NEW AGENDA

South African Journal of Social and Economic Policy



WAR ON TERRORISM
IMPACT ON AFRICA

BY EDDY MALOKA

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Celebrating 10

In 1994 South Africa emerged from a past that denied people their humanity and their dignity. As we approach a decade of freedom, we take pride in the wealth of human rights achievements in our wake and now look forward to another decade filled with new and interesting challenges.

In just under a decade of democratic rule, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development has achieved some important milestones and instituted much needed and far-reaching changes in the South African Legal System. Since 1994, we have consigned to history some of the archaic laws we inherited from the previous dispensation, and have considerably altered the structure and form of our legal institutions. This has not been change for change's sake; we have striven to establish institutions and legal frameworks that reflect the new constitutional and democratic order. Armed with a historic and firm mandate from the people of South Africa, our Constitutional Assembly drafted and adopted a highly regarded Constitution and Bill of Rights.

The Constitution is not just an important piece of legislation, it is a declaration of intent. The supreme law of our land expresses a singular determination to institute genuine reconstruction and transformation processes in all aspects of our society. This all-encompassing evolution of our legal system had at its heart the creation of an independent Constitutional Court, set in place to uphold our Constitution and entrusted with powers to invalidate laws adopted by Parliament, if these laws in any way impinge on the letter or spirit of that founding Act. The ground-breaking judgments of the Court have been acclaimed internationally. The new building for the Constitutional Court in Johannesburg, which forms part of the Constitutional Hill Legacy Project, will be officially opened soon. This is our single most significant project, as it will not only provide the highest court of our country with appropriate accommodation, but it will also be the first major public building of the new era of constitutionalism and democracy.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was formed and its reports chronicle the trials and tribulations of a microcosm of what was the national human tragedy. With these findings we were able to reflect again on the extent of the damage inflicted upon our society by decades of institutionalised deprivation, domination and discrimination. This reflection should strengthen our resolve to fight poverty and underdevelopment, and to renew our commitment to reconciliation and social justice.

One of the post 1994 dispensation's objectives was the transformation of the judiciary and magistracy into a single, unitary judiciary that is truly reflective of the composition of the South African population. The Constitution decrees "Organs of state through legislative and other measures must assist and protect the courts to ensure independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts." Our initial response to this challenge was vigorous. Parliament set about adapting the existing statutes where possible, but more often than that, it enacted completely new laws such as the Constitutional Court Complementary Act, the Judges' Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Amendment Act and the Judicial Service Commission Act. All of these measures were introduced to give effect to the most pressing issues relating to the judiciary in terms of Chapter 8 of our Constitution.

Our judicial system, including the judiciary and the magistracy, has come a long way from the days when the judicial system and its institutions were unashamedly manipulated to implement and uphold chauvinistic apartheid policies. In May 1994, racial and gender representivity, as it related to the judiciary, was notable only for its near absence; two female judges and one black male judge. Today 60% of judges in the High Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and our Constitutional Court, constitutes post-apartheid placements and significant levels of race and gender representivity have been achieved in a relatively short space of time. Of 1662 magistrates, 794 are black and 428 are women.

South Africa's Justice System has also made its impact felt in the upgrading of courts in rural areas, after making a welcome arrival in the urban black areas. New additions to the Justice System are the National Prosecuting Authority, which already boasts significant successes to its credit, and burgeoning Community Justice Centres that make legal representation accessible to the poor and the indigent. It must be mentioned that a comprehensive development programme spanning several years and worth over R1 billion in the past years was unrolled for the training of magistrates, prosecutors, candidate attorneys and other officials in the Department. It is paying dividends. This is not the end of the road. When South Africa celebrates its 10th anniversary of democracy, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development will deliver, amongst others, the following:

- The upgrading of approximately 100 courts
- The construction of approximately 30 new courts
- Automation of all sub-offices
- Establishment of an additional 75 community justice centres
- Establishment of an additional 35 sexual offences courts
- Reduction of case backlog by 40%, training of an additional 2 000 judicial officers, prosecutors and interpreters
- The appointment of maintenance investigators at 50% of all the courts
- Overhauling the Maintenance System and making it reliable, consistent and prompt
- Expanding the Family Courts to all major court centres
- Improving access to justice on all fronts, especially to the poor and marginalised
- Continuing to develop improved implementation of gender- and child- specific legislation, such as the Domestic Violence Act
- Expanding the establishment of Sexual Offences Courts throughout the country.

