It sounds so right! The right to... whatever.

Rights should help us to do right. Rights that lead to wrongdoing are *wrongs*! This simply means that when we introduce rights we need to close loopholes, else we do ourselves wrong.

When we did not have rights, things were tough for us, very tough. Almost everything we touched was an offence. We wanted rights and people lost lives fighting for them. Things are much easier now. People can say what bothers them without fear of being punished. But what is worse punishment than being allowed to talk and not being listened to?

This is simply to ask if all our rights have a platform to be rightly observed. No one says you have the right to be listened to. And if you do, then who is obliged to listen? We were expecting the politicians to be obliged to listen, but certainly we were wrong. We can make any noise and, if no one bothers to listen, that is their right. So the right has one side and not the other.

No doubt that last paragraph is moaning about the multitudes of rights that we have. It raises several questions. One is this: "How many of the rights that South Africa boasts are absolutely right?"

The right not to disclose one's HIV/AIDS status is under scrutiny in this commentary. It is a barrier to information. It leaves vulnerable every person willing to get involved in a sexual relationship. AIDS is not written on anyone's face, and trust sometimes comes with a charm. A loyal and unsuspicious partner may be tempted not to insist on protection. We tend to trust, and then we don't ask questions or challenge the practice of not using protection. Now and then, we fall in the trap of having unprotected sex with someone who has HIV/AIDS. Then we get infected! Someone who knows about his or her HIV-positive status can infect another without affording the other person their right to that information.

Rights are good, no question about it. Welfare and caring are also good. That is why South Africa cares about the plight of its own people and of others from elsewhere. But the way we "do the right thing" sometimes seems to prevent us from being effective in other areas.

I feel strongly that the statistics of HIV infections and AIDS deaths need to be recorded correctly somewhere. If the certificates of people dying from HIV are not allowed to specify that AIDS was the cause of death, surely the statistics of AIDS deaths are going to be undercounted. If we do not know the level of HIV/AIDS within our own ranks, it is very risky to bring in many other people who we do not know about. If the right statistics can be given, the impact of HIV/AIDS will be shown as even higher. Many unmeasured problems combined together can result in a major problem.



WHAT SCHOOLS COULD DO

Schools and the education system can be a great influence. If it were at all possible, all schools and every teacher should be obliged to commit to the fight against HIV/AIDS. They could be compelled to give a statement before and after lessons, in class, informing learners that people living with HIV/AIDS should be treated with respect and not stigmatised. Perhaps this could allow them to be loved and befriended like everyone else.

Teachers should warn children to be careful about conduct that could cause HIV infection. The people with HIV/AIDS should be encouraged to use extreme care to avoid re-infection and infecting others. Almost every school subject, including life orientation, could include something that contributes to the fight against HIV/AIDS. But now? If you do not know about it, you cannot solve it. And if you lie about it or if you are in denial, you cannot address it. And no one can help you to address it.

Since HIV causes AIDS, we should also believe so and let others know it. We can abstain as much as possible, and practice sex only with "those people who are ours", our partners. We should also learn to use condoms, especially those who are infected and those who cannot control their lust.

Good education is not where the teacher says, "Do as I say, not as I do." It starts with practising what we preach. If we lead our groups, we should lead by example. We should be able to tell them to be faithful and also be faithful ourselves. We should tell them to use condoms if we also use condoms. If we tell them to refrain, we should also refrain. Other than this, we should not say anything.

As youth of the village, we learned more "life skills" than one can imagine. We were taught to believe that "he who advises the king advises himself" (*molaya kgosi o a itaya*). In the same breath, we were taught to follow in the footsteps of the elders. It is easy to understand the reason. The elders had more experience and we were learning from them. By and large, we attempted to follow their advice.

VULNERABILITY OF FOLLOWERS

Followers are vulnerable people. If they believe in their leader, they sometimes believe that all that she or he says is right. They will even defend the wrong things this leader says or does. When they have lost the argument, they still refuse to accept that the leader is wrong, pleading that "to err is human". Then they ask why you can't forgive. They may attack, saying that "you did nothing during apartheid" or "you were silent when the struggle needed you". Even very young people – who were not born when things were hot and who know nothing about apartheid – make these accusations. They would even say this to people who had suffered torture of some kind during apartheid.

A university dropout, expelled from university due to what she said was a struggle against racial injustice, lamented that the "measures of contribution to the struggle against apartheid are subjective, and are pronounced when it suits those with a loud voice and a large following." Words of wisdom should be taken as such – without regard to who produces them. Unfortunately, some leaders take advantage of vulnerable followers and do filthy deeds that some of the masses will defend.

> People can say what bothers them without fear of being punished. But what is worse punishment than being allowed to talk and not being listened to?

DETRIMENTAL ARRIVALS

In December 2010, Zimbabweans received free identity documents from the South African home affairs department. For South Africans, these documents more than doubled in price in 2011. South Africans have to believe that the resources available in South Africa are not adequate for them, so they are concerned about competition – even without the mass absorption of foreigners.

To accept fellow Africans and others into the country is not wrong. But it may be detrimental to the host to just let them in when it is not clear as to what they are carrying. Some people coming into South Africa in mass exodus may be carrying illegal drugs. Others come with HIV/AIDS. We'd rather know what they are carrying and how much of it.

"How many of these people carry HIV/AIDS?" "Are they tested? If found positive, what resources will they get that are denied to South Africans?" "How will vulnerable people in destitute conditions be protected from foreigners who want to expedite their citizenship by marriage and other relationships?" These questions were raised not long after the xenophobic clashes by people who expected some control on the movement of foreigners into this country.

youth who were already excelling, but each year we would start with new young recruits. This recurred until we could not sustain the club anymore. Some of us went to different places due to work and marriage commitments. I was one of those who had to go away.

We started the youth club in order to manage the transitions of that time. Soccer, which had been utterly supported by the community in the past, was losing support. The youth were also changing their behaviour: drinking liquor and having love affairs in clear view, with neither fear nor respect for the adults. We needed a platform to develop the youth in progressive ways. Many adults did not support the initiative.

> Some people coming into South Africa in mass exodus may be carrying illegal drugs. Others come with HIV/AIDS. We'd rather know what they are carrying and how much of it.

GOOD TIMES ARE GONE

As I write, I am mourning the good practices that we witnessed and experienced as we grew up. All the good that we had is no more. I have been visiting my village since I left in 1975 to attend secondary school, but I am told that life was still orderly in the village for some time, up to the late 1980s.

Recently, we were watching soccer in the village when someone said, "Things changed in 1994. The youth took over and corrupt rich guys took charge of the village. They say they are coming with 'development' and 'entertainment' and then they build beer lounges. Young boys and girls drink there. Young ones from 11 years of age use these lounges, and right next to the road. We poor guys cannot say anything; you risk your life. When you blow a whistle to the police, the police will inform the beer lounge owner and you are in trouble. Police visit the lounge, and they are the ones who use the small girls. This lounge is where HIV and AIDS in this village are manufactured."

We were all listening. He said personally to me, "You know, Solly, during that time when you opened a youth club for drama and other development activities, we did not support you. We undermined your good initiatives. The elders of the village have said you were right. They also indicated that they need people like you. You are dearly missed. Why don't you come back and lead these youth? The village needs you. You used to show respect. When you wanted our children to participate, you visited the families and informed the parents fully on how you intended to run the clubs. We let you down. Please, my child, come back. This is your home and the village needs you."

I did not answer because I was surprised. This was one of the parents who showed no support when we wanted to enlighten our fellow youth at that time when we were becoming more enlightened in schools and other areas. We did everything with respect but we were opposed by the very same people who now want us to help. Their children are some of the ones who have become burdens on their families and headaches to the community. Among the ones who showed potential at an early age, there are those we count among the dead, those who are now criminals and others who are ailing.

When the elder invited me to come back to introduce development programmes, and I did not answer, it was not because I was refusing to help. My main question was, "Where do I start when I do not know the village anymore?" I was denied the opportunity when I believed I had a plan, when I still knew the village and the village knew me. Now I am involved elsewhere. I cannot share myself, but it's difficult to say that because it may be seen as boasting. I wish I could have resources and time to do something for my village. I cannot stop what I am doing because I treasure it vastly. Becoming vigorous in my old village might disrupt my current success. If I fail in my current programmes because of the efforts and interest at home, then it would most likely be a double failure. I have intricacies, troubles and interruptions in my own life and my work is lagging behind. I cannot afford to honour another development initiative.

When my initiatives were rejected in the village, the community rated me as a small boy from a simple family. It was almost impossible to convince people to give me and my colleagues a platform to develop the youth. Weaker and less effective initiatives by children of rich parents were given a platform and support. Parents did not want us, the destitute ones, to help their children. The other programmes did not create much development since corruption was rife in them. Girls fell pregnant in large numbers. We could not work with this group because it was formed from jealousy and competition, mainly by those who opposed our youth club. They also refused our invitation to meet and discuss if we could work together.

People in general need to learn to open up and support development programmes without considering who initiates them. If this could have been the case in my village, HIV/AIDS would probably not have had a chance to overtake human life.

VILLAGE MEMORIES

Let me take you to the times when I was still a young village boy and an activist for youth development. I used to attend community meetings (*makgotla*) in our village. There I learned a lot. This was during my high school and my early university days. The men there were not schooled, and many of them were illiterate. I learned to make a logical argument from the ways these fathers deliberated. The women were led by fine mothers. The village kept running in amazing order. The law started in the families and progressed into the streets. Every child was every adult's child, and every adult was considered a teacher and parent of every child.

I am sure that everyone who experienced indigenous village life will agree with me to some extent. We respected one another, and we respected the elders. Believe you me, the abuse that is rife these days did occur there – and when it was detected, it was punished. Boys and girls were taught and compelled to respect one another as well. As far as I can remember there was no abuse of women and children. Any form of disrespect or wickedness was an offence. Some offences were dealt with inside the community structures, but serious crimes were taken to the police. We knew what it meant to break the law. At school as well, teachers were forced to conform to village norms, and they had to teach community work and dynamics. They were allowed to punish us for wrongdoing. And we benefited from the punishment. As a result, we cannot be corrupt.

I remember that rape was a very, very serious offence in those days. One year we heard that someone I knew very well had raped a girl. He was arrested. We were still learners at primary school. At that time we did not exactly know what rape meant, but we were "taught" that it was extremely devilish. How could someone from this village do such a thing? When we saw this alleged rapist in the streets, we would run away and warn the girls to be careful. Also, during my last year at primary school, someone I knew killed another person through stabbing while the two were fighting. We started to fear that person seriously. How could he carry a knife? It meant he had planned to kill. In our mind such a person did not deserve to belong in that village. No one was allowed to carry a knife when there was no beast to be slaughtered. This was part of our community education.

In those days, offenders were punished and punished quickly, either by local structures or by external ones (such as the courts) that were equally effective. It was not announced that we had the rights to life and to the protection of village authorities, but in my village we had rights. It was purely inherent.

"Things changed in 1994. The youth took over and corrupt rich guys took charge of the village. They say they are coming with 'development' and 'entertainment' and then they build beer lounges. Young boys and girls drink there."

YOUTH DEVELOPMENT

However, a few years later, in the mid-1980s, I brought together a few men and women in their early twenties to form a youth club, in order to introduce development and talent programmes in the village and keep the youth active. Soccer was the only entertainment in those days, and it was not supported by all. Some who were not good at playing it were already resorting to drinking and becoming mischievous. Our club tried to intervene and give the youth some useful direction in life. We targeted and recruited youth from 14 to 30 years of age. We made it clear, however, that younger or older people would be accepted if they were willing to participate. The initiative was announced at a community meeting, but some parents complained that this was an inappropriate forum and that we had hijacked the *lekgotla*. We were not distracted by this.

We identified youth in the targeted age categories and then visited the parents and explained ourselves and our intentions. Very few parents allowed their children to join and even fewer agreed to buy the required uniform and equipment for their children. Chess, drama and netball were the activities offered, and we made financial sacrifices in an attempt to sustain the youth club. Every year, some parents withdrew their children on the advice of those who refused to allow their children to join. We lost many

Barriers to HIV/AIDS prevention: A layman's view

By **Solly Matshonisa Seeletse**

The author is senior lecturer in the department of statistics and operations research at the University of Limpopo (Medunsa Campus)

In earlier times, problems were solved by simple, humble servants of the community. They were the ones who cleaned the residential surroundings and picked dirt from the jungles and burnt it to make the area clean. So we are told. Some of them also provided herbs to cure sick people and to provide general good health. These were the people who gathered at meetings of their communities and earned respect by advising one another about life issues. In those days, high position, material wealth, academic achievement and monetary riches were not criteria to earn respect. People earned respect by virtue of being people, and also by working with their communities. As a result, suggestions for development could emerge and be welcomed from every community member regardless of status. Yes, it is true!

If one looks back at history, the layperson was the guide to problem solving. Kings and chiefs were advised by the common man. Governments were run by laypersons. In African history – as we are told by elders "around the fire" – there was love among communities. People paid taxes (or donated gifts) to the king, but not for the king's benefit. For welfare purposes! All by communal agreement! The king was the custodian and not the owner of welfare. Poor people were urged to go to the king to ask for help with food and other needs. Parents in these poor families were treated with full respect. In social and political gatherings, they contributed fully, with no discrimination.

The networks that existed at the time allowed different nations to communicate and address any ailment. No disease was impossible to address. The "spirits" that guided the traditional doctors never misled them, as we are told. There were no divorces in Africa. There was no modern technology. Then technology dawned. And all hell broke loose.

Technology was introduced to address problems more easily, quickly and efficiently, and to improve the quality of life of humans. And technology is good. It is extremely excellent! But technology has led to a gap. The thread that existed in indigenous education, by which older generations were able to teach younger ones, is now completely lost. No one knows what made it easy to solve problems in ancient times, which we are missing currently to solve our modern problems.

Technology did not fail us. What failed is the way it was advanced without incorporating indigenous education and knowledge in its dynamics. Technology moves so fast that it leaves the human mind lagging behind. Yet even technology is slower than the pace of HIV/AIDS and its effects on the life and health of humans. Consequently, HIV and AIDS are here.

Some traditional medical practitioners claim that they can address HIV/AIDS but modern guidelines restrict them. Modern medical practitioners claim they have knowledge and understanding of the epidemic. However, so far they can only reduce its pain and maybe some of its impact, but they cannot completely eradicate it. In the meantime, HIV and AIDS have a negative impact on the country's economy. Imagine what would happen if traditional and western doctors had an equal platform to research the cure. What would happen if they could complement and not antagonise each other in fighting HIV/AIDS? It seems more beneficial if these parties were to become partners.

DIHLABENG EXECUTIVE MAYOR THERE FOR OTHERS

The Executive Mayor for Dihlabeng Local Municipality, Councillor Tjhetane Mofokeng, tells his story in a one-on-one interview with Express Qwaqwa.

Regarding the R81m set aside for roads, storm water drainage, sports facilities and the 720 jobs forecasted. Challenges and opportunities of creating these jobs?

Most of the labour required is for unskilled workers so even people with no prior experience will be provided with the opportunity to enter the job market. However, some of the work is of a more specialised nature, although we are confident that amongst the residents of Dihlabeng there are enough people who are willing and able to do the work.

What are the ideas that you are championing in getting communities to participate in local economic development (LED)?

The Directorate LED appointed an economic consultant to identify certain aspects in which Dihlabeng Local Municipality can accelerate on economic development. These findings were taken to the community for discussion via the Dihlabeng and Bethlehem Highlands business forums. The community was invited to make comments, take part in discussions and raise their concerns. The process is now on its way and the next meeting between the Municipality and the two business chambers will be held during October 2011.

Regarding the R81m set aside for roads, storm water drainage, sports facilities and the 720 jobs forecast – how many of these jobs are sustainable?

Due to the nature of these projects, these jobs are mostly for 6 to 8 months; however the work experience and skills acquired will be of great value to the people working on these projects in terms of future employability.

Food & Water security is a key social concern in South Africa. What do you feel is the way forward for protecting communities?

People need to be educated that water is a scarce and precious resource. Our responsibility as a local municipality is also to ensure that proper maintenance of our infrastructure ensures that there is no wastage of water. We have to lead by example.

Partnerships between business and government in municipalities to better the social and physical infrastructure needs of communities are crucial to food security – how is Dihlabeng taking advantage of this opportunity?

Partnerships have been formed with the University of the Free State, the Dihlabeng Business Forum and the Highlands Business Forum.

The Executive Mayor, Honourable Clr TMH Mofokeng

MAKING STRIDES IN DIHLABENG

There is nothing small about the objectives of this municipality situated in the heart of the Free State.

Dihlabeng Executive Mayor Tjhetane Mofokeng knows he has a tough job on his hands. Currently serving his second term in office, he is aware of the many challenges facing his municipality, but nevertheless remains confident. 'I am happy to be part of a winning team,' he says, 'and I always feel fulfilled when our team realises what it has set out to achieve.'

Dihlabeng, one of five local municipalities that forms part of the Thabo Mofutsanyana District Municipality, incorporates the towns of Bethlehem, Clarens, Fouriesburg, Paul Roux and Rosendal. The greater Bethlehem area is situated approximately 240km north-east of Bloemfontein and 90km west of Harrismith. The town originally developed as a service centre to the adjoining agricultural hinterland. Growth is stimulated by the strategic location of the area. It is situated close to high-volume roads, such as the N5 between Bloemfontein and Durban, the N3 between Durban and Johannesburg and the R26.

Councillor Mofokeng is passionately committed to realising the aims of President Jacob Zuma's Vision 2014 for South Africa, which includes a growing economy, halving both unemployment and poverty, a fairer distribution of land and greater access to education, water, electricity and sanitation.

Municipal Manager Thabiso Tsoaeli believes Dihlabeng's mandate is to provide effective and efficient people-centred governance that facilitates the developmental role of local government.

He says there are five key performance areas of their strategic agenda: municipal transformation and organisational development; basic services and infrastructural development; local economic development (LED); financial viability and management; and good governance and public participation.

In terms of LED, the municipality's aim is to stimulate economic growth, create jobs and business opportunities and thereby alleviate poverty. The focus remains on emerging small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) and farmers, as well as tourism development. Some noteworthy projects in the past financial year include the building of a water reticulation network for 200 sites in Bohlokong at a cost of R5.6 million, as well as a R3.5 million reservoir in Clarens. In terms of human settlement and planning, 50 houses were built in the township revitalisation of Fateng tse Ntsho, costing R3.2 million. As part of the municipality's Marketing Strategy, R50 000 was spent on a Hot Air Balloon Festival in Bethlehem in May 2010.

Municipal Manager Tsoaeli is honest in his appraisal of the municipality's performance: 'Although we are very focused in our desire to deliver quality services to the communities of Dihlabeng, we understand why we have not met some of our objectives. We recognise that there will always be limited funding and resources, and yet we are committed to doing more with less and delivering on time.'

He concludes: 'Our approach is guided by three imperatives aimed at propelling the municipality forward: the need to prioritise, ensuring that our planning is outcome-based and developing a culture of performance.'



Municipal Manager Thabiso Tsoaeli

been spent, our people remain impoverished. A service delivery inspectorate needs to be established to verify the accuracy of reports.

SERVICE VALUES

However, even the best systems and tools cannot instil good values. The rising elitism within the public service is a cause for concern. Increased expectations for the public service have resulted in a demand for highly skilled personnel. In order to attract the right staff at the level of senior management, in competition with the private sector, salary adjustments had to be made and greater flexibility in remuneration applied. This has resulted in an increase in the wage gap between the highest- and lowest-paid public servants and the creation of an elite. Particularly in the state-owned enterprises, salaries for senior managers have reached levels way beyond that of the average citizen, allowing some to flaunt a lifestyle of conspicuous consumption. While the commitment of many a public servant might indeed be genuine, such luxury could easily result in them losing touch with the citizens they are meant to serve. The disjuncture between the comfortable elite and the harsh misery on the ground adversely affects the appropriateness of policies and programmes and the pace of delivery. When civil servants no longer feel the pain of poverty, lots of energy can be incorrectly directed, and they easily use the trappings of bureaucracy to justify their tardiness in effecting change.

The value system of public service should be vigorously protected. Commitment, passion and integrity cannot be enforced; these have to emanate from a culture of service. The introduction of socially orientated values, as contained in the *Batho Pele* principles, aims to negate individualistic, self-centred tendencies and encourage a culture of devotion to the greater good. This needs to be internalised by all public servants.

Imbizos should not be confined to politicians. Senior public servants at all spheres have to be integrated into public accountability structures in the wards where they reside. We cannot allow the gap between our public servants and ordinary citizens to increase any further. Progressive values also have to extend to donor agencies, private sector partners and consultants that deliver services on behalf of government.

QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT

The institutions established by Chapter 9 of the Constitution have to play a greater role to ensure that the values contained in the Bill of Rights are adhered to. It is also important that their integrity not be compromised by political interference so that they may ensure that public sector performance is not only assessed quantitatively, but also qualitatively. Systems that measure whether the public sector is efficient and effective have to ensure that state policies, programmes and projects have the desired impact.

> Constitutional changes – including a review of provinces – are being debated. This may not be needed. We may only need to replace a competitive, turf-protecting silo mentality with synchronised efforts towards shared developmental objectives.

These systems have to direct and appraise financial management, the performance of government officials and the relevance of public programmes to the people at large. The appropriate allocation of public funds is fundamental to ensuring economic development and social security. A well formulated budget allows for public funds to be spent with the utmost care, to be deployed for the benefit of citizens, and ensures that public expenditure is appropriately accounted for. Public servants are key instruments of delivery and their inability to perform and incorrect value systems can cause even the best public policies to fail.

South Africa has made tremendous strides in public governance practices. The government is continuously assessing and improving its financial and performance management practices and strengthening its constitutional oversight bodies. Development and training forms an integral part of facilitating public service efficiency and effectiveness, and this includes building capacity for monitoring and evaluation. As public management theory evolves, and as policy implementation proceeds, the challenges currently being experienced will undoubtedly be addressed.

While systemic weaknesses can never be completely eradicated, a steadfast dedication to excellence, an institutional adaptability and appropriate measurement systems will contribute significantly to ensuring that indeed we have a better life for all.

Towards efficient and effective government

By Reneva Fourie

The author is a South African Communist Party activist

The 2011 local government elections revealed a number of challenges concerning service delivery at grassroots level. The Treasury's latest Estimates of National Expenditure *demonstrates a marked improvement in revenue collection efficiency, but the poorest of the poor have not experienced significant improvements in their living conditions. An interventionist state with a developmental orientation has to ensure that resource allocation occurs in a manner that accrues social and material benefits to society at large. While policy choice and its ideological persuasion are fundamental to achieving the socio-economic objectives of the state, theoretical intent loses significance if the application of state resources fails to have the required impact.*

Planning and measurement processes that incorporate financial management, public service performance and programmatic impact are the tools to ensure that the state is efficient, effective and cost-conscious. The enactment of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) in 1999 and the National Treasury Regulations issued in 2002 supported longer-term financial planning and control, including outcomes-based budgeting. The department of public service and administration also introduced performance management systems to increase accountability and set standards against which the work of public officials could be measured. These two tools are supported by the national planning and monitoring and evaluation processes of the Presidency. These policy and institutional instruments lay a strong foundation to ensure public sector accountability. Despite this, a number of weaknesses exist.

BUILDING CO-ORDINATION

The primary weakness is co-ordination. Many attempts have been made to improve co-ordination between the three spheres of government in order to maintain policy coherence and ensure programme alignment. Very recent measures include the delivery agreement signed between the president and each of his cabinet ministers and the agreements signed in turn between ministers and provincial MECs. Provinces and municipalities in some instances still insist on doing their own thing – operating as if we were a federal state and did not have historical challenges that require maximum co-ordination to fundamentally improve the quality of life of our people.

In a desperate bid to improve delivery, constitutional changes – including a review of provinces – are being debated. This may not be needed. We may only need to replace a competitive, turf-protecting silo mentality with synchronised efforts towards shared developmental objectives.

Problems of co-ordination are exacerbated by the measuring instruments used within the state. Linking inputs, activities and outputs, these allow us to account for quantitative achievements. But the current instruments do not measure the qualitative impact of policy decisions and interventions, thereby creating the illusion that we are deploying our resources very effectively.

There is also poor co-ordination of local government reporting. The sphere of local government is burdened with compliance regulations, as they have to report to their provinces, sector departments, the department of co-operative governance and the national Treasury. Despite an onerous reporting regime, the service delivery commitments on paper do not tally with real experiences on the ground. Thousands of activities later, after millions – if not billions – of rands have resources are intense. People have migrated to the cities in search of better lives, but are frustrated and angry about the poor conditions and limited opportunities of being trapped on the margins. Overstretched municipalities struggle with the competing demands from different communities to reduce backlogs, maintain existing services in better-off areas, and accommodate new population growth.

Third, the metros are experiencing growing financial difficulties associated with wage inflation, cash flow problems and administrative deficiencies. Higher levels of national grant funding in recent years may have weakened internal financial disciplines and local accountability. Technical billing problems and a hangover from generous spending on World Cup facilities have compounded the financial headache. Government funding comes in separate streams with sometimes contradictory purposes, thus limiting the possibility of coherent urban planning and development strategies.

Fourth, a series of environmental concerns looms large, including water scarcity, energy shortages and overloaded sewage treatment facilities. Inadequate and poorly maintained urban infrastructure is buckling under the pressures of population and economic growth. Climate change obligations require more vigorous efforts to promote public transport, increase energy efficiency, recycle waste and water, and develop renewable energy sources.

Finally, sprawling settlement patterns impose high personal costs of long-distance commuting on poor peripheral communities and expensive bulk infrastructure charges on municipalities. The general preference for greenfield development is inefficient and unsustainable. Little progress has been made to reshape fragmented cities and knit them together through well-located housing or economic development in and around the townships. The density map of Gauteng shows just what a challenge it is to overcome the splintered settlement pattern of this region. Yet it is all the more important to get started on this long-term project because of the way current investment entrenches future spatial patterns.



REBUILD TRUST

A simple but nonetheless important message is emerging: active government support for urban integration and transformation is essential. A decade ago the government seriously underestimated the enormous task it set for the new metro authorities, with their enlarged boundaries and extended responsibilities, to service low-income communities from a restricted tax base. There is somewhat more recognition now of both the problems and the potential of urban areas. This is undoubtedly where most of the jobs the country needs will come from.

The government deserves praise for backing the devolution of housing and transport powers to the metros. An integrated city-wide approach to transport, housing, land reform and spatial planning should help to manage urban growth better in the future. The metros will need to rise to the challenge, and will require additional funding and technical assistance to fulfil these functions effectively. Most have the capacity to borrow on the private market to fund extra investment in infrastructure, and they should be encouraged to do so in the national as well as the local interest.

Another priority for the new municipal leaders elected in May is to rebuild trust in the competence and integrity of metro government, following well-publicised difficulties. They should acknowledge past problems and restore credibility by tightening up ethical procedures and making decisions more transparent. Revitalised ward committees and other oversight mechanisms could strengthen the voice of communities and enhance local democracy. Cadre deployment is destabilising and should be stopped.

It is also important to revisit the original vision of metro government. A bold vision is needed of productive and inclusive cities in which everyone can lead a useful and fulfilling life. It means giving priority to socio-economic development and jobs above all else. Developing human capabilities and active citizenship is a better way forward than welfare or consumerism. We seem to have lost sight of the principles of community empowerment and self-reliance, which are healthy for democracy and vital where state capacity is constrained.

The different spheres, departments and agencies of government need to work together much more closely in future. A functional multi-level developmental state could harness the power of each sphere to help every city achieve its potential. Metro councils should be the catalysts that make this happen.

Urban and rural areas: Allies, not rivals

By **Ivan Turok**

The author is the deputy executive director of the programme on economic performance and development at the Human Sciences Research Council and principal author of the *2011 State of the Cities Report*, **published in April by the South African Cities Network (www.sacities.net)**

South African cities perform a vital role in underpinning all-round national development, despite their internal problems. Stronger economic growth in large urban areas over the last decade has effectively funded the large-scale expansion of social programmes to towns and rural areas. As a result, the fortunes of city and rural economies have become more interdependent. It is important for policy-makers and planners at all levels to understand such connections and not see rural or urban areas in isolation. Yet we seem to remain trapped in an unproductive and divisive discourse that views spatial issues in either rural or urban terms. We seem unable to envisage a national territory that is becoming increasingly integrated, and in which different parts of the country perform different roles and functions.

There is also a surprising hesitancy at the heart of government to endorse policies that address the distinctive challenges facing our larger cities. The pursuit of equity and inclusion does not mean that every location has to be treated in an identical manner. Places have very different needs and potentials, and the government should be capable of a adopting a differentiated approach. The metros too could perhaps accept some responsibility for their surrounding areas by offering technical assistance, staff training and other shared services to neighbouring municipalities.

The nine biggest urban municipalities now account for nearly two-thirds of national economic activity and the bulk of formal jobs. During the late 2000s, their economies were supported implicitly and in reaction to congestion and other growth pressures by selected government investment in road improvements, airport expansions, Gautrain and bus rapid transit (BRT) infrastructure. Transport spending is now being scaled back after the World Cup, leaving a shortfall in capital investment.

Towns and rural areas have received a rising share of social spending in the form of grants for the elderly, persons with disabilities, and children. Social grants have replaced remittances as a major source of household incomes in villages and towns. The significance of this shift has not been widely appreciated and its consequences are not well understood. Selected rural areas have also benefited from the extension of subsidised electricity, sanitation and water. However, there has not been the same effort to boost jobs and livelihoods by diversifying flagging rural economies.

Considering the prosperity gap between the cities and countryside, it is fair and reasonable that state spending is partially skewed towards the latter. High levels of social need, strong feelings of historic injustice and widening economic disparities could otherwise threaten social stability and national unity. However, there can be no room for complacency about conditions in large urban areas. The metros cannot be left to fend for themselves if the lion's share of the taxes they generate for the national fiscus are siphoned off elsewhere. Mounting stresses and strains warrant fuller attention from national government, as well as a step change from local municipalities.

URBANISATION STRATEGIES

First, metro councils have struggled to keep pace with rural-urban migration, resulting in more unplanned urban settlements, informal housing and backyard shacks without basic facilities. Rising population densities in the shack areas and townships worsen vulnerability to floods, fire damage and the spread of disease. Ambiguous national attitudes towards urbanisation mean that the metros have so far failed to develop a coherent approach to new settlements. Suitable land and services need to be provided in advance to plan and manage the process better.

Second, community service protests are concentrated in informal settlements on the outskirts of the large cities. These are pressure cookers where social tensions, overcrowding and competition for scarce

Dr Joseph Phaahla
Deputy Minister of
Arts and Culture

The Department of Arts and Culture launches the second phase of Reprinted South African Classics

The Deputy Minister of Arts and Culture, Dr Phaahla officially launched the second phase of South African Classics, a project funded from the R1 Billion Conditional Grant aiming to promote access to libraries and to encourage the culture of reading and writing.

In 2008 the Department of Arts and Culture entrusted the National Library of South Africa with the task to identify and reprint books, which are regarded to be classics in the nine indigenous languages in South Africa. The public nominated thousands of titles which they consider to be classics, leaving the panel of experts with an enormous task to screen and select the classic books. The panel constituted of literary and publishing experts who finalised the list.

In the first phase of the project 27 literary classics titles were reprinted, while in the second phase 19 literary titles have been reprinted. These add up to the total of 46 titles reprinted in the nine indigenous languages to this far.

The National Library of South Africa will continue reproducing the texts and ensure that knowledge is not lost from future generations. The reprinted books of the first phase were distributed to all nine Provinces, public and school libraries, and all centres of information for easy access to the public.

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National Library of South Africa

The National Library of South Africa is the National Treasure house of the published heritage materials, a centre of excellence in providing access to the immensely valuable resources, facilitated and provide knowledge and information literacy. The National Library Act 92 of 1998 provides for the National Library to collect, record, preserve and make available the national documentary heritage materials.

The National Library as the national depository of published material in the country has key collections of the South African documentary heritage and makes these accessible through its work as the national bibliographic agency according to national and international standards. The National Library's comprehensive collection enables it to position itself as a leading national library and information centre of excellence in Africa.

The National Library of South Africa has become a symbol of community upliftment and empowerment. The Library now attracts on average of over 15 000 users per month.

The NLSA has been fitted with 500 new computers available for use by the public for free access of the Internet. Deploying computers to the public areas contribute a great deal in providing the public free access to the Internet and normal computer use activities. Information literacy training is offered to the general public to equip them with the necessary skills.

NLSA is one of the best-known and best-used points of access to information by national and international researchers. In addition, the NEPAD programme funded on the principle of sustainable economic development requires the support of African institutions such as the National Library of South Africa.

The NLSA achievements:

- A well equipped new National Library building with computers available for use by the public, thus contributing towards reducing the digital divide.
- A National Library serving its purpose in providing a repository for current electronic published documents and a preservation service for all legal deposit documents in South Africa
- There is more space available for studying, reading, research and on-line services.
- The auditorium and meeting rooms are used for training and meetings with national and international delegates, and the necessary audio-visual equipment is available.
- The reprint of South African Classics project has paved the way for more African literature being made available in all the nine indigenous languages.
- Full participation in the Library Transformation Charter and NCLIS to advise the LIS sector around issues affecting libraries and librarianship.

The National Library of South Africa lives to its vision as a leading library and information centre of excellence in Africa, and in the world. The CEO and National Librarian, Mr John Tsebe is the Chairperson of the Council for Directors of National Libraries of the world.


NLSA Building


Deacidification machines.

Department of Arts and Culture R1 billion Conditional Grant for Libraries

The Department of Arts and Culture supports public and community libraries through the conditional grant to enable South Africans to gain access to knowledge and information resources that will improve their socio-economic situation.

Since it began in 2007, the conditional grant has made great strides in improving the state of community libraries in the country. With over R433 million being spent on the community libraries in all nine Provinces, several library structures have been built, others refurbished.

There are seven broad categories in which provinces have utilised the conditional grant funding:

- Building libraries (18 new libraries built)
- Refurbishing libraries (139 libraries refurbished)
- Public Internet access
- Staffing and staff training
- Equipment and furniture acquired
- Reading programs
- Access for disabled people

The Transformation Charter of Libraries:
With its roots in the Freedom Charter, the Transformation Charter of Libraries is spearheaded by the NCLIS and the National Library of South Africa. The Charter is guided by fundamental principles enshrined in the South African Constitution, with the most crucial being redress and equity.

The purpose of the Transformation Charter of Libraries is to:

- To develop an integrated funding model for the Library and Information Services Sector.
- To ensure that all South Africans have access to information as prescribed by the South African Constitution.
- Promote employment equity and skills development therefore effecting efficiency and effectiveness to clientele.
- Make libraries the centres for the dissemination of information and knowledge.
- Make libraries places where people from all backgrounds can find each other.

Following the extensive consultative process the LIS transformation charter was drafted. Now onto its sixth draft which includes inputs from the ministries of Arts and Culture and Education. Now the charter is awaiting the parliamentary process.

Skills Development in the Library and Information Services (LIS):
Over 200 community libraries in South Africa have received disaster management and basic book repair training. Each library is provided with a toolkit and book repair tools so they can conduct book repair in a responsible manner.

Reprint of South African Classics Project:
One of the national priorities that the conditional grant is advocating for is the promotion of writers and publishers in African languages. Already on the brink of its second phase of reprints this ministerial project has already seen the reprint of 27 titles at 3 000 copies a title. The process to make these books available in all public libraries is in full swing.

LIMPOPO LEGISLATURE
It's your voice, use it!

LIMPOPO LEGISLATURE STRIDES TOWARDS EFFECTIVE SERVICE DELIVERY

The Limpopo Legislature was established in terms of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The Constitution confers certain powers upon the Provincial Legislatures to, inter alia, consider, pass, amend or reject Bills brought before the Legislature. As part of government accountability, the Limpopo Legislature under the Speakership has established 14 Portfolio and Standing Committees to play an oversight role over the executive.

In line with the directive of the Speaker, Honourable Kgolane Alfred Phala, that portfolio committees should hold meetings outside the normal Legislature precinct, the oversight work of portfolio committees is making an impact. The Portfolio Committee on Education has visited schools in all districts and held meetings at circuit offices. The Committee on Health visited all district hospitals and health centres and held meetings. All other committees such as Safety and Security, Roads and Transport, Sports, Arts and Culture, Quality of Life and the Office of the Premier did the same.

The Limpopo Legislature encourages the public to participate in the lawmaking process as part of its mandate. It therefore deemed it fit that Legislature should establish the Portfolio Committee on Public Participation and Petitions to drive the process of public participation in decisions that directly or indirectly affect their lives. The Portfolio Committee on Public Participation and Petitions thus receives a large number of petitions on issues of water, roads, housing, schools, clinics, etc. Between 2006 and 2010, the committee received 196 petitions, and 61 percent have been finalised. The Committee also works together with Constitutional institutions (referred to as Chapter Nine institutions) in order to resolve these petitions.

On 5 August 2009, the Limpopo Legislature made a landmark breakthrough regarding the enforcement of the Limpopo Petitions Act No 4 of 2003. This was after a municipal manager was convicted at Polokwane Magistrate Court for refusing to appear before the committee of the Legislature. In terms of the Act, the committee is empowered to subpoena any person to appear before a committee to answer any questions or to produce any documents required by the committee. In terms of Section 11(1) and (2), any person who fails to appear before the committee after being duly subpoenaed or fails to produce any documents required by the committee, is guilty of an offence. In pursuing this matter up to this stage, the Legislature did not intend to punish, but to send a strong message to the public about the importance of this Act and the role of the Legislature in particular. This case is the first, not only in the Province but in the whole of South Africa. It is a landmark victory of which the Legislature is proud.

South Africa is on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goals on universal primary education. Investment in early childhood development is beginning to yield results in the province, and the number of schools offering Grade R has been increased. The introduction of various programmes such as no-fee-schools, scholar transport and the School Nutrition programme has widened the access to education in the province to all people regardless of their financial background. Members of the Committee visit schools when they reopen at the beginning of the first term, to assess schools' readiness and to check if learner support materials such as textbooks have been delivered to schools. The School Nutrition Programme provides food to needy children and currently 1 435 516 learners in Limpopo benefit from the programme.

Oversight activities of the Portfolio committee on Local Government and Housing have significantly led to the delivery of houses to the people of Limpopo. In 2010 the Portfolio Committee oversaw the completion of 33 200 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) houses and further visited local municipalities to ensure the delivery of 15 514 housing units. The committee has encouraged the campaign led by the department with the dictum "My RDP, My Pride", and this slogan encourages people to value their houses and keep them clean. Limpopo is the first and the only province to introduce this campaign and it yielded good results.

The Limpopo Legislature strives to contribute towards improvement in the lives of people in the province by ensuring that departments adhere to the strategic plans that are approved by the House. Various programmes have been initiated to fight rural poverty and underdevelopment, and portfolio committees had been in the forefront of overseeing the implementation of such programmes. One of the key priorities of the South African government is that of rural development, and the province of Limpopo is among the priority areas; a good example is the Muyexe rural development project, one of the villages in the area of Giyani, Mopani District. Muyexe community members currently have access to a clinic, a police station, water and roads. In addition, the Portfolio Committee has ensured maximum support to rural communities with infrastructure and input needs so as to drive the agenda for rural development forward.

The Limpopo Legislature takes responsibility and makes every effort to ensure that the creation of economic opportunities to the public is at the apex of the developmental agenda, and that targets explicit in the strategic plans are met. In order to push back the frontiers of poverty, the introduction of the Expanded Publics Works Programme (EPWP) has created no fewer than 49 000 job opportunities. This programme aims to bridge the gap between the haves and the have nots. The EPWP programme has changed the lives of a substantial number of people in the rural areas by offering them job opportunities, thus improving the quality of their lives. The Portfolio Committee on Economic Development, Environment and Tourism has overseen the completion of the Mall of the North, Phangami Mall and Dzumeri Mopane Indigenous Industry, which are contributing towards job creation. They further ensured that the Limpopo wildlife resorts were revitalised in order to attract more tourists and create job opportunities. The increase in rhino poaching is a concern, and has been frequently debated in the House; the public has applauded the Green Scorpions (Rangers) for successfully convicting 36 suspects and consortiums responsible for selling and exporting rhino horns.

Committees continuously and proactively exercise their oversight role over the government and public entities to ensure an effective service delivery. Access to basic services such as water and housing has been on the increase in the province. The Limpopo Legislature strives toward creating a better life for all.

HON KA PHALA
THE SPEAKER

ADV EN LAMBANI
THE SECRETARY

leverage. We need to create a platform to focus on some of the key issues that the public sector unions, in partnership with government, need to transform. For example, the whole issue of productivity in the public service is something that the government and the unions need to talk about seriously.

BT: Are they not doing so?

RL: I don't think it's happening at the pace and the level which is required. If we're going to have the kind of wage increases that the public sector unions are fighting for, then we need to have similar increases in productivity and in the quality of our public service. We need the unions to play a positive role within many of the things we've been talking about – for example, discipline. It's true that often their members are affected and this may put them in invidious situations. But it's also true that we have corruption in the public service and that corrupt individuals, although they may be members of trade unions, need to be rooted out of the system.

BT: Are the unions willing to do that?

RL: On a case by case basis, the unions do play a positive role. There is a maturity in some of the formations, even at a very local level, that understands these contradictions and is willing to play a positive role. The issue of the size of the settlements is a big issue of economic policy, but what we need is a stronger partnership around public service transformation, the attitudes of public servants, the culture and the way public servants conduct themselves. I would be very surprised if the leadership of our trade unions would be hostile to partnering with government to turn that culture around, in order to have a better interface with our people and improve service delivery.

I don't think the solutions are complicated. But the day when we have a strong meritocratic bureaucracy, which is willing and able to implement the developmental priorities and objectives of our country – that will be the day that you and I will be very happy.

BT: You're indicating that we need a bureaucracy which is progressive and supportive of a developmental state, but some political leaders are very afraid that the bureaucracy would develop its own interests and pursue its own agenda. Is that a problem?

RL: Yes, I think they are correct. I also share that fear, even though I've been in the belly of the beast for all this time. Bureaucracies tend to develop a self-interest that can be put ahead of public interest.

I want a separation of powers, but the executive will always have the power over the architecture of the bureaucracy. The executive must determine the size, deployment, where we put our institutions...

BT: It's relative autonomy?

RL: It's relative autonomy. Absolutely! No absolute autonomy, definitely not! The executive must shape the bureaucracy. Give the bureaucracy the policy and strategic imperatives to run with, provide oversight, but do not leave the bureaucracy to shape itself.



itself, often in neo-colonial environments. Is the same pattern emerging in South Africa?

RL: It may be, but I think there are strong tendencies to counter it as well. That is what the struggle is all about.

BT: I agree. But going back to our public service as it is: how is discipline imposed on public servants where there is a plurality of power structures?

RL: That plurality may not necessarily infect the whole system of discipline. After everything I've said, it's important to note that there are problems within the public service that are not about the relationship between the executive and the administration or the political/executive interface. We do have public servants who haven't embraced the importance of the various codes which have been established and the accountability mechanisms. This would include disclosures by senior and other relevant managers who may be responsible for tender processes. We haven't significantly battened down the culture of accountability.

Again, discipline might be better administered by heads of department who are then accountable to the executive in parliament for what is happening in their particular departments. Currently, this responsibility is placed with the executive, the minister.

I do think the ministers must be given the space to provide a stronger interface between the state and the people and to ensure that the policy and strategic imperatives are being adequately driven by the departments they're responsible for – but not actually administering human-resource management practices.

BT: No micro management?

RL: Whatever the management style is, the actual assignment of powers is still flawed. Ministers must be given the space to do their political work and not be encumbered unnecessarily by human resource administration.

BT: Who's in charge of implementing the disciplinary code within a department?

RL: It would be the head of department and the minister who would constitute the appeal authority. It would also depend on the particular delegations [of authority] that are issued to a head of a department by the minister, because there are many factors which impinge on discipline.

The codes are in place and we need sound human-resource management in order to administer discipline adequately. All the possibilities are there.

BT: Who's not doing it?

RL: It may be that the will is not there.

BT: The DG's?

RL: It could be the will of the DG or a deputy-DG. It's better to administer discipline at the point at which it occurs.

> Ministers must be given the space to do their political work and not be encumbered unnecessarily by human resource administration.

I don't think the system is necessarily or fundamentally flawed. It is important to indicate that this is a matter of mutual interest. The existing disciplinary code has been negotiated in the public service co-ordinating bargaining council (PSCBC) and any changes would also need to be negotiated at that level. There may be ways in which it could be improved, but often it's the administration that is problematic. The slow turnaround times, or the fact that people spend long times on suspension, is often a straight management issue. There is massive room for improvement in the basics of administration.

One of the downsides of the NPM is that it was designed and conceived in the West, in the developed countries, where the basics of administration were not necessarily the issue. In our country, the basics of administration need to be solved: skills and practices. It's embedding practices. It's creating the discipline of repetitive practice, if you like. Administration is often about repetition, creating that basic discipline and practice. That is what we require.

POWER IN THE UNION

BT: It's said that the public-sector unions are now the major force driving COSATU, and that their fight for higher wages is setting the standard for the rest. Any comment?

RL: I do think the public sector unions are strong – and that is a potential strength which we need to

"Single Public Service". But it would be possible to overcome those constitutional difficulties in order to gain the desired outcomes.

When we engage in these processes, it's always very important to look at the bigger picture of the relationship between the state and the people, and not to focus on institutions and the power individual actors have over institutions at a particular moment in time.

BT: Some people were afraid that the SPS would entrench central power.

> The relationship between the state and the people is the fundamental issue that needs to be addressed. That is where we have a flawed bureaucracy.

RL: As I've indicated, we are very much on the same page when it comes to the need for a strong centre of government in order to drive the agenda of a developmental state, but within the administrative apparatus, you still can have decentralisation of decision-making. That's really what's important. It's important that managers of every institution – at whatever point they are in the system, and even if we re-align towards much greater capacity at the local sphere – are accountable to their executive authorities.

I'm definitely not saying there must be no accountability between heads of departments or heads of local government institutions and their executive authorities. But those who are responsible for running and driving those institutions must be given the necessary powers to appoint the people they believe have the necessary skills and attributes to discharge the publicly mandated policies and programmes that they are responsible for.

CORRUPTION AND DISCIPLINE

BT: In your experience, how deep was the corruption – the tenderpreneurs and so on – in the public service?

RL: That's another reason why I argue for a separation between the executive and the administrative apparatus of the state: it separates the executive from the temptation of using the state as an instrument of accumulation.

BT: You're saying there's an alliance between an individual minister and a senior public servant to engage in corrupt practices?

RL: Certainly that exists in some cases, but I'm saying something slightly broader. Corruption is a broad concept. You spoke specifically of tenderpreneurs, but let's look at nepotism. When executive authorities – ministers, MECs, mayors – have power over the administrative apparatus, they can appoint staff, they can design organograms, and say we need a certain structure in our organisation. Rightly or wrongly. It might be right in many cases, but in other cases it might be done simply in order to exercise patronage.

BT: To create a crony system?

RL: Yes, to create a crony system. That's the one side of it.

BT: On what scale does this happen?

RL: It's not uncommon nor is it the norm. I think it's quite broad at the provincial level. This is one of the reasons we now require the public service and administration minister to concur with any changes in a public service organogram at the chief-director level and above. Although this measure was controversial at the time – and still is – many provincial premiers and heads of departments actually pushed for it, because misaligned institutions and inappropriate appointments at that level were creating a legacy that was difficult to manage.

Let me make a fundamental point about the tenderpreneurs, which is a point about South Africa, Africa and developing countries generally. One of the big challenges with the development of capitalism in the "Third World", if you like, is that the colonial powers, through the various structures of oppression and exploitation, had a monopoly over the levers and means of capital accumulation. At independence in Africa, and at liberation here in South Africa, the majority of the people had no independent access to accumulation outside the state apparatus. There's a structural issue which we need to understand in order to explain better – not to justify, but to explain better – why we have this phenomenon.

This is where a lot of the debate around the state bourgeoisie resides. Do we have a bourgeoisie which is motivated by self-interest and self-enrichment or do we have a progressive bourgeoisie keen to foster and create the space for accumulation from below?

BT: I'm afraid the story in Africa is that the state bourgeoisie has not developed Africa but developed

RL: This is the opposite model. In fact, NPM emphasises decentralisation.

There are certain aspects of decentralisation which are not necessarily problematic. Decentralisation of decision-making to heads of department and institutions gives them the necessary leverage to do what they need to do in order to manage an organisation effectively. For example, if a hospital must rely on a provincial health department to administer disciplinary action, then we have incoherence within the state.

But I would very strongly agree with you that building a strong centre of government – which is able to articulate a national vision and has the necessary mechanisms for horizontal co-ordination, which means co-ordination by national departments, as well as vertical co-ordination between the different spheres of government – is fundamental to a successful developmental state.

As is institutional coherence. We need to rein in the fragmentation of the state because we don't have the skills capacity to have a myriad of organisations at national level, at provincial level, and at local level. If we look at the institutional architecture of economic governance, for example, it doesn't seem to be appropriate to our actual needs. We need to have a coherent state with strong administrative apparatuses.

FLAWED BUREAUCRACY

BT: I recall you saying that we can't build a developmental state with the present public service.

RL There are limitations, and I would certainly argue that we do need to effect that separation between the executive and the administration. We need to effect that separation on an understanding that we are going to build a stable, strong bureaucracy that is capable of delivering on the policy imperatives and the strategic priorities of the government of the day.

BT: Thabo Mbeki introduced the cluster system in order to facilitate horizontal co-ordination. Did it work?

RL: There are certainly positive aspects of that system and it laid the basis for very strong innovations in the area of monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring and evaluation is important for accountability. It is absolutely fundamental that the administrative apparatuses are accountable, not only to the executive but also to parliament and hence the whole link with the people.

The relationship between the state and the people is the fundamental issue that needs to be addressed. That is where we have a flawed bureaucracy. The manner in which the administrative apparatuses interact with the people is one of our key challenges.

BT: Can you elaborate on that?

RL: It is the very basic interface our communities confront when they walk into public institutions.

BT: Are they not friendly?

RL: They're not friendly and often there's no attempt to be friendly. In cases it may be argued that the capacity is inadequate for the kind of services that one would hope for.

> It is important for the ruling party to deploy its strongest cadres into the public service, while recognising that ultimately there should be a greater separation.

But we have even created a policy framework within which to solve that. The 2002 ANC National Conference in Stellenbosch took a decision to establish a single public service (SPS). A huge amount of work was done on that. We have a fundamental misalignment of the public service. We have a very bloated national and provincial public service and a very lean local government.

One of the key theoretical underpinnings of the SPS was to optimise deployment of civil servants to interface with the public in the appropriate manner. If we just look at the distribution of public servants – and these numbers are not exact – we have approximately 200 000 to 250 000 at local government level, 890 000 to 900 000 at provincial level, and maybe 309 000 at national level. We can see that there is an imbalance. We don't have public servants where the people are, and that is what we fundamentally need to change.

BT: Why was that plan not carried through?

RL: A huge amount of work was done. Draft legislation was formulated. We brought together some of the strongest legal minds in South Africa to look at the constitutional implications. The Constitution creates local government as a distinct sphere and hence it would probably be difficult to call the legislation the

BT: It's really a toothless bulldog, isn't it?

RL: Well, it may not be a toothless bulldog, but I believe the system for managing the performance of DGs does need a radical change.

Although it's good in theory to have a panel of ministers, chaired by the PSC, it has proved a huge challenge to convene those panels. There is a massive backlog in the formal assessment of year-on-year performance of DGs. There are many DGs, including myself, who have not had their performance managed on a yearly basis, because of that problem. And it is a problem, because DGs need feedback on their performance, whether positive or negative.

BT: The role of the DG in the Presidency is a rather formal one, the particular ministers seem to have a great deal of power, and the PSC is a facilitating body. The result of all this is that the line of accountability is blurred. Would you agree?

RL: I would agree that the current system is imperfect and it needs to be changed.

BT: Is this a system in which decisions can be taken easily, directly, clearly and decisively? Are the government and the public service conveying an impression of coherence and co-ordination?

RL: I wouldn't root this in the question of performance management per se. I would argue that we do need to elevate the role of the cabinet secretary; we do need a head of the public service. We do need, in the context of our system – which is essentially a bourgeois-democratic political system – to create a greater separation between the executive and the administrative apparatus of the state.

BT: Why?

RL: The separation is important to build the capacity of the public service – even in the context of a developmental state. One of the essential conditions of a developmental state is a meritocratic bureaucracy.

The problem is the assigned role of ministers which dates back to the need to transform the character of the public service from the apartheid days. Obviously the racial composition of the public service needed a radical overhaul, and that is a very positive development. But we've had continuity in the culture inside the public service despite the attempts to turn it around. We still have a very compliance-oriented, rule-bound culture as opposed to a service-oriented culture.

STATE FRAGMENTATION

RL: It is important for the ruling party to deploy its strongest cadres into the public service, while recognising that ultimately there should be a greater separation. This is in order to build the capacity and continuity so that, from electoral period to electoral period, there is a strong system of public administration in South Africa. It's a public administration which must understand the basics.

We attained our liberation within a specific global theoretical discourse of "good governance", which emerged simultaneously with a paradigm of "new public management" (NPM) that displaced a predominantly Weberian approach to the bureaucracy. Good governance in itself is not necessarily problematic, but it is underpinned by theoretical assumptions within the discipline of public administration. The underpinnings of the NPM were extremely influential globally. Beginning in the late 1980s, countries started to adopt these precepts, which were to develop alternative service-delivery institutions, accompanied by the hegemonic "structural adjustment" position of privatisation.

The balkanisation [division into smaller, mutually hostile parts] of the state occurred in the era of good governance. This is the irony. The balkanisation of the state didn't involve only privatisation but also agencification – structural disaggregation and the creation of alternative service-delivery institutions. Countries like New Zealand balkanised their state: they broke up departments, and created "special purpose vehicles" of various sorts to deliver services to the population.

That's the context in which we attained our liberation. NPM was obviously seductive because we were confronted by this massive bureaucracy that seemed to be impenetrable. The DTI [department of trade and industry] has been built on this model. So it created all these various agencies that deal with small business, with various aspects of regulation, with the registration of businesses, etc. SASSA [the South African Social Security Agency], which was set up in the department of social development to administer social grants, would be another example of such a vehicle.

BT: One could call it fragmentation.

RL: One could, definitely. The impact has been the fragmentation of the state.

BT: It sounds like a model where the private sector would flourish, but a developmental state – which requires a drive from the top and a degree of centralisation – would not.

Fixing the public service

An interview with **Richard Levin**

Richard Levin, director-general of the economic development department, is a former DG of public service and administration. Ben Turok interviewed him on 8 June 2011

Ben Turok: In your previous position, you were director-general (DG) of the department of public service and administration. Did that mean that you were the top public servant in the country?

Richard Levin: Not really. The top public servant in South Africa is the DG in the Presidency, who is also the cabinet secretary. In our system, there isn't a formal assignment of powers to the head of the public service.

In most African countries, especially those previously under British colonial rule, the cabinet secretary also takes on the portfolio of head of the public service. In practice, this means there is a greater separation between the administrative apparatus of the state and the executive: the executive sets the policy and strategic direction, but the administration is solely in charge of implementation and the administration of the policies and strategies of the government of the day. The head of the public service and the cabinet secretary is also responsible for the appointment and career incidents of heads of departments.

BT: Is the DG in the Presidency then senior to the DG of the public service?

RL: Yes, particularly with the establishment of the cluster system. The DG in the Presidency convenes FOSAD, the Forum of South African Directors-General. As the convenor, he or she effectively becomes the first among equals within our system.

BT: With the power to hire and fire?

RL: No. DGs are appointed by the president, but the process has been delegated to ministers who convene and chair selection panels which must consist of other ministers as well as a DG. The recommendation of that panel is then taken to cabinet for final signing. Formally, still, the appointment lies with the president of South Africa.

BT: So each DG is actually accountable to the minister, not to the cabinet secretary.

RL: That is correct. That is where formal accountability lies, although the actual performance management is handled by the Public Service Commission (PSC), which convenes panels to evaluate the performance of DGs.

BT: But the PSC has no powers.

RL: The PSC has specific powers, but not really in the performance management of DGs, because it is not involved in their appointment. Formally, the chair of the PSC convenes the selection panels, providing the framework and the oversight of performance management.

BT: It has no disciplinary powers.

RL: Not with respect to that particular process of performance management.

> There are many DGs, including myself, who have not had their performance managed on a yearly basis. And it is a problem, because DGs need feedback on their performance, whether positive or negative.

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BEE TO GET A BOOST FROM THE LAUNCH OF A MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

The implementation of Broad–Based Black Economic Empowerment received a boost with the launch of the B-BBEE Management Development Programme (MDP) on 26 August 2011. The programme was launched by the Minister of Trade and Industry, Dr Rob Davies, at the Velmore Conference Estate in Erasmia, outside Pretoria. The programme, which will be offered by the University of South Africa and Wits University, is aimed at ensuring uniformity and consistency in the application and implementation of B-BBEE.

Speaking at the event, Davies said the MDP is a milestone in the history of BEE. “For the first time we are institutionalising and professionalising B-BBEE, thus entrenching it within the economic system. It will create and build capacity in the B-BBEE verification industry. The programme presents exciting career opportunities for new entrants into this industry. Students can now elect to study B-BBEE as a profession,” said Minister Davies.

He added that in order to ensure consistent application and interpretation of the BEE policy that would lead to valid and accurate measurement of B-BBEE, the development of the MPD was critical in building capacity in the whole economy due to the alignment process of the Preference Procurement Policy Framework Act and B-BBEE Act. This would necessitate that all supply chain and procurement practitioners both private and government, consultants, verification analysts and government officials were conversant with the key principles of verifying B-BBEE.

The BEE Verification process evolved since the release of the B-BBEE strategy in 2003 and the promulgation of the Broad-Based BEE Act, which set the scene for the regulation of the BEE measurement/verification industry. The gazetting of the BBBEE Codes firmly moved the industry from a self-regulated BEE Measurement Industry to a BEE Verification Industry.

In the initial days of implementation of the B-BBEE, the market used different standards and methodologies to measure B-BBEE. **the dti** was approached by the market to provide guidance on appropriate standards and entities to be used for measurement of B-BBEE.

Minister Davies stated that the B-BBEE Management Development Programme does not only change the history of B-BBEE, but also talks to skills development, access to job opportunities and enterprise development.

The Management Development Programme is a short certificate programme at NQF Level 7. It is targeted at the B-BBEE verification industry, B-BBEE consultants, auditors, as well as private and public sector practitioners. The programme offers modules covering B-BBEE Legislative and Strategic Framework, Basic Finance and Principles of Accounting, Enterprise and Socio-Economic Development, Affirmative Procurement, Management Control, Employment Equity and Skills Development, B-BBEE Ownership and Best Practices.

Registration for the course opened on 1 September 2011, and companies or individuals who wish to register should go to: bbbee.traininggateway.co.za

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Broad – Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Management Development Programme

The Department of Trade and Industry (**the dti**) in partnership with UNISA and WITS has developed a standardised national Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Management Development Programme (MDP). The program gives impetus to the institutionalisation of B-BBEE within the South African economic system. The aim of the B-BBEE MDP is to develop a national standardised knowledge-base for B-BBEE consultants, B-BBEE verification agencies, private and public sector practitioners.

The MDP will also enhance understanding and compliance with the B-BBEE Act, B-BBEE Codes of Good Practice, Sector Codes and the Verification Manual.

The B-BBEE Management Development Programme (MDP) is a short certificate programme at NQF Level 7.

To register go to: bbbee.traininggateway.co.za
(Applications are open from 1 September 2011)

the **dti**

Department:
Trade and Industry
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Why are we so irritable?

By **Ben Turok**

South Africa has never been so busy discussing national problems. Everyone has an opinion and rarely hesitates to proclaim it for all to hear. But why is the debate so acrimonious? Why so personal? And so irritable?

Obviously the majority wants a participatory democracy. The more participatory the better, although voicing personal opinions may not be an indication of real participation. Indeed, as complaint, it may indicate a refusal to participate. But even that is better than mute acceptance.

It is equally obvious that there are many issues to complain about. The National Planning Commission's Diagnostic Report gives a serious assessment of poor performance in the health and education systems, failures in the justice system, and alarming data on unemployment, poverty and inequality.

Yet the country continues to exhibit a degree of stability that belies these facts. No doubt a summation of the service delivery protests would indicate the opposite. Yet these are localised and seem to be easily resolved.

There seems to be a general consensus in the country that the legacies inherited from apartheid are much worse than we thought, and that resolving these is that much more difficult than we anticipated.

This is not to suggest that we have been as effective as we could have been since 1994. There have been massive failures in some areas.

But the correct response is not irritation or frustration.

Our system of government still provides ample scope for systematic, serious dialogue in which all can participate. If the government seems to be unresponsive, this does not foreclose discussion. Nor is there any lack of forums. Even the press, with its determination to sensationalise, is willing to publish commentary and news reports that are both critical and supportive of government performance.

New Agenda has for ten years sought to give space to serious analytical articles which reflect on the problem in our country. We urge more readers to make use of our pages to further this work.

We are particularly keen to promote debate about our universities. Some have very good reputations for teaching and research. Yet there is considerable disquiet about their contribution to the intellectual stock of our country and the relevance of their teaching. This is not to say that they are meant to only produce graduates to fill particular occupations. But there is undoubtedly something missing, especially from the viewpoint of the many thousands of historically disadvantaged students. The indices of attrition and failure to graduate are alarming.

Are the universities open to real debate on this? Are they willing to reveal what steps they take to ensure equality of opportunity for all students, even those who have had a false start in life?

It is these failures in sensible public discourse that feed public irritation. Let's dispose of them.

Ben Turok

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PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT

One Africa, One Voice

OVERVIEW

Hon. Dr Moussa Idriss Ndélé, MP
President of the PAP

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) is one of the ten Organs of the African Union (AU) provided for in Article (5) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, adopted by the Thirty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the former OAU in Lomé, Togo on July 11, 2000.

The PAP is established according to the provisions of Article (17) of the Constitutive Act of the AU so as to "ensure the full participation of African peoples in the development and economic integration of the continent."

The composition, powers, functions and organisation of the PAP are defined in the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Related to the Pan-African Parliament (the PAP Protocol), adopted by the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Conference of African Heads of State and Government in Sirte, Libya on 2 March, 2001.

The Pan-African Parliament was inaugurated on 18 March, 2004 at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, according to the provisions of the PAP Protocol. Membership is open to all AU Member States who ratify the PAP Protocol. Currently, membership stands at forty-seven (47). Each National Parliament elects/designates five of its members to the PAP.

The ultimate aim of the establishment of the Pan-African Parliament is for it to evolve into an institution with full legislative powers, whose members are elected by universal adult suffrage. At present, it exercises advisory and consultative powers.

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT

The objectives of the Pan-African Parliament are spelt out in Article 3 of the PAP Protocol as being to:

- facilitate the effective implementation of the policies and objectives of the OAU/AEC and, ultimately, of the African Union;
- promote the principles of human rights and democracy in Africa;
- encourage good governance, transparency and accountability in member states;
- familiarise the peoples of Africa with the objectives and policies aimed at integrating the African continent within the framework of the establishment of the African Union;
- promote peace, security and stability;
- contribute to a more prosperous future for the people of Africa by promoting collective self-reliance and economic recovery.
- facilitate cooperation and development in Africa;
- strengthen continental solidarity and build a sense of common destiny among the peoples of Africa;
- facilitate cooperation among regional economic communities and their Parliamentary fora.

THE BUREAU OF THE PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT

The Bureau of the Pan-African Parliament is composed of the President and four Vice-Presidents, who represent the five regions of Africa. The current President of the Pan-African Parliament is Hon. Dr. Moussa Idriss Ndélé, MP, from Chad.

THE PLENARY AND COMMITTEES OF THE PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT

The Pan-African Parliament holds at least two Ordinary Sessions annually. The authority of the PAP to make decisions is vested in both the Protocol and Rules of Procedure in the Plenary Session. However, the main work that results in the decisions is performed by the ten Permanent Committees, which, at the same time, meet to oversee the work of the AU. The committees are:

- The Committee on Rural Economy, Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment;
- The Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs;
- The Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters;
- The Committee on Co-operation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution;
- The Committee on Transport, Industry, Communications, Energy, Science and Technology;
- The Committee on Health, Labour and Social Affairs;
- The Committee on Education, Culture, Tourism and Human Resources;
- The Committee on Gender, Family, Youth and People with Disability;
- The Committee on Justice and Human Rights;
- The Committee on Rules, Privileges and Discipline.

THE SECRETARIAT OF THE PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT

The work of the PAP is supported by a Secretariat of permanent staff members who are headed by the Clerk of Parliament, Adv. Zwelethu Madasa, from South Africa. The Secretariat is also assisted during sessions by support staff seconded from national Parliaments and freelance staff.

Adv. Zwelethu Madasa
Clerk of the PAP

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