NEW AGENDA

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NEPAD ON THE MOVE

THE GENDER CONSPIRACY

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

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Discover an abundance of game. Some of it gold.

Blessed as it is with great natural wealth, it's hardly surprising that Limpopo is one of South Africa's fastest growing provinces.

LIMPOPO

AFRICA'S EDEN.
THE HOME OF PEACE

CHANGING THE MINDSET ON UNDERDEVELOPMENT

BY BEN TUROK

The debate is on, the issues are becoming clearer, but a mindset drag seems to be holding us back. Why is it so difficult to see that the debate about the dual economy and underdevelopment is critical for our advance? How many more statistics do we need about poverty, inequality and unemployment before we confront the fact that South Africa's legacy of internal colonialism continues to shape our social and economic system?

Let us pose two fundamental questions. First, having got rid of the legal and institutional framework of apartheid, why does dualism persist under a democratic order? Second, why do Soweto and all the other townships not transform into normal suburbs such as you would find all over the world?

If we can find the answers to these questions, we will solve the dilemma facing government and the country as a whole.

Let us take the first question. All are agreed that apartheid was a system created to provide cheap, forced migrant labour for the mines and industry. It was enforced by harsh laws, extra-economic measures like hut taxes, and implemented by a police state. Almost all these have been removed by the democratic order. Yet the legacy of misery for millions of people who are unable to get employment or provide a livelihood for themselves remains in place.

This suggests that all government's efforts at extending social grants and massively enlarging social services are diminished by the fact that the recipients do not have earned incomes as the foundation of their wellbeing.

The second question concerns the continuing role of townships as dormitories for the reserve army of labour of the first economy, which is equally disconcerting. In most countries, the suburbs have shops to meet local needs such as bread, groceries, meat and odd bits of household necessities, plus a range of other services. But not in South Africa. Here the apartheid era custom of taking a taxi into the city centre to do the Saturday shopping continues. Imagine a Londoner or New Yorker taking a taxi to the city centre on a Saturday morning and you will realise how ridiculous this is.

So what is wrong? Part of the explanation is that the country has yet to grapple directly with the need to foster enterprises and services of all kinds in the areas of underdevelopment, now called the sphere of the second economy. Our Minister of Trade and Industry refers to people who are trapped in a permanent state of maginalisation and exclusion.

I believe that decision makers are still overly focused on the first economy, vital as that sector is. Also, we spend so much energy on debating the nature of the fault line between the developed and underdeveloped parts of our economy and society, that there is little energy left for taking decisions about remedies. Lurking behind these positions lies a pervasive stereotyping of the African rural areas (former homelands) as places of destitution where reside only the aged and very young. This is a false perception as any examination of the data shows. There are still many areas where farming and enterprise can flourish if the correct measures are taken by government. The same goes for the townships where enterprise potential is huge but largely untapped.

Is it not possible for all our state development agencies, the HSRC, DBSA, IDC, CSIR, NEF, NDA, Khula, etc etc to sit around a table with government departments to identify the present mechanisms which perpetuate disadvantage and to hammer out a programme to find the answers to these questions and address them? None of them can do it on their own.

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We also wish to extend our heartfelt condolences to those and their families who have had to endure the pain of losing their loved ones as a result of sailing.

SAMSA hosted the appraisal mission of the proposed GEF-Western Indian Ocean Marine Highway Development and Coastal and Marine Contamination Prevention Project from July 28 to August 4, 2005. The mission was composed of: representatives of the recipient countries (Comoros, Seychelles, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Mauritius, Madagascar and South Africa); SAMSA; IOC; International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Department of Transport delegates and the World Bank.

The overall objective of the proposed project is to contribute to protect the region's coastal and marine environment and rich biodiversity from damage due to accidental spills and illegal discharges from ships.

The specific objectives are to:

(i) increase the safety of navigation by assessing the risks of catastrophic accidents and taking action to gradually reduce the risks and prevent accidents;
(ii) assist countries to undertake technical work needed to ratify conventions and to translate their provisions into national laws and regulations;
(iii) build capacity in countries to assess the necessary measures to control ship-based pollution;
(iv) strengthen capacity of countries to improve safety of navigation to ensure that coastal and marine resources are managed in a sustainable manner;
(v) strengthen the capacity of countries to cooperate among themselves in managing their common marine and coastal resources; and
(vi) develop financing and institutional mechanisms to sustain capacity of countries to address issues of navigation safety, and to enforce, in coordination with other countries, laws and regulations governing the shipping and fishing industries.

A draft proposal for the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for implementation arrangements to be signed by the eight recipient governments has been prepared and sent to the legal department of the bank before finalising and submitting to the governments for signing.

The proposed MOU recommends that the government of South Africa be the recipient of the GEF funds and that the South African government delegates SAMSA as regional implementing agency and IOC as the sub-regional implementing agency.



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Professor Wiseman Nkuhlu

TRANSFORMATION IS A LONG-TERM PROCESS, SAID NEPAD OUTGONE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT
NEPAD
A Programme of The African Union

Transforming a country and a continent is a long-term process that cannot be achieved in just four years, says PROF WISEMAN NKUHLU, in his review of the organisation's progress since it was formed in 2001.

'Evidence from other parts of the world shows that transformation processes of this kind can take decades or even generations. In the case of Africa this is an even more complex task, given that it is a continent of 53 countries that have to be transformed. Nonetheless, encouraging and indeed rapid progress has been registered during the past few years.'

He points out that the African Union (AU) conducts itself differently from its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). 'It is taking its mandate and responsibilities very seriously and a number of African leaders are helping to make it an effective organisation, not only by providing it with additional resources, but by ensuring that it conducts its affairs competently, procedurally and transparently.'

One of the key changes is the way in which the AU is leading the resolution of conflicts and managing peace building. It is providing strong leadership and the African countries that undertake assignments on its behalf act under clearly defined mandates.

A comprehensive and holistic approach

Professor Nkuhlu emphasises that African leaders have not only taken ownership and leadership of the continent's socio-economic renewal agenda, they have also transformed the content of the agenda and are making progress in changing the international context as well.

'The narrow approach of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers has been replaced by a comprehensive and holistic one. African people have determined a development path for their countries and their continent.'

Many African leaders are implementing peer review processes. Twenty-three countries have acceded to the programme of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and reviews of two countries – Ghana and Rwanda – have been completed.

Faster implementation of NEPAD programmes

'Preparations and consultations for the rollout of the CAADP (the agricultural development programme) have been concluded. The regional communities and national governments have identified high priority projects and early actions.'

Governments are also committed to increasing national budget allocations for agriculture to 10% per annum over five years.

'Good progress is also being made in the implementation of other NEPAD programmes including health, ICT, education, environment and science and technology.'

Since 2001, NEPAD's priority has been to push the fight against the burden of potentially preventable and treatable diseases to the top of the development agenda.

The 'Fight Against AIDS' plan provides an overarching strategy and is incorporated into all NEPAD programmes.

NEPAD top priorities in ICT

The top NEPAD priorities in ICT are the e-schools project and the provision of a fibre-optic submarine cable on the East Coast of Africa.

'Furthermore, we are promoting the development of a framework for e-governance, which includes the public service sector, election commissions and local government. The first phase focuses on e-parliament, which will enable African parliamentarians to easily source and share information relevant to their legislative and oversight roles.'

'We continue to interact with civil society groups at various levels and it is clear that NEPAD has energised development on the continent. It has released energy and action. Above all, it has laid the foundation for an African agricultural revolution and the rollout of a continent-wide socio-economic transformation,' Professor Nkuhlu concludes.

Website: www.nepad.org/2005/files/journey.php

NEPAD ON THE MOVE: COMPREHENSIVE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND FOOD SECURITY IN AFRICA

This article is based on documents from the NEPAD secretariat

After just over a year of meticulous planning, co-ordination and ensuring that goals and aims are widely understood, enthusiasm is growing among African countries for an ambitious new plan to restore agricultural growth, food security and rural development on the continent.

The brainchild of the African Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development (AU/NEPAD), the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) is expected to start showing concrete results over the next year with the aim of achieving 6 percent annual growth in agriculture by 2015. In the process, the millennium development target of halving poverty and hunger should be met.

The CAADP has been endorsed by African leaders, who have also pledged to increase their budgetary support for agriculture, aiming at allocating 10 percent of their annual government budgets to agriculture-related programmes within five years.

This important new initiative had its beginnings at Sea Island, Georgia, USA, in July 2004, when the Group of Eight (G8) leaders declared their clear commitment to ending famine and raising agricultural productivity, especially in Africa.

Recognising their mutual goals, the G8 and AU/NEPAD then called for accelerated efforts to implement CAADP.

In October 2004, the Africa Partnership Forum (APF) endorsed the planning process laid out by AU/NEPAD. This involved four meetings in Africa, organised by regional economic communities to define region-specific actions. The preparatory process culminated in Accra, Ghana, in April 2005, with a continent-wide event to launch CAADP implementation.

Continental, regional and national action plans, each with their own set of milestones and monitoring mechanisms, are now expected to start kicking in towards the end of the year and gather momentum thereafter.

THE AFRICAN PARTNERSHIP FORUM MEETING, WASHINGTON: OCTOBER 2004

The programmes proposed in this paper emanated from the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), which has been endorsed by the African heads of state and government as a framework for the restoration of agricultural growth, food security and rural development in Africa.

The CAADP document draws the attention of member governments to a wide range of actions to revitalise African agriculture and provides a framework for harmonised and collaborative responsive action. Four specific thrusts for improving Africa's agriculture that are outlined by NEPAD are:

- extend the area under sustainable land management and reliable water control systems
- improve rural infrastructure and trade related capacities for market access
- increase food supply, reduce hunger and improve responses to food emergency crises
- improve agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption.

NEPAD's overall vision for agriculture seeks to maximise the contribution of Africa's largest economic sector to achieve self-reliant and productive economies. In essence, NEPAD aims for agriculture to deliver broad-based economic advancement, to which other economic sectors, such as manufacturing, petroleum, minerals and tourism, may also contribute in significant ways, but not at the same level as agriculture. The NEPAD goal for the sector is agriculture-led development that eliminates hunger, reduces poverty and food insecurity, opening the way for export expansion. The vision for agriculture is that, by the year 2015, the continent should have:

- improved the productivity of agriculture to attain an average annual growth rate of 6 percent, with particular attention to small-scale farmers, especially focusing on women
- developed dynamic agricultural markets within and between countries and regions
- integrated farmers into the market economy and improved access to markets to become a net exporter of agricultural products
- achieved a more equitable distribution of wealth
- become a strategic player in agricultural science and technology development; and
- practised environmentally-sound production methods and developed a culture of sustainable management of the natural resource base.

A SIX-MONTH ROADMAP TOWARDS CAADP IMPLEMENTATION

The NEPAD Secretariat's report to the APF meeting outlines a roadmap towards the implementation of the CAADP agenda and an action-oriented process which, by March 2005, would produce investment options and institutional arrangements that would allow regional economic communities (RECs) and member countries to prepare investment projects, and development partners to plan for long-term financial assistance. Actionable programmes and initiatives are defined based on the CAADP pillars. The paper then proposes a strategy for resource mobilisation centred around the identification of lead financial partners for each of the programmes and initiatives. A similar process is proposed to identify lead technical partners. Finally, a set of four regional implementation-planning meetings are proposed between November 2004 and March 2005 to agree on rules and procedures for country and regional-level project preparation, in-country resource mobilisation, access to funding by development partners, co-ordination and governance, and programme performance review.

MOBILISATION OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES

The proposed strategy calls for NEPAD to seek and reach agreement with up to three financial partners among G8 members, and multilateral organisations to take leadership for providing and co-ordinating financial assistance for the implementation of each of the programmes and initiatives. These lead financial partners would co-ordinate financial assistance by all development partners for their respective programme or initiative. They would act as main interlocutors for the Secretariat, RECs and member countries in following up and reviewing programme implementation and progress.

The secretariat has already launched the process of exploring the readiness of individual development partners to take leadership for individual programmes and initiatives. It has undertaken the first two missions to meet with the US government and the World Bank, which together have agreed to join other partners in taking leadership for six major programmes covering land, water, agribusiness, academic/professional training, research and technology, and knowledge support systems for strategy preparation and implementation. Plans are being made to engage other G8 members and development partners, including multilateral organisations.

MOBILISATION OF TECHNICAL EXPERTISE

The goal here is to identify lead technical partners to provide the necessary expertise and advice to the secretariat in its co-ordination and advocacy role, and to assist in the preparation and implementation of country and regional-level investment projects under specific programme areas. The secretariat is being assisted by the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) and the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in mobilising the necessary expertise. The Secretariat has also signed memoranda of understanding with individual international research centres of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), in addition to an umbrella memorandum that has been signed with the Consultative Group as a whole. The next step is to complete the engagement of regional research organisations and networks which has already been started. Other specialised institutions of the UN system will be approached as well to provide technical support in their respective fields.

IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING BY RECS AND MEMBER COUNTRIES

The secretariat focuses on its role as a facilitator in the implementation of CAADP by RECs and member countries. In particular, it emphasises its role in linking African countries to the investment resources and technical expertise that are required to implement the CAADP agenda and thereby accelerate and sustain growth in the agricultural sector and achieve food security. The main value addition here consists of using NEPAD's political capital to facilitate access by African countries to a substantially larger pool of investment finance and technical expertise than they could mobilise individually and separately. In addition, co-ordination and leadership by NEPAD would facilitate benchmarking and encourage mutual learning and exchange across countries and speed up the spread and adoption of successful development models and best practices. Successes would be shared and duplicated across a large number of countries, thereby spreading the impact over larger sections of the population over a much shorter time period.

The most critical factor in moving towards effective co-ordination by RECs and direct implementation by countries is the need to ensure empowerment and establish ownership at the regional and national levels. The secretariat's strategy to ensure empowerment and ownership and launch the implementation over the next six months includes two main building blocks - raising the necessary funding and implementing projects.

FUNDING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

The first segment of the roadmap, which covers a six-month period from November 2004 to March 2005 and includes the production of necessary documents and the organisation of regional implementation meetings, requires a one-time funding of US$3.5 million, of which slightly more than 10 percent, or $350 000 would be contributed by the NEPAD

secretariat. G8 and other partners are expected to contribute the balance of $3.15 million.

The preparation and planning phase will be followed by actual implementation of national and regional investment projects by member countries and RECs. Funding for co-ordination and support as well as for project preparation would be required on an annual basis. It is estimated at $19 million, of which $11.25 million would go to the project preparation facility. The NEPAD secretariat's annual contribution to the overall funding requirement would amount to $2 million. The balance of $17 million would be contributed by G8 members and other partners.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CAADP AGENDA: FUTURE CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES (POST-ACCRA: JUNE 2005)

The regional implementation planning meetings that took place in the regional economic communities (RECs) - COMESA, SADC, ECOWAS, ECCAS and North Africa - between January and April 2005, and subsequently the wrap-up meeting in Accra, Ghana in May 2005, enabled key stakeholders to: (i) identify priority investment programmes, including a set of regional early actions to be implemented with a 12 month time period; (ii) agree on basic co-ordination and governance principles and procedures to guide implementation; and (iii) explore necessary public-private partnerships and business-to-business alliances to ensure effective and successful implementation.

The international development partners, including the G8 and various multilateral and bilateral development agencies, have endorsed CAADP as a useful framework in defining their financial and technical assistance to the agricultural sector in Africa. At their meeting in Sea Island, Georgia, in July 2004, the G8 leaders declared a clear commitment to ending famine and raising agricultural productivity in line with the CAADP agenda. In October 2004, the roadmap for accelerating the implementation of the CAADP agenda was discussed and approved at the African Partnership Forum (APF) meeting in Washington DC. Several other bilateral and multilateral development partners joined the G8 at the Accra meeting in endorsing the process that has been laid out for effective implementation of the agenda by RECs and their member countries.

There is currently broad consensus on the strategic direction of the implementation process. There is also a great sense of readiness among RECs and national stakeholders to move the process forward.

AU/NEPAD SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

While AU/NEPAD is transferring the facilitation tasks of CAADP implementation to the RECs, the secretariat will need to regularly engage the lead RECs and provide support, as necessary, for the co-ordination efforts. This will include the convening of joint AU/NEPAD-RECs meetings on topical priorities that have been identified during the regional planning meetings. Such priorities include the nutrition and fortification initiative in SADC; the knowledge and information systems initiative for COMESA, and the Multi-Country Agriculture Productivity Programme (MAPP) initiative for SADC and ECOWAS. In collaboration with the AU Commission, AU/NEPAD will also take leadership in the development and implementation of the budget tracking system, technical backstopping of the implementation process, continental monitoring and evaluation, and the facilitation of implementation governance and the associated CAADP peer review process.

RALLYING AROUND AGRICULTURAL SUCCESSES

In all RECs, there was an echo that not all is doom and gloom in African agriculture. There is recognition that countries in Africa and initiatives on the ground have made significant contributions to agricultural growth, food security and rural development at the national level. Such progress should be noted and encouraged.

AU/NEPAD intends to continue to facilitate the documentation and dissemination of existing agricultural successes in collaboration with RECs with a view to encourage the growth of such successes. In line with its commitment to facilitate mutual learning, benchmarking and adoption of best practices, AU/NEPAD intends to support the establishment of regional knowledge management systems that will encourage the mainstreaming of success factors in national priority investments programmes. One of the early actions in this regard is the planned continent-wide Parliamentarians' Dialogue on Agriculture Successes to be hosted by the South African Parliament in Cape Town in October 2005.

SECTOR STRATEGY AND POLICY SUPPORT, CO-ORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION

The strong need to ensure better development and poverty-reduction outcomes requires a continued focus on improving strategy and policy design and implementation in the agricultural sector. Sustained agricultural growth is the most effective strategy for the realisation of the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of poverty reduction among African countries. There is also consensus that most of the other goals, in particular those related to health, education and the environment, cannot be achieved without stronger agricultural growth. A critical component of the CAADP agenda will therefore consist of setting up a knowledge development and management system to facilitate strategic analysis, mutual learning, benchmarking and adoption of best practices to improve policy design and implementation. The establishment of the Regional Strategy Knowledge Support Systems (RESKSS) is therefore part of the regional early action agenda.

The RESKSS will include: (i) an expertise network to analyse strategic and policy issues facing the agricultural sector; (ii) regional web-supported knowledge data bases where policy-relevant information (such as analysis results, statistics, norms, best practices) will be stored; and (iii) country-level access nodes, which will allow national policy analysts and advisors, universities and research organisations, private sector operators and farmer organisations to access and use such information. Information from CAADP monitoring

and evaluation activities will also be managed and accessible through the RESKSS.

The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) programmes will also have to give greater prominence to the agricultural growth agenda. Under these programmes, there has previously been a strong tendency towards emphasising the social sectors at the expense of agriculture. One of the reasons for this is the fact that PRSP and HIPC-based programmes are primarily executed through the national budgets. Social services, being traditionally public sector based and thus simpler to design and implement and with a lower risk of failure from the point of view of government services, have received most of the initial attention under these programmes. Moreover, social services programmes such as the construction of new clinics and schools or the recruitment of additional teachers and medical staff are more visible and easier to justify by donor organisations and national governments.

Nevertheless, it is also true that there is great urgency to meet the significant social needs of Africa's poor. It is important to note in this respect that the lack of access to social services is primarily a symptom of low productivity at the household level, limited fiscal resources at central and local government levels, and poor planning and execution of services delivery. A successful strategy to meet these social needs would therefore require greater attention to accelerating and sustaining the rate of agricultural growth. This can be achieved by giving greater attention to rural areas in the design and implementation of social sector programmes and linking them more systematically to the objective of raising agricultural labour productivity.

The above issues will be among the early items on the secretariat's policy dialogue agenda. This agenda will expand as the secretariat moves away from implementation planning and more towards policy and strategy support, as part of its evolution towards an agricultural development policy think-tank, and the establishment of a CAADP Partnership Forum to serve as a platform for policy dialogue and advocacy. As part of its strategy/policy support and communications agenda, the secretariat will work with RECs and national governments to mobilise the necessary expertise to improve the design of agricultural and broader national development strategies and programmes. It will support governments in bringing about better balance and greater convergence between social services provision and agricultural productivity growth and thereby improve the chances of achieving the MDGs. Under the CAADP-PF, it will engage development partners and national leaders to address policy barriers and other issues relating to managing the development process and delivering assistance for the successful implementation of the CAADP agenda.

POLICY AND PARTNERSHIP CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES

Successfully implementing the CAADP agenda in order to raise the contribution of agriculture to the MDGs requires focus, commitment and sustained efforts on the part of African governments and development partners. The former need to significantly raise the effectiveness of the development process through improvement in policy and strategy design and implementation, as well as better public expenditure planning and execution in the sector.

Development partners, on the other hand, need to more effectively align and co-ordinate development assistance for the sector to reflect the priorities that are identified in the regional action plans. Both need to work more closely to facilitate mutual review and greater accountability. Specific commitments and actions that are recommended to both sides to ensure effective support for the CAADP implementation process are summarised below. Detailed indicators of success are proposed in the subsequent section.

COMMITMENTS AND ACTIONS BY AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

The following are commitments and actions that need to be taken by African countries over the next 12 months to support the implementation process and raise the chances of success:

- raise the prominence of agriculture in national growth and investment strategies, including PRSPs, HIPC, and similar special initiatives, and align these with the CAADP objectives and framework
- set up a review and tracking process to report on the efforts to meet the Maputo pledge of raising the funding for agriculture to 10 percent of annual national budgetary allocations, starting with the allocation of national resources to support the implementation of national components of the regional early action programmes over the next 12 months
- establish and expand public-private partnerships to modernise smallholder farming and expand domestic and foreign direct investment in agriculture by: (i) building the capacities of farmer organisations to provide services to their members and participate in markets; (ii) increasing investment in technical and commercial public infrastructure to promote agriculture-based businesses; and (iii) support the emergence of business-to-business alliances in the sector
- take concrete steps to expedite regional agreements and protocols and build required capacities to achieve the CAADP objectives of improved integration of and increased access to regional agricultural markets
- establish inclusive processes and mechanisms to facilitate: (i) effective co-ordination of national CAADP processes, in particular to ensure greater synergy of programmes across ministries and at the local level to maximise their contribution to the CAADP agenda; and (ii) full participation of the agribusiness sector and farmer organisations in the CAADP implementation planning and oversight processes
- support RECs' efforts to set up governance and co-ordination mechanisms to guide the implementation process, including: (i) setting up the CAADP Advisory Groups (CAADP-AG) made up of permanent secretaries and representatives of agribusiness and farming communities to provide oversight of the process; and (ii) establishing monitoring, evaluation, and peer review

systems to facilitate benchmarking and mutual learning and track performance
- strengthen the capacities of the AU/NEPAD secretariat to: (i) co-ordinate implementation activities and encourage exchange of experience and mutual learning across the regions; (ii) facilitate CAADP alignment processes at the regional and national levels as well as among development partners; (iii) establish continent-level performance and peer review processes to track implementation progress, including tracking the level and effectiveness of national and external funding for the sector; and (iv) develop an effective policy dialogue and advocacy work programme to advance CAADP objectives and improve policy design and implementation, including the setting up of a CAADP Partnership Forum.

COMMITMENTS AND ACTIONS BY DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

The required actions and commitment on the part of development partners, bilateral as well as multilateral, to support CAADP implementation over the next 12 months and beyond include:
- adopt the CAADP as the common framework for support to agricultural and rural development assistance and work together and individually to align medium- and long-term assistance to agriculture with the CAADP agenda, as reflected in regional priority programmes
- endorse and participate in the proposed CAADP Partnership Forum (CAADP-PF), as a platform for mutual accountability and review of the CAADP implementation process as well as assistance related thereto
- provide technical and financial assistance to support RECs and their member countries to implement the early action programmes
- support the efforts by African governments to build the capacities of RECs and the AU/NEPAD secretariat to effectively co-ordinate and facilitate the implementation process at the continental, regional, and national levels
- increase the share of funding to agriculture and rural infrastructure from both bilateral and multilateral sources to meet the expanding financing requirements of the CAADP agenda as implementation progresses; and, in the case of multilateral agencies and other partners involved in the PRSP and HIPC process, support efforts by African governments to meet their pledge to raise the share of national budgets allocated the agricultural and rural growth agenda under CAADP, including the establishment of public expenditure and budget tracking systems for agriculture.

IMPLEMENTATION MILESTONES AND INDICATORS

Satisfactory implementation progress would be measured through the following set of indicators at the continental, regional and national levels. These indicators are used for the purpose of continent-wide monitoring. Growth and poverty specific indicators, as well as country specific indicators related to the MDGs, will be developed in connection with individual country-level programmes. The indicators listed below will be reflected in the final design of the regional and national programmes, including the early actions, as well as efforts in support of these programmes:
- operational CAADP regional action plans are developed and ready for implementation for the five regions by December 2005
- at least 12 countries across the five regions have started implementation of the early action programmes by December 2006
- co-ordination processes are established in all early action countries which ensure that future PRSP and HIPC related programmes, assistance programmes to agriculture and activities by major NGOs in these countries are fully aligned with CAADP priority action plans, starting in 2006; such alignment is to be reflected in a top priority ranking and a level of programme spending for the sector which is adequate to help meet the MDGs
- by the end of 2006, at least 33 percent of countries have allocated 6 percent or more of their annual budget to agriculture; by 2007 at least 50 percent of countries have allocated 8 percent or more of the annual budget; and by 2008 at least 75 percent of countries have allocated 10 percent or more of their annual budget to agriculture
- starting in 2006, all future agricultural development assistance programmes by bilateral and multilateral development partners are fully aligned with the national CAADP priority action plans, as reflected in a 100 percent share of agricultural assistance funding going to support such priority action plans in countries that have completed the alignment process
- bilateral partners have raised the share of agriculture in development assistance funding starting at the latest in 2007
- multilateral development agencies have doubled lending to agriculture, with an increase in the grant components as necessary to ensure debt sustainability, by 2007 at the latest
- operational monitoring and evaluation systems, including detailed benchmarks, clear milestones, and adequate data assembly, analysis, and dissemination tools are in place to track implementation of the early actions in at least three of the regions by December 2006
- a review of current national budget classifications is completed by the AU/NEPAD secretariat and a set of common definitions and categories of agricultural sector spending are available by December 2005 to guide the piloting of the budget and expenditure tracking system. The entire system has been successfully tested and a blueprint for improved budget classification and monitoring is available by December 2006 at the latest
- the CAADP Partnership Forum (CAADP-PF) is established and operational, as reflected in the successful organisation of its first meeting around the APF in October 2005.

SPEAKING OUT AGAINST THE GENDER CONSPIRACY

BY PRISCILLA MISIHAIRAMBWI
Shadow minister of foreign affairs in Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change, (MDC)
INTERVIEWED BY BEN TUROK

Ben Turok: Thank you very much, Priscilla, for agreeing to talk to me. You said something at the G-8 Parliamentary Conference today that surprised me and that I have not heard for quite a long time, namely that you are a fighter for women's rights and you feel that gender issues are a distraction from that fight. Did I understand you right?

Pricilla Misihairambwi: Yes, you did. What I meant is that the moment people get into a discourse around gender issues, you lose the essence of the women's right issues and I think we lost it at the conference in Beijing when we decided to go into "gender" in development analyses. Whilst at the conference, the issue of gender was put on the table as a tool for analysis, i.e. to then say if you are going to be talking about poverty, you need to use gender as a tool for analysis to give justification for why women's issues were issues that people needed to deal with. Unfortunately, and I always say this, I actually believe that there is or was some conspiracy around it, because then we say we actually should be dealing with men and women, so increasingly you are finding people running away, or not wanting to talk around issues of women's rights, to wanting to go into what I call the neutral term of gender, and therefore, you know, getting away from debating the real issues around the women's rights issues, the women in development issues, which in my opinion are the crucial and important issues that should be dealt with.

BT: We used to talk about women's liberation, especially in the liberation movement. What is the difference between what we used to talk about then, the notion of a liberation struggle for women, as opposed to the gender approach?

PM: I think the main difference is that the moment you get into the gender debate there is a certain level of apologising for raising the women's rights issues, so you get into a mode in which you are not necessarily acknowledging the fact that the whole essence of women's liberation is premised on the point that it is about power relations and power struggles between men and women. Increasingly, you find that people do not want to take that position because they believe it is too confrontational. Secondly, the gender debate then gets women into a situation where they then have to say "until and unless we have the support of men, we cannot get out of where we are", and I have major problems with it. I have major problems with it in that the issue of women's liberation is that we are in this position because we are a patriarchal society. We are in a patriarchal society because for us to question the patriarchal society shows that power is vested in men. So it is really about wrestling that power from men and placing ourselves in a position where there is a level of equality. But the moment we say "gender" we do not even begin to get into a serious discourse around what that means.

BT: But you do not regard the women's struggle as a civil rights struggle, do you?

PM: I believe that until and unless we look at it within that context of civil rights, within the context of what you as South Africans went through during the apartheid era, then you are not talking.

BT: But you see, we did not say, our struggle against apartheid was a civil rights struggle. We said it was a liberation struggle. There is actually a difference.

PM: Well, perhaps you could assist me in saying what is the main...

BT: A liberation struggle includes socio-economic issues, it includes power relations, it includes structure of society, etc. Whereas civil rights is a legalistic notion. For instance, you would agree, surely, if we change the law on the rights of women with respect to property that would not actually emancipate women. Let's open up a number of words. Let's take the word "rights", let's take the word "liberation", and the word "emancipation". Which of those words reflect most what you are trying to say?

PM: I think emancipation.

BT: Because it reflects a fundamental structure of change in the status of women?

PM: Oh, yes, it does, I think, emancipation.

BT: So, when people were talking today in the meeting about women's rights, it was quite a limited, legalistic formulation. I found that.

PM: Yes, it was quite limited, but this is where we go back to the gender versus the women's rights debate. One of the worrying points and which I think is quite fundamental for me is that to achieve emancipation, one, you need to make sure that that group of people provide themselves with spaces in which they can strategise and engage safely in their own spaces. The gender debate, unfortunately, takes away those spaces.

Actually, I normally say to people, I do not talk about gender mainstreaming, I talk about gender men-streaming, which is m-e-n, in that you basically are beginning to stream men in all those spaces that used to be our spaces, but most importantly, at a resource level, it is also taking away resources that used to be specifically targeted for women to now be divided between men and women and so, to some extent, you are literally empowering the same group of people you are talking about, the men, because they have always had spaces in which resources were allocated to them anyway. But, over and above the resources that they have had, you are now taking away resources from women so that they are shared between them, and increasingly I am amazed at how women continuously buy into this conspiracy and literally own it.

So, it is not the men that will sit there and say we want to be in this space, it is the women that will either be so grateful that there are some men in that space, even if they then challenge the positions that the men would take in those meetings, but increasingly you will find that women are desperate to have the men in those places. And I say to people, do you think that at the G-8 Conference, when Tony Blair and George Bush are sitting next to each other, they ever look around and wonder where are the women? Do you think at the SADC level, when Robert Mugabe and Thabo Mbeki are sitting, they ever sit around and say: "Oh, guys, it's the heads of state summit, where are the women here?" They don't. They will look at their agendas, they will deal with them, they will probably talk about women's issues but the presence of those women is not necessarily there. So, why is it that in those meetings men do not necessarily go back and say, gender mainstreaming - we are supposed to be having women?

BT: I want to leave the mainstreaming word for a bit later, because I am a little puzzled as to why you find this offensive, and I would like you to explain a bit later on, but let's get rid of this issue. So, we are clear. You are saying that should we use the word "emancipation", because this is the one you seem to like? It is a struggle for emancipation. Now, you are saying that women need to be on their own in the struggle for emancipation and not mixed up with men is that what you are saying?

PM: I am saying that the spaces that women have should be protected - organisationally, resource-wise, we are talking about targeted resources and ensuring that this emancipation takes place, specifically women's resources. Yes, there may be a need for strategic alliances.

BT: So you would want, if the MDC has a women's league, you would want it to consist of women and women only?

PM: I would certainly want it to be considered women and women only, in a way that we are then allowed, or we allow ourselves to create these spaces as the women's league within the MDC to then plan around how we are going to engage with the other structures. Even the issues around women's ministries are crucial: unfortunately, we are beginning to have an attack by a number of people that decide to have a women's ministry. I think it is crucial that anybody has a women's ministry and that you have the women's league, because in that way you have the spaces to do so. But those women's league spaces should be very clear about what their agenda is. Why do we set ourselves up as the women's league? What are the issues? Do a critique of your entire party structure. Not necessarily to be desperate for being taken on as if it is charity, like we had at the last presentation, that you know bringing women to the table is not being charitable. It is to be understood that it is their right to do so.

So the women's league is a space that should be guarded jealously, our space in which we discuss our unique issues, but most importantly in which we then discuss how we strategically engage with the other power structures, which, you know, in most cases are basically patriarchal structures.

BT: Now, the argument often is that, if you isolate women's issues, like having a women's ministry, this is going to be down-graded, it will be a second-grade ministry, it will be marginalised and so forth, and in fact we heard today that in the Blair Commission report or was it Jeffrey Sachs report, one of those reports, there was no chapter on women, because they said it is a cross-cutting issue. What is your answer to that?

PM: Well, I actually took him on afterwards and he admitted that that particular response was not good enough.

BT: So, you do not agree on the cross-cutting issue?

PM: Well, I agree that it is a cross-cutting issue, but I also insist that we need to ensure that we make it an issue on its own and articulate it in every other way that it is raised, because if you lose it, in terms of articulating it and being clear on paper and in the language that we use, there is no way that you are going to find it on implementation. It will

be lost in the stream as it goes through. By the time you actually get to implementation, you have lost it.

BT: Most governments in Africa do not have a women's ministry. In fact, most governments in the world. I think the reason that most governments would say is that it is cross-cutting and, if you have a women's desk in an organisation, whether it is government or any organisation, I mean this is a conventional view, people say that it becomes marginalised.

PM: It becomes marginalised because it is not being used for purposes of strategising. The women's desk should not necessarily pretend to be the only desk that would deal with women's issues. It should be a desk at which people strategise, at which the women strategise around how they are going to engage with the various structures - whether it is at a company level, whether it is at parliament, whether it is at governmental level. It is a place for strategy development - almost like you would, during the liberation struggle, whether it was with Zimbabwe or when you guys were going through apartheid, the reason why you guys literally went into exile, into safe places, was not necessarily that you were running away from the processes. It was to find spaces in which you could sit on your own, strategise, engage, find the support that you could find, and then deal with the issues.

And for me, this is why I find it really so important to me, and as director of Women and AIDS Support Network, which is where I come from in Zimbabwe, which is an NGO that works with women, HIV and AIDS. My biggest arguments are with donors and funders, because they would come into the organisation and say: "Well, we could give you money, support you but we feel that you need to also deal with men, you need to also deal with boys." And I would also argue and say: "No, for me there are so few places...

BT: ... to do what with the men? In what way?

PM: Well, the understanding was that, because the issues that you are raising are basically gender issues, you need to bring men into this debate, that until and unless men are educated enough to understand and appreciate those things, you are not going to get - etc. etc. etc., and I have issues with that, because...

BT: So the problem for you is not the involvement with men, and you agree that men have to be "educated", but that the struggle should be clear and well-defined by women and with women?

PM: Oh yes, that is right, but also, I think there is this myth that we are going to change power relations necessarily by educating men. And it is so flawed in that you are saying, to some extent, the issue around power is not that men enjoy that they are privileged to be in the position that is there, but that you can persuade them to give up that power, to give up the privileges that they do hold, and to be nice to you - and I lose it at that stage. And therefore, I am not sure: do you really want to spend resources, time with people that hold that power in a privileged position? Or whether it is not about defining what the issues for women are, what it means for women's empowerment, what their strategic needs are, and dealing with those kinds of issues, and only then, when they are at a position where they are clear about what the strategic needs are, they are sufficiently empowered, then you can then let them engage with men at that level.

This is why, even in the issues of politics, until and unless you are able to get women their own spaces, and they talk about why they are not in positions, what are the things that they need, whether there are resources, whether there are skills, whether there's capacity, it may be difficult to just throw them there and say "compete".

BT: That is very clear. You feel that struggles should actually be led by women, with women and the lines of march should be determined by women, but you wouldn't exclude men allies from that same struggle.

PM: I would not exclude them, but like I said, it would really be about strategic alliances. It is not about getting any or every other man in the street. It is about saying, does this make sense?

BT: Who's on your side?

PM: With men, where is he, where is he positioned, and what are the benefits of engaging with him? For me, that is the issue, so it is not taking all and sundry. I mean, I have been in meetings where you have got these men that are brought in, because they are men, because it is gender, and you spend time then, talking about how they are so nice to their wives, and how they have changed nappies and, excuse me, I am supposed to be at a certain level in which we are doing a much higher critique around issues that matter. I am not interested in spending a day talking around nappies and washing dishes.

BT: Now, you talk about power. What sort of tactics, methods, do you see are necessary for women to achieve their emancipation, apart from persuasion?

PM: It depends, it depends in which area, because you are going to have to use different strategies of emancipation differently. The area that I was talking about, that I worked on for a long time, is the issue of sexual rights.

BT: Sexual rights being what?

PM: Sexual rights being, for example, the need for women to begin to define their own sexuality, to do a critique of ...

BT: I think you need to spell that out for me. What does defining their own sexuality mean?

PM: For a long time, women have not had a sexuality, they've had a reproduction. They've defined their sexuality only in terms of being bearers of children and not necessarily

being sexual beings, and for me it is a completely different thing altogether.

BT: So when you say "the definition of sexuality," you mean the fact that women can participate in sex for its own sake and not for bearing children?

PM: Precisely, which is where the whole issue of family planning comes in, what kind of family planning it is, what kind of sex, what is the type of sex they are going to engage with, and how protected is it, so that they can enjoy it.

Clearly, if you are a woman and you are going to have unprotected sex - how do you expect that woman to achieve her total sexual enjoyment and sexuality in an environment in which she is fearful about whether she is going to be infected or not, in an environment where she cannot say: "I do not want to have sex because I am not sure that you are well. I have issues about your multiple relationships." She is unable to question that. When she is unable to say: "I had unprotected sex, I need to make sure that I do not get pregnant", and if she is able to go and access a morning-after pill, if she is able to get an abortion when she wants to - those are serious issues and issues that again need women's spaces to define and to talk about. So there are various strategies in terms of how that would be.

I sat in sessions where I debated and discussed with women around how they would introduce the condom, for example, in a relationship - married women who have never had a condom used in their relationships. You want to find strategies around how that would be, how you turn around that situation, how you would be able to use contraceptives with this man, so he would not know, how you can go and have your tubes tied without necessarily having this doctor saying: "Please can you go and get consent from your husband?" How you are going to have the loop without necessarily being beaten up by this man. So, there are a number of issues and to some extent you are taking power from this man, and you are getting this woman to understand that it is OK for her to take control of her own life, and to find strategies for how that can be done, whether it is in challenging her medical doctor in saying: "You know what, this is my body, and if I want my tubes tied, if I want my uterus taken away, it is my uterus and they are my tubes." To literally not be honest about what you have done, so that you are able to continue with your life without necessarily giving this man power over what he will say you need to do with your body.

BT: Okay, now that is one element of power. What about other issues?

PM: Precisely. Then there is political power. The issues around political power: how do we mobilise ourselves, for example. Part of the debate that we have been having in Zimbabwe, is to say, why is it that when we have a majority of women voters' we do not necessarily have these women voting for other women. What are the dynamics, what is it that men do that get women to vote for them? Is it because women believe that men are better, or are there other things that men do that get these women to vote for them?

What is it that we as women should be doing to ensure that women in turn will understand that they need to vote for another woman?

We have worked on a number of officials, we have created groups of women within constituencies, we have worked with women who have done analyses around what men do and why in the long run it is not beneficial for the majority of women, and it is unbelievable what this has done, at least in my constituency. I have been undercut in my own political party and the people that defended me during primaries, people that voted for me in primaries were women, and no man, I can assure you, in my constituency, can go and say anything about me to women in that particular constituency. It has gone right up from where I am to the various structures in the areas. Now they understand that it is a women's structure, at district level. This is why you are there. You are there to defend and to raise the issues around women and to ensure that the women's gender is there, and you are not going to sit there and watch another woman in the process enter leadership. And we could not have done that without creating the space, finding the time to educate each other. And if I can do it in my constituency, we can identify five or seven constituencies, mobilise women and ensure that they begin to place women in those positions and there is no better definition of taking power away from men other than doing the kind of thing that I am talking about.

BT: Priscilla, what you say, sounds to me like it is something we used to talk about 20 years ago. Is that right?

PM: Well, in what context do you mean?

BT: Well, there was a time, 20 years ago, maybe 10 years ago when the question arose of mobilising women for women as a kind of separate entity and struggle. So, it was fairly common - that's gone - are you saying it's because gender has displaced this whole thing?

PM: Precisely. Gender displaced this kind of thing. The issue of women's mobilisation, I agree with you, has gone. It is gone, precisely because of the issues that I have been talking about. This whole issue of saying that gender is about men and women, and therefore not necessarily confronting the issues, that is, saying it is about taking power, it is about emancipation, it is about defining our rights, and it is about going for those rights. Invariably it is about confrontation and I think increasingly women are so overwhelmed by a number of things, that we have now said: "Is it really worth it? Is there any other way of doing it that does not take so much out of us, that will not get us into a confrontational position?" Do people now want to be in the safe confines?

But I think, for me, what is also worrying is the coming up of an elite group who have, to a large extent, become very selfish. They will say: "You know really, this is not about

taking power from you, so to say, it is about us working together." They therefore create situations where they will be appointed ministers, forgetting that that does not necessarily translate into changing the lives of the women who are at the lowest level, and that this thing about popularisation of women means spending time with women at those lower levels.

BT: So you are disappointed in women leaders who take positions?

PM: I'm very disappointed in women leaders, not necessarily those who take positions, but those who think that if you have some woman who is a foreign minister, she is so celebrated, as if it is a benefit for the majority of women. I have often said that if I am a minister, (I happen to be a [shadow] minister of foreign affairs), the only time women should celebrate my being there, is if my being in that position translates into real things.

BT: You were a minister?

PM: No, I am saying if at some stage I became a minister. The issue that I am minister of foreign affairs is not the issue to celebrate. The issue to celebrate is whether the issues that I bring up, the policies that I take on, translate themselves into things that are tangible and critical for the majority of women. If this does not happen, I am not interested.

BT: What do you think of quotas?

PM: I believe that it is important for people to talk around issues of quotas. Only insofar as ensuring that the voices of women are heard. Not just in terms of the numbers.

BT: How do you guarantee that?

PM: Precisely. Any stage where you have quotas, those quotas should not be defined by the male-dominated structures. For example, if you say we are going to have seven women in a particular position, for goodness sake go back to the constituencies where women are and ask those women to identify the women who will represent them.

BT: If you have got a system of, say, that the executive of your party says not enough women are coming through the normal process. We are going to ensure by a quota system that x number of the executive are women, and we are going to fill them by co-option or whatever. Are you opposed to that?

PM: I am not, but I am saying - it is a very good thing that you have asked me that - that the reason why you would have the women's league in the party is because that is your women's constituency in that party.

BT: But if it is weak and does not promote enough women?

PM: Hold on. So, through the normal process you have not been able to get the women. You want to do a co-option. You go back to the women's league and you say: "We did not have seven women, we only had two - we need to co-opt the other five." The women's league itself should propose the five women who will make up that quota, as you work through the processes in which you then get the women in the party next time around, because it is a process. It is a process of empowering, it is a process of translating some of the issues that you are talking about into reality but those women should fundamentally be coming from a women's constituency.

BT: You know, in some countries of Africa which I know, the women's league, or whatever it is called, is really a very subordinate institution and sometimes, as I have known in my experience, I do not want to name countries, and I am not talking about South Africa, the women's league is really an adjunct of the ruling party and the "subordinate clause". If they were to promote the five you are talking about, you might get some very poor people.

PM: Are you, in other words, saying if these people are chosen through the patriarchal structures they would be better?

BT: Well, they might be based on merit as opposed to merely representivity.

PM: I actually think that, in most cases, when they come from the male structures, it is the definition of males, in terms of what they define as good quality.

BT: Let's discuss this question of merit versus representivity. It applies to race, it applies to class, it certainly applies to women. If you have to choose between the two criteria, let's say you are choosing a cabinet for the president, and you are very anxious to have a cabinet of high merit, and the representivity produces less qualified or competent women, what would you do?

PM: Well, like I am saying, I still to a large extent believe that you can still define what you would want as merit, and ask that whoever is chosen, even while they are coming from the women's structures, to fit in with some of those things. It takes time, but it can be done.

BT: Look, let's be rather blunt about this. Women, on the whole, are less experienced and educated than men, because of the system historically, and therefore, when it comes to merit, there may be a historical disadvantage, if in fact usually there is, even in Britain or any developed country. So, if a president has to choose between a person from the formerly disadvantaged sector and somebody of merit - I am talking about women, you know - if you are filling a woman's vacancy on a quota system, you say: "Now I must choose, I want a woman minister of finance", or whatever, and then you look at the women candidates

available who for historical reasons, lack experience and do not have the same opportunities, etc. - what is your answer to that?

PM: From your party constituency, or from where?

BT: Wherever, yes.

PM: I just think we do not look hard enough. It is almost like the answer that I got around the commission. You remember the Commission for Africa? The gentlemen said to me: "Oh, you know, we have got some women, but some of them said they could not make it, and therefore..." I think it is just a lame answer. The issue that I did go back to, the merit issue, is that, if you are just going to choose women, because you believe they have merit to be the minister of finance...

BT: No, because you need a quota?

PM: Hold on. No, I think there should be a difference. There are times when you are just going to get somebody because they are of merit and it does not matter whether they are a man or a woman. But there are times when the quota, and if you are saying the quota is for women, for me the fundamental issue is that this woman should have the sense to understand and appreciate that she is coming there to represent a constituency. So, to a large extent, they should be people that are clear around issues of feminism, around issues of women's rights and that is what they are bringing to the table. That is the quota that they are bringing to the table. They are not bringing the quota that they are biologically women - because for me that does not address the issues. I don't care where you get them, I don't care where they are coming from. If it is for a functional job, because they're expected to deliver in a particular area, then do that, but when they are coming to cover a particular quota, and that is a women's quota, the overriding issue is that. Are they clear around women's issues, are they going to be able to understand them, and that is what they are bringing to the table. And I think this is why the issue of the constituency is crucial because that is what they link. They are bringing the women's voices and if they do not have a way of bringing those women's voices, they are not useful for a quota.

BT: All right, what do you say of tokenism?

PM: This is what I always refer to where there are women that have been chosen by the patriarchal structures, because, to a large extent, those structures are not comfortable with women who will raise women's rights issues. But there are the "nicer" women - they set the particular agenda, and usually it is the male agenda, and increasingly that is what you are beginning to see all over the place. And then you say to yourself, why are you not picking the women that are clear, strong, independent and with their own views? Why is it that in politics, the women who are powerful, are independent, can say things usually somewhere along the line you lose them. And this is what I see in the developing world or in the developed world. Especially in the political field, which is where you really see serious power struggles, you will not find a woman who is articulate, clear, independent, going up. Somewhere along the line, you lose them.

BT: Is this the glass ceiling the women talk about?

PM: Certainly, but it is so systematic and I see it all the time. There are women who survive in politics, they're nice, they're quiet, they do not say too much, they do not rock the boat - then you will get there. If you are anywhere near, you rock the boat, you raise questions, you are on your way out.

BT: You raised the issue, in a very negative context, of gender mainstreaming. Now what is going on in the international environment? What does it mean?

PM: Like I said. I have found out that it is a way of buying time, it is a way of avoiding the crucial and critical issues.

BT: What is the actual mechanism? What do you mean by mainstreaming?

PM: I do not believe in it, so I will talk about what they mean about mainstreaming. They basically are saying that we will bring the issues of women into any subject - cross-cutting - we will ensure that when we talk about poverty, it also includes issues of gender, but what it has meant is that it either just happens, so what you will find is that they go into this document and genderise it ...

BT: But the word mainstream - it implies that it is prioritisation.

PM: Yes, it implies that it is prioritisation. It implies you are making sure that the issue of gender is an aspect in every other area.

BT: The main aspect?

PM: No, when they talk about mainstreaming, in the true sense, it is just about making sure that it is in every other stream - kind of - it is not necessarily prioritisation. I wish it was. Because that would mean that if you get to talk about poverty, the issue that you want to talk about is women ... it is about making sure that it is included, it is a cross-cutting issue, it receives always a fair...

BT: This phrase - "sexual and reproductive rights" or "sexual and reproductive health" - what are they talking about?

PM: When you talk about sexual and reproductive health, it is really the health issues that are involved. I will give you an example - if you talk about reproductive health, you are talking about issues of cervical cancer, ensuring that women are checked most of the time, what are the kind of family planning methods that are okay for the particular individual - it is ensuring that the women are in their best

health, whether it is issues to do with their own sexuality, their own sexual reproductive organs, etc. etc. Rights are really to do with, for example, if the woman is going into her reproductive stage, what rights accrue to her. She needs to understand that she has got rights in defining when, how, how many children she is going to have at any given time. Also around sexual rights, I have to be able to define where, how, and what kind of sex I'm going to have - those are the differences. So the health ones are really about providing for the needs of women, because they are women. There are certain sexual health issues that you need to take on because you are a man, and there are also needs that I need to have taken care of because I am a woman, because generally and biologically we are different.

Then there are rights issues around - what are my rights in being a woman? My own sexual rights? How do I define them, what do I do? Like I say: where, how, how do I say I do not want to have sex without necessarily being battered? How do I have my reproductive organs and know that I own them and that I control them, without somebody deciding how, where I should get rid of them or keep them or whatever.

BT: This last week, someone here said: "Women are beyond charity." What is she talking about?

PM: She said that we need to understand that the issues around the women's rights are not necessarily about charity. It is not out of the goodness of the men's hearts. It is not a privilege. You are not doing us a favour. And the analogy around the difference between ourselves in developing countries. If you understand it then you would understand what she is talking about: that when we talk about power relations between ourselves and countries in the north and the west, we should not necessarily be saying: "We want you to deal with issues around trade justice because you are nice people and you are being good to us. We deserve to be treated properly, we deserve to be treated justly and you need to do that because we are helpless people from Africa and we need you guys to ..."

BT: You don't want to be patronised. OK, I think that is very good indeed.

GOOD GOVERNANCE NEEDS AN EFFECTIVE PARLIAMENT

BY FIROZ CACHALIA

The author is Gauteng's MEC for community safety. This article appeared in Umrabulo 11

The idea of a "People's Parliament" has been at the centre of the ANC's political vision. But what this might mean in specific institutional terms has received little attention in our publications and conferences. The result has been that the views of our parliamentary opponents and academic and media critics have tended to dominate public debate. And the contribution that parliament and the provincial legislatures could make to the achievement of the objectives of our movement has not been thought through. (Throughout this article, the word "parliament" will stand for elected representative bodies in the legislative sector.)

My point of departure is that good governance, and the realisation of the ANC's political project, depends on the development of a "strong" parliament. This so because parliament plays a crucial role in identifying the needs of the people, articulating their experiences and views and, thus, in determining the national political agenda. As "oversight bodies", they help identify problems of policy failure that require attention and help to overcome bureaucratic inertia.

In this regard, I will make two preliminary points. Firstly, building a strong parliament will depend on the ANC as the governing party taking a long-term view on the decision-making structures and management systems that are appropriate for a "People's Parliament". Reactions to immediate political pressures and considerations of short-term political advantage should not be at the expense of long-term goals. Secondly, building a strong parliament should be approached in the spirit of what Roberto Unger, the Brazilian social activist and intellectual, has called "democratic experimentalism". The institutions of a constitutional democracy, including representative bodies, have widely come to be regarded as fundamental. But they should be regarded as a point of departure, not the end-point, of the project of building a democratic, socially just and humane society. Representative democracies, in Unger's words "can assume many different institutional forms, with radically different consequences for society". We should therefore constantly be thinking about how our parliament should be designed institutionally to reflect our people's ideals and interests.

STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENT IN A PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

Most theorists of transition would agree that the framers of our constitution were correct to choose a parliamentary, as opposed to a presidential system, of democratic government. Such systems, together with proportional representation, tend to produce inclusive government as opposed to "winner takes all" outcomes common in presidential systems, and are

therefore conducive to the consolidation of democracy in societies with a recent history of conflict.

Since the political majority in parliament also controls the government, the executive and the legislature are "fused" and the likelihood of conflict between the two branches of government, common in American-type systems based on a clearer separation of powers, is reduced. Party discipline ensures that the governing majority acts cohesively. These characteristics of parliamentary systems facilitate the translation of the objectives of the electoral majority into government decisions and the effective exercise of executive authority.

Parliamentary systems tend, however, also to produce an imbalance in the relationship between the executive and parliament and a subordination of the internal workings of parliament to the requirements of the government. This is so because the members, on whose support the government is dependent to sustain it in office, and who are subject to party discipline, are at the same time required to subject the government to critical scrutiny. This can lead to a weakening of parliament's investigative and oversight roles and to less transparent, accountable and effective government.

The weakening of parliament is by no means inevitable. In fact, a range of "types" of parliament - ranging from "rubberstamp" parliaments through "arena" type parliaments to more transformative representatives bodies appears in parliamentary systems. The German Bundestag, for instance, plays a critically important role in relation to both government legislation and the budget. Contextual factors, like the orientation of the leadership and membership of the governing party, relationships within and between parties and the resources available to parliament, will have an impact.

CHANGING CHARACTER OF SA'S PARLIAMENT

In South Africa, the character of the governing party as a liberation movement committed to democracy and the presence of a large number of talented, idealistic and influential leaders in both branches of government immediately after the establishment of democracy, ensured an initial strengthening of the representative branch of government. But in the long term, as the composition of the governing party undergoes some inevitable change, and the political leadership becomes more closely associated with the executive, the normal "weakening" tendency in parliamentary systems may begin to prevail in the absence of a clear ANC vision and conscious strategy to sustain the vitality of the representative branch of government.

Some commentators suggest that the unusually strong position of the governing party at present will reinforce this tendency. They fail to appreciate that the strident, media-driven style of some opposition parties, and their narrow emphasis on the role of parliament as a "check" and "limit" on the authority of the Executive, are important factors limiting the capacity of parliament to play a role in promoting not only accountability and good governance, but service delivery and development. CES Frank for instance, maintains: "Parliament is far from a negligible tool... But the present processes of policy-making place an unnatural and heavy burden on it. Confrontation and conflict, posturing for the media, oversimplification and trivialisation... The subordination of every aspect of parliaments or approach to the legislative process to the demands of partisan warfare, all follow from parliament's strange role".

Question time, for instance, has the important function of providing parliament with information which will enable it to play a role in promoting accountability and service delivery. Therefore, MPs/MPLs who have been elected to support the government should be willing to question the government on behalf of their party and the electorate. However, many are not sure that this would be appropriate. And the opposition approaches question time with a view to short-term tactical advantage. As Sir Michael Quinlan told the 1993 Scott Commission of Inquiry in Britain, the activity of giving and seeking information in parliament, has become, "in a certain sense analogous to a game... in the sense that it is a competitive activity conducted within rules largely for a purpose different from that of its apparent form." While the form is to bring information into the public domain, the prime purpose is on the one hand "to give the government a hard time". And on the other "for the government to avoid having a hard time". The "opposition will seek to extract information which they can use to portray the government in a bad light: and they will... feel free thereafter to exploit the information, if necessary selectively and tendentiously, to that end. The government for its part will be reluctant to disclose information of a kind, or in a form that will help the opposition to do so". The so-called "strong opposition", which judges its efficacy by the number of embarrassing questions it asks, thus promotes a politics of "smoke and mirrors" and erodes the capacity of parliament to deal constructively with the problems our society confronts.

Whatever the causes of this potential weakening, I would argue that the ANC should be committed to maintaining and strengthening the representative branches of government, since the idea of a "strong" parliament is consistent with notions of democracy implicit in ANC traditions as well as in contemporary notions of good governance. This latter aspect is of critical importance since it helps to position the ANC clearly in the context of global cultural and political trends and improves the attractiveness of South Africa as a destination for foreign direct investment. Furthermore, "strong" parliaments draw on the talents, energies and expertise of all people deployed to government, whereas "weak" parliaments/legislature(s) tend to encourage passivity and inaction among "back-benchers".

Parliamentary strengthening comes in many guises, depending on the objectives it is intended to serve. For instance, it may aim at enhancing the "effectiveness" of the opposition or at strengthening the capacity of private members to initiate legislation. Institutional innovation in the design of parliament, aimed at strengthening the representative branch of government and

inspired by the ANC's perspectives should, I believe:

- not be counterposed to executive authority. Indeed, as members of the governing party, we ought crucially to be interested in encouraging measures which enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the executive, promote the capacity of ministers to direct the bureaucracy, etc
- respect the limits of the parliamentary system. Not only will innovation which does not do so fail, but it will risk jettisoning the desirable features of parliamentary systems
- promote good governance, accountability and transparency
- promote development and service delivery and enhance the overall performance of government.

I do not intend in this paper to set out a comprehensive and detailed programme of institutional innovation. I will put forward only embryonic ideas and suggest some pointers in the hope that this will stimulate creative thinking in our movement on these issues.

REPRESENTATION

Representative bodies form the central pillar of democratic government. Through our system of co-operative governance incorporating provincial legislatures and the electoral system based on proportionality, the framers of our constitution sought to reinforce representation and inclusivity. This aspect of our system helps to contain conflict by encouraging an expression of societal differences within rather than against institutions, to create a stable framework in which the governing party can govern and to sustain democracy in a complex and diverse society.

But the rituals associated with parliamentary politics and the class, gender and racial inequalities in our society tend to demobilise popular participation in politics. It is therefore necessary to take positive steps to overcome obstacles to participation.

Participatory democracy is sometimes counterposed to representative government. But strategies to improve public participation can also be thought of as reinforcing and strengthening representative government - by providing public representatives with information they would not otherwise have but which is necessary for effective and responsive decision-making. Strategies to facilitate and promote public participation are also critical in ensuring the participation of marginalised and under-resourced constituencies in decision-making by representative bodies. In the absence of special measures, public decision-making is also vulnerable to "capture" by special interests.

Gauteng has established a Public Participation and Petitions Office separate from the Information and Communication Directorate, with a dedicated staff and budget and a mandate to promote public participation by marginalised constituencies. The office has engaged in an extensive public education programme and has worked effectively with the committee section to promote public participation in committee hearings.

The legislature has also pioneered a petitions procedure which gives effect to the constitutional right to the petition. A petitions committee (a kind of parliamentary ombud) has been established, which provides citizens with a cheap form of administrative justice (to challenge termination of a grant, for instance) and with a surrogate form of constituency representation (since constituents are able, whether or not their deployed representative is working, to raise matters directly with the legislature). Both the rules and the petitions law that has been adopted, place a positive obligation on the legislature to assist those who may be unable to petition (for reasons of illiteracy, for instance).

The content of the petitions indicates that some marginalised and unresourced constituencies are aware of the procedure and are using it. The petitions office has received petitions relating to a wide variety of matters including applications for disability grants, pensions, dependants of prisoners, complaints of inaction by a town treasurer, inaction by the legal aid board, inaction by the Soweto city council, provision of housing in an informal settlement in Centurion, evictions in Lanseria, a proposed road in Thokoza, the land restitution process, complaints by inner city tenants, forced removal of tenants from an informal settlement, corruption by town council officials and evictions in Chiawelo.

The ANC should perhaps think about establishing a petitions committee in the national parliament.

OVERSIGHT

One of the more important roles of parliament is to exercise scrutiny and oversight over the executive. The dominant, "traditional" model of parliamentary oversight emphasises the "separation of powers" and "checks and balances". While not entirely displacing this paradigm, oversight could also be thought of as a way of promoting co-operation between the executive and parliament and in this way contributing to accelerated service delivery. In the words of the report on oversight commissioned by national parliament (Corder et al):

"The oversight role is often seen as that of opposition parties alone, designed to police and expose maladministration and corruption. Such a view is limited and deficient.

Oversight and accountability helps to ensure the executive implements laws in a way required by the legislature and the dictates of the constitution. The legislature is in this way able to keep control over the laws that it passes and to promote the constitutional values of accountability and good governance. Thus oversight must be seen as one of the central tenets of our democracy because through it the legislature can ensure that the executive is carrying out its mandates, monitor the implementation of its legislative policy and draw on these experiences for future law-making. Through it we can ensure effective government.

Seen in this light the oversight function of the legislature

complements rather than hampers the effective delivery of services with which the executive is entrusted".

The ANC and the government should therefore be committed to reinforcing the scrutiny functions of the representative branch of government.

It is important here to be a little more specific. The question is how, through their oversight function, can committees contribute to enhancing service delivery? The traditional oversight/accountability model is a form of compliance auditing. Its raison d'être is the discovery of error. But a delivery enhancing concept of oversight should primarily be aimed at identifying the systemic causes of policy failure by monitoring the implementation of policy and programmes. Committees have to have the requisite resources, information and expertise to assume the role of monitoring in the policy cycle.

The relevant standing committees could also consider developing a set of performance monitoring criteria (e.g. socio-economic indicators like infant mortality rates, access to potable water, nutritional status) to monitor whether the government's poverty alleviation programmes are working, with a view to improving their implementation. The Gauteng legislature is currently examining ways of enhancing the capacity of standing committees to monitor expenditure and programme results.

It is of course arguable that monitoring could just as easily be the responsibility of departments. Perhaps it should be a "shared" responsibility. But civil servants are hardly always the best judges of the efficacy of their own ideas. A role for parliament in the monitoring of the implementation of policy may in fact enhance the overall performance of government

THE EXECUTIVE, PARLIAMENT AND MINISTERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

In parliamentary systems, the constitutional lodestar of accountability is the doctrine of ministerial accountability. The South African constitution creates a parliamentary executive which is accountable to parliament.

Section 92(2) provides that "members of the cabinet are accountable individually and collectively to parliament". Section 92(3)(b), requires ministers to provide parliament "with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control". Section 102 subjects the continuation of government to the will of parliament.

But the application of this doctrine of ministerial responsibility in different situations is not always clear. These are matters which require debate within the ANC.

The traditional approach to executive accountability to the legislature assumes, at least in theory, that ministers alone exercise the powers of executive government and can be called to account both for their own acts and for those done on their behalf. Civil servants, on the other hand, have no direct responsibility to parliament.

It is arguable that the traditional doctrine's refusal to allow a distinction between political and managerial responsibility does not accord with the realities of modern government, discourages frankness and candour on the part of ministers, and is inconsistent with public sector reforms. The Public Finance Management Act, for instance, draws a clear distinction between the accountability of "executive authorities" (ministers) and "accounting officers" (heads of departments).

Opposition parties tend to rely on the traditional conception of ministerial accountability. Ministers are routinely called upon to resign whenever things go wrong. I think the ANC should emphasise more modern notions of accountability, which do not jettison the element of resignation for malfeasance, but shift the emphasis from the apportionment of blame to the obligation to provide accurate information to the house and the correction of error.

Strategically, such a paradigm shift would locate the ANC clearly in the new thinking on accountability, defuse unproductive political pressures on individual ministers and enhance both the accountability of the executive to parliament and the effectiveness of these bodies. In addition, the traditional conception of accountability assumes that ministers but not civil servants are directly accountable to parliament. It is arguable that the "new accountability" should require direct accountability of civil servants to parliament. Again, this could have the effect of improving overall performance. Fears that this approach could lead to tensions between ministers and their officials have generally not proved to be well-founded. Consideration should be given to taking the political initiative on these issues at the appropriate time. A code of conduct for ministers and civil servants setting out their responsibilities to parliament could be considered as part of this ANC-led initiative.

STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNING PARTY IN PARLIAMENT/ LEGISLATURES

The debate about the role of caucuses has correctly concluded that these structures are subordinate to the constitutional structures of the ANC. But the role that caucuses play in governance has been neglected. I put forward the following hypothesis: strong caucuses produce strong parliaments and consequently contribute to effective governance: conversely, weak caucuses produce weak parliaments. Within parliament, caucuses play a critically important role in ensuring party cohesion, discipline and unity, which are essential preconditions for effective leadership by the governing party within parliament.

Matters of parliamentary strategy and tactics should be subject to full and adequate discussion within caucus. Caucuses also play an important role in monitoring the executive. Caucuses should therefore be thought of as collectives with decision-making responsibilities on political issues, as opposed to merely administrative matters.

While caucuses have important responsibilities within parliament, these should not be carried out in a way which subordinates the investigative responsibilities of parliament.

STRENGTHENING THE LEGISLATIVE SECTOR

The transition to democracy in South Africa produced a bicameral national parliament and nine provincial legislatures. Some of the legislatures had to be established from scratch. Others inherited parts of administrations established under the previous order.

From their inception, newly-established provincial legislatures in particular faced many challenges. They had to draw their staff from a very limited pool of skills, develop systems to manage their human resources and budgets, establish committees with inexperienced members, adopt new rules, etc.

It is not surprising therefore, that they show elements of "weakness" - sit infrequently, pass little legislation, are dependent on the executive for information and their budget allocations, etc.

This "weakness" undermines the capacity of the ANC to consolidate democracy, promote accountability, improve governance and accelerate delivery. Development and transformation of the legislative sector must therefore be one of the central strategic priorities of the ANC. The ANC has to develop a vision, and take a long-term view of the development of legislatures as institutions with an important, if not a central, role in our democracy.

THE POLITICS OF PARLIAMENTARY STRENGTHENING

The "strong" parliamentary model does pose some risk for the governing party in an adversarial and politically contentious environment. Nevertheless, I think that the emphasis on the constructive role of parliament will resonate with our own constituency, promote good governance, strengthen the performance of the governing party in parliament and enhance service delivery. The government therefore has an interest in parliamentary strengthening and should support efforts aimed in this direction. Parliamentary strengthening also requires a willingness to co-operate across party lines on basic issues of institutional design.

CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that the ANC should explicitly seek to promote a "strong" parliament and legislatures within the framework and limits of a parliamentary system. This will help consolidate democracy, improve governance, accelerate delivery and position the ANC favourably in the global context.

Developing a "strong" parliament involves articulating an alternative conception of parliamentary politics, which fundamentally unsettles the trivialising logic of "oppositionism". Moreover and most important, the idea of a strong parliament is entirely consistent with and arguably required by, our transformative political project.



UNITED CITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF AFRICA (UCLGA)

REPRESENTING THE CITIZEN IN AFRICA

UCLGA is the African Union of Cities and Local Governments – the united voice of African local government and the principal local government partner of regional and international institutions.

UCLGA structure

- The Council – all members
- The Executive Committee – 17 members
- The Presidency – one president and five vice-presidents
  - Father Smangaliso Mkhatshwa, Executive Mayor, City of Tshwane, UCLGA President (South Africa);
  - Mr Eneas Comiche, Mayor, City of Maputo, UCLGA Vice-President, southern Africa region (Mozambique);
  - Mr Augustin Kampayana, President, Rwandese Association of Local Governments, UCLGA Vice-President, East Africa region (Rwanda);
  - Mr Baver Dzeremo, President, Association of Local Governments of Nigeria, UCLGA Vice-President, West African region (Nigeria);
  - Mr Omar El Bahraoui, Mayor, City of Rabat, UCLGA Vice-President, North Africa region (Morocco); and
  - Mr Hugues Ngouelondele, Deputy Mayor, City of Brazzaville, UCLGA Vice-President, Central Africa region (Congo)
- The Secretary General
  - Mr Jean Pierre Elong Mbassi (Cameroon)

The role of UCLGA

- To organise, at continental level, effective political dialogue with central and local governments, civil societies, and the international community with a view to adopting decentralisation amongst Africa's priority development issues.
- To accord African local governments their due place in the dynamics of African integration.
- To integrate the African Municipal Movement into the mainstream initiatives of the world municipal movement.

UCLGA's priority areas of focus

- Ensure that UCLGA is recognised by the African Union.
- Advocate for decentralisation and autonomy for organised African local government.
- Deliver capacity building activities focusing on associations of local government and political dialogue.
- Support African local government developmental endeavours and cooperate with international organisations, both government and non-governmental, as well as multilateral institutions (United Nations, UCLG, the World Bank, and so on).
- Deliver the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) at local level.
- Position African local governments in Africa to support initiatives by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).
- Support peace and stability initiatives within the African region.
- Share knowledge and experiences.
- Develop tools in support of decentralisation, especially in countries where the lack of democracy remains a challenge.

UCLGA
United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLGA)

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LEGISLATURE SUPPORT PROGRAMME

THE LEGISLATURES SUPPORT PROGRAMME:

SUPPORTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S LEGISLATIVE SECTOR

Kurt Morais, Director of the Legislature Support Programme

The Legislatures Support Programme (LSP) is a €10-million, three-year donor support programme funded by the European Commission (EC). The financing agreement for this initiative was signed between the EC and the Speakers' Forum (SF) of South Africa on 17 February 2004. The purpose of the programme is to support the South African Legislatures (national and provincial) to fulfil their constitutional mandates in a citizen orientated manner, thereby contributing to the strengthening of democracy and good governance. In order to reach this purpose five key result areas were identified in the design of the programme, which include:

1. improving law-making systems and processes, oversight and accountability, policy development, and assessment of implementation capacity;
2. enhancing public participation in decision-making and developing education on democracy;
3. improving gender equality and addressing disability in the legislatures;
4. improving skills in the legislatures; and
5. enhancing the ICT facilities and equipment of legislatures.

A partnership programme between the European Union and the Speakers' Forum of South Africa

These key result areas have a number of activities and since the ten institutions (parliament and the nine provincial legislatures) at which this support initiative is aimed are at different levels of development and have varying institutional budgets the activities they undertake with programme funds also differ. Each institution therefore receives an allocation annually from the LSP budget according to a predetermined formula. The funds are held and administered by the LSP Secretariat for Programme Implementation Unit (SPIU), situated in Cape Town, and legislatures put forward applications to incur expenditure. Simply put the SPIU acts as a facilitator ensuring that programme funds are spent on the above key result areas on activities identified by institutions and that spending is within the budget allocations given to each institution. The SPIU manages the implementation of programme on a daily basis liaising with a wide range of stakeholders nationally to work toward making the programme a success.

Given that the LSP is a programme of the SF, it is overseen and strategically guided by a Programme Steering Committee (PSC). It is chaired by the President of the SF (currently the Speaker Mbete of the National Assembly) and has as its members Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), three Speakers of KwaZulu-Natal, North-West and Gauteng, Secretary of Mpumalanga and Deputy Secretary of Parliament all nominated by the SF. While the EC, has observer status through its delegation situated in Pretoria. The SF is a collective association of the Speakers and Deputy Speakers of the National Assembly and the nine provincial legislatures, including the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). The Chair of the SF is the Speaker of the National Assembly. The Forum convenes every quarter and discusses the strategic direction of the legislative sector. Though each legislature is autonomous, they are interdependent on each other with the same core objectives, which include law-making, oversight and public participation. Looking at the key result areas of the programme one would see that the LSP is designed in such a manner so as to provide direct support to any one of the identified core objectives.

The EC has been supporting parliament and the nine provincial legislatures since 1996. The LSP is the second support initiative which follows the Parliamentary Support Programme (PSP), which came to end in 2003. The evaluation of the PSP found that while good progress had been made in developing the legislatures more assistance was needed for legislatures to meet their constitutional objectives, hence the LSP. In this light the LSP should be viewed as a logical progression of the PSP, adjusting support to be more beneficial to current needs and realities.

The development of the legislatures is of critical importance given that their role is that of ensuring the needs of the people of South Africa are met through making laws, calling government departments and parastatals to account and ensuring that the public is involved in these processes. These are by no means easy feats to undertake given that systems and processes to accomplish these constitutional mandates were non-existent prior to 1994, especially for the provincial legislatures. Though parliament structurally has remained post-1994, functionally it has changed to serve the needs of all South Africans. Given that its functions changed this has had a direct implication on the internal structure of the institution. This has further culminated in the development of clear strategies set by legislatures and which the LSP contributes toward meeting.

What sets this programme aside from others is its aim of addressing the institutional challenges that the nascent institutions face, while seeking to assist members from across the political spectrum to address their mandates. The latter is done, for example, through the LSP undertaking a nation-wide assessment of members needs and providing capacity development courses directly to committees on areas that complement and facilitate their work. The success of the programmes such as these, is not only determined by the ability to address the key result areas but also the sustainability of the initiatives undertaken and ownership of the said activities by institutions. Thus the SPIU, with a bird's eye-view of the sector, tries to take these elements into consideration when implementing, in the hope that legislatures leap-frog stages of development in reaching their constitutional and institutional mandates and objectives.

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DEMAND DRIVEN ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE MICROFINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR THE APEX WAY

BY NTOMBI MSIMANG
The author is project manager of the Apex Fund

INTRODUCTION

Khula Enterprise Finance Ltd is an agency of the department of trade and industry (dti), established in 1996 to facilitate access to finance for small, medium and microenterprises (SMMEs). In 1999, a review was done by Khula and the dti to assess the impact of their financial interventions on the lives of historically-disadvantaged community members in the SMME arena. For various reasons, specific reliable data could not be found but a general sense of failure could be deduced from the responses received through surveys. Meanwhile, developmental microfinance institutions had been stating that the absence of affordable financial capital made it impossible for them to reach the poorest of the poor. A realisation that the formal banking sector could not play a meaningful role in the developmental microfinance sector left the government with no alternative but to explore other avenues in pursuit of their objective of delivering on a people's contract to fight poverty and unemployment.

On May 13 2005, the South African Microfinance Apex Fund was launched at Motswedi Village in North West Province. The Apex Fund is the government's response to the lack of affordable finance for the poor and unemployed, survivalists and microentrepreneurs. It also seeks to provide credit to families whose household income does not exceed R1 500 per month. In the latter category, ability to repay rather than engagement in microenterprise is key, since impact on livelihoods through smoothing of cash flow troughs becomes the objective. Embedded in this mandate is institutional and client capacity-building which will be outsourced based on a focused curriculum. Microfinance is not a solution to all problems associated with access to finance. The Apex Fund works through locally-based outlets called "partner organisations" that will be capacitated in a focused way to deliver on behalf of and with the Apex Fund. These may be financial outlets like local development agencies, developmental retail financial institutions and others whose ethos and organisational culture fit with the Apex mandate. Partnerships for delivery will be forged with institutions such as Post Bank while lobbying government for the most effective framework within these institutions to support economic wealth creation within communities.

The overall challenge for the Apex Fund is the balancing of its "double bottom line." This means that a clear priority must be set upfront and consciously by the first board of Apex as to whether the fund is going to pursue microfinance for social imperatives, such as poverty alleviation and unemployment, or financial sustainability in the short to medium term. The Apex model has been set up with a clear social mandate but at different times in the operations this may tilt towards the financial. The board and principals must understand the Apex key performance indicators from the onset.

THE APEX FUND OPERATIONAL MODEL

The Apex Fund has rural and peri-urban poor and the unemployed as its core end-clients. This is a section of the population that historically gets studied and whose experts come from outside of their ranks. The challenge for the Apex team was how best to serve this community on their own terms, in a manner that gives them ownership of the Apex process while at the same time making sure that lessons learnt can be documented and sustainability and impact factors accorded to deserving entities. Following are the cornerstones of the Apex operational model.

- **Provision of financial services by "institutions and entrepreneurs" within the community:**

People who have been brought up in rural areas know that there has always been an informal support structure within communities, both for lending and support during times of need. At the beginning of the school year when children have to be sent to boarding school, neighbours and relatives get together to group their meagre savings. If there is death in the family, the same network ensures that

different activities are carried out to give the dead a decent burial and support the family. The people in the village know who are the pillars of the community and custodians of integrity. There are structures like stokvels, burial societies, manyanos (church formations) and others that readily come to mind. The Apex Fund seeks to identify these and work through them to strengthen and formalise (to a certain extent) their participation in the Apex mandate. The individuals with integrity within the communities have to be co-opted to be part of the board of directors to ensure good governance. Only through working with the community can these operatives be identified and integrated into the wider scheme of things. The Apex has a role in formalising these structures and making sure they understand the social and economic mandate of the Apex Fund. The government, through the Apex Fund and its partner organisations, will address the invisibility of people whose savings must by law be deposited in formal banks. By their location in formal banks, these savings never contribute to the creation and circulation of wealth in the communities where they belong.

• Co-operative formations:

Because the Apex is primarily an economic instrument, it follows that economic formations within communities must be identified and strengthened to carry out its mandate of sustainable outreach. South Africa has a dismal history of financial co-operatives and village banks. A close study of these institutions will show that, because of their capacity challenges and an unclear regulatory environment from the government, they were left to their own devices and those of preying international institutions. The Apex has recognised the resilience of these local institutions in savings mobilisation. Working together with government departments, the Apex will provide institutional capacity-building within these institutions, ensure that financial audits are carried out and governance structures are put in place. Most of these institutions were started with the aim of not only collecting savings but also to be able to provide loans for their members. The fact is that savings (deposits) cannot be used for on-lending and the complexities of such transactions were never understood by the communities. Absence of on-lending capital exacerbated the problem. Where fraud is committed by people who prey on the ignorance of the financial services co-operatives, it will be dealt with promptly, as the Apex Fund and national treasury are co-operating to solve the problem. Good initiatives must not be allowed to die because of unscrupulous operatives.

Village banks are owned by the community and have community members as depositors and/or shareholders; hence they provide a risk-ameliorating mechanism for on-lending. However, institutional capacity-building throughout the value chain, as well as monitoring, are key to the success of the Apex initiative.

ANTICIPATED SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE APEX FUND

Partner organisations:

These institutions are empowered with skills, both technical and managerial, to deal with loans and poverty-targeting tools where applicable. They are empowered to run financial institutions at the community level and take responsibility for them. They are responsible for the portfolio quality and outreach, by setting targets and working towards them. They are well-versed in governance issues and the community understands their role.

Levels of social impact

Access to microfinance usually leads to higher and better-diversified income at both individual and community levels.

At the **individual level**, women tend to be the main recipients of microfinance and hence the health of the family, both economically and physically, improves through better access to education, healthcare as well as food supply. Since the partner organisation imparts financial skills as part of their lending methodology, this education impacts on the family. By using the group lending methodology and using savings as a risk-mitigating tool (savings are not used as collateral per se), giving credit and having other micro-insurance products, the loss of an important family member can be coped with more easily.

At the **local community level**, the impact of microfinance will be felt and possible economic avenues are explored and consolidated to enable clients to pay their loans. Jobs are created as the skills-base increases and people feel a sense of ownership of their community empowerment. The community cohesiveness flowing from the institutional capacity makes the community less susceptible to external shocks.

At the **district level**, microfinance in the rural areas supports income generation and employment and can help reduce migration to the city. When combined with agricultural microfinance, this widens the scope and outreach of the financial sector as a whole.

Sustainable demand-driven microfinance

Because communities have been vulnerable and underpowered for so long, scepticism regarding this model reigns. The most vocal proponents of this scepticism are the "experts" on poverty, who reside outside these communities, who say financial systems are too complex for local communities to run. The Apex Fund believes that with appropriate capacity and management information systems communities can be empowered to be conduits for sustainable microfinance outreach. In South Africa, a supply-driven top down model of access to finance has been in operation for too long. A distinction between microfinance and microcredit which treats recipients as ignorant "consumers" of credit must be made. The microlending sector has reaped enormous profits from the rural poor and peri-urban, while shouting loudest about the risk of the sector. Because of lack of options and financial understanding, the recipients have found themselves in eternal debt. There is demand for microfinance but affordability and outreach are the challenges; unfortunately the foregoing scenario extends to people beyond the Apex target market.



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UNEMPLOYMENT FOR BEGINNERS: BEING A CATALOGUE OF SOME OF THE PITFALLS AND PLEASURES A DO-IT-YOURSELF INTERPRETER MAY ENCOUNTER IN THE OFFICIAL STATISTICS

BY CHARLES METH
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There is a story, possibly apocryphal, about a newspaper (in Denmark?) that ceased to publish what politicians said, but instead, reported only on those things that they did. It halved in thickness. Although one could get into a fine, hairsplitting debate about whether or not saying is doing as far as politicians are concerned, the story is intriguing. As far as our lot is concerned, it would be a good thing if they ceased to talk about certain glaring problems and rather went about the serious business of setting them to rights. One social ill to which this applies is unemployment.

WHAT TO BELIEVE

Our president thinks that he has found good grounds for doubting the high unemployment figures generated (with monotonous regularity) by Statistics South Africa. His time would be better spent engaging the services of an independent neutral statistician to comment on the likelihood that the very similar estimates of unemployment returned by two large household surveys, whose samples are independently drawn, could be incorrect. The surveys in question, the September 2003 Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the General Household Survey (GHS) conducted in July 2003, yielded the results shown in Table 1.

Table 1	Official unemployment		Expanded unemployment	
	Rate (%)	No. (1 000s)	Rate (%)	No. (1 000s)
LFS Sept 2003	28.2	4 570	41.8	8 332
GHS July 2003	30.0	4 824	42.7	8 382

Since the two surveys use similar questions to discover the unemployed, it is possible, of course, that they are so badly designed that they allow people who are actually working to be classed as unemployed. Scrutiny of the questionnaires suggests that this is unlikely. They are carefully designed to capture the tiniest amount of work done, paid or unpaid (including begging). The order of the questions is such that a "Yes" response to an exhaustive list of queries on economic activity (conducted for as little as one hour) prompts the enumerator to jump straight over the unemployment questions. So, if the surveys are generating incorrect results, it is because people are lying, and doing so systematically. It may well be the case that the LFS respondents, who are visited four times before being removed from the panel of respondents, lie consistently.

If the LFS respondents are lying, the GHS respondents must be lying as well. If the fact that they tell such similar lies is not coincidence then maybe one could be forgiven for suspecting that there is a seventh force operating. Maybe this is a case for the National Intelligence Agency

(NIA) - maybe the Democratic Alliance (DA) has phoned respondents and promised them a job if they respond "appropriately" to questions in the surveys. Maybe Patricia de Lille (Independent Democrats leader) has got to them. Maybe...

It is probably worth pointing out that when tight controls over responses to the unemployment questions such as those used in the LFSs are relaxed, even greater proportions of the population describe themselves as unemployed. This may be seen by glancing at the comparison between the September 2001 LFS and Census 2001 results presented on pages 54 and 55 of **Census in Brief**. While the LFS's aggregate "strict" (official) rate stood at 29.5 percent, the census returned a rate of 41.6 percent. As with certain other census results, we probably should not pay too much attention to this one.

UNSUITABLE WORK OR NO WORK?

Prior to September 2002, conservatives had another line of defence against the unpleasant reality portrayed by the LFS results - they could claim that the unemployed were "choosy." They could do this because poor question-design in the LFS generated the result that, almost half the unemployed said that they had not worked in the past seven days because they could not find "suitable work". This was defined in terms of salary, location or conditions of work. In 2002, a colleague in the then University of Natal, Rosa Dias, and I persuaded Statistics South Africa that it would be a good idea if one more alternative were added to the list of reasons why people had not worked in the past seven days. As may be seen in Table 2, once the opportunity was offered, almost everyone migrated out of the "lack of skills" or "cannot find suitable work" into the "cannot find any work" category.

Nothing daunted, some conservatives, pursuing their instincts, apparently persist in believing in the existence of a large group of mythical "won't works". Unfortunately, official statistics let them down again. Table 3 (containing September 2003 results once more) shows why.

Table 2	LFS Feb. 2002	LFS Sept. 2003
OFFICIAL UNEMPLOYED	No. (1 000s)	No. (1 000s)
Lack of skills for available jobs	2 142	373
Cannot find suitable work (salary, location or conditions of work not satisfactory)	1 989	263
Cannot find any work	-	3 640
EXPANDED UNEMPLOYED		
Lack of skills for available jobs	3 835	828
Cannot find suitable work (salary, location or conditions of work not satisfactory)	3 017	428
Cannot find any work	-	6 376

The Table 3 results are for responses to three questions in the LFS, aimed at finding out how many people may be work-shy. Results are presented by monthly household expenditure category. Totals may differ from the sums for the individual expenditure categories because some respondents either did not know how much their monthly household expenditure was, or they refused to supply the information. As may be seen, about one quarter of a million people (out of eight million unemployed) have reportedly been offered jobs which they have turned down.

There is a slight tension between these results and those for the next question which asks whether the respondent "knows" of any available work which they are unwilling to do. Once again, by comparison with the huge number of unemployed, the number of those unwilling to work at particular jobs is trivial. Question 3.4 in the LFS probes into the reasons why people may be unwilling to pursue these job opportunities. In almost all cases, the resulting numbers are so small as to be statistically unreliable (Statistics South Africa does not usually publish any weighted result smaller than 10 000).

Taking them at face value, it would seem that about 15 000 or so potential workers (out of eight million) thought that the wage offered was too low. Another 10 000 thought working conditions were unsuitable. Of course, there may be more people among the 249 000 who are said to have turned jobs down. It is a pity that they were not asked why, in times of such apparent distress, they thought it appropriate to reject a job offer. That most of those who turned jobs down came from the poorest households serves only to deepen the mystery.

Turning to the aggregate figures, we begin by observing that navigating through the unemployment figures is not a task that should be undertaken by the casual statistics user. Although Statistics South Africa has not sunk to Margaret Thatcher's level, the discontinuities (all there because of improvements) in the series make interpretation a bit of a nightmare.

FALLING LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION

The vagaries of the statistics led the presidency into a thorough misunderstanding of the causes of unemployment. By the time the compilers of the **Ten Year Review** had finished interpreting the numbers, a brave government, making modest progress with the difficult task of stimulating job creation, was frustrated in its best efforts by the sheer mass of humanity flooding into the labour market. It is a good story, but unfortunately, for the presidency it is only true for the period up until 1999. Since February 2000, the number of economically-active persons and the participation rate according to the official definition have both fallen, while the number of non-economically-active persons has climbed significantly. The problem in South Africa is thus not one of rapidly increasing numbers of entrants to the labour market, but rather of decreasing participation (withdrawal from the labour market). The probable cause is the fact that so many work-seekers cannot find any jobs at all.

Table 3	R0-1 199	R1 200-4 999	R5 000+	Total
Q3.2 Has ... been offered a job and turned it down?	174 000	53 000	16 000	249 000
Q3.3 Does ... know of any available work for which he/she has the relevant qualification but is not willing to do?	30 000	28 000	14 000	73 000
Q3.4 Why would ... not be willing to do this work?				
Wages too low	8 000	6 000	1 000	15 000
Job is not permanent	1 000	2 000		3 000
Location (work too far)	4 000	2 000	1 000	6 000
Working conditions unsuitable	3 000	5 000	2 000	10 000
Work not legal	2 000	2 000	0	3 000
Other	5 000	10 000	11 000	25 000
Total	20 000	23 000	14 000	59 000

With the exception of the 1995 results, the full set of October Household Surveys (up until October 1999) and Labour Force Surveys (from February 2000) for participation in the economy are given in Table 4. There are three break lines indicating discontinuities of varying degrees of seriousness. The largest of them comes with the changeover between the OHS and the LFS.

It was this changeover that caught the presidency unawares. The changes between 1999 and 2000 are partly definitional and partly "better" enumeration which causes the survey to find, inter alia, an extra 1.2 million subsistence agricultural workers (who have since disappeared). Another component of the 2.7 million more economically active people was an unprecedented jump of 1.1 million in the number of officially unemployed. Between February 2000 and September 2003, the number of economically active fluctuated, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, around the 16 million mark. The most recent set of changes, caused by a revision of population estimates which will ultimately work its way back through the numbers, was introduced in the September 2004 LFS.

While the numbers of economically active (using the official definition) remain relatively constant, the number of non-economically active rise steadily. Between February 2000 and September 2003, they increase by almost three-and-a-half million. This increase works its way into the participation rate, which, apart from the odd hiccup, declines steadily. Assuming that it is appropriate to compare ratios (i.e., that changes in population cause equi-proportional changes in other magnitudes), the rate falls from 61.3 percent in February 2000 to 53.8 percent in September 2004, a truly spectacular decline. Part, but only part, of this is explained by the disappearance of the subsistence agricultural producers.

Participation rates according to the expanded definition do not show the same precipitous decline because the number of discouraged work-seekers rises steadily over the period. This is shown in Table 5 below, which gives the numbers of unemployed (thousands) and unemployment rates according to the two definitions.

Apart from the fact that it is not known precisely what the impact of the revisions to the statistics will be, it is clear from this table that celebration of declining unemployment rates is premature. The two big falls in the official rate, that between March and September 2003 and that between March and September 2004 were both accompanied by increases in the number of discouraged work-seekers, and by falls in the participation rate, as well as by increases in the numbers employed. Until such time as these are better understood, the champagne will be best kept on ice.

HALF MEASURES

In particular, this means that the urge to boast about the likelihood of meeting Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, or their local variants by 2014 should be held in check. As I have shown elsewhere (Meth, 2004), not

Table 4	Official definition			Expanded definition		
			Participation			Participation
	EA	NEA	Rate (%)	EA	NEA	Rate (%)
Oct 96	11 511	13 146	46.7	13 853	10 804	56.2
Oct 97	11 698	13 414	46.6	14 449	10 663	57.5
Oct 98	12 553	13 157	48.8	15 024	10 686	58.4
Oct 99	13 527	12 753	51.5	16 251	10 028	61.8
Feb 00	16 213	10 242	61.3	18 432	8 022	69.7
Sept 00	15 794	11 100	58.7	18 272	8 623	67.9
Feb 01	16 077	11 044	59.3	18 798	8 323	69.3
Sept 01	15 358	12 006	56.1	18 531	8 834	67.7
Feb 02	16 130	11 543	58.3	19 268	8 405	69.6
Sept 02	15 866	12 118	56.7	18 954	9 031	67.7
March 03	16 815	12 740	56.9	19 986	9 569	67.6
Sept 03	16 192	13 725	54.1	19 954	9 963	66.7
Sept 03	16 279	13 638	54.4	20 098	9 818	67.2
March 04	16 596	13 833	54.5	20 396	10 033	67.0
March 04	15 807	13 324	54.3	19 571	9 560	67.2
Sept 04	15 778	13 527	53.8	19 726	9 578	67.3

only has government not made clear what it intends with its "halving the unemployment rate" promise, it has also not specified the base year whose rate is to be halved. If the rate in the year the MDGs were formulated, the year 2000, is used, then by 2004 the country had managed only to tread water. Rates if anything, were a little higher in 2004 than in the year 2000. Far more sensible (from a political point of view) to choose 2003 as base year, the year in which the Growth and Development Summit was held, and the year when rates apparently peaked. Viewed from that perspective, the five percentage point drop between March 2003 and September 2004 apparently represents substantial progress. To forestall excess self-congratulation, however, it is necessary once again to point to the increases in the number of discouraged work-seekers that accompanied the two dips in the unemployment rate that account for this drop.

Table 5	Official definition		Expanded definition		No. of
	No.	%	No.	%	discouraged
Oct 96	2 224	19.3	4 566	33.0	2 342
Oct 97	2 451	21.0	5 202	36.0	2 751
Oct 98	3 163	25.2	5 634	37.5	2 471
Oct 99	3 158	23.3	5 882	36.2	2 724
Feb 00	4 333	26.7	6 553	35.6	2 220
Sept 00	4 082	25.8	6 559	35.9	2 477
Feb 01	4 240	26.4	6 961	37.0	2 721
Sept 01	4 525	29.5	7 698	41.5	3 173
Feb 02	4 738	29.4	7 876	40.9	3 138
Sept 02	4 837	30.5	7 925	41.8	3 088
March 03	5 250	31.2	8 421	42.1	3 171
Sept 03	4 570	28.2	8 332	41.8	3 762
Sept 03	4 627	28.4	8 446	42.0	3 819
March 04	4 611	27.8	8 412	41.2	3 801
March 04	4 415	27.9	8 179	41.8	3 764
Sept 04	4 135	26.2	8 083	41.0	3 948

It is not to be wondered at that the president seeks relief from South Africa's obstinately unpleasant unemployment figures in the flights of fancy of inappropriate comparisons. Like the poverty statistics he summarily rejected (and of which he is now being forcibly reminded by the poor themselves, many of whom are unemployed), the figures on joblessness will come back to haunt him unless far more vigorous steps are taken to address the problem of unemployment.

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

CONTESTING STATE POWER - COSATU AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE, REVIEW OF THE FIRST DECADE OF DEMOCRACY

BY FIKILE MAJOLA
General Secretary, NEHAWU
COSATU Conference to celebrate 10 years of democracy
March 5 - 7 2005

CONTESTING STATE POWER - COSATU IN THE TRANSITION

Contestation in a changed environment

For the purposes of this paper we shall look at two aspects: engagement on development strategy and on the reconstruction of the state apparatus (i.e. the bureaucracy). Therefore, we shall not look in detail on how COSATU engaged parliament, the judiciary and other spheres of state power.

COSATU had to adjust to operating in a democratic environment to represent the independence of labour and poor communities. In this respect, it had to adjust to being part of the broader liberation movement and to champion the cause of workers in a democratic setting. To that end it has pursued various strategies to advance the cause of workers as a counterweight to the influence of capital and to nudge the state towards a more working-class orientation.

These interventions occurred through bilaterals with departments, at NEDLAC and in parliamentary processes. The process of policy engagement posed two challenges for the labour movement:

- to respond to all these issues with very limited capacity, and
- to ensure strong mandating procedures even on fairly technical regulations.

In these interactions, COSATU argued it must act as the voice for all poor and working people, not just workers. More often than not, its policies aimed to raise living standards for the destitute, rather than the employed, as well as job creation.

COSATU sought an alliance programme for transformation that first crystallised in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). To a great degree, the RDP has been sidelined by the shift towards conservative macroeconomic strategy. Still, the document itself was contradictory as the development agenda sat uncomfortably with the emphasis on macroeconomic stabilisation. It also lacked a clear implementation strategy and was hobbled further by the recalcitrant old-order bureaucracy and a lack of enthusiasm in the new officials.

In the absence of a broad consensus on a development accord, COSATU continued to argue in alliance meetings for a strategy of implementation with mixed results. The alliance itself has proven incapable of asserting its power over the government. COSATU thus faces a conundrum - the alliance is too weak to assert its power over the executive and other quarters are reluctant to consult.

Another layer of COSATU's engagement for a development strategy was a "war of attrition" against elements of the GEAR strategy. This took many forms including withdrawing from the budget process and mass action against privatisation at a national and sectoral level. COSATU did not abandon the strategy of direct negotiation with the government: for example, it forged national framework agreements on state owned enterprises and municipal assets.

COSATU also engaged government departments and parliament over aspects of economic and social policy, again with mixed results. These engagements were augmented by pressure in NEDLAC to open debates on economic strategy.

The Presidential Jobs Summit and the recent Growth and Development Summits (GDSs) are significant in this respect for two reasons. Symbolically, they represent government willingness, albeit grudgingly, to engage social partners on economic policy. Second, the GDS in particular has opened avenues that were first explored in the Job Summit around sectoral policy. If this element can be driven to its logical conclusion it has the potential of designing an industrial policy for the country.

COSATU has also built broad coalitions by forming tactical alliances with other mass formations largely drawn from the mass democratic movement. Labour was facing a real danger of being marginalised and had to seriously begin building broad coalitions with other forces in civil society.

SEARCH FOR A RECONSTRUCTION ACCORD

Over the last 10 years, contestation centred around economic direction and the need for a new developmental strategy. Such a development strategy, aimed at fostering a new accumulation or growth path, should have four elements:

1. A social wage that sets a minimum living standard for all South Africans. The social wage would combine basic social and municipal services with a basic income grant and other transfers. Since the social services (except for welfare grants) are inherently labour intensive, maintaining the social wage thus makes substantial downsizing of the public service impossible. The social wage must:

- provide an adequate income, healthcare, security and housing to stabilise communities
- accelerate skills development and improve education on a mass scale
- develop more efficient, socialised systems to meet retirement transport and health needs for working people, to reduce the costs of employment while improving benefits
- generally be designed to support economic growth and employment creation as far as possible
- it should be conceptualised and implemented to relieve women's unequal/gendered burden of unpaid labour - therefore policies supporting early childhood development, access to childcare, safe transport, healthcare systems, parental rights, etc. are crucial.

2. A growth strategy that focuses on providing strong policy support for sectors to protect and create quality jobs and meet both domestic and export needs. To this end, it should ensure growth in relatively labour-intensive sectors, such as agriculture and food processing, services and tourism, infrastructure provision and cultural industries. This strategy should contribute to the efficient production of wage goods such as housing and food. In this context, the expansion of housing and social infrastructure such as schools, clinics and police stations, combines improvements in the social wage with a stimulus to investment and employment.

A critical first step is to develop sectoral strategies to guide government, capital and labour. These strategies must ensure that production shifts to meet the changes in domestic demand that result from improvements in the social wage. They must also help diversify exports. Government can support sectoral strategies through:

- targeted investment in transport, communications, schools, clinics and other infrastructure
- measures to ensure that the financial sector supports new kinds of production, including self-employment and co-operatives, as well as low-income housing
- a review of tariffs to ensure that reductions do not unnecessarily harm employment
- rigorous implementation of the skills-development process
- greater support for constructive implementation of new labour policies including agriculture, domestic labour and other sectors that must make a substantial adjustment and
- a strategy to ensure retail networks support domestic production and ensure efficient distribution of wage goods.

3. Democratisation and strengthening of the state through the establishment of systems to permit greater participation by the majority who historically have been shut out of power, as well as more coherent and effective delivery systems and structures. Steps to achieve this end include:

- the definition of procedures for policy development that ensure both a strategic role for the political leadership and the alliance and broad consultation with all major stakeholders, especially working people
- stronger capacity and power for parliament, especially to amend money bills and participate in policy development
- measures to control lobbying by big business by defining consultative forums and limiting the scope for corruption, including setting appropriate constraints on the ability of top officials to move from government directly into business
- the improvement of co-ordination within government, by consolidating departments and giving them capacity for greater co-operation and by establishing a development agency with the power to review, co-ordinate and monitor departmental proposals
- measures to end corruption and control patronage, especially by ensuring collective decisions around employment at all levels.

This requires fiscal and monetary strategies geared to growth. In the last few years there have been improvements in fiscal policy while monetary policy has remained unchanged.

4. Developing alternative centres of economic power. All the other strategies can contribute to this aim, in part by ensuring a stronger state sector, co-operatives and small and micro enterprise linked to black economic empowerment initiative, land reform, improved housing and investment in skills development.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE APPARATUS

The South African public service combines social services and administrative functions. This makes South Africa somewhat unusual as typical public service in other contexts is narrowly confined to the civil service.

In summary, government driven public sector reform over the last 10 years has included:

- overcoming fragmentation of the state by unifying all state departments, establishing new provincial bureaucracies and a new system of local government
- attempts towards integrated planning at a national level through the creation of the ministerial clusters
- the introduction of multi-year budgeting and new financial management systems through, for example, the Public Finance Management Act and the recent Municipal Finance Management Act
- the redeployment of teachers as a means to equalise resources between well and poorly resourced schools
- attempts to downsize the public service
- measures to improve the service ethos of the public service.

These reforms did not deal adequately with the chronic shortages of personnel and resources in the social and security services. This is largely attributed to the fact that emphasis was on cost saving rather than aligning expenditure with needs. While efforts were made, pay levels in the public service for some categories are still low. While efforts were made to close the wage gap between the low skilled and high-earners, the relaxation of fiscal policy has promised more resources, but structures for implementation are often not in place due to cuts made in the late 1990s.

Finally, COSATU successfully negotiated a framework agreement on the restructuring of local government assets. The hallmark of this agreement is that it found expression in legislation - the Municipal System Act. However, the agreement was flouted by a number of municipalities including Johannesburg, and it seems to have stalled as the unions lost faith in the agreement.

STATE POWER CANNOT BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED

COSATU confronts a national democratic state with aspirations to transform it into a developmental state. It is a state that is not completely transformed, where power is diffuse and contested. COSATU's objective over the last 10 years has been to reinforce the progressive elements and resist the pernicious aspects.

In the final analysis, it was hoped that the state would shift towards a more developmental role as opposed to managing the apartheid economy. In the first instance, contestation centred on the direction of economic strategy. COSATU also contested aspects of economic and social policy.

A critical lesson from the first 10 years of democracy is that state power cannot be taken for granted. Moreover, the state is a site of contestation and is not a homogenous entity. The working class should not assume that having a democratic government necessarily means that its voice will determine the direction of the state. In that contest, it must define its own independent agenda for contesting state power.



WHERE HAS ALL THE GROWTH GONE? THE SOUTH AFRICAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 1970-2001

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INTRODUCTION

At the end of the 1960s, after a half century of rapid industrialisation, South Africa had a relatively advanced and diversified manufacturing sector. By the standards of today's advanced industrial countries, South Africa was a very late industrialiser, but it was a very much earlier industrialiser than those East Asian countries which have been the stars of the manufacturing growth firmament since the 1960s. Since the early 1970s, however, South Africa's manufacturing growth performance has deteriorated greatly, and has been especially poor since the early 1980s. This is the central fact which any account of South African manufacturing in the period 1970-2000 must seek to explain.

THE DRIVE TO INDUSTRIALISATION THROUGH IMPORT SUBSTITUTION: 1911-1970

Hard data on the rate of growth and structure of manufacturing industry before World War I are hard to come by. One view, however, is that with some notable exceptions, South African manufacturing industry grew relatively slowly during the first great wave of investment in gold mining, 1886-1911, and at the end of this period was in general of a rudimentary kind. The reasons for the rapid growth of manufacturing which began shortly thereafter are controversial. One probably fundamental factor, however, was the abrupt collapse of new investment in gold mining in 1911, which until then had absorbed most of the capital and technical expertise available to South Africa. The emphasis in South African development shifted, thus, to exploiting the huge scope which existed at the time for industrialisation through import substitution. In 1916/7, the ratio of South Africa's imports to its GDP, and the ratio of manufactured imports to the domestic supply of manufactured goods (that is the ratio of imports to gross output plus imports), both exceeded 50 percent. Furthermore, in the case of non-durable consumer goods, which are generally the focus of industrialisation in its early stages, imports consisted to a major extent of products of the most basic kind. There was thus much scope for relatively easy import substitution. Given the relatively large internal market created by gold, domestic producers took good advantage of the opportunities for profitable import substitution. From World War I through to the end of the 1960s, South Africa industrialised largely through a process of import substitution. Manufacturing value-added (MVA) grew rapidly. The highest MVA growth rate, though not the highest GDP growth rate, in any full decade occurred in the period 1926/7 -1936/7, which included the Great Depression. Both the MVA and GDP growth rates, however, reached their peaks at 9.9 percent and 6.3 percent during 1960-65, with average annual growth rates during the 1960s as a whole of 5.7 percent and 8.6 percent respectively. As a result, the economy diversified considerably, away from primary commodities, towards manufacturing. The percentage share of manufacturing in the GDP increased from 6.2 in 1916/7 to 19.4 in 1956/7 (in constant 1956/7 prices), and further to 22.8 percent (in current prices) in 1970. Manufacturing output also became increasingly diversified. Also, manufactured exports became an increasingly large proportion of South Africa's total exports, rising from 8.2 percent in 1916/7 to 26.3 percent in 1956/7 and to 31.4 percent in 1972 (owing partly to a levelling off of gold exports in 1965-70). The composition of manufactured exports also changed considerably, with the share of non-durable goods (especially food, beverages and tobacco) decreasing substantially in the 30 years to 1956/7; and those of natural resource-based manufactures (such as chemicals, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, and pulp and paper), and of downstream durable goods industries (fabricated metal products, machinery, electrical machinery and transportation equipment) rising. The upshot of these developments was that, as noted earlier, by the early 1970s, South Africa had a relatively mature and diversified manufacturing sector. Comparison with South Korea helps put this in perspective. In 1970, some 58.3 percent of South

Korea's total MVA was still contributed by sub-sectors producing non-durable consumer goods, higher than for any year in South Africa since 1916/7; and the combined MVA share of fabricated metal products, the various capital goods sectors, and the motor vehicle industry, in South Korea was only 12.4 percent, compared with 33.3 percent in South Africa in 1972. Though with a considerable time lag, and at much lower levels of per capita income, South Africa, like some other natural resource-abundant countries, such as Australia and Canada, had apparently made effective use of the internal market for manufactures, and of the rents, created by its natural resource abundance, to achieve a considerable degree of industrialisation.

THE ONSET OF THE DECLINE IN GROWTH

As noted earlier, the average annual rates of growth of both GDP and MVA reached their peak of 6.3 percent and 9.9 percent respectively in 1960-65. They fell to 5.2 percent and 7.4 percent respectively in 1965-70, further (to 3.7 percent and 5.9 percent) in 1970-75 and yet further (to 3.5 percent and 5.3 percent) in 1975-81 (averaging 3.5 percent and 5.6 percent in 1970-81 as a whole). These MVA growth rates, in both 1970-75 and 1975-81, were lower than in any earlier full decade or five year period since World War I, excepting only 1955-60. This was the beginning of the decline of growth rates, and of the descent towards stagnation of the economy as a whole, but especially of manufacturing, which has characterised the period since the early 1980s. As is argued later, in so far as factors peculiar to South Africa are concerned, though other factors may have compounded and propagated it, the initial impulse to decline was a fundamental change in the South African economy in the years between 1965 and 1975. Nearer to the surface, and more readily observable, however, the major feature of the 1970s was the great, gold-led commodity price boom which took off from about 1972.

THE COMMODITY PRICE BOOM OF THE 1970S

Superficially, conditions for growth were very favourable in the 1970s as a whole. The commodity price boom resulted in huge foreign exchange windfalls. Though interrupted by declines in the mid-1970s, the price of gold increased from a yearly average of about $US52 in 1972 to $613 in 1980, before beginning its descent. Commodity prices in general followed a roughly similar pattern, with a large upswing from 1972 to 1980, interrupted by declines from late 1974 through to 1976-77. The effect on the foreign currency value of South Africa's exports of goods was dramatic. Whereas total exports of goods increased at an average annual rate of 5.03 percent in 1965-70, in 1970-80 they grew at 12.4 percent a year. Exports of gold and "other mining" (coal, diamonds, platinum, iron ore, etc) grew at 16.4 percent and 15.3 percent respectively between 1970 and 1980 (compared to absolute declines at 0.9 percent and 1.9 percent respectively in 1965-70). A major effect of this was a substantial real appreciation of the foreign exchange value of the rand. Relative to its level in 1970-72, the real effective exchange rate (REER) was 9.4 percent higher in 1974-78, 24.8 percent higher in 1979-81 and 28.2 percent higher in 1982-83.

INTER-SECTORAL DIFFERENCES IN EXPORT GROWTH RATES

The commodity price boom, and the resulting real appreciation of the rand, thus, represented a huge change in relative prices which impacted on manufacturing industry in various ways. One of these is reflected in the rate of growth and structure of manufactured exports. Whereas South Africa's total exports of goods including gold grew at rates unprecedented at least since World War II, the average annual rate of growth of manufactured exports in the aggregate in 1970-80 (7.2 percent) was slightly lower than in 1960-70 (8.0 percent). This is particularly remarkable considering that the export growth rate of natural resource-based manufactures (represented by chemicals, iron and steel, non-ferrous metal basic industries, and pulp and paper) grew rapidly at 11.9 percent a year in 1970-80. (The share of these sectors in total manufactured exports thus increased from 24.3 percent in 1970 to 37.1 percent in 1980.) As these figures suggest, the exports of non-natural resource-based, more downstream manufactures grew slowly in 1970-80. For instance, the export growth rate of the downstream durable goods group of industries (represented in this study by fabricated metal products, machinery, electrical machinery, motor vehicles and other transportation equipment) fell from an estimated 8.0 percent a year in 1960-70, to 2.1 percent in 1970-80. (Their share in total manufactured exports which had been strongly on the rise before 1956/7, and held steady in the 1960s, fell from 15.7 percent in 1970 to 9.1 percent in 1980.) The effect of the commodity price boom on real exchange rates probably contributed to these inter-sectoral differences in export growth rates. It resulted in a substantial deterioration in the international competitiveness of the more downstream manufacturing sectors. Exporters of minerals and of natural resource-based manufactures were insulated from any adverse effects of the appreciation of the rand on their competitiveness by rising world prices for their output. The price competitiveness of downstream durable goods, however, fell both relative to foreign producers of such goods, and relative to domestically produced primary products and natural resource-based manufactures.

SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT

The substantial change in relative prices resulting from the commodity price boom also had a significant effect on the sectoral allocation of investment within manufacturing industry. The most striking feature of manufacturing investment in the 1970s was that the share of the chemicals sector in manufacturing gross fixed capital formation increased from 7.2 percent in 1974 to 55.7 percent in 1979, and remained high for several years thereafter. This remarkable increase was due mainly to investment in two new, large-scale, capital-intensive synthetic fuel plants, known as Sasol II and Sasol III (Sasol I having been constructed in the early 1950s). As the above discussion indicated, by the 1970s, import/domestic supply ratios, and consequently the scope for further import contribution, were considerably lower than in earlier decades. Because of this, and the appreciation of the rand, conditions in general were not conducive to import substitution. One major exception, however, was production of alternative energy sources, that

is, of alternatives to imported crude oil. The price of oil had increased five-fold in a short space of time after the 1973 oil crisis, and trebled again after the second, in 1979. Also, when the decisions were taken to construct the Sasol II and Sasol III plants, in 1974 and 1979 respectively, real interest rates in South Africa (as in the world economy in general) were low, indeed, at times negative, and the strong rand made for relatively low prices of imported capital equipment. Together these three factors (high oil prices, low real interest rates, and a strong rand) resulted in a relatively low user-cost of capital. It is debatable whether Sasol II and Sasol III were then, or subsequently, commercially justifiable propositions or should be seen simply as late, gross examples of South Africa's (allegedly inefficient) traditional import-substituting strategy, necessitated now by political circumstances. At the time, however, conditions for them could hardly have been more favourable. Earlier in the decade, as a result of decisions taken before the major commodity price upswing, another capital-intensive, natural resource-based sector which accounted for a sizeable proportion of manufacturing investment, was the iron and steel industry. This was apparently related to the expansion of ISCOR's steelworks in Pretoria and Vanderbijlpark in 1973, and its completion of a new plant in Newcastle in 1974.

INTER-SECTORAL DIFFERENCES IN VALUE-ADDED GROWTH RATES

The effects of the commodity price boom discussed so far were those stemming mainly from the change in relative prices which it brought about. However, it also had a substantial effect on the level of expenditure in the economy. That is, it had spending effects as well as price effects. The most striking spending effect of the commodity price boom was a substantial increase in gross domestic fixed capital formation in the economy as a whole, including the large scale investments in synthetic fuels discussed above. The ratio of economy-wide fixed capital (GDFC) formation to GDP increased substantially between 1970 and 1975, fell through to 1978, but with the cyclical upswing, thereafter, increased considerably again through to 1981 (almost to the 1975 level, the highest GDFC/GDP ratio since World War II). The output of the sectors comprising the downstream durable goods group of industries (fabricated metal products, machinery, electrical machinery, motor vehicles and other transport equipment) consists to a significant extent of capital goods, the demand for which is very sensitive to variations in the level of investment. These are the major capital goods-producing manufacturing sectors. The general increase in investment in 1970-81 resulted in rapid growth of value-added in this category of manufacturing industries. Thus, their average annual output growth in 1970-81 was relatively rapid, at 7.3 percent compared to the 6.2 percent of the natural resource-based sectors. Any negative effects of the commodity price boom on the price competitiveness of these sectors, and hence on their exports were thus more than offset by the positive spending effects of the boom on their output. The sensitivity of the rate of growth of these sectors, and hence to a significant extent of total MVA, to the level of investment, evident in 1970-81, is crucial to understanding the stagnation of South African manufacturing industry since the early 1980s. The tendency for the degree of export orientation and the rate of growth of output of these sectors to be inversely related remains, but now with relatively rapid export growth, and increasing export orientation, associated with declining output.

THE SLOWDOWN IN THE WORLD ECONOMY

The discussion of the 1970s has so far touched on the relative price and spending effects of the commodity price boom on South Africa as a minerals-rich economy. Especially, it has emphasised inter-sectoral differences in the performance of manufacturing industry caused by the boom. Beneath the surface, however, various real forces were at work slowing the growth of the economy as a whole, including in particular manufacturing industry. Some of these forces, to be described later, were peculiar to South Africa, and involved fundamental changes in the structure of the economy. One major real factor, external to South Africa, however, was the slowdown in the growth of the world economy in the 1970s. A deterioration in growth performance in the 1970s was obviously not peculiar to South Africa. The OECD recession of 1974-77 was the most severe since World War II. Its effects are reflected in the variations in output growth rates in South African manufacturing during the period 1970-81. This was probably the major external reason for the worsening of South Africa's growth performance in the 1970s. It is striking, though, that decline in South Africa's per capita growth rate was greater than that of developing countries in general. In developing countries, the mean per capita growth rate fell by 0.94 percentage points, from 2.68 percent in 1960-73 to 1.74 percent in 1973-82. In South Africa, however, the per capita growth rate fell from 2.44 percent in 1960-73 to 0.75 percent in 1973-82, that is by 1.69 percentage points, significantly more than in developing countries in general. This suggests the possibility of some special factor operating in the case of South Africa which made for a larger proportional decline than in developing countries in general. It seems, thus, that the deterioration in South Africa's per capita growth and hence in the growth of manufacturing industry must be explained both in terms of factors which made for the slowdown in the world economy as a whole from about 1973, and in terms of some factor peculiar to itself.

ECONOMIC CRISIS

For a while, between 1965 and 1972, there had been the possibility of South Africa shifting from its traditional strategy of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) to export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) in relatively placid economic conditions. As the rapid growth of gold output from 1951 onwards came to an end, gold exports reached their peak in 1965 and declined (at a rate of 0.9 percent a year) in 1965-70. The resulting slow growth of South Africa's exports led to the appointment of the Reynders Commission in 1969 to inquire into South Africa's export trade. Its report, published in 1972, emphasised the need for diversification into non-gold exports, including manufactures, and proposed the use of direct export promotion measures. For a moment, thus, there had been the possibility of South Africa making the transition to EOI. The ink had hardly dried on the Reynders Commission report, however, when it was overtaken by

events, and, for the time-being at least, rendered superfluous by the natural resource boom of the 1970s. A shift to EOI between 1972 and 1981 was neither necessary nor economically feasible. The problem of sustaining export growth in the face of declining gold exports, however, returned with a vengeance in the early to middle 1980s. With the collapse of the commodity price boom, and in the context of the OECD downturn of 1980-1983, the exports of all the main sectors of the economy fell sharply. The rand began to depreciate in late 1983, and fell precipitously from mid-1984, culminating in the debt crisis of August 1985 and the rescheduling of foreign debt. As in many other developing countries which had been subjected to such debt shocks in the early 1980s, the immediate effect was a sharp reduction in gross domestic expenditure, particularly investment, which fell by 20 percent between 1984 and 1986. The most urgent requirement for recovery was accelerated growth of exports, including, especially, manufactured exports to compensate for the decline of gold and other commodities. The effect of these events was an abrupt, involuntary shift to export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) in conditions of economic crisis. In a mood of optimism before the debt crisis, a deliberate voluntary process of import liberalisation had in fact been instituted in 1983, which resulted in a substantial reduction in quantitative restrictions (QRs) in 1983-85. The real depreciation of the rand, together with domestic recession, however, were the decisive factors in the shift to a system of incentives less biased towards production for the domestic market and more favourable to exports. Following the debt crisis in 1985-90, QRs were relaxed further, systems of duty-free-imports-for-exports were introduced in the motor vehicles, textiles and clothing industries in early 1989 and export subsidies, in the form of the general export incentive scheme were introduced in April 1990. Between 1990 and 1995, import surcharges, which had been imposed earlier in response to the foreign exchange crisis, were removed. Comprehensive tariff reductions began with the commencement of the Uruguay Round implementation period in January 1995.

THE GROWTH AND CHANGING STRUCTURE OF MANUFACTURED EXPORTS

In 1985-90, following the debt crisis and the real depreciation of the rand, and in the context of revival of OECD economics, the average annual rate of growth of manufactured exports, measured in constant US dollars, accelerated to 14.2 percent, considerably faster than the 7.2 percent growth rate of the 1970s. The period 1985-90, following the Plaza Accord of September 1985, was however one in which the US dollar depreciated substantially against other major currencies, especially the yen and the mark. The real increase in the foreign currency value of South Africa's exports in this period was thus not nearly as great as the rate of growth of exports measured in constant US dollars suggests. The question of the effect of export growth on South Africa's capacity to import essential inputs and capital goods is important and we return to it below. Of particular interest at this point, however, is the change in the sectoral structure of manufactured exports after 1985. What is striking is that, whereas the average annual rate of growth of the exports of the natural resource-based group of sectors (measured in constant trade-weighted foreign currency) fell to 4.8 percent in 1985-90, compared to 11.9 percent in 1970-80; that of the downstream durable goods group accelerated considerably to 15.7 percent in 1985-90, from 0.7 percent in 1970-80. In the 1990s, the average annual rate of growth of South Africa's manufactured exports in the aggregate increased to 8.7 percent in 1990-95 (owing to especially rapid growth in 1993-95, with the revival of OECD economics); but this could not be sustained, and it fell to 4.8 percent in 1995-98 (a period which ended with the East Asian crisis). Particularly pertinent at this juncture, however, is that in both these parts of the 1990s, as in 1985-90, the durable goods group of industries performed better, in terms of export expansion, than the other major categories of manufacturing industry - averaging a growth rate, in trade-weighted foreign currency, of 10.6 percent per annum in 1990-98 as a whole. With the end of the commodity price boom, thus, it seemed there was a shift in South Africa's comparative advantage within manufacturing towards the downstream durable goods sectors. This has in effect represented a return to underlying trends which were in operation before the aberration caused by the commodity price boom. There was also a significant increase in the degree of export-orientation in manufacturing industry. The ratio of total manufactured exports to the total sales of manufacturing industry, in the aggregate, fell during the commodity price boom, but thereafter increased from 9.1 percent in 1983, to 12.7 percent in 1990, 19.1 percent in 1995, and 21.1 percent in 1998. This impressive display of increased export-orientation, however, is a sign not of the success of manufacturing industry, but of its deep-seated problems.

EXPORT-ORIENTED STAGNATION

As noted earlier, the rate of growth of manufacturing value-added in 1970-81, 5.6 percent a year, was the lowest MVA growth rate in any full decade since World War I. It fell considerably further, however, to an average annual rate of 1.6 percent in 1985-9026, and to 0.2 percent in 1990-95, recovering only slightly to 0.7 percent in 1995-98. The increases in the degree of export orientation of manufacturing industry noted above were thus largely due to the stagnation of manufacturing output. It is noteworthy, indeed, that since 1985, the very manufacturing category that has experienced the most rapid export growth, and the largest increases in export orientation - the durable goods group - has had the lowest output growth rates, and shown the biggest proportional decline in output growth compared to the 1970s. As noted earlier, the output of the downstream durable goods group of industries (fabricated metal products, machinery, electrical machinery, motor vehicles and other transport equipment) consists to a greater extent of capital goods than in other manufacturing sectors. These sectors, which collectively were the laggards in export growth but the best performers in terms of output growth in 1970-81, had relatively rapid export growth and the largest increase in export orientation since 1985, but absolute decline in real value-added. Value-added in these sectors fell at an average annual rate of 2.1 percent in 1980-90 and 1.1 percent in 1990-98. By contrast - a fact of some significance for the future

sectoral growth path of the economy - value-added in the natural resource-based manufacturing industries (which has increased in every five-year sub-period since 1970), grew at 2.0 percent in 1980-90 and 2.7 percent in 1990-98. The decline of value-added in the downstream durable goods manufacturing sectors is clearly largely due to the decline in the economy-wide rate of investment, to which demand for their output is particularly sensitive. The significance of these sectors, thus, is not only that their decline has impeded the growth of manufacturing industry in general, but that they are a barometer of the state of the domestic economy as a whole. By comparison, the natural resource-based category of manufacturing sectors has put in a relatively solid output growth performance. Just as the downstream durable goods sectors grew fastest in 1970-81 when the rate of investment rose to unprecedented levels, so they have been hardest hit by the substantial declines in levels of capital formation. Revival of growth in these sectors, and in manufacturing as a whole, thus depends heavily on a revival of the domestic demand for capital goods. As things are, there is a situation in which South Africa's comparative advantage, judging by shares in exports, has shifted towards these downstream durable goods sectors, and towards manufacturing in general, but in which both the shares of these sectors in MVA and of manufacturing in GDP, have fallen. Before going on to consider the reasons for the deterioration in the growth performance of South African manufacturing industry since the 1960s, and in particular the decline of investment and the stagnation of the economy since the early 1980s, it should be noted that the extent of the decline in South Africa's growth since the early 1980s has been apparently very much in line with the experience of developing countries in general. It seems, thus, that, so far as the relatively large decline in South Africa's per capita growth rate between 1960-73 and 1973-82 is concerned, the causes must be sought in factors peculiar to South Africa, as well as in factors common to developing and developed countries.

THE DECLINE IN THE OUTPUT OF GOLD

One factor peculiar to South Africa, which has probably contributed significantly to the decline in the rate of GDP and MVA growth since the 1960s, is the decline in the physical volume of gold output. This probably accounts at least partly for the size of the decline in South Africa's growth rate between 1960-73 and 1973-82, relative to the average for developing countries. With the opening of the Orange Free State gold fields, gold output increased almost uninterruptedly from 348 000kg in 1951, to a peak of 1 000 0000kg in 1970, but at a declining rate from 1965 on, as the maximum output permitted by existing deposits was approached. Despite the huge increase in the gold price in the 1970s, the output of gold in physical terms began falling after 1970, and in the year 2000 was only 43 percent of its 1970 level. These changes in the physical output of gold resulted in a significant decline in the rate of growth of real value-added in mining as a whole in 1965-70, compared to 1960-65, and a substantial absolute decline in 1970-75. This would clearly have had a significant negative impact on GDP, and probably largely accounts for the 1.50 percent decline in the GDP growth rate from 5.15 percent in 1965-70 to 3.65 percent in 1970-75. This would have contributed significantly to a sudden lowering of the long-term growth trajectory of the economy in the early 1970s, and made for lower GDP growth in 1973-82 than in 1960-73. While perhaps the whole of the decline in GDP growth between these two periods cannot be explained in these terms, this factor, apparently peculiar to South Africa, seems to account for a significant part of the decline in South Africa's per capita growth in 1973-82, relative to the past, and to other developing countries. Whereas conditions during the commodity price boom of the 1970s seemed favourable, underneath it all real forces were at work to slow the growth of the South African economy, as a whole.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONSTRAINED GROWTH AND EXCESS CAPACITY

There has apparently been substantial reduction in the ability of the South African economy since the early 1980s to grow without running into balance of payments difficulties. This is suggested by evidence of a significant unfavourable change since the early 1980s in the historical relationship between the rate of growth of the GDP and the ratio of the current account deficit to GDP. This ratio, in the years since 1994, for instance, has been such as would be associated with much higher GDP growth rates in earlier decades. This suggests a foreign exchange constraint on South African economic growth. Given the complementarity, in domestic output and investment, between domestic resources and imported intermediate and capital goods, this view implies that the upper limit on output and investment since the early 1980s has been set by the availability of foreign exchange. There are various possible reasons for this. One possibility is a decline in the rate of growth of South Africa's exports. As noted above, between 1965 and 1972 South Africa faced the problem of sustaining the growth of its total exports, and the prospect of a tightening foreign exchange constraint. In 1985-90, South Africa's total exports measured in constant US dollars grew at a relatively good rate (of 5.8 percent a year), but as indicated earlier, this gives a misleading impression of the effect of export growth on import capacity. In constant price trade-weighted currency units, a more appropriate measure, South Africa's total exports in 1985-90 fell at 0.8 percent a year, owing to an 8.2 percent a year decline in gold exports. This aggravated the problems caused by the foreign debt crisis, which had involved a sudden, massive withdrawal of foreign exchange, and produced a substantial contraction of the economy. In the 1990s, merchandise exports (i.e. exports of goods other than gold), increased at average annual rates of 5.4 percent and 6.1 percent, in 1990-95 and 1995-2000 respectively. Both of these growth rates were higher than the average annual rates of growth of merchandise exports in 1950-70. Weighed down by declining gold exports, however, total exports increased at average annual rates of 3.1 percent and 4.1 percent in 1990-95 and 1995-2000 respectively, both lower than the average of 4.5 percent for 1950-70. Following the absolute declines in total exports in the 1980s, these export growth rates in the 1990s have not been sufficient to generate the foreign exchange earnings needed to raise GDP and MVA growth

rates significantly towards pre-1980 levels. If the period of the global and South African economic downswing from 1990 to 1992 is excluded, however, South Africa's export performance in the 1990s improves considerably. Measured in trade-weighted foreign currency units, the average annual rate of growth of total exports was especially rapid, at 5.8 percent in 1992-95, in the initial phase of recovery from the recession. Despite slower growth thereafter - and absolute decline in 1998 and 1999 - this rate was 4.7 percent in 1992-2000. This was higher than the average in 1950-70, and indeed higher than in any period before 1970. As would be expected in a situation in which foreign exchange is a binding constraint, this improved export-growth performance was accompanied by accelerated GDP growth. GDP increased at an average annual rate of 2.48 percent in 1992-2000, a substantial improvement on the 1.67 percent of 1985-90. The GDP growth rate in 1992-2000, however, was modest by the standards of earlier decades, and, though the rate of growth of manufacturing value-added also increased, it remained relatively low, at 1.8 percent a year in 1992-2000. It seems, therefore, that other factors may have changed in this period, in ways which have prevented rapid export growth from alleviating the foreign exchange constraint sufficiently to move GDP and MVA growth rates closer to their pre-1980 levels. One striking difference between earlier and more recent decades is a significant decline in the rate of import substitution. In earlier decades, the effect of GDP growth on import growth was contained in some measure by rapid import replacement. In the period after 1992, however, merchandise imports grew rapidly despite the relatively modest GDP growth. In 1992-98, when total exports increased at an average annual rate of 5.0 percent, merchandise imports increased at 9.0 percent a year. This was just short of the rate of growth of merchandise imports in 1960-65, though GDP growth of 2.48 percent a year in 1992-98 was less than half the level of 5.9 percent a year in 1960-65. Import penetration ratios in manufacturing industry also increased substantially in the 1990s, especially after 1993.

AN INADEQUATE SUPPLY OF SKILLS?

There is evidence of a significant increase in the demand for skilled relative to unskilled labour in South Africa. For instance, data indicate that the number of skilled workers employed increased in all the main sectors of the economy - primary, secondary and tertiary - between 1984 and 1997, and that only in the skilled category did employment increase (with the minor exception of the number of "elementary" workers in manufacturing). In all other categories, in all sectors, employment fell. The result was a substantial increase in the proportion of skilled workers in each sector. (Edwards 2000) This suggests a growing scarcity of skilled relative to unskilled labour, consistent perhaps with the idea that a scarcity of skills is a key reason for the stagnation of manufacturing industry. Yet it poses a puzzle, brought out more clearly by other evidence. Using a different dataset, Bhorat (2001) finds that in manufacturing industry, between 1993 and 1997, there was an increase of 16 283 in "highly skilled" workers, but a decline of 4 589 "skilled" and 28 192 "unskilled" workers, giving an overall job loss of 16 478 in manufacturing. In marked contrast, in the Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services (FIRE) sector, there were increases of 27 302 "highly skilled" and 30 487 "skilled" workers, but a decrease of 9 709 "unskilled" workers, giving an overall increase of 48 080 jobs. It should be noted too that, according to Bhorat's figures, the FIRE sector is a great deal more skills-intensive than manufacturing as a whole. Furthermore, though the total labour force in FIRE was only one-third of that of manufacturing in 1993, the increase in employment of "highly skilled" workers in FIRE in 1993-97 was more than two-thirds greater than in manufacturing as a whole. The puzzle is this: if a shortage in the supply of skills, as such, is a binding constraint on the growth of manufacturing industry, why was the output and employment growth performance of the FIRE sector, a far more skills-intensive sector, so vastly superior to that of manufacturing, especially in the 1990s? The relatively rapid output and employment growth rates of the FIRE sector suggest that an inadequate supply of skills as such may not be a key reason for the stagnation of manufacturing, but rather that various factors have resulted in huge differences in their respective demands for skilled labour and, indeed, for labour in general. The problems of manufacturing, in short, may lie more deep seatedly within South African manufacturing itself. The FIRE sector, commonly associated with the "new economy", seems to have grown rapidly worldwide in the 1990s, unlike manufacturing. In this context, South Africa with its well-developed financial system, good accounting standards and a legal system conducive to such activities, has been well-placed for growth in this area. These factors, which have given South Africa a comparative advantage in this area, have enabled employers to productively use, and hence to attract, skilled people. Supply has responded to demand. This does not mean that the supply of skills, as distinct from the demand for them, is irrelevant. The ability of supply to respond to demand presupposes a potential supply. South Africa, as a middle-income country, had a skills-endowment (as measured by average number of years of schooling) in 1990 intermediate to those of poorer and richer nations, and apparently slightly better than the average for Latin America. This should give South Africa a comparative advantage at intermediate levels of skill-intensity. Indeed, Edwards finds, for the period 1993-97, a high correlation between the skill-intensity of sectors and their export growth rates, suggesting a comparative advantage recently in relatively skills-intensive sectors. As we have seen, though, neither the exports nor (especially) the output of manufacturing industry has grown nearly fast enough over the past two decades. The question is whether a shortage of skills at the higher levels is now the major obstacle to the substantial increase in the output of tradable manufactured goods that is needed. The argument here is that conditions for manufacturing itself have simply not been such as to enable manufacturers to compete with the FIRE sector and other areas of skills-intensive non-manufacturing activity (including, for instance, the communications industry), for the supply, such as it is, of high level skills. This idea, that there is a shortage of skills which is a fundamental obstacle to growth, has also relied on evidence of large and possibly

increasing disparities between the earnings of skilled and unskilled people in South Africa (Bhorat, 2000). As is well known, however, growing skilled/unskilled earnings differentials have also been a feature of the United States over the past few decades. It clearly does not follow from this that the long-term relative decline of US manufacturing industry is due to a shortage of skills. The reasons for this decline, as for the decline in the growth trajectories of industrial and developing countries in general since the 1960s - and for the deterioration in the growth performance of South Africa in particular - must be sought elsewhere.

PERSPECTIVES ON MANUFACTURING GROWTH

The earlier discussion of the problems of the decline in real value-added in mining since the early 1970s, and of the foreign exchange constraint (due partly to the decline of gold exports), suggests one possible perspective on the decline in the growth of the South African economy, and its stagnation (especially in manufacturing) since the early 1980s. It is the rather pessimistic one that, having seen the rise of an unusually minerals-rich economy from about 1870 to about 1970, we are now witnessing its more or less inevitable decline. It seems, however, that the problems of the South African economy, and the prospects for its recovery, cannot simply be seen in such South Africa-centred terms. Factors operating at a global level must also have contributed to the deterioration of South Africa's growth performance in the past, and will affect its growth trajectory in future. There has been a marked decline in developing relative to developed country growth rates since the early 1980s. One reason for this is that, compared to the undemanding technologies of mass production during 1960-79, skill-biased technical change since the early 1980s has favoured developed countries, leaving poorer countries behind. In the United States, industrial machinery and electronic and electrical machinery, which include the production of computers and semi-conductors respectively - and are thus regarded as new economy sectors - have contributed significantly to output and productivity in the economy as a whole. In South Africa, though, the durable goods group, especially these new economy manufacturing sectors, are those which have had particularly poor growth since the early 1980s. This suggests that an inability to penetrate significantly into skills-intensive, high-tech manufacturing of products central to the IT revolution may be one reason developing countries like South Africa have fallen behind. Another perspective is the prevalent sanguine view of the stagnation of manufacturing industry, and the shift to services, as a natural and beneficial transition to the new economy. Even in the US this view is not completely accepted. In South Africa, employment has fallen in both manufacturing and formal sector services, as well as in the primary sector. The increased share of services in GDP has been largely due to slow growth in the rest of the economy. As the significant contribution of the new-economy sectors to US growth since 1995 indicates, manufacturing has mattered a good deal in the US. In South Africa, likewise, economic revival depends to a significant extent on improved growth of the durable goods manufacturing sectors. Continuing increases in the relative importance of services are incompatible with further increases in the GDP growth rate. Finally, the challenge facing South Africa is that of climbing the international ladder of industrial production to more high-tech, more skill-intensive, higher value-added manufacturing activities, but the obstacles to this are formidable in today's global conditions. It is particularly difficult for a natural resource abundant economy, with an intermediate skills endowment, which is a relative latecomer to export-oriented industrialisation. In a world in which many developing countries are striving for the same thing, raising our level of educational and skills attainment - while very necessary - will not necessarily increase comparative advantage in skills-intensive activities, or therefore increase the growth rate. In these circumstances, dependence on natural resource-based products, may be more of a blessing than it has appeared in the past. South Africa is likely to remain heavily dependent on these for a considerable time to come and should make the most of its comparable advantages, to increase its exports and output, while upgrading its skills and educational levels, and in other ways trying to promote further diversification of the economy. Much seems to depend on the future growth of the advanced industrial countries. South Africa's GDP growth rate in 1995-2000 was substantially higher than in any other five-year period since 1980 (though not as high as in any such period before 1980). Growth rates in virtually all the main sectors, excepting mining, improved in the latter half of the 1990s. This improvement in South Africa's growth rate, however, has occurred in the context of, and is probably due to, the protracted US upswing beginning in 1992, which saw US GDP growth accelerate to 3.9 percent a year in 1995-2000. Though South Africa has not yet been pulled up to these levels, a quick and sustained resumption of such growth rates in the US could well raise further the rate of growth of the South African economy, and facilitate its restructuring.

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COMING OF AGE IN TIMES OF CRISIS

BY LANGA ZITA
The author is a member of the South African parliament. This is a talk delivered to students at the Peninsula Technikon

Indeed, it is a great honour for us to appear before you today. I wish the setting was different that instead of a talk we would be having a discussion, a common search, a joint enterprise, on what it means to be young and educated, in a young country. If we were in Ghana in 1957, the year of their independence, the air would have been different, full of exuberance and excitement. I think there is excitement in this room, but it is not absolute, it is aware of the challenges that lie ahead.

A teacher friend of mine, who comes from a working class background has been without work for the past five years. She did everything that this society demanded of her. She played by the rules. She sacrificed. She eschewed the temptations that come with youth, she overcame the odds and successfully completed her tertiary education. But the job would not come. I asked myself what does this society want from working people. When you don't play by the rules, it punishes you, but even when you play by the rules and succeed, it still punishes you.

I do not plan to promote pessimism. I am actually an optimist in many ways. What I do want to share is the inordinate challenge that all of us face as we seek to fashion a better life for all of us.

We are living in a complex world, a world of a dead Apollo.

The world today has come full circle. This circle was started with the advent of western civilisation in what is referred to as the Greek classical period. This is the period that gave rise to such great scholars such as Plato, Socrates and Pythagoras of the famous Pythagoras theorem. A fundamental feature of the classical civilisation was the replacement of hope with expectation. The Greek god Apollo was the ultimate embodiment of absolute control. Hope is to be at the mercy of the fate and in the hands of the gods whilst expectation is to be God. Expectation is about being in total control, about predictability and knowing and being certain of the ultimate outcome of what you are involved in.

What does this reference to the Greek world mean to us? Most of the things we have come to expect as a result of being educated are no longer guaranteed. Playing by the rules is no longer the sure way to a secure life. The playing field itself is changing, the game is on, and the rules are ad hoc.

Why is this the case? All of us are part of the modern world. The Greek classical period was the precursor of a world designed and controlled by humans which developed in contrast to the barbarian world that preceded it. It died more than 2 000 years ago. The modern world which we are part of is perhaps 300 years old. It is the outcome of the European renaissance, in which major scientific discoveries, such as those of Galileo and Newton laid the foundation for a scientific age where chance was replaced by predictability.

These scientific discoveries coincided with the rise of capitalism - the production of goods, not for use, but for sale. Drawing on the scientific discoveries the capitalist system brought about the most advanced form of economic production that human kind has ever experienced.

If control and expectation were achieved by the Greeks using slave labour in their city states, capitalism has achieved this on a world scale. Capitalism has changed almost every facet of human and natural life into a commodity. Factories use science. Barring a mechanical failure, they know exactly what and how much of a product they seek to produce.

A fundamental aspect of capitalism is competition. Each of the companies seeks to win and subsequently all are forced to improve the way they undertake production. Over the past 150 years, competition has led to so much innovation that there have been tremendous achievements in productivity.

In its initial stages, capitalism was progressive. It brought tremendous changes to people's lives. It transformed serfs into workers, away from the quietness of rural life to the cosmopolitanism of urban life. The urban life was a life of possibilities, a life of change and excitement. More importantly, capitalism offered an integrated life. It seemed as though there was something for everyone. It offered a predictable life. Workers had jobs and they founded their unions, stayed in working-class suburbs, had their houses and their pubs. It was not a perfect life, but a good life for many. This certainly was the case in the capitalism of the developed world.

Capitalism was not just a national system, characterised by the contradictions between workers and capitalists. From the beginning it had global ambitions. In globalising, it created developed and underdeveloped areas. In pursuit of markets and raw materials, the developed world colonised the rest of the world, and gave capitalism a global face of

a combined but unequal and uneven geography. When President Thabo Mbeki refers to the underdevelopment of Africa, he is referring to a feature that has been with capitalism from its inception. A feature that capitalism, in its own terms, has proved incapable of solving.

The capitalism that we have in our country bears the imprint of this underdevelopment. The causes of this underdevelopment relate to the way the capitalist system and the civilisation of modernity were brought to our continent. Capitalism did not evolve from within the interstices of our society. It was brought from outside through colonialism. It was, from the beginning, underpinned by an alien logic, and outsiders' logic. It had at its helm Europeans who wanted the rich mineral deposits for their manufacturing needs in Europe, and not for the development of the South African economy. Even the limited manufacturing that emerged succumbed to this reality. That explains why the South African economy has mostly had to rely on reserves or homelands as supplementary economies for the modern capitalist economy. This further explains why there was no further industrialisation capable of absorbing the majority of black workers both in the urban and in the rural sectors. This skewed capitalist regime was further consolidated by the apartheid system with all its gruesome Group Areas Act and other laws. It sought to complete what the processes of global capitalist accumulation had set in motion.

Whilst the European working classes had a good, if not perfect life, under capitalism, we were from the beginning short-changed. It would be wrong to describe every aspect of our encounter with capitalism as wrong. Capitalism through colonialism drew us into a universal culture, the civilisation of modernity. Despite our distorted entry, we are part of the modern world. It is a world that counts many positive achievements, a world of the values of the French Revolution, "Liberty, Fraternity, Equality", a world of tremendous technological prowess, a world of democracy and political freedom. It is simultaneously also a world of the atom bomb, a world in which human beings have developed the capacity to end the world and human civilisation itself.

The counter-position of the celebration of life as depicted in the values of the French Revolution and the threat to human life through the creation of the atom bomb, reflects the ambiguity of modernity. It is this ambiguity that I want to speak to.

The capitalism of today, both in the developed world and in the underdeveloped world, is no longer progressive. Its progressive character only relates to its capacity to develop new and advanced technologies. But these technologies appear as a double-edged sword. The technologies I am referring to are robotics or computers.

Increasingly there is an acceleration of computerisation in production. The South African Breweries (SAB) factory in East London used to employ 2 000 workers. It closed down and shifted to a new plant in Port Elizabeth which employs about 300 workers and has greatly improved its productivity due to the introduction of new and advanced technologies. COSATU's submission to the trade and industry portfolio committee of parliament indicated to us that the most globally competitive firms, which means the better performing ones, were simultaneously shedding jobs due to the introduction of new technologies.

Of course there is a view that we as a country are moving to more technologically-advanced forms of production, and we need to realign the workforce with more skills to adapt to the new labour market demands. There is some truth in this. However, European countries have been dealing with this technological change for some time and their labour forces have tried to adapt to the new skill demands, but their levels of unemployment remain very high. It is therefore implausible that 45 percent unemployed South Africans would all get jobs if only they had computer-based skills.

There is therefore both a crisis of expectation and a crisis of hope. Humanity, having perfected production in order to control and predict its outcomes, is threatening its own capacity to reproduce itself. Its highest inventions, robots, are threatening the stability of society. Playing by the rules is not enough!

What are the implications of this challenge for us? We need to acknowledge the fact that as a result of this crisis, the crisis of the job system, a significant number of new graduates may not get the jobs they want. For the first time, we will have to deal with the reality of a number of educated professional people who are unemployed. Any student of history knows that the greatest danger to social stability is the co-existence of a layer of educated professionals threatened by social change and a mass of deprived and destitute people. That co-existence is dynamite. It can wreck whatever project of stabilisation that we are presently creating.

In the past, revolutionaries used to appeal to the consciences of the professional and middle classes to participate in revolutionary change. The great African revolutionary from Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau, Amilcar Cabral, called upon African intellectuals to "commit class suicide" and to "return to the source" to the people. Your generation is the first one in African history who will not have to be convinced of this option. This option will be the only viable path for your own survival.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

To understand what has to be done we need to understand the root cause of the problem, in order to apply the most appropriate responses to it. What we have is a problem of modernity. It is a problem that is created by us. It might express itself as the disarticulation of modernity, what Touraine calls "demodernisation", the death of the historical consensus that made capitalism appealing to most sections of society particularly in the developed world. The capitalism that had everything for the capitalist, the worker and the youth is no more. Its demise is humanly-caused and so will its solution be. In looking for the solution we cannot dream

of solutions derived from non-rationality, the world of mythology. We will have to draw reflectively on reason, to seek to understand the causes of the crisis we face and the possibilities of a way out. We will have to reinvent modernity in order to address the crisis of modernity.

Is this crisis of modernity and the job system a curse, or is it a "perverted form of potential blessing"? Is this a correct question to ask, can one see a crisis as a potential blessing? The present crisis is the logical outcome of the capitalist system - the capitalist system in its logic cannot solve these questions. Precisely because the present problem cannot be solved within the framework of capitalism, the solution can catapult us into a different civilisation. It is therefore important that the response to this crisis embraces elements that take us out of the system. Nothing would be more cruel and less imaginative than to clamour for solutions within the logic of the dying, rather than to face the challenge of building a new system of social life.

To respond effectively to this crisis, we will have to recover our capacity for dissidence. We will have to recover our sense of being subjects. According to Gorz (1999)

Indeed, the subject, as defined by Touraine, becomes the only foundation for legitimate and effective social critique, when the self-evidences, unquestionable convictions, social roles and identities are swept away by an ongoing process of social change and disintegration. Individuals can then no longer be explained and understood by their position in society, by what society expects from them or by what they are accustomed to expect from it... Individuals are expected, on the contrary, to be prepared for continual changes: for changing jobs, skills, patterns of consumption, lifestyle, residence etc. They are set free from social enrolment

It is these "freed" individuals who have to reclaim their freedom and define it for themselves as individuals and together create a humanistic future for themselves. This is the difficult challenge that we have to confront.

What counts in our favour is the fact that we are in South Africa, and we are led by revolutionaries and a revolutionary movement. Increasingly as the tripartite alliance, we are coming to the conclusion that the game and the field are changing. We are aware that we cannot jump out of the capitalist train. But we are aware that the train is heading towards a cliff. We believe that we have to move and walk on many legs. We have to strengthen the economy that we have. It has to be modernised, we have to train the people to acquire new skills, we have to make our industries internationally competitive, and manage public finances intelligently. In the same vein, we have to understand that not everyone will be absorbed, even by an improving economy. To that extent we have to look at different ways of addressing the challenge of sustainable livelihoods.

In this regard, we are talking about two principal challenges and strategies. The first one, which activists in the democratic movement are beginning to work on, is the building of an alternative economy. An economy that is consciously built by people who understand that there are serious problems in the dominant economy. An economy that is both linked to, but simultaneously rebels against, the capitalist logic. We are talking of an economy that promotes co-operation. An economy that understands that as individuals we might be weak when participating in the economy, but if we come together we can be strong. A R100 that buys groceries may not achieve much, but a hundred poor people bringing R100 each are R10 000 stronger and can negotiate a better deal. We talk therefore about a consumer co-operative. We talk about community-owned enterprises. Organised communities can bring their weight and influence to access tenders and share collectively the profits. As the ANC, we resolved in our recent policy conference to make resources to promote this kind of alternative development available.

Such an alternative economy will need managers, it will need engineers, etc. You can participate fully in such initiatives. Certainly, the salaries may not be the same as in the dominant economy, they will be less, but they should be able to offer a decent life.

This brings me to the second challenge: that of a change of consciousness, a cultural revolution. The present crisis forces the majority of us to question whether capitalism offers all of us a future. I think the answer is evident: NO! If that is the case, we will have to ask ourselves whether we want advertising agents to manufacture our needs and our tastes, or whether we should not do it for ourselves.

Erykah Badu and Lauryn Hill are hated by the media, particularly by fashion designers, because they design their own clothes. A number of women with clear African identity and form of dress are becoming part of our lives. They make their clothes. Maybe the cultural revolution is already with us. You do not have to go to Woolworths to be beautiful. What stands before us is a new civilisation struggling to be born. Let us embrace the challenge.

THE CONFLICT AND GOVERNANCE FACILITY:

A SOUTH AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN UNION PARTNERSHIP: MEASURED PATHWAYS TOWARDS PEACE...?

South Africa is poised at a time of innovation, reinvention, exploration and fusion. As the strong brand of 'Democratic South Africa' emerges, there are opportunities to explore new approaches to running a country, to search for diverse and innovative methods to make the nation work, to fuse lessons being learnt with lessons learnt and to mobilise people and partnerships that do indeed search for a better tomorrow.

One such partnership that has emerged against this broadened scope is piloting a pathway that seeks to follow measured steps towards building peace. This is the Conflict and Governance Facility, funded under the European Programme for Reconstruction and Development in South Africa and under the ambit of Government's International Development Cooperation. The project aims at promoting analytical research, capacity building and collaborative partnerships around conflict and governance issues, presenting policy makers with studies and networks that are positioned potentially to inform the policy framework.

The Conflict and Governance Facility: one opportunity to make the nation work...

With an increasing number of countries striving towards greater accountability and deeper democracy, there is a concurrent need for better instruments that support improved policy analysis for better informed policy-making and implementation. Parallel to this is the intensified worldwide awareness of and search for greater security and peaceful coexistence taken up by the global role players.

It is within this overarching framework that the Conflict and Governance Facility was conceived. The Facility's main activities will involve making contact with government clusters, the Policy Making Unit in Presidency and other stakeholders, ensuring that the funded research and dissemination proposals are targeted to influence the policy priority programme. The facility encourages collaboration, especially the twinning of research institutions – strong research institutions working with emerging institutions.

The Conflict and Governance Facility or CAGE, an acronym by which it is somewhat ironically known, has been in operation for just over a year. It has set up a secretariat and project steering committee to run its operations.



Mr Shaheed Rajie, chairperson of the Project Steering Committee, and committed activist for International Development Cooperation.

Described as a 'first' for the South African-European Union Reconstruction and Development partnerships, the programme gives some expression to the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement that requires regular dialogue between regional and sub-regional organisations and representatives of civil society on issues around democracy, rule of law and good governance.

Left:
Ambassador Michael Lake, former head of the Delegation of the European Commission in South Africa (DECSA), outlining EU commitment to Cage at the launch.

Below:
Partners for measured peace. From left to right: Ms Charmaine Estment (CAGE programme coordinator), Mr Shaheed Rajie (chairperson: PSC), Ambassador Michael Lake (former head of DECSA).

A key challenge thus has been to launch this resource. The project has started to build public awareness through the media in its calls for expression of interest to register on its website and calls for proposals, to provide grants in 2004. It has held rounds of consultations involving workshops and a formal launch, networked with role players and continues to strive to position itself as a brand clearly within the conflict prevention, human rights and governance landscapes. To this end it defines itself as a Grant Maker that primarily funds research in the field of conflict and governance. Its identity will be further shaped through the research partnerships that it will fund in its lifetime.

CAGE stakeholders committing to the Isivivane custom at the launch.

Currently the project is funding, through individual grants, eight research studies that are seen to respond to policy priorities around conflict and governance. The grant award list of our first Call for Proposals, is available on our website (www.cage.org.za). CAGE will shortly be embarking on a new cycle where it will publish in the national media a second Call for Proposals for research and dissemination activities against published policy themes.

In terms of building its identity, CAGE sought to expand its somewhat limiting acronym by creating a relevant and accessible logo. Coming across a pile of stones in rural South Africa, the programme coordinator was inspired by the concept of the Isivivane and so a metaphor for the project was born.

Isivivane is a term rich in connotation and gives truth to the fact that the languages and traditions of our country are being used to iconic effect as we begin to explore, innovate and fuse new identities. The 'Isivivane' refers to a pile of stones that has been heaped together by individuals who have travelled along certain pathways. The explanations for the custom are diverse but common to the tradition is that travellers would add a stone to the pile to show that they identified with a common purpose, sought protection and guidance on their journey and acknowledged the spiritual knowledge and significance of a place. The Conflict and Governance Facility thus developed their slogan as 'Isivivane: Building peace through knowledge'.

CAGE and the Isivivane custom were linked by the ideas of building a common purpose, acknowledging the importance of knowledge, highlighting the need for guidance and protection through conflict resolution/good governance. CAGE tapped into the metaphor in terms of the planned Freedom Park's Garden of Remembrance that will have at its heart a contemplative space with an Isivivane devoted to the heroes in South Africa including those who died in conflict.

Linked by the ideas of building a common purpose. From left to right: Ms Nathalie Vereen (CAGE: operations officer) and Dr Isabel Gabashane (EU: project officer for CAGE).

One stone, two and then many stones that create a cairn seen by many on the pathway... the Conflict and Governance Facility is therefore piloting a pathway of measured, incremental steps to promote evidenced based knowledge that will hopefully contribute towards building peace through knowledge.

Contact us at info@cage.org.za or register on www.cage.org.za to be part of this initiative.

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

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SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND RESEARCH

By Prof Romain Murenzi, Rwandan Minister of Education
INTERVIEWED BY PROF BEN TUROK MP

BT: Minister, tell me, you have a remarkable plan for the development of education in Rwanda. What are the main dimensions of this plan?

RM: Thank you very much. As you know in Rwanda we had a genocide and around a million people died. In 1994/95 the new government decided to discuss primary schools and also the other levels of education. Education was considered, in 1994, as a major factor of our development. A decade later we see that we are starting to harvest what we put into education.

At all levels of education we have seen a tremendous increase in terms of access and if you look at the current employment in the Rwandan economy you find graduates that went to school after the genocide. Now looking into the future we consider education again as a major factor for development, but in particular we would like to concentrate more on quality. This is why we are investing in science and technology all the way from primary to secondary and higher education, vocational training and technical schooling. We consider that literacy and numeracy for adults is also important.

BT: Let me ask you, why the emphasis on science and technology?

RM: The emphasis is on science and technology because, as you know, science and technology are important for development. We need innovation in order to be able to have growth. For example, Rwanda produces coffee. For the last decade this coffee was sold or sent abroad without any added value. So the coffee went from 50 US cents per kilogram to US$2 or more dollars per kilogram in some circumstances, just by adding value, by adding some innovation. Also, science and technology are very important in the knowledge economy. We have seen instances where countries like India were able to export knowledge in terms of call centres, outsourcing, etc. So Rwanda is moving into that direction.

BT: But isn't it a bit ambitious for a relatively (forgive the word) backward or underdeveloped country to think about being an exporter of Information and Communications Technology (ICT)?

RM: I don't think it is backward. If we lay out a plan of what we are trying to do: although Rwanda is a small country, we have 400 to 500 secondary schools around the country. If you can put a wireless broadband in and have fibre-optic connectivity throughout the country and also if Rwanda could link through those submarine cables in the Indian Ocean, Rwanda could have the cheapest telecommunication connectivity in central and east Africa. This could bring a lot of investment in terms of industry, in terms of outsourcing etc. Already some companies are starting to move to Rwanda from the east.

BT: So you think that you want to be a kind of Switzerland?

RM: We would like to be helped with technology. We are doing that. We have already started. In the next few months, we are going to purchase more that 4 000 computers that will be distributed throughout the country and by doing that, our children are going to learn computing and software development, all the way from secondary schools. Also, we have a plan today to develop and to invest in education all the way from primary to higher education. The children who are in primary now, in 2020 are going to be the taxpayers, are going to be the ICT guys or the science guys, or are going to be in the government, and it is very important for them to actually have access to this knowledge all the way from primary.

BT: Tell me - you know this is not a typical African story. Most people talk about Africa as being underdeveloped and so on, agricultural, rural. You are proposing a very imaginative scheme to create, in the middle of Africa a real hi-tech country, small but with enormous scientific know-how. Is it realistic?

RM: I believe it is realistic.

BT: Perhaps you can tell us something about the nature, the character of Rwanda. I mean what kind of economy it is and what is the level of the people at the moment.

RM: Rwanda is mostly an agrarian or agricultural country, but we do believe that if we invest in the knowledge and the people from right now, in 15 years we are going to have the result of what we put in. I believe that investment in technology is going to be there, not only from primary,

secondary or higher education, but also we are going to invest in appropriate technology for adults in the rural area - water harvesting, to prevent the depletion of the forest. We are going to protect our environment, our biodiversity etc. These are things that we are doing, but don't forget also the nature of Rwanda as a very small country. Being a small country, you have an advantage in being able to invest and to go everywhere right from the beginning. You can go everywhere in Rwanda in less than four hours. This means that, in terms of school administration, in terms of investment, in terms of doing the follow-up, you can do the things.

But also we are not only aiming at investing in technology but also in terms of human rights, right away from primary education. We believe that knowledge is not enough, in 10 to 20 years from now, when these youngsters become part of the government or leadership, it is important that they have respect for human life. This also will happen in terms of developing the economy, because we believe that it is not only the training and the science and technology but also it is the environment in which the scientists or the people live in that makes them perform.

BT: Tell me, how - I don't know the level of education in Rwanda, but if you took the average African country - how ready are people in an agricultural society to absorb this science and technology? Is it easy?

RM: It is a challenge. We are turning the challenges into opportunities. Rwanda has a very sad past and in particular before 1994. We would like to change that bad history into opportunities. Rwandan people are very respectful toward the authorities. It means that one can channel that energy, that respect into something that is very good. Already we are going to start a national programme for literacy and numeracy. Being able to read being able to write, because before, even during the genocide, people were taught to kill for the revenue, and now also, the workforce now, cannot even write. They get all the information by radio. Actually they cannot memorise all the information they are being given. Even in the health system, when they are told about HIV, it is a problem for them to be able to follow-up. They are being told. So reading, writing and calculating becomes a challenge and this year, we are going to start with the intake to the university. We will have a national service where most of the work is going to be to teach literacy in the countryside.

BT: Well, to elaborate a little, if you have a country in which literacy is low, and you want to introduce science and technology at a fairly high level, how realistic is it? Are you designing a special...

RM: It is a two-track system. You introduce the science and technology all the way from primary, an awareness of science, and also in the rural areas, you are going to introduce science into the appropriate technology at the highest level. At the university you can introduce a higher level of knowledge. Education into literacy and numeracy and primary education reduces poverty and higher education - science and technology in particular - brings wealth very, very quickly and that wealth can be injected into the system.

BT: So you are not only talking about a primary school system, but in fact raising the level at all levels. Now you yourself have a background, you are a professor of mathematics and you studied in France and in the US and you published extensively. Is that biasing you towards science and technology when, in other countries, the tendency is to teach many other things?

RM: Possibly, but I have realised through my scientific life that it is possible to bring innovation and innovation requests us to be highly trained but, at the same time, you can be innovative with low levels of education. You don't need complex mathematics in order to be innovating. My father was a carpenter and I am a carpenter too. During my life as a student and also as a youngster, I had a chance to make chairs, armchairs and cupboards etc., so I know this from looking at my parent, my father, who could not really read a lot but who could design and draft things, who could put his ideas on paper. I realised that it is possible really, that you could add value in terms of knowledge, in terms of continuing education I think it is possible. I was born in Africa and trained in Europe and I worked in the US and I had a chance to teach on three continents, in the US, Latin America, then in Europe and then in Africa and I believe that it is possible.

BT: Now, part of your approach to designing a plan for Rwanda, has used mathematical modelling. Can you tell me a little about that? How does mathematics help you as a minister?

RM: The education system is a complex system and you can analyse that complex system with a mathematical model. It is an approach that you can also use for the environment and for the other systems. We will have to use our resources properly and efficiently. The Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Scientific Research is in charge of all the education, is in charge of science, promotion of science and also the research and we are also in charge of literacy and numeracy and also vocational training. So where to invest, where to start and where to go? Can we achieve our objectives? So this is why we need to work with the World Bank to design a mathematical model that allows us to plan for the next 10 years. We did look, for example, at what our annual growth is for the next 10 years approximately and what are the main six points that we need to achieve. We will have to achieve a primary completion rate, we would like our population to be literate, to be numerate, even to calculate and also we would like to have quality education. So we are able to have a model - if possible a scenario for the 2015 horizon and see if we can achieve some of the major objectives of education for all in the Millennium Development Goals. We were able to come up with a possible financing model - a scheme - of how much money Rwanda is going to get from fiscal resources and how much money Rwanda can get from outside resources. So these have been very instrumental in

working with donors and funding agencies.

BT: What balance in your budget is domestic and what is external in terms of aids and so on?

RM: The most likely scenario in that model was going to be between 20 percent and 25 percent external resources and SAAT national resources.

BT: Now, what sort of support are you getting in the country to these ideas about moving up the ladder of science and technology? Does this get a lot of response inside?

RM: We have a lot of support from inside the government, in particular from the president of the republic. He is a firm supporter of the idea of developing science at all levels. He just approved a presidential decree to establish a national Olympiad in primary, secondary and higher education and other prizes and incentives for science and technology. We have already started to approach our European partners in order to support the idea. As you know, there is a report from the House of Commons in the UK where science and technology were put to the forefront and the department for international development was requested to support countries in their PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) to include science and technology because the report showed that there is no way you can get away from poverty if you cannot develop science and technology.

BT: It is sometimes said by radicals that countries in the north do not want to encourage countries in Africa or indeed in the third world, to develop too fast in the areas of science and technology, because this is inevitably going to lead the competition. Do you not fear that?

RM: I do fear that because with science, with equipment, it is possible to turn around the cycle of poverty. I have seen in my whole life as a scientist that you can really do a reversal in discovery and that discovery has a lot of implications, in terms of economics and applications at many levels and that can change the life of a country. But in this global economy, I think it is in the interest of everybody to see that the lives of people are changed all over the world.

BT: What is your feeling about this African Institute of Science and Technology? Do you think this will make a quantum leap?

RM: I do believe that if it is done properly it will make a quantum leap, but the most important thing is the interest and the enthusiasm of all the people who are there to drive and move that very, very quickly. Rwanda will continue to invest in science and technology independently of the initiative and also in initiatives that will link up, through the internet and other means of connectivity, with other institutions of higher learning and research and technology in the world in order to move forward.

BT: Anything else you would like to add.

RM: Thank you and I look forward to visiting the Institute of Mathematics in South Africa.



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

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THE THIRD PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT SESSION:

THE FIRST TEETH OF A CHILD OR THE ROARING OF TAMED LION?

BY PRINCE MASHELE
The author is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies
This article first appeared in The Sowetan, April 5 2005

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) is among the recent developments on the African continent that have generated a new sense of hope and optimism for ordinary Africans. This continental assembly flows from Article 5 of the AU's Constitutive Act that enumerates the organs of the AU. Put in context, the PAP is seen as a critical cog on a big wheel moving Africa towards a situation of peace and security, democracy and good governance and, most importantly, development on the continent. This continental assembly stands in a similar position to that of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) since both organs are not directly linked to the AU's executive architecture, as is the case with the Permanent Representatives Committee of Ambassadors (PRC) in Addis Ababa and the Executive Council of Ministers (EC).

Today PAP enters the fourth day of its third Ordinary Session with 46 countries represented. As its President, Ambassador Gertrude Mongella, observed last Tuesday during the official opening, the current session provides for a platform to celebrate the "first anniversary of the existence of the PAP", since the continental assembly was inaugurated on March 18 2004 in Addis Ababa.

While the inaugural session was more of a ceremonial affair, mainly meant to elect the president and her four vice-presidents, deliberations at the second session were much more characteristic of a parliament. Of course, these largely had to focus on internal institutional issues pertaining to the operation of the parliament, hence the adoption of the rules of procedure and the election of 10 committees to handle a variety of PAP's functions. This and advocacy work to popularise PAP were singled out by Ambassador Mongella as some of the most important achievements in PAP's first year of existence.

Perhaps what will go down in history as the first most important decision of PAP was the resolution to send an observer mission to Darfur in Sudan. This decision sets the important precedent that the parliament will not shrink away from real challenges confronting the continent.

While the fanfare and hype that characterised the first session of PAP last September in its permanent seat, South Africa, have clearly waned, this session should be the most interesting to observe. Not only because it considers ways of ensuring the financial sustainability of PAP, but also because it will begin to answer some of the important questions raised when the idea of a continental parliament was first mooted. Key among these were: what practical impact will such a parliament have? In what way will a continental parliament promote peace, security and democracy on the ground?

Among others, the session currently afoot is considering the report of PAP's Darfur mission; deliberating on the report of the UN High Level Panel that, inter alia, recommended the reform of the UN Security Council; considering a report on the progress made or otherwise in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) process and debating development issues related to the Millennium Development Goals. All these issues raise important questions relating to the impact of PAP.

On Darfur, it would not be overly-critical for analysts to ask: having made first-hand observations, what practically will PAP do to ameliorate the conditions of the suffering people of that troubled part of the Sudan? On the UN report, it would be fair to question: since there is already an African position on the report (the Ezulwini Consensus), is there anything new PAP can add to the position? If not, does it mean that future PAP sessions will only serve to rubberstamp already-existing decisions taken by higher AU structures? On the APRM, the end of the third session must respond to the following questions: is there anything practical PAP can do to accelerate the pace of the process and, perhaps most importantly, to ensure that more states are added to the 23 that have acceded to the APRM?

Apart from immediate calls for PAP to demonstrate its relevance and significance, there are still a number of medium and long-term challenges that lie ahead of parliament. While the coming together of African parliamentarians is in itself an important unifying and symbolic step, more still needs to be done to ensure that PAP is not merely a recommendation-making body at the mercy of African heads of state and government or just another institution to be called upon to submit opinions for consideration by a supreme executive. Perhaps the real question is: will the executive allow PAP the critical space to take positions that are sometimes radically incongruent with those held by the PRC, the EC and the AU Summit? These are among the power-relation issues that need to be dealt with if PAP is to play an oversight role that its rules of procedure suggests it will play.

The extent to which heads of state influence the composition of their country delegations to PAP is another challenge. Another more complex practical problem is the linking of membership in PAP to that of local parliaments. While it is politically not easy to de-link the two, this might curtail the independence of PAP members during discussions since whatever they say might jeopardise their political future back home. For PAP to offer an alternative voice for the people, it is important to cut the strings tying its members to their political principals.

Power relations and institutional intricacies aside, an ordinary African, tired of war in Darfur, Ivory Coast, the DRC, Somalia and elsewhere will have a question for the parliamentarians currently meeting at Gallagher Estate: what role will you play to prevent the recurrence of my ordeal in my country? Equally so, a citizen of Swaziland, Libya and perhaps an African in Zimbabwe-like countries under life leaders would like to know the relevance of PAP in bringing about democracy in his or her country? How PAP will respond to these and other practical questions will determine its significance. The future of PAP lies in its own hands.

EASTERN CAPE CONTRIBUTION

The FIFA decision to award the 2010 World Cup to South Africa not only meant that the country would host it, but added value and meaning to the idea of African renewal.

BD Makubalo, head of sports directorate, encouraging future soccer stars to aspire for participation in 2010 World Cup

Leading by example, the Premier of the Eastern Cape Mrs Nosimo Balindlela with the MEC for Sport, Recreation, Arts and Culture Mrs Nomsa Jajula and the MEC for Health Dr Monwabisi Godwana

The vibrant culture of the Eastern Cape will entertain spectators and participants in the fields of play

BACKGROUND

The World Cup will be hosted for the first time on African soil. This will take place within the context of a continent that is reviving from centuries of colonisation.

We would define the African World Cup as a tournament that is not only played in Africa but characterised by inclusivity. It is a culturally diverse and participatory tournament in all its forms. By inclusivity we refer to the principle that Africans should be given enough both in the organisation and hosting of the games.

WHY AN AFRICAN WORLD CUP?

During the bidding process there was healthy competition among the African countries about who should host. The level of political maturity demonstrated by other African countries in withdrawing their bids in support of the country meant that it was not an exclusively South African issue – our success relied on their support. Now the challenge is to make the tournament truly African.

THE ROAD TO 2010

We need to set an African agenda for 2010. This programme should address critical challenges, including infrastructure, soccer development, hospitality and tourism, safety and security, public procurement, arts and culture, and many other areas of engagement.

The critical challenge is that the country has to host these games within the constraints of unevenly allocated resources. It is important to ensure that, as a country, we agree with FIFA that the venues should be spread throughout the country as much as possible. This ensures our neighbouring countries are able to get affordable access to the games. Accommodation and entertainment facilities should be available for visitors. Infrastructure development should be integrated to address all these challenges. In addition, it isn't easy to watch football clearly when televised in some African countries, therefore

TO 'AFRICAN' WORLD CUP

connectivity and IT development should be prioritised.

The challenge is to ensure that what we develop and nurture in Africa is preserved. African countries must ensure that they preserve African talent. A concerted effort is needed to ensure we compete widely with Europe in attracting the best talent in football. In this regard the province is geared to host a soccer development summit towards the end of October. When making a comparative analysis of our tournaments in relation to Europe we observe that we do not put much emphasis on African football, for example the African Nation's Tournament and COSAFA Cup. These are not given as much priority as the European Cup and many African countries struggle to get their players based in Europe to play in these tournaments.

African governments must intervene. Issues of national duty in sport cannot be left in the hands of sport federations under the pretext of autonomy.

Africa should declare a year of soccer development with a clear focus on youth development, specifically the under-17 and under-23 categories. African and regional tournaments should be prioritised and more resources should be allocated to ensure they attract large audiences and are sustainable.

Part of preparing for the African tournament would be to ensure that Africa hosts a tournament with a difference. The feeling that this is truly an African World Cup should be felt throughout the world. It is important that we fully utilise the wealth of skills and knowledge that Africans have. We should therefore involve other Africans in preparatory structures for the tournament. This should also involve their participation as volunteers in areas like interpretation, as tour guides and many other useful things.

We should establish an African ensemble for the opening and closing ceremony of the tournament. We should plan cultural activities, establish cultural villages and ensure the challenges of language and cultural barriers are addressed. The country has to develop an African heritage brand to truly reflect the African identity. Expectations about 2010 have been raised beyond football itself. The other area relates to economic benefits. The country has to resolve whether, with all the work being done to develop the required infrastructure, the country is going to allow the other African companies to tender. If we take the route of allowing them to compete with the South African companies, how then does one ensure that the South Africans benefit through 2010? The reality is that in an economy like ours open competition is inevitable within the existing trade regulations. Therefore the country has to tread carefully and ensure that we deepen the campaign against xenophobia. Let us ensure that all South Africans buy into the concept of an African World Cup. All these campaigns of popularising the African World Cup should be located within our broad understanding of NEPAD.

The country has to balance bilateral relations and the need to focus on strengthening regional and AU relations. To the extent that some African countries are better resourced than others, we should be careful not to compromise regional integration and, as such, a priority should be based on strengthening those regional and organised partnerships.

Publicising and marketing of the tournament should be maximised. This should see the launch of the African 2010 website to ensure Africa is always kept abreast of the developments.

We must ensure the country is accessed without any hindrances by Africans. What are we going to do with the issue of passports and visas? The country has to pronounce on the issue without compromising national security. Provinces sharing borders with our neighbours should not wait for 2010 before engaging with each other on cultural and sports exchange programmes. The Eastern Cape has already started to play games with Lesotho and this programme will be done on an annual basis.

Finally, the issue of legacy should be clarified. It's obvious that our planning is geared towards leaving a lasting legacy. What is legacy and who benefits from it? How best do we invest in Africa so we benefit as a continent from the South African experience?

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MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

BY MONICA HIRST
The author is executive director of the Foundation of Brazilian Studies and Professor at the University Torcuato Di Tella (Buenos Aires)

In June 2003 as a result of a trilateral foreign minister meeting, Brazil, India and South Africa signed the Brasilia Declaration and created what has become known as the IBSA bloc. This initiative could represent an important step for the configuration of an innovative inter-state coalition among developing countries. It may also reflect a tendency towards a new wave of politicisation in world affairs. Another signal of movement in a similar direction is the G20+ clustering, which was formed by more than 20 states at the World Trade Organisation's September 2003 Cancun meeting, in support of a set of commonalities they shared regarding the opening of a new round of global trade negotiations. Indeed, Brazilian and Indian leadership was, and remains, crucial in moving the initiative.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the ways in which a group of states which share a similar identity in the international hierarchy of power could behave according to convergent political and economic concerns. Their basic aim has become to challenge the prevailing expectation that they act as passive "rule-takers" in world affairs. While the starting point has been to focus on Brazil, India and South Africa, it is clear that these three states do not cover the ground. Countries such as Mexico, Indonesia, Egypt and Nigeria are perfectly eligible for the categorisation in mind. Another point of clarification is that not all intermediate states are willing to play an active political role within the international community. Indeed, this paper will focus on those who are.

Previous experiences, particularly those of the late 1970s and early 1980s, demonstrate that states are more likely to form a common gathering around an economic agenda than around security issues. An important question to raise is whether a new wave of politicisation among intermediate states could involve both economic as well as common security interests.

In concurrence with the expectation of opening a new political and analytical frontier for academics and practitioners, an approach from the security field could contain normative aims. This approach departs, however, from the premise that intermediate states play an important role in the strengthening of multilateralism at a time when international institutions are facing a strained context. Indeed, coalitions and collaborative initiatives between these countries could enhance international co-operation by promoting an agenda of peace and security in regional and world affairs.

MIDDLE POWERS, INTERMEDIATE STATES

Brazil, India and South Africa belong to a fluid group of "middle powers" which brings together a mixed set of countries easier to identify by what they are not than what they are. Indeed, heterogeneity among these countries is an outstanding characteristic and identification can be quite fuzzy and subjective. Hence, it is important to distinguish between the concepts of middle powers and intermediate states.

Not all middle powers should be considered as intermediate states, though the reverse would be true. The first category is more inclusive, as it relies primarily on national GDP as the defining characteristic without regard to the internal socio-economic environment of the countries. For instance, Mexico and South Africa are considered as middle powers, as are Canada and Sweden. Intermediate states, however, share a more specific and an array of commonalities that would set them apart from middle powers. Hence, the definition includes variables such as population size, geopolitical identity, development status, the nature of the emerging economy, as well as relevance for regional and international stability.

THE IBSA INITIATIVE

With South Africa's inspiration, the initiative of Brazil and India's immediate acceptance, an attempt to transform coincidental, or episodic, inter-state co-operation into a concrete co-operative agenda took place in Brazil in June 2003. The formation of the IBSA bloc was conceived as a strategic partnership among developing countries, based upon three shared characteristics:

- the commitment to democratic institutions and values
- a proactive role to combine the fight against internal social disruptions with development policies
- the conviction that multilateral procedures and institutions must be strengthened to address international economic, political and security instability.

These three areas of convergence have been perceived as the essential components of a model for south-south co-

operation. A trilateral joint commission was created with the task of assembling a co-operative plan involving a myriad of areas for co-operation, such as science and technology, defence and transportation.

Ties between the IBSA countries have been deepening, even prior to formalising the trilateral commission. In addition to permanent efforts to co-ordinate stances at multilateral forums, the three countries have expanded bilateral economic and political relations. Besides an enthusiastic political convergence between Presidents Mbeki and Lula da Silva, Brazil and South Africa have been working on a special deal between MERCOSUR and the Southern African Customs Union to increase trade and investment between both economic and trading blocs. Meanwhile, Brazil and India who have shared positions in multilateral environments, including disarmament and trade, are finally moving ahead under the aegis of a wide bilateral and co-operation agenda, which is solidified by a preferential trade agreement between India and MERCOSUR. Particular mention should be made of the interest of the three countries in health co-operation programmes, particularly regarding biotechnology research and pharmaceuticals production.

Foreign policy convergence between the three states has tended towards the need to strengthen multilateralism in world affairs with special emphasis on the need to reform the UN framework. Subtle differences, however, emerge in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) related matters. While India and Brazil have been explicit regarding their mutual support for each other's candidacy for permanent membership, South Africa has been more cautious in recommending that reform must first be securely underway before opening the debate on seat assignments.

A second IBSA meeting took place in New York during the 58th UN General Assembly, when Presidents Lula and Mbeki and Prime Minister Vajpayee reaffirmed the commitments assumed by the trilateral commission in Brazil. The three leaders also expressed their concern regarding the risks that the Millennium Development Goals would not be met by 2015 and underlined the importance of combating poverty and hunger in the world. The most important political achievement at this time was to announce a 3+ I co-ordinating initiative, which would include the UN General Secretary to further UN reform.

It is important to stress that the IBSA bloc has been particularly careful in avoiding addressing security issues. On the one side, no mention has been made of an agenda involving conflict-resolution, regional security and\or even humanitarian intervention. On the other, the use of the concept of human security which addresses social and environmental disruptions as threats has been avoided. The joint commission's view is that:

"...efforts to eradicate poverty and hunger must be undertaken within the broader framework of the promotion of human rights, in particular their economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development. Combating hunger goes beyond the provision of food and encompasses structural measures in many areas, in particular education, sanitation, health, employment, rural development and infrastructure."

Such caution can be partly understood in the face of the different approaches chosen to deal with the delicate regional security realities each one confronts. For instance, South Africa has been an active player in sub-Saharan Africa peace negotiations, as it facilitates dialogue and is currently implementing a fund for conflict prevention in the region. Meanwhile, Brazil has made explicit its willingness to play a political role in the search of a peaceful outcome to the war in Colombia, assuming unprecedented activism in the defence of democratic solutions for Venezuela and Bolivia. India, nevertheless, carries the larger responsibility for the role it has played in the security impasse of south Asia. It would be interesting to observe what effects the recent peace dialogue initiated with Pakistan would have, not only for the opening of a new horizon for the region, but also for enhancing the IBSA coalition's capacity to share experiences and common goals in regional and international security. An interesting possibility could be to transfer the learning process involved in the nuclear accord negotiated between Brazil and Argentina (1990) to India and Pakistan.

If, and when, IBSA co-operation spills over to the security field, this could open up space for a myriad of co-ordinated initiatives to take place, involving peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, the promotion of 1) an agenda for peace, conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation, and, 2) a collaborative agenda between the UN and regional bodies (OAS, AU and ASEAN). IBSA states can also lead in defining a new model for multilateral security measures. Indeed, it has become crucial to avoid the worrying tendency for humanitarian intervention to replace development aid, as it is for trade negotiations to be subordinated to security priorities, and for formal democratic rule to overlook the protection of human rights.

THE ROLE OF BRAZIL AS AN INTERMEDIATE STATE

Though the ground for autonomous foreign policy has become more restricted, Brazil still aspires to retain some level of independent capability to determine its actions in world affairs. Recent indicators of such aspirations include its initiatives in South America, its battles in hemispheric trade negotiations and in global trade forums, the announcement of its goal to become a permanent member in the UNSC, and its engagement in the trilateral commission with India and South Africa. Moreover, Brazil has attempted to articulate independent stances in world affairs with pluralistic support at home as democracy deepens throughout the country.

Democratic consolidation in Brazil during the 1990s has given a boost to non-governmental movements and organisations committed to fight against human rights abuses, environmental degradation and social inequality. One of the consequences of Lula's election as president has been the political strengthening of these groups and their agendas, both within society and government.

The inclusion of the social agenda as a major topic of foreign affairs has become the Lula administration's most important and recognisable international asset. Linking the fight against poverty and unequal income distribution at home with an outstanding international performance became this government's most innovative feature. If social improvement is, in fact, accomplished in Brazil under the Da Silva administration, this would become a new source of political projection for Brazil in Third World areas and in the developed world.

In multilateral arenas, most remarkably the UN, Brazil has insisted on the need for a conceptual revision of institutional structures, with special concern for the uneven distribution of power and the distortions in interest representation the present framework imposes. The Brazilian government has made explicit to the international community its ambition to be one of the new permanent members of the UNSC if the number of seats increases. Though Germany, France and Russia have already endorsed Brazil's candidacy, the US has been more cautious, as endorsement would involve a regional preference that could hurt the interests of other Latin American members, particularly Argentina and Mexico, which have not withdrawn their candidacies.

Since the mid-1990s, Brazilian foreign policy choices have improved its participation in international security regimes and institutions. In 1994, Brazil joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and in 1997 it ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the same time, Brazil has also supported the enhancement of multilateral initiatives, particularly the expanded role of the UN in world politics as it increased its participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Brazilian officials have been active participants in multilateral security institutions and regimes. Among relevant examples, Brazil was head of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, is a member of the ongoing UN High-Level Panel "on threats, challenges and changes" and has been invited to form the recently created Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission supported by the Swedish government.

Since the Fernando H Cardoso administration (1996-2003) Brazil has also become more active in regional crisis situations. Nevertheless, and however discretely, concerns have been raised in the US regarding the possibility that a more active Brazil could assemble South America into a single bloc that would destabilise Washington's pre-eminence in the hemisphere. Thus, as Brazil aims to become more active in regional affairs, discrepancies with the US in regional trade and security issues tend to politicise hemispheric affairs. Gaining impetus within South American diplomatic and political circles is the idea that Brazil could be forging a "unified regional front in negotiations with the United States."

Countries like Argentina and Chile at first demonstrated more caution than enthusiasm towards Brazilian diplomatic moves in South America notwithstanding the fact that the Lula administration is poised to move rapidly towards building leadership within South America with the expectation of expanding its global presence. The idea that this can be achieved together with the strengthening of the MERCOSUR process, particularly increasing strategic ties with Argentina, has become a priority for Brazilian foreign policy. Indeed, both Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires have reached an unprecedented understanding to work together as non-permanent members of the UNSC.

Yet, Brazil must deal with the constraints imposed by the perennial status of South America as a US sphere of influence. Washington and Brazil do not share the same premises when addressing conflict-zone areas, such as in Colombia, or politically turbulent scenarios, such as Bolivia and Venezuela.

In this context, co-ordination during the Venezuelan political crisis in early 2003 provided some hope. This was the first time the US had acceded to participating inter pares in a co-ordinated regional diplomatic initiative, while, also for the first time, Brazil took the lead in putting together such an idea. Labelled as the "Group of Friends of Venezuela," the initiative also included Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Spain and Portugal as well as the secretary general of the OAS. The Friends' aim was to bridge the understandings between the Chavez government and the opposition groups so as to find a political solution that would not be in violation of democratic principles. Even though the practical results may have been modest, the presence of the US and Brazil and the perseverance of the OAS helped hold back the deterioration of the political situation in Venezuela.

Nevertheless, a partially successful result in the case of Venezuela may still not help reduce the distance between the US and Brazil regarding other turbulent realities in the region. In fact, divergent perceptions and policies may deepen even more in the case of the war in Colombia. Of the many factors that contribute to differences in their stances, is the fact that the United States links its participation in the Colombian conflict with the war against terrorism, giving its political and military involvement a different connotation.

While the US government has deepened the militarised approach to addressing the war in Colombia, Brazil has made explicit its preferences towards a political process involving international mediation, with the participation of the UN, based upon the premise that all parties to the war should participate in the negotiations. Undoubtedly, there are major differences regarding the political and ideological affinities of Washington and Rio de Janeiro which reflect upon relations with Caracas and Bogota. Relations between Uribe's government and the Bush administration have been far more friendly and co-operative than those with Chavez, while the opposite can be seen in the case of the Lula government. Washington nevertheless expects Brazilian involvement in the Colombian war to expand and to adjust to US-Colombia security priorities.

Though not yet on the horizon, Cuba could become a new issue to be included in US-Brazil political dialogue. While

Washington will continue to insist on addressing relations with Havana as a bilateral issue, the Lula administration could come to use its fraternal relationship with Castro to move the Cuban regime into a less defensive posture towards Cuban democratisation efforts and to persuade the US to moderate the use of coercive policies towards Cuba.

Regional security and politics have assumed unprecedented importance for Brazilian foreign policy. The idea that the country should expand its responsibility in the maintenance of political stability in South America by way of stronger democratic institutions and values has become a permanent concern for the Lula administration. Moreover, the link between such aims and the fight against poverty and social inequalities in the developing world is perceived by the Brazilian government as a crucial source of legitimacy for its militancy in favour of the strengthening of multilateral institutions and procedures in world affairs.

MOVING AHEAD

The idea of intermediate states, and the potential role they can take on, faces many theoretical and practical challenges. The chances that a certain group of intermediate states may assume a positive and expanded role in enhancing the capacity of multilateral institutions in promoting international and regional peace and security is one of the most important issues in the international arena. At the same time, any project in this field is bound to face a myriad of challenges in reaching its full and desired impact. Yes, this remains an innovative terrain to explore in the context of international relations and south-south, or even south-north, co-operation. Yet, they should only move forward with awareness of the limitations posed by reality and the vast expanse of issues and problems to be encountered.

Future work in this field should focus on the need to develop new knowledge and the need to share knowledge better and institutionalise its reproduction within academic, government and non-governmental environments directly, or indirectly, connected to the field of security and peace studies and activities. Indeed, explorations should aim to stimulate the establishment of linkages across different organisational settings of intermediate states, particularly within and between Brazil, India and South Africa. Among other priorities, future activities should promote the production, exchange and dissemination of knowledge and experience between these countries by way of collaboration, transnational network formation and research and teaching. The overall purpose would be to bring together senior and junior researchers and analysts working at universities, research institutes, international agencies, NGOs and governments.

To accomplish its aims a series of projects could lead to a broad programme to promote and support different kinds of activities. This could include fellowships for dissertations and research, seminars and conferences, teaching and dissemination activities.

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

NORTH-WEST DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

MEC Jo Tselapedi

Department of Education

The Member of the Executive Council for Education in the North West, Rev Johannes Oabetswe Tselapedi declared 2005 the year of the foot soldier, in line with the department of education's commitment to open the doors of learning and culture for all through quality education. This implies that more resources are being channeled to officials who are supporting schools to produce quality education, such as subject specialists and curriculum advisors.

DEPARTMENTAL PRIORITIES AND HIGHLIGHTS

School fees

In its endeavour to alleviate poverty and expand access to education, the department has taken strides to implement the adequacy funding of R516 per learner, as pronounced by the MEC during his budget vote. Learners from seriously impoverished schools (those in Quintile 1) are the targeted beneficiaries for this year.

GET Curriculum Implementation.

Preparations for the implementation of the Revised National Curriculum Statement (RNCS) for grade 7 learners in 2006 are at an advanced stage. Training for educators will be finished in October. Preparations for grade 8 and 9 will in October 2005. Training for educators in this regard will be conducted in the winter recess holidays.

Training/orientation for educators, with regard to NCS for grade 10 educators will be concluded on 7th October. Training for grade 11 and 12 for 2006 and 2007 will also be conducted in june next year.

HRD and Skillls Development

The National Skills Development Strategy 2005-2010 and the Provincial Growth and Development 2014 plan are coordinated by the office of the Premier, the department of labour and the department of education jointly. The skills gap audit in education has been conducted and the workplace skills plan has been approved. Training for various categories of employees is ongoing.

276 learners in the HRM; project management and public sector accounting learnerships are currently receiving training. An additional 120 learners in the ABET and ECD sectors are being rolled out in this financial year.

Race and values in education

The Department will monitor the implementation of the Religion and Education Policy and the Manifesto for Race and Values.

Matric Improvement Implementation Plan

The Department, in its endeavor to obviate the declining performance of learners, adopted the Matric Improvement Implementation Plan containing events and processes that will improve the results. The Department firmly believes that a

focus on the teacher at the coalface will counter the drop in the results. The MEC therefore declared 2005 'The Year of the Foot Soldier in Education.' A key pillar of the Matric Improvement Implementation Plan is the visits to schools by regional officials, the foot soldiers. During these visits, they prioritise trapped schools and trapped subjects.

Mathematics, Science and Technology Education
MEC Tselapedi also declared a 'State of Emergency' around the teaching of mathematics in this province early this year. This was to reinforce and commit the department to the National Strategy for Mathematics, Science and Technology Education. The Africa Drive Project is registering a high success level and is continuing. This project currently trains teachers on computer literacy.

Two hundred educators have been enrolled this year for a two year Advanced Certificate in Education (ACE) in Mathematical Literacy. A limited number of educators will enroll in a special bridging programme for Mathematical Literacy. Winter and spring vacation schools were held in mathematics and science, to complement other efforts in this regard.

Farm schools
The Department has now developed the provincial strategy for farm schools, to assist with the establishment of a database and monitor these schools carefully. A unit is being established to dedicate its efforts in dealing with challenges facing farm learners.

Quality assurance
This department has the mandate to ensure the provisioning of quality education to all learners, and to regularly monitor the performance of the education system. To this end, the Department, through the implementation of Integrated Quality Management Systems (IQMS), in particular, the Whole School Evaluation Policy, conducted external evaluations of 60 sampled schools in the province.

Learner and Teacher Support Materials (LTSM)
R160-million of the 2004/5 financial year, primary schools have been provided with textbooks for the intermediate phase. Stationery has been provided to each school on time. The Department spent an additional R5.7-million on equipment for FET colleges. A further R14.3-million will be allocated to provide the colleges with the critically needed equipment. Procurement processes for the 2006 LSTM is on course. This includes LSM for the RNCS and NCS.

Primary School Nutrition Programme (PSNP)
The MEC has constituted a team that is looking at mechanisms of improving the primary schools nutrition programme. The team is busy conducting some studies including looking at models of other provinces where the scheme is running well.

Currently, out of 429 190 primary school learners in the Province, 300 678 are benefiting from the scheme. There are 1 465 schools participating in the scheme. Through this scheme, 1 398 women groups were employed.

Independent education
During 2004/2005 the Department of Education spent R5.5-million on subsidies for independent schools. This year, the Department will regulate independent and home education. These regulations will be promulgated in the near future at a cost of R200 000.

Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET)
During the 2004/5 financial year, the Directorate developed an ABET Reference Guide to ensure access to key information at all levels. Two hundred and twenty five (225) centres were opened. Employment was created for 1 820 unemployed qualified educators. The ABET expansion programme is on course. Additional centres have been established already, to fast-track our efforts to break the back of illiteracy among adults.

Early Childhood Development
Approximately R4 211 467 was committed to payments of subsidies to Early Childhood Development (ECD) sites with grade R. These have been processed. One hundred and seventy four (174) grade R classes are now beneficiaries.

HIV/AIDS and Life Skills
To date, a total of 75 master trainers have been trained and 6 329 officials, community leaders, educators and parents have been attending advocacy workshops.

A partnership between the department and the Royal Dutch embassy has seen 2005 being the year in which centres of community care are being launched throughout all our five regions.

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LATIN AMERICA TAKES A LEFT TURN

BY XU SHICHENG
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He is the latest winner in an ongoing political shift toward the left in Latin America. On March 1, Tabaré Vázquez of Uruguay's Broad Front-Progressive Encounter Coalition was sworn in, four months after his victory in the October 31 presidential election, to become the country's first left-leaning head of state in 170 years.

In his inaugural speech, Vázquez stressed equality, freedom, human rights and friendship, and pledged to give his nation a thorough facelift that will focus on production and development. According to a two-year emergency plan, the Vázquez government will annually budget $100 million to address the food, health and educational needs of the nation's 200 000 households living in poverty.

Regarding international diplomacy, the new president, who is firmly against foreign intervention, put forth the principles of independence, justice, peace and self-determination that will guide his administration. Three hours after his inauguration, Vázquez fully resumed Uruguay-Cuba diplomatic relations by signing a framework agreement on trade with the Caribbean country. He also signed an agreement to enhance economic and trade integration with Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, whose leaders were present at his inauguration.

Vázquez's assumption of the Uruguayan presidency is not only a watershed in the history of this small South American nation but also completes a political map in Latin America's southern cone that differs markedly from the laissez-faire, free market "neo-liberal" policies that prevailed in the 1990s. An article in the **New York Times** pointed out that three-quarters of Latin American countries have installed socialist-oriented governments, with the new Uruguayan president being the latest.

Several years ago, Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva, the current Brazilian president, had predicted that leftist parties would assume power in the majority of Latin American countries within six to eight years. The prediction has become partially true. He was sworn in as Brazil's president on January 1 2003. Hugo Chavez, candidate of the Movement of the Fifth Republic Party, began his tenure as Venezuelan president in February 1999. Despite strong challenges, he won a recall referendum last August that will allow him to remain in power until early 2007. In Ecuador, Lucio Gutiérrez of the Patriotic Society January 21 was sworn in as president on January 15 2003. (The Ecuadorean president was removed from office by congress for dereliction of duty in April.) In addition, Chilean president Ricardo Lagos, from the Party for Democracy, and Argentinean president Nestor Kirchner, from the Justicialista (Peronist) Party, who both took office in 2003, are also labelled as center-left politicians by some observers.

Many experts on Latin American affairs agree that the inauguration of the Broad Front government in Uruguay can been seen as a symbol of the consistent strengthening of left-leaning governments in Latin America in recent years and a good example of how they have come to assume power peacefully through democratic elections.

In other Latin American countries, leftist parties are also playing an important role in state affairs as the dominant party or as the major opposition party. For example, the Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front, Mexico's Democratic Revolution Party, El Salvador's Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, Bolivia's Movement toward Socialism and the National Revolutionary Union of Guatemala have all become the second or third largest party in their respective countries. In Mexico, Colombia and El Salvador, mayors of their state capitals are currently leftist politicians. The Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front won a landslide victory in the country's local elections last November.

The rising influence of Latin American left-leaning politics can also be seen by the influence of regional social movements. The fall of communist governments in eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the ensuing disintegration of the Soviet Union severely impacted the communist movements in Latin America. Some communist parties in the region have been renamed and some groups were merged with others. But the communist parties of Brazil,

Chile, Argentina, Peru and Venezuela have weathered the test and have survived after years of reflection and self-adjustment. Some of them have even strengthened. At present, most Latin American communist parties have been recognised as being legitimate and are allowed to campaign in elections. There are more than 20 politically-active communist political organisations in Latin America.

Moreover, the São Paulo Forum and the World Social Forum, initiated by Brazil's Labour Party and other leftist parties, have gained influence among leftist movements worldwide, becoming the major platforms for left-leaning political organisations to exchange and promote ideas. Amid the rise of new social movements in Latin America, they are playing an important role in adjusting neo-liberal policies in relevant countries, safeguarding state sovereignty and independence and defending national resources and public interests.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

In the last decade of the 20th century, Latin American leaders experimented with neo-liberalism as the solution to the problems of poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment. Supported by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the US Treasury Department, neo-liberal economic policies are supposed to promote free trade through the reduction of tariffs, the elimination of subsidies, public spending cuts, privatisation of state assets and the devaluation of currencies. However, growing evidence has shown that the prescription has failed to revitalise Latin American economies. The per-capita gross domestic product of Latin American countries plummeted from 1998 to 2003, creating another losing streak for the region after the "lost decade" of the 1980s. Though the regional economy saw a rebound last year, such prominent problems as wealth disparity, distribution inequality and social polarisation have remained.

Some western observers conceded that it was public discontent and disillusionment with the neo-liberal policies that have given birth to the leftward-leaning governments in Brazil and Argentina. The defeat of Venezuelan opposition forces to challenge president Chavez, some believe, has demonstrated support and confidence in left-thinking leaders.

In the meantime, a sweeping worldwide anti-globalisation campaign that particularly targets western dominance, as well as the strong critiques of the US-based economic theories practised in Latin American countries, has added to the influence of leftist parties.

First of all, Latin American leftist parties as a whole stand firmly against neo-liberal economic policy and globalisation, as well as the establishment of an American free trade area. They have also opposed the US invasion of Iraq, US sanctions against Cuba and the US military presence in Colombia, which they blame for only serving to destabilise the country. They promote a fight against government corruption and for a restoration of public interests.

To maintain social stability, almost all leftist governments of Latin American countries have continued existing neo-liberal policies, while paying more attention to poverty alleviation and the eradication of social inequalities. In diplomatic relations, they have distanced themselves from the United States and instead are more enthusiastic about developing relations among Latin American countries and with the European Union and Asia-Pacific countries.

Latin American left-leaning forces have chosen to strive for state power through democratic elections, in a bid to follow their public aspirations and unite all walks of society. Their more practical campaign pledges, centring on integration of economic development and social justice, have helped expand their base of support. In the next few years, their strength may continue to grow, making them the major players on the Latin American political stage and exerting a far-reaching influence on regional political and economic prospects.

However, leftist governments of Latin American countries will inevitably face a series of internal and external challenges, including a mountain of foreign debt, poverty, social polarisation, different approval ratings at home and potentially contentious relations with the United States. They are very likely to suffer some set-backs. In addition, their attitudes also vary toward the establishment of a free trade area, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In this sense, it is still too early to predict the trend of a further political shift leftward in Latin America.



TARIFF-CUT PROPOSALS CONSTITUTE AN "UNEQUAL EXCHANGE"

BY YILMAZ AKYUZ
The author is the former Director of the Division on Globalisation and Development Strategies and Chief Economist at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

In the current non-agricultural market access (NAMA) negotiations, developing countries are asked to liberalise their trade in industrial products and to bind their tariffs, cutting them aggressively on a line-by-line basis and bringing them closer to the level of tariffs in industrial countries.

The proposed increase in binding coverage in developing countries would lead to a considerable reduction in the scope for using trade policy for industrialisation. Any future multilateral agreement on generalised tariff cuts would apply to all tariff lines that are bound one way or another. Furthermore, commitments are made for an indefinite period: they are not time-bound, to be renegotiated after a pre-specified period according to the outcome obtained.

It is true that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules allow countries to resort to measures such as anti-dumping duties or safeguards when tariffs are ineffective in checking disruptive imports. In theory, it is also possible for countries to renegotiate their tariffs under Article XXVII of the GATT.

However, these are exceptional and temporary provisions designed to address possible adverse effects of imports on existing industries. They are not meant to allow countries to pursue effective industrial policies to establish competitive industries in more dynamic, high value-added sectors by providing them with appropriate protection against mature industries in more advanced countries.

Developing countries are asked to engage in rapid liberalisation despite the mounting evidence that past policies of big-bang liberalisation did not bring the expected benefits but, in many instances, caused serious balance-of-payments difficulties and de-industrialisation. They are asked to do so even though their industries are not mature enough to compete with early starters in developed countries.

In the absence of policy measures for infant-industry support and protection, developing countries could be locked into the existing pattern of international division of labour wherein they would be specialising in natural resource-based and labour-intensive products, without being able to advance rapidly in industrialisation and climb up on the technology ladder. This would be so even if these countries derive some immediate benefits in terms of deepening the use of their natural resources and unskilled labour as a result of their increased access to markets in developed countries.

Since industrialisation takes place in waves, involving the introduction of new industries and products with higher added value and technology content, over time, tariffs for some sectors may need to be raised while others are lowered.

A poor country does not need tariffs to provide infant-industry protection to capital goods industries in the early stages of development, when such industries are not yet in existence. However, over time, tariffs may need to be introduced in order to nourish firms producing machinery and equipment. But this would not be possible if current levels of applied tariffs are taken as the basis for the determination of bound tariffs.

The proposals made by developed countries are at odds with their own past experience regarding the use of tariffs in the course of industrial development. At the end of the 19th century, when per capita income in the United States was at the same level as per capita income in developing countries today (that is, some $3 000 in today's dollars), its weighted average applied tariffs on manufactured imports was close to 50 percent, compared to 8.1 percent in developing countries and 13.6 percent in least-developed countries (LDCs) today.

The United States maintained its average industrial tariffs at around 40 percent in the inter-war years. In 1950, when its per capita income was close to $10 000, its average applied

tariff rate was still higher than the average tariff rate in LDCs today.

In 1950, Germany, France and the United Kingdom had average industrial tariffs ranging between 18 percent and 26 percent even though their per capita incomes exceeded that of today's developing countries by a large margin.

There was no harmonisation in the past among today's developed countries when they were at different stages of industrial development. In the inter-war years, average industrial tariffs varied between zero and 5 percent in Britain, 4-6 percent in the Netherlands, 20-21 percent in Germany, 20-30 percent in France, 22-46 percent in Italy and 37-48 percent in the United States.

In today's major industrial countries, continuous and widespread tariff liberalisation is a recent phenomenon, taking place gradually with industrial maturity in the post-war golden age in the context of rapid economic growth. Even then, the levels reached by 1980 were similar to the average level in developing countries today: in 1980, the weighted average applied rate was above 8 percent in France, Germany and the United Kingdom and 7 percent in the United States.

Some of the formulas currently proposed in the NAMA negotiations would imply that the weighted average applied tariffs of developing countries would be reduced by more than two-thirds and weighted average bound tariffs by more than three-quarters of their current levels.

These are deeper than the cuts made by most major developed countries in the 30 years after the war. From 1950 to 1980, applied average industrial tariffs were reduced by about one half in the United States and France, by less than two-thirds in the United Kingdom, and by slightly over two-thirds in Germany.

Developed countries are offering to cut their tariffs in products of export interest to developing countries in return for across-the-board cuts in tariffs by the latter, including cuts in industries in which they have not yet developed competitive firms.

Many of the tariffs in developed countries are in labour-intensive sectors such as textiles, clothing and footwear which have no chance of gaining competitiveness and which should have been phased out long ago, rather than continuously protected by artificially high tariffs and non-tariff barriers. By contrast, developing countries would be cutting tariffs that would help them nourish industries in higher-value-added, technology-intensive products. That is, tariffs that should eventually be removed as these industries become competitive. Such an exchange of tariff cuts, regardless of the percentage cuts agreed, constitutes an unequal exchange insofar as their implications for industrial development of the Third World are concerned.

Universal Service Agency

The Universal Service Agency is responsible for providing universal service and universal access to South Africans in under-serviced areas. Universal service policies generally focus on promoting or maintaining "universal" availability of connections by individual households to public telecommunication networks. Universal access generally refers to a situation where every person has a reasonable means of access to publicly available telephones.

Established by the Communications Ministry under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as amended in 2001, the Universal Service Agency is mandated to promote the goals of universal service and universal access in under-serviced areas of South Africa engulfed by poverty.

The Act also established the Universal Service Fund (USF) in which all telecommunication license holders contribute 0.1% of their revenues to the Fund which is used to promote universal service and universal access; these are the five current network operators i.e. Telkom, Vodacom, Cell C, MTN and Sentech. The Universal Service Fund is managed by the Universal Service Agency and according to the Act; every communications company in South Africa licensed to roll out telecommunications must make a contribution to the USF.

In implementing universal access projects in South Africa the Universal Service Agency has gone beyond basic telephony to encompass advanced services such as the Internet, email and multi-media technology. Telecentres and Cyberlabs were established to provide public access to information and communication services as a means of addressing the skewed penetration of ICT infrastructure in the country, particularly in the under serviced areas.

- **Cyberlabs –** are school-based computer laboratories, located in historically disadvantaged communities to equip learners with ICT skills while providing access to a variety of services. A number of Cyberlabs are located in schools for learners with disabilities.

- **Community Telecentre –** an ICT community access point deployed in under-serviced areas to provide computer services, telephones, fax machines, Internet, email, DVD and CD facilities, typing, printing and photocopying facilities and capacity building training in Computer Literacy.

- **Multi-purpose Community Telecentres (MPCC's) –** are Telecentres but are located within a multi-purpose community centre. In collaboration with Government Communications and Information System (GCIS), these centres provide support to existing community development initiatives such as craftwork, Adult Basic Education & Training, crè'e8ches, bakeries, etc. Other government department are also found at an MPCC e.g. the Department of Labour, the Department of Home Affairs and many others to provide the community with a "One stop shop" of Government services. There are 35 MPCC's to date around South Africa.

- **Tele-Containers –** Telecentres constructed from cargo containers furnished with computers (internet and email access), telephones, fax and a photocopy machine. The first Tele-Container was launched at the World Telecommunication Day Celebration on the 4th June 2005 for the Makhutswaneng Community.

- **Under-Serviced Area Licenses(USALs)-** The Authority (ICASA) embarked on a process of licensing small businesses to provide telecommunication services in under-serviced areas. Public hearings were conducted in all the areas deemed under-served and an invitation to apply was issued on 19 December 2002. After scrutinising all the applications, the Authority that 7 companies be awarded licences by the Minister of Communication. Since the USA is mandated by the law to subsidise under-serviced are licences, guidelines for subsidisation were developed by the Agency and gazetted on 27 May 2003.The Agency is set aside an amount of R 50 million to subsidise successful USAL licensees. Each Licence holder is set to receive an amount of R 5 million a year over a period of 3 years. It should be noted, however, that the only guaranteed amount (R5 million) is for the first year; thereafter subsidisation would be based on meeting conditions.

- **Community Digital Hubs-** The Agency is establishing Community Digital Hubs to serve as a one stop facility for ICT services and innovation projects in the rural and urban renewal nodes in phases over the next three years. The Objectives of the Community Digital Hubs (CDH'S's) are to:

  - Build capacity in the under-serviced areas for optimal utilization of ICT's.
  - Empower the communities in under-serviced areas with the use of information and communication technology to improve their quality of life.
  - Develop digital opportunities for the communities to utilise ICT's so as to enhance education, health, business development and to access government services on line.
  - Develop a "buy-in" on the part of provincial and local government leadership and other stakeholders to consider the Telecommunications infrastructure as important as other basic infrastructure such as roads, housing, water and electricity when allocating their budgets.
  - Test and evaluate the appropriateness of various latest technologies that have a potential to assist communities with their socio-economic development goals.
  - The first 4 Community Digital hubs will be established in the following under-served areas; Motherwell, Inanda, Bohlabelo and Thabo Mofotsanyane.

Communication is the only way for an emerging country to evolve and access to the Internet, multi-media and telephones are the way forward. The Universal Service Agency is not only about extending telephony to the under serviced areas of the country, but also to address the social and economic situation of South Africa and help to create jobs and alleviate the strain of poverty.

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UNIVERSAL SERVICE AGENCY

A POEM FOR SARAH BAARTMAN

BY DIANA FERRUS



"I've come to take you home -
home, remember the veld?
the lush green grass beneath the big oak trees
the air is cool there and the sun does not burn.
I have made your bed at the foot of the hill,
your blankets are covered in buchu and mint,
the proteas stand in yellow and white
and the water in the stream chuckles sing-songs
as it hobbles along over little stones.

I have come to wrench you away -
away from the poking eyes
of the man-made monster
who lives in the dark
with his clutches of imperialism
who dissects your body bit by bit
who likens your soul to that of Satan
and declares himself the ultimate god!

I have come to soothe your heavy heart
I offer my bosom to your weary soul
I will cover your face with the palms of my hands
I will run my lips over lines in your neck
I will feast my eyes on the beauty of you
and I will sing for you
for I have come to bring you peace.

I have come to take you home
where the ancient mountains shout your name.
I have made your bed at the foot of the hill,
your blankets are covered in buchu and mint,
the proteas stand in yellow and white -
I have come to take you home
where I will sing for you
for you have brought me peace."

CAMPBELL, CATHERINE

'LETTING THEM DIE': WHY HIV/AIDS PREVENTION PROGRAMMES FAIL

James Currey: London & Second Storey: Cape Town 2003. 214 pp
REVIEWED BY MARY TUROK

With the current focus on the rollout of anti-retroviral drugs, this book is a sober reminder that AIDS is not solely a health and treatment issue. The level of HIV infection in our society is high but the fact remains that the majority of the population are not infected by the virus. Are we able to ensure that they stay that way?

This book looks at a project which tried to address this in one setting and asks: Why do well-intentioned attempts to stem the tide of HIV/AIDS have so little impact? Why do people continue to have unprotected sex knowing this could lead to their painful and premature death?

The Summertown project (a nom de plume for a group of mines on the West Rand) set out to understand why the mining industry's health education programmes, designed to reduce sexually transmitted infections among miners, have had so little impact. It concluded that the main reason was that the programmes saw prevention as a biomedical issue for the individual miner and disregarded any connection with wider social issues.

In exploring alternative approaches, the Summertown project made the following observations:

- Health education messages are not passively accepted but must compete with existing belief systems. While most miners are aware of HIV and how it is transmitted, this knowledge is only part of a complex web of beliefs on health, sexuality and healing systems.
- Mineworkers' identities are shaped by the fears and struggles of their working lives. Most of them live far from their families in large, overcrowded single-sex hostels and work in highly dangerous and stressful conditions.
- Drinking and sex are two of the few diversions available to miners. They make a strong link between sex and masculinity in relation to their general well-being. Linked to this is the belief in the need for multiple sexual partners and the desire for "flesh-to-flesh" sexual contact.
- It is probable that, as in Europe and America, there is an inverse correlation between level of social support and risk-taking behaviour.

The Summertown project covered a group of mines and the surrounding shack settlements which house several hundred people. Most of the residents are female sex workers who live in windowless tin shacks without sanitation or running water.

"From early in the morning the first customers (miners who had just completed their night shift) come and go in a steady stream to buy sex and alcohol, so that throughout the day the community vibrates with the noise of blaring music and shouting."

The Summertown project set out to involve mineworkers and sex workers in the design and implementation of parallel peer-education programmes to address condom use, early treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and greater tolerance towards HIV-positive people. An essential element of the programme was the participation of trade unions and mine management.

The lack of active mineworker participation in the project's peer education programme was its "major disappointment." The mining houses did not fulfill their promises to recruit and train peer educators and the mineworkers' trade union "made no contribution to HIV prevention of any sort": the wider social issues of migrancy and hostel-life were not even on the agenda.

While survey results among mineworkers over three years showed improved knowledge of HIV/AIDS and an increase in reported condom use, this was not reflected in the levels of sexually transmitted infections (figures on the levels of HIV infections being regrettably withheld). In-depth interviews suggested that the myths about health and sexuality evident in earlier surveys still prevailed. If anything, there were more misapprehensions about HIV, such as suspicions that the mines were providing poor quality condoms or that these condoms were causing HIV infection. Several miners argued that the HIV epidemic had been engineered by whites deliberately seeking to reduce the African population by planting the virus in the condoms.

In the programme for sex workers, the assumption was that condom use would be increased by boosting women's ability to take control of their sexual health. Sex workers

were recruited as peer educators in the community. When the programme started in 1998, biomedical surveys showed that 68 percent of women were already HIV-positive but cases of AIDS has only recently become evident. However, for many of these women, HIV was simply one new link in the chain of life-threatening phenomena that had characterised their lives and they were slightly puzzled by all the attention it had generated.

The project succeeded in raising the level of community awareness of the risk of HIV and the importance of condom use. It distributed large numbers of condoms and motivated women to seek early treatment for sexually transmitted infections. Once again, the problem lay with condom use. Before the programme, condom use by sex workers was nil. Six months later, two out of 10 women reported condom use "some of the time" but not at all with regular, non-paying, partners. Thirty months later, more women reported condom use "some of the time" but still no use with regular, non-paying, partners. This, despite their awareness that their men had other sexual partners.

Nor did the project succeed in changing the negative perceptions of people living with HIV/AIDS. Among sex workers, one of the worst insults one could deliver was to accuse someone of being HIV-positive. Almost every person interviewed said they would never disclose their status if they were HIV-positive for fear of rejection, loss of clients and loss of love from regular partners. This made them afraid to discover their HIV status. The project came to the conclusion that, for attitudes to become more tolerant, there would have to be a home-based care programme. The over-stretched medical services could not cope with the care of people dying from AIDS.

One of the key difficulties that faced the project was the stakeholders' very different understandings of the causes of HIV infection and the best way to prevent it, some believing that nothing could be done to limit its transmission. Because of this lack of a common rationale, the project ultimately fell back onto the biomedical approach. The concepts of participation and partnership are articles of faith in development projects around the world, says Campbell, yet an understanding of the processes necessary for them to achieve their objectives is in its infancy.

The outcome of her research emphasised the need to combat HIV at three levels: in the short term, the control of sexually transmitted infections; in the medium term, peer education and condom distribution; and in the long term, national efforts to reduce poverty and empower women.

YOUNG, IRIS MARION

ON FEMALE BODY EXPERIENCE: "THROWING LIKE A GIRL" AND OTHER ESSAYS

Oxford University Press: Oxford 2005. 177 pp
REVIEWED BY HELEN DOUGLAS

Part of Oxford's **Studies in Feminist Philosophy**, this book includes eight essays written over two decades, all of them concerned with the particular experience and meanings of life lived in a female body. Young uses descriptions of women's experience - of being pregnant, menstruation, breasts, fashion and homemaking among others - both to demonstrate the effects of male-centred cultural norms and practices and also to ground alternative ways of perceiving and structuring women's experience. Drawing on the work of American and European feminist theorists, she freely admits that she is not offering a definitive account of female body experience. She writes: "This is politics, not autobiography. ...The differences among women do not circumscribe us within exclusive categories, but the only way we can know our similarities and our differences is by each of us expressing our particular experience." While academically rigorous, the essays are written with engaging style, raising issues which are relevant in various fields: philosophy, sociology, geography, medicine (particularly), nursing and education.

UNGER, ROBERTO MANGABEIRA

POLITICS: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY



(3 vols) Verso: London 2004
REVIEWED BY HELEN DOUGLAS

Unger is Professor of Law at Harvard University and active in Brazilian politics. In these three books, he sets forth "a programme for a comprehensive progressive alternative to the dominant ideologies of social democracy and neo-liberalism"

False Necessity: Anti-necessitarian social theory in the service of radical democracy (Vol 1). This central work presents both a way of explaining society and a programme for changing it. The explanation develops a radical alternative to Marxism, showing how we can account for established social arrangements without denying their contingency or our freedom. The programme offers a set of institutional innovations that would democratise markets, deepen democracy and empower individuals. [not seen by New Agenda]

Social Theory: Its situation and its task (Vol 2). 256 pp. Unger begins here with critique - on the one hand, of Marxism as an evolutionary deep-structure social theory and on the other, of postivist social science. His starting point is constructivist and anti-necessitarian: society is a human artefact, but social theories and political projects have failed to push this realisation to its full transformative possibilities. In developing a new theoretical project, his aim "is to break loose from a style of social understanding that allows us to explain ourselves and our societies only to the extent we imagine ourselves helpless puppets of the social worlds we build and inhabit or of the lawlike forces that have supposedly brought these worlds into being. History really is surprising; it does not just seem that way. And social invention, deliberate or unintended, is not just an acting out of pre-established and narrowly defined possibilities."

Plasticity Into Power: Comparative-historical studies on the institutional conditions of economic and military success (Vol 3). 231 pp. This volume contains three works of historical analysis. The first is called - with Unger's flair for great flowing titles reminiscent of the 19th century - "The Periodic Breakdown of Governments and Economies in Agrarian-Bureaucratic Societies: Its Causes, Antidotes and Lessons: A Comparative Study of the Relation Between Failures of Institutional Invention and Constraints on Group Conflict". His concern here is with the historical "reversion cycles" where money economies came into being and then collapsed and reverted to natural economy and why, and to what effect, these cycles were more pronounced in some societies than others. The second essay, "Wealth and Force: An Anti-necessitarian Analysis of the Protection Problem", considers issues of national rivalry and security. In the third, "Plasticity into Power: Social Conditions of Military Success", Unger uses military history to explore the themes of plasticity - the facility and opportunity for innovation in work relations - and the institutional indeterminacy in which it exists.

Unger, perhaps contradicting himself, finds an historical imperative in this plasticity: it brings wealth and power to the societies and the groups that achieve it. But further, "the subjection of factional privilege to challenge and conflict has been the single most important spur to social plasticity", and the goal requires the invention of "institutions that turn economies and politics into machines for the ongoing destruction of all privileged claims on the resources - of capital, power and expertise - with which we make and remake society." He claims that the "more successfully we learn and practise the gospel of plasticity, the less suitable we become as subjects of the necessitarian styles of social and historical analysis that the great social theorists have taught us. We can in fact, raise a storm in the world and still understand and explain ourselves. All we need is a better approach."

MILLS, GREG

THE SECURITY INTERSECTION: THE PARADOX OF POWER IN AN AGE OF TERROR



Wits University Press: Johannesburg 2005. 321 pp
REVIEWED BY HELEN DOUGLAS

Mills, the national director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, has written a thoughtful, comprehensive approach to the security challenges currently facing the world. The "paradox of power" takes several forms: how to balance "hard" military power with the "soft" power required to stabilise and build peace; or to balance idealistic goals and their costs; or to enforce international norms and the increasingly alienable rights of national sovereignty; how to justify particular interventions; or to achieve long-term goals within shorter-term electoral cycles. The core background question is to explore the conditions which lead to "radicalisation" - as opposed to "modernisation" - in societies and which could produce the 19 hijackers of 9/11.

The book is very broad in scope. In addition to the above, Mills discusses the changing nature of states and the role of globalised trade and markets, the particular vulnerabilities of weak and failing states and the growth of powerful non-state actors, an assessment of military developments and changing intelligence requirements, the role of peace-keeping interventions, and how conflicts resolve. The geographic range is equally impressive, as the author's research took him on extensive travels through the Middle East, Africa, Asia and the West. For all of this complexity, the material is presented and argued with great clarity and personality. Mills' pragmatic and realistic approach provides a sound platform from which to engage these growing challenges.

DE WAAL, ALEX

FAMINE THAT KILLS: DARFUR, SUDAN



(revised edition)
Oxford University Press: Oxford 2005. 258 pp
REVIEWED BY HELEN DOUGLAS

In 2004, Darfur, Sudan was described as the "world's greatest humanitarian crisis." Twenty years previously, Darfur was also the site of a disastrous famine. **Famine that Kills** is a seminal account of that famine, and a social history of the region. In a new preface prepared for this revised edition, Alex de Waal analyses the roots of the current conflict in land disputes, social disruption and impoverishment. Despite vast changes in the nature of famines and in the capacity of response, De Waal's original challenge to humanitarian theory and practice including a focus on the survival strategies of rural people has never been more relevant. Documenting the resilience of the people who suffered, it explains why many fewer died than had been predicted by outsiders. It is also a path-breaking study of the causes of famine deaths, showing how outbreaks of infectious disease killed more people than starvation. Now a classic in the field, **Famine that Kills** provides a critical background and lessons of past intervention for a region that finds itself in another moment of humanitarian tragedy.

RAFTOPOULOS, BRIAN AND TYRONE SAVAGE, EDS

ZIMBABWE: INJUSTICE AND POLITICAL RECONCILIATION

Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town,
South Africa, 2004. 296 pp

REVIEWED BY TIM HUGHES
South African Institute of International Affairs

South African government leaders have bemoaned the disproportionate global attention the Zimbabwe crisis has attracted, claiming it smacks of racism. There is an element of truth to this. Absent the kith and kin relations of Zimbabweans in western countries and South Africa, one suspects the column inches dedicated to Zimbabwe since 2000 may have been shorter by miles. On a pure body count basis and measured against the most brutal conflicts on the African continent, Zimbabwe doesn't rank. It speaks volumes about the decline and decay of post-independence Zimbabwe that such comparisons are made.

Yet much of the abundant recent commentary on Zimbabwe is poorly informed, or wilfully subjective, leading to simplistic analyses of the country's pathologies and commensurately simplistic "solutions." **Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation** is a refreshing and welcome departure.

Written by Zimbabwean scholars and commentators, the book's 15 chapters document the limits of reconciliation in post-independence Zimbabwe, but also provide a textured reading of the emergence and contours of the current crisis. The central theme of injustice and reconciliation is addressed via an examination of key issues including the economy, land, the military, media, the church, nationhood and identity. In so doing, the compendium rejects simplistic, uni-linear/causality explanations for understanding the current crisis. On the contrary, the issues confronting Zimbabwe are profound, perplexing and mutually reinforcing.

This retrospective of a country in transition for a quarter of a century highlights a swathe of wasted opportunity, compounded by failed, or incomplete, programmes of transformation. The collection reminds us that without institutional transformation, reconciliation is unachievable. Indeed, under such conditions the healing balm of restorative justice soon runs dry.

As a leading Zimbabwean political figure recently opined, any attempt to assist in the resolving the Zimbabwe crisis first requires an honest assessment of the problem. This publication is a significant contribution to such an assessment.

BERNSTEIN, HILDA

THE WORLD THAT WAS OURS

Persephone Books UK
REVIEWED BY MOIRA RICHARDS

When Nelson Mandela stood trial for his life on a charge of treason against the Republic of South Africa, he stood not alone - eight other men shared the dock with him and on that June day, 40 years ago, all those Rivonia trialists were sentenced to a lifetime's imprisonment - with the exception of one man, Lionel "Rusty" Bernstein who walked free because the state found insufficient evidence to convict him too. In **The World That Was Ours**, Hilda Bernstein tells the stories leading up to and surrounding this historic trial from the perspective of another banned political activist, also the wife of a trialist.

Her book often reads like a fictional story of intrigue and danger. But what spy in a storybook ever felt compelled to get that last load of family laundry into the washing machine before slipping out the back window to escape the enemy? What secret agent ever risked capture to honour a promise to her small son that she would be back at home to kiss him goodbye on his first day of school? What conspirator ever managed to swing permission to visit her accomplice by convincing his jailer that she was unable to decide domestic matters without his consent as head of the family?

In our post-apartheid years, **The World That Was Ours** raises impossible questions about that dark time. When I read about how Hilda Bernstein's activism and commitment to social justice led to her being banned from attending even a child's birthday party, when I understand that she acknowledged unflinchingly that her activism could, would lead to her imprisonment without trial or recourse to a lawyer, perhaps even to her assassination, when she describes the burden to her school-going children of socially unacceptable and non-conformist parents, when she tells how she risked the possibility of never sharing in her youngest son's childhood, and recounts the ways her eldest daughter had to shoulder the responsibilities of adulthood before she was even out of her teen years. It is then that I wonder whether I myself could have been any better a white person during those apartheid years? Would I have been prepared to make even one of those sacrifices or to take any such huge personal risk for the principle of human rights? I pray that no one will ever ask me to answer those questions.

Hilda barely escaped South Africa and its security police shortly after the Rivonia trial had ended and she and Rusty lived in exile for 30 years, returning for a short visit in 1994 to cast their votes in the country's elections, and to attend Nelson Mandela's inauguration. Today she is an 89-year-old grandmother with children scattered over three continents and a home in the beautiful Cape Town of our new South Africa - surely the world that was her dream all those years ago.

MCDONALD, DAVID A. AND GREG RUITERS, EDS

THE AGE OF COMMODITY: WATER PRIVATIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Earthscan: London and Virginia. 2005. 303 pp
REVIEWED BY LIANE GREEFF

David McDonald and Greg Ruiters have once again edited a book that brings home to the reader the horrors of what happens when the economic value of water is prioritised, and how this is manifested politically through the neo-liberal policies of commodification, corporatisation and privatisation. The book is divided into three sections, the first, on "theory and practice," gives a comprehensive overview of the extent of water privatisation in Southern Africa, the constitutional implications of water commercialisation in South Africa and the looming threat of water services falling prey to the World Trade Organisation's General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS). In the second and third sections of the book, an array of talented academics and grassroots activists detail case studies in South and Southern Africa respectively. This powerful combination of theory and case studies is grounded in the bizarre reality of post-apartheid South Africa and a sub-region where human rights is often ignored in favour of donor conditionalities.

The book succeeds well in its task of explaining why our fears are rational and why we should all be more alert to what happens when water becomes a commodity like any other. It is a book that makes one want to take to the streets with banners and placards, and to shout the words scrawled across the front cover: Our water is not for sale.

HOLLMANN, JEREMY C, ED

CUSTOMS AND BELIEFS OF THE /XAM BUSHMEN

Wits University Press: Johannesburg. 439 pp
REVIEWED BY CHERYL RUMBAK

At last, Jeremy Hollmann has provided all those interested in San culture with a portable dictionary, encyclopedia, and illustrated research and teaching tool.

This anthology combines anthropological research dating as far back as 1870, long before the arrival of the Coke can and other features of the spoiled San landscape. This book, published in 2005, brings an up-to-date appreciation of San experiences; in one narrative, Dia!kwain (a hunter) discusses the nuances of the word !kwa that can, depending on pronunciation and context, mean "broke", "leg", "bone", or all three!

With beautiful photographs, facsimile copies from the original manuscripts, archive prints and antique maps this book will be one of the first items I pack when I go to a small village called Ekoka in Namibia, where remnants of a Bushmen community are producing art. Previously I would have to bring loose-leaf bundles of photostats "eased-out" of the national archives back to this !Xung and Quagga Bushmen community, so this book is absolutely invaluable! As it includes many fables, myths and riddles, **Customs and Beliefs of the /Xam Bushmen** can be at home on your coffee table and bedside table, or used as a textbook. I recommend "A rain story" (173) as a teaching tool for the young, not so young, and students of all ages.

MANGANYI, N CHAMBANI

GERARD SEKOTO: 'I AM AN AFRICAN'

Wits University Press: Johannesburg 2004. 244 pp,
with 17 colour plates and 16 b/w drawings
REVIEWED BY HELEN DOUGLAS

Originally published in 1996 as **A Black Man Called Sekoto**, Manganyi has substantially rewritten this biography of the great South African artist, drawing on a newly available "suitcase" of personal papers and documents. Sekoto was born to mission-educated parents in Botshabelo in 1913. In 1947, at the height of his creative powers, and in his quest of freedom and artistic development, he left South Africa for Paris where he lived until his death in 1993. As Es'kia Mphahlele comments in the introduction, Manganyi "adds a great deal of new information... takes us deeper into Gerard Sekoto's 'internal geography'", and "we are the richer for it."

THE NO-NONSENSE GUIDES

New Internationalist and Verso publishers are producing this helpful series of little books on big topics, such as globalisation, migration, development, indigenous peoples, global media and HIV/AIDS. We review two of them.

VAN DER GAAG, NIKKI

NO-NONSENSE GT WOMEN'S RIGHTS

New Internationalist/Verso: London 2004. 138 pp
REVIEWED BY HELEN DOUGLAS

Bundled into chapters ranging from health and sexuality to work, politics and organisation, this is less a guide to women's rights than an international primer of historical and current feminist issues. Recommended to readers looking for a concise introduction to the current status of women, the book is well laid out, with useful statistics and telling vignettes.

BLACK, MAGGIE

THE NO-NONSENSE GUIDE TO WATER

New Internationalist Publications/Verso: London. 2004. 144 pp
REVIEWED BY LIANE GREEFF

This is a wonderfully concise introduction to the world of water, and how we arrived at the current world water crisis. Or is it a crisis? This No-Nonsense Guide takes the reader from the beginning sentence: "Water was the matrix of the world, and all its creatures" - a quote from the 16th century which reflects the essential nature of water as the source of life - through all the controversies surrounding water scarcity, consumption patterns, the large dam debate, water for food, water as a human right and the looming water wars. Of concern in the book is the question "Water at what price?" This is unpacked in an explanation of the neo-liberal notion introduced in the 1990s of water as an economic good and how water privatisation came about. Case studies are detailed which show how privatisation in many cases has made water unaffordable to local consumers and did not achieve the efficiency gains predicted.

The timing of the book is perfect as the issue of water is recognised as pivotal for human survival on this planet and increasingly we are experiencing water stress and water scarcity across the globe, exacerbated in many places by climate change. That the book achieves what it sets out to do is very clear. It is concise, readable and uses global examples and case studies to illustrate the points articulated, which in turn highlights the global nature of many of these problems. Highly recommended as an introduction, and indeed, for those already in the water sector, there is still much to learn from this book.

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

Seth Bhuda, Skhosana Secondary School, Mpumalanga - Shortlisted for DBSA National Schools Arts Competition, 2004

Local Government and DBSA: a Public-Public partnership to fulfil the People's Contract

The Vuna awards acknowledge the dedication of local government to deliver efficient service for the improvement of the quality of life for our people. The DBSA is proud to have formed a public-public partnership with all spheres of local government, as we believe that the challenges of eradicating poverty and the developmental backlogs require a joint effort. Through municipal bonds, funding investment projects with the private sector and grant funding for capacity building through the Development Fund, our organisation has entrenched itself as a partner for successful service delivery.

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