10 YEARS OF FREEDOM
South Africa 1994 - 2004

Department of Justice and Constitutional Development

years of Democracy



Mr David Porogo

In terms of the Government's Crime Prevention Strategy, combating violence against women and children remains the highest priority. Disturbing levels of sexual violence and domestic abuse directed at women and children have kept this issue at the centre of focus. Our Domestic Violence legislation is exemplary and compares favourably with similar legislation internationally. The response to the Domestic Violence legislation has been overwhelming. Women and children are turning to our courts for protection in increasingly large numbers.

It is precisely because effective maintenance collection has the potential to accelerate the debilitating impact of poverty on vulnerable groups, that we are determined to make it work. The Department launched several initiatives, which include:

- Educating people about their rights and responsibilities in respect of maintenance and child support.
- The appointment of Maintenance Investigators who commenced duty on 1 April 2003. These investigators complement the work of the additional Maintenance Prosecutors, whom the NPA has made available to our courts.
- Progress in the modernisation of systems for the collection and distribution of maintenance.

Effective maintenance order enforcement is vital for the empowerment of mothers and significantly improves their ability to provide appropriately for their children. The effective prosecution of maintenance defaulters is increasingly bringing the message home that failure to observe maintenance orders will no longer be tolerated.

In terms of Family Courts, we have entered into a public/private joint venture with the establishment of People's Family Law Centres. Specific protocols for case management, client support and the early resolution of matters have been tried in these centres and tested for similar application in our courts. Family Courts function away from the glare of publicity and the media, and consist of a divorce court, maintenance court, children's court and a family violence component.

Added to this are special courts for sexual offences. The courts give protection to women and children, the most abused sectors of communities worldwide, and South Africa is now among the leading nations in countering this scourge. The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, the National Prosecuting Authority, Social Development and the SAPS have established a close working relationship and have developed a National Strategy for the accelerated roll-out of Sexual Offences Courts. The focus of their efforts is to provide a seamless service to our clients from the time that each case is reported right through to prosecution. To date, more than 40 Sexual Offences Courts have been established in designated crisis areas and 4 Thuthuzela clinics are already operational. The cooperation and assistance of the Health Department have been invaluable in setting up these fine examples of service excellence, where the victim is central to the process.

With respect to improving access to justice, it is our belief that Small Claims Courts have a crucial role to play, and this is especially the case in rural areas. We now have Small Claims Courts operating throughout the country, including 25 in designated rural areas. The establishment of these courts is attributable to the services of many attorneys and advocates who serve voluntarily as commissioners and who are the driving force behind the process.

Recent United Nation's statistical analyses have revealed that women perform two-thirds of the world's work, earn one-tenth of the world's income and own less than one-hundredth of the world's property. The President, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, has insisted that gender equality be the litmus test for the advances we are making towards fundamental social transformation. The establishment of Equality Courts all over the country will serve as important mechanisms for righting gender and racial wrongs and other imbalances that continue to prevail in our society.


Our programme for judicial and legal reform is well on track and we can be proud of the fact that many of the rights-based laws passed by Parliament since 1994, are widely considered to be best-practice examples of progressive law making. Our challenge, as we go forward, will be to reduce the gap between ambitious legislative measures and practical delivery on the ground. The ongoing transformation of the Justice System continues to be one of our Department's greatest challenges. The ideals of a society free of sexism, racism, discrimination and poverty are incredibly tantalising and worthy of our best and most determined efforts. The Department takes its obligation very seriously, to ensure that access to justice does not become the sole preserve of those able to hire the services of a lawyer. Failing to provide legal representation in especially criminal matters, would be an unforgivable betrayal of the poor and vulnerable in this country. But worse still, it would undermine one of the founding principles of our Constitution, that of access to justice.

The Legal Aid Board has been unwavering in its commitment to providing legal aid services to the most remote rural areas, where discrimination and poverty are daily realities. They have also made a conscious decision to move away from an almost exclusive allocation of legal aid resources to persons accused in criminal cases, to a more equitable system of legal assistance that also meets the civil law requirements of marginalised and disadvantaged communities. It is in supporting people to assert their fundamental human rights, that the new system will reach out to the poor, the disadvantaged and victims of continued discrimination.

The process of upgrading, streamlining and modernising the justice system, and making it relevant to South Africa's needs, will continue for years to come.

The inscription on South Africa's Coat of Arms, the highest visual symbol of our new democracy, can guide us in this new era. The motto, !ke e: /xarra //ke, is written in the Khoisan language of the /Xam people, the oldest known inhabitants on the southern tip of Africa. It literally means: "diverse people unite". It calls for unity in diversity and the recognition of a common humanity, regardless of race, class or gender.

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DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS

PUSHING BACK FRONTIERS OF POVERTY THROUGH AN INTENSIVE JOB-CREATION INITIATIVE


Ms Stella Sigcau: Minister of Public Works

The legacy of the past has resulted in a situation where a large proportion of our population does not yet have the skills or opportunities to effectively participate and earn a living.

The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) is one of many government strategies aimed at addressing unemployment, alleviating poverty and increasing economic growth to create new jobs.

In essence, the EPWP is a bold step by government to bridge the gap between the first and the second economies by drawing pools of unemployed and unskilled people into the mainstream economy. Using public sector expenditure, the programme builds on existing best-practice government infrastructure and social programmes that are known to be successful, by either deepening their labour absorption or by extending them, to create work opportunities for the unemployed.

In addressing the challenge of lack of skills, the EPWP improves the education system so that the workforce is able to take up the largely-skilled work opportunities which economic growth will generate.

Work opportunities are created in the following four ways:

- Infrastructure sector: Increasing the labour intensity of government-funded infrastructure projects
- Environmental sector: Creating work opportunities in public environmental programmes (e.g. Working for Water)
- Social sector: Creating work opportunities in public social programmes (e.g. community-based healthcare workers and early childhood development)
- Economic sector: Developing small businesses and cooperatives, including utilising general government expenditure on goods and services to provide the work experience component of small enterprise learnerships or incubation programmes

The programme has a target of providing employment


Infrastructural development

opportunities and training to at least one-million targeted unemployed people in its first five years.

To maximise its impact, the programme cuts across all government departments and all spheres of government, and incorporates all government bodies and parastatals who are required to make a systematic effort to target the unskilled unemployed.



The EPWP is an integral element of a people's contract to create work and fight poverty.

EXPANDED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME
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WHITHER SOUTH AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION?

By DR M M Balintulo, Rector & Vice-Chancellor, Cape Technikon

The year 2004 sees the implementation of the first phase of higher education mergers that will radically transform the national landscape. When completed, this will represent the triumph of Minister Kader Asmal's impassioned desire and goal to banish forever the ghost of Verwoerd.

The system, which the country inherited in 1994, was designed as a piece of social engineering whose aim was to service and perpetuate the system of apartheid. The Extension of University Act (1959) was a landmark in this process. It not only ushered in a rigid racialisation of the higher education system, but also further fragmented it along ethnic lines with the establishment of 'bush' colleges in the pursuit of the Bantustan and other divisive and oppressive policies.

Much has been done in the last ten years to reverse that legacy. And now we face an impending earthquake of mergers which will reduce the number of Higher Education institutions from the original 36 to 22 in 2005. This is the culmination of a process of structural reconfiguration that commenced with the appointment of the National Commission on Higher Education (NHCHE) in 1995 by then President Mandela, chaired by Professor Jairan Reddy, former University of Durban-Westville Vice Chancellor.



This was accompanied by a widely consultative process whose intensity was unfortunately not repeated in the subsequent debates about mergers. The outcome, the Education White Paper 3 and the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 were on the whole welcomed as milestones in the country's transformation agenda and formed the basis for the National Plan for Higher Education of 2001. The more controversial issues of the size and shape of institutions emanated from recommendations by the Minister's National Working Group appointed early in 2001, chaired by Mr Sakkie Macozoma, whose primary mandate was to consider the reduction in the number of HE institutions.

The methodology used, which factored in output variables as well as financial viability considerations, applied to a landscape that mirrored the inherited inequities. It also took account of the non-materialisation of the promised redress for the historically disadvantaged institutions. Hence the study could result in one outcome, namely the targeting of virtually all the historically black institutions for mergers.

The outcry that greeted their recommendations resulted in the Minister shelving some of the recommendations. Significantly he reversed the position on Fort Hare and the University of the Western Cape and declared these future flagships for the production of black intellectuals. He also brought in two new mergers involving three historically white institutions.

The final reconfiguration has left eight historically white institutions (six universities and two technikons) and four historically black universities unmerged. Two of the latter (Venda and Unizulu) have to effect a mission refocus and develop Technikon-type programmes. Further, there will be 4 new hybrid, comprehensive institutions resulting from the merging of technikons with universities. Also, Kader Asmal's recent announcement on the future of technikons will result in five Universities of Technology.

These recent developments reinforce the view that the South African higher education transformation programme represents the most ambitious higher education change project ever undertaken anywhere in the world. However, there is some irony about mergers being used as instruments of transformation in that some of least transformed institutions untouched.

Will this ambitious change programme work? Only time will tell. In the meanwhile we may ask whether comprehensive institutions (neither fish nor foul) will be a bane or blessing? Whether the proposed Universities of Technology will merely be old wine in new bottles? Or whether the above new institutions actually represent a genuine leap into 'new order' institutions with the potential to be more responsive to the imperatives of our young democracy than the unmerged traditional universities with their heavy legacies. All these are salient and important questions as we look into the future.

What is not clear is whether this massive change agenda is excessively structurally over determined, in which case it may be an exercise in futility verging on recklessness in handling what is a major continental asset in the light of NEPAD imperatives.

If on the other hand there is a consistent focus on matters such as essential curriculum reform, quality and relevance of research, governance and the quality of the learning environment, all of which impinge on the quality of our students' experience of higher education, much may be gained. But this has to be located within a broadly defined and diverse mandate of higher education as a public good. If so, this scheme may turn out to be cutting-edge experimentation that has worldwide significance.

CPPP

PARTNERSHIP FOR GROWTH

Community Public Private Partnerships

the dti

ENTERPRISE INDUSTRY
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION
SOUTH AFRICA

TURNING DREAMS AND VISION INTO REALITY

The Community Public Private Partnership (CPPP) Programme, an initiative of the dti (Department of Trade and Industry), was launched in 1999 and its core role in stimulating rural enterprise, is facilitating mutually beneficial, sustainable Community Public Private Partnerships that result in ownership by the Community.



The Programme currently facilitates projects in the five key economic sectors of:

- **agri-business and forestry** – the 'fruits' of the CPPP work were reaped by the Cairn Lemon Community Trust buying out the private partner
- **agro-biodiversity** - the Podi-Boswa Goats (Pty) Ltd and Moruleng Herbs projects in the North West Province are examples of how value addition to indigenous resources can create enterprises
- **aquaculture and mariculture** - the launch of the SA Fisher Women's Association in the Western Cape empowers women to negotiate subsistence permits and to become self-sufficient income earners
- **small-scale mining** - land ownership, job creation and dividend/royalty benefits are helping create jobs in a number of provinces
- **tourism** - land reclamation and infrastructure rehabilitation have led to establishing community-owned tourism destinations across South Africa, including the Komjekejeke Heritage Site in Gauteng, the Khiwane Holiday Resort in the Eastern Cape, the Ethunzi Nature Reserve in KwaZulu Natal and the Makuleke Lodge in the Limpopo Province.

By mid 2003 the CPPP Programme played the pivotal role of facilitating the creation of 1388 full-time and 780 part-time jobs, with a total investment in excess of R25 million. In addition, the Programme has leveraged R1 million for capacity building and training in the hospitality industry.

"Success and the real achievement of community well-being and economic growth, results from Partnerships that are driven by a combination of enthusiasm, dedication, and knowledge."
Zandile Ndaba
CPPP National Co-ordinator

The **dti** regards the Programme as one of its best kept secrets and sees the initiative as integrating marginalised Communities into the mainstream economy. Communication activities to ensure that the word gets out about the Programme include Umnoto - the Programme's magazine, and participating in conferences, workshops and exhibitions locally and abroad. One of the highlights of these activities was the award received for the Programme's participation in the Ubuntu Village at the WSSD (World Summit on Sustainable Development) in 2002.

A unique characteristic that has flowed out of the work of the CPPP are models for Community Public Private Partnerships. The models that are based on best practice in rural enterprise development, enable the public and private sectors, and the Communities, to understand their inter-dependent and ownership roles while providing supportive processes to solve complex problems.

By remaining focused, despite the challenges, the Programme has become more than an implementing agency for Government – the development of the models provide the platform for sharing the 'lessons learned' and best practices with agencies involved in similar and broader rural development.

"... as rural communities we have natural resources and cultural wealth - with the help of CPPP we can make sustainable development a reality!"
Ingwenyama (King) Makhosoke Mabena of the amaNdebele
CPPP Project: Komjekejeke Heritage Site

For more information visit www.cppp.org.za or e-mail cppp@dbsa.org or call 011 313 3065.

INPUT BY MR ALEC ERWIN, MINISTER OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, AT RE-LAUNCH OF NEW AGENDA



New Agenda editorial board chairman Professor Ben Turok, right, with Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, and Picasso Headline editor, Trisha Bam, at the re-launch of New Agenda.

The Minister welcomed the re-launch of the journal, saying that debate on issues of development was an imperative.

He traced some of the broad contours of various schools of thought, beginning with the "dependencia" school associated with Raoul Prebisch and the UN Commission for Latin America. A central proposition of the "dependencia" school was that the development of the advanced industrialized countries and the underdevelopment of the periphery were inter-linked processes, and that the development of the core did not therefore of itself bring development to the periphery.

In SA we face a similar situation. The President has recently spoken of "dualism" in the SA economy, and of the reality that there is no dynamic in which growth and development in the "first" economy brings about development of the "second" – the economy of the townships and rural areas.

We live in a world economy that is different from that analysed by "dependencia" theorists – in a globalising world economy. Orthodox economics and prescriptions deriving there from have, however, not offered the policy solutions to the challenge of "dualism" and marginalisation. Soviet Marxism was a 70 year experiment that purported to offer an alternative, but that too has now been shown to have failed. We need a new economics of development, and more robust debate. A journal like "New Agenda" is well placed to contribute to this.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE



Neo Moerane-Mamase (MEC)

The Eastern Cape has a total population of over 6,9-million. It is a province characterised by the complex coexistence and constant contradictory interplay of objective and subjective factors, which constitute both the opportunities and threats to the realization of the national goal of building a better life for all. On the one hand, it's a province full of promises for economic advancement in terms of agriculture, the fishing industry, tourism, the manufacturing industry and information technology.

On the other hand, it's a province with the highest levels of poverty in the country. The province has a very low concentration of industrial activity to yield jobs and other income-generating opportunities for the populace; about 55% of the economically-active population is unemployed and the massive retrenchments that have taken place over the past two decades, especially within the manufacturing industry, have further increased the already high levels of unemployment.

Poor infrastructural development, including lack of access to electricity, running water, decent housing, sanitation and telephones, characterizes the province. About 69% of the population lives in peri-urban centres (informal settlements); only 36% has access to clean running water; 31% has access to proper sanitation; and 46% has access to telephones. Only about 31% of the population has access to electricity. HIV/AIDS prevalence is estimated at approximately 20%.

The consequences of limited economic development are highlighted by the myriad of social needs in the province, which range from high levels of poverty and unemployment; to insufficient infrastructure, especially in the deep rural and peri-urban areas; poor access to service delivery; a high level of vulnerable groups, mainly composed of women, children and the disabled; underdevelopment; and minimal access to social, institutional, physical and technological infrastructure. In essence, unequal socio-economic development between urban and rural areas is very pronounced, with development being concentrated largely in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan and Buffalo Cities. The former Transkei and Ciskei homelands form the bulk of the impoverished areas of the present-day Eastern Cape.

These areas suffer acute social service delivery challenges. These include social security services, HIV/AIDS, teenage pregnancies, drug and alcohol abuse, child and women abuse, caretaking of pre-school children, child malnutrition, water purification, street children, and sustainable income-generating projects. Children, who constitute a large percentage of the population (about 37% are between the ages 0-14 years), are among the worst affected. The socio-economic environment has also adversely affected women, who constitute 54% of the population in the province. People with disabilities and older people also suffer. All these factors have far-reaching social, economic and political consequences, not only for the province but for the country in general.

As we celebrate the ten-year anniversary of our democracy and enter the 10th anniversary of the International Year of Families, the Department of Social Development hopes that we will treat our families, children, communities, older people and people with HIV/AIDS, with dignity and respect.

The people of this country mandated us, the Department of Social Development, to build a carrying society for a better life for all.

Achievements

Most importantly, as a Department of Social Development we can claim many achievements in our endeavour to improve and accelerate service delivery, changing the lives of vulnerable and poor citizens for the better.

Now, with a click on a computer, a beneficiary can know his\her status if he\she has an identity document.

This is because of our File Management Centre, and the related Management Information System with over 2-million records, which has been nominated for an international United Nations award.

Litigation cases have been stabilized through the litigation desk, resulting in savings of R9-million per month.

In two weeks a social grant can be approved through our Document Management Centre.

We have changed the lives of many children who have been trapped in the shackles of poverty. As the province of the Eastern Cape, we are proud of our track record of being among the leading provinces in registering children for Child Support Grants.

Today, more than 680 451 children are in the system and continuously receiving R160 a month in Child Support Grants. The picture has drastically changed from where we were in 1998, when only 214 000 children were registered for state maintenance grants.

The national government exceeded 3-million children in 2003, and the Eastern Cape contributed towards ensuring that target was met.

More than 15 000 orphans have been identified. We thank the private sector institutions that have taken the initiative of supporting HIV/AIDS orphans, and we encourage other groups to follow suit in taking care of orphans so as to accelerate service delivery.

This financial year, in an attempt to alleviate immediate hunger, ninety-six thousand families were the recipients of food parcels at a tune of R300 for a period of three months.

Child Protection Week is one of our highlights. We registered many children for the Child Support Grant to ensure that children's rights are upheld and protected against all forms of abuse.

We hosted a conference on the elderly to kick-start the Social Development Month and it was tremendously successful.

Our achievements include the consolidation of departments, including leadership and management, a new organogram and payment of backlogs.

We also established a Contract Management Centre to manage the service providers, including monitors and help desks.

It has resulted in stabilization of the process of payments of social grants, although the problems still remain. Our centre is a national pioneer in the management of these service providers.

We have established a Bee-Keeping project to alleviate poverty in a sustainable way, which has won national awards.

We also employed social workers on a contract basis to assist with foster-care applications and social relief of distress.

As a department we inculcate a culture and practice of Batho Pele, which ensures excellent service to our citizens at all times, and recognizable excellence among our staff in the department. This includes sustaining the good initiatives and the turnaround that we have begun.

Ahead of us lies a decade, during which we must continue to act together to advance towards building the carrying society for a better life for all.

We won't shift our focus from our vision of a proactive and dynamic Eastern Cape Social Development Department, striving towards self-reliant individuals and communities, within a secure socio-economic environment.

Customer satisfaction

Gone are the days when beneficiaries were sent from pillar to post because the officials were not armed with accurate information about the status of the beneficiaries.

All our pay-points now have laptops, aimed at assisting the beneficiaries on the spot, without them having to go to Bisho to identify their status.

In partnership with service providers, beneficiaries will get their social grants in secure environments with running water, toilets, soup kitchens and quickset service.

We are therefore calling upon the private sector, labour, and religious organizations to join hands with government in building this carrying society.

The process of building a carrying society means training managers. In so doing, you are providing a skill that will help in accelerating service delivery; that will change the life of the poor old lady who was unable to access social services because a person in the front office didn't have the skills to render satisfactory customer care.

In this coming financial year, in partnership with the private sector, all service providers and all people of goodwill, we will change the lives of the poor for the better.

Let us build a people's contract to create jobs and fight poverty.

AFRICA AND THE "WAR ON TERROR"

By Eddy Maloka
Africa Institute of South Africa

The US "war on terror" is now in its third year, and the bombings in Afghanistan and Iraq are far from over. Many analysts and policy think-tanks have reflected on the impact of this war on Africa; some have put emphasis on the economy, development aid, security questions, and others on implications for US foreign policy. The intention of this piece is to make a contribution to this effort by introducing new elements to the reflection.

The historiography of "terrorism"

Titles such as Morgan Norval's Inside the ANC: The Evolution of a Terrorist Organisation (1990), remind us of how the definition of "terrorism" has evolved over the years, and the fact that definitions are rarely without ideological assumptions.

During the Cold War, the definition of "terrorism" revolved around two clusters of issues. One category of the "terrorism" definition put more emphasis on what was then a common phenomenon of airline hostage-taking and related activities. The second category, directly linked to the Cold War and the armed activities of the liberation movements, particularly in Southern Africa, equated "terrorism" with "communism" and the guerilla movement. Indeed, this definition informed participants in Springbok Radio's "Top Level" programme, which was broadcast on October 30 1983 with the theme "The Modern face of Terrorism in South Africa", when one of them warned: "The ANC, the PAC, SWAPO, the South African Communist Party are names which have become synonymous with the cowardly acts of the covert world of terrorism".

Similarly, armed political organisations which were supported by the apartheid regime and some Western countries - notably Angola's UNITA and Mozambique's RENAMO - were defined as "rebels" and "liberators" fighting the monster of communism.

The 9-11 attacks have opened a new frontier in the debate over the definition of "terrorism." Whereas during the Cold War the defining evil was communism, today "terrorism" is equated with "Islamic extremism." In the spirit of Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilisations", "terrorism" is presented as the manifestation of Islam's resistance to "civilisation" and Western values. Unlike the "terrorists" of the Cold War period who were associated with a state that represented a particular ideology, the "terrorists" of today, carrying the banner of religion, have no states and belong to the domain of "transnational threats".

There are two related definitional issues that must be highlighted. According to the US Department of State annual report on Patterns of Global Terrorism, "the term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience". The US National Security Strategy of September 2002 also argues that the 9-11 events have "taught the United States that weak states can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders".

These two citations reflect a tendency in the dominant definition of terrorism to marginalise "state terrorism" as a phenomenon and the "cause" factors -that is, the linkage between a country's level of development and terrorism. Patterns of Global Terrorism limits its notion of state terrorism to "state sponsors of terrorism". Yet, for many, especially in the developing world, the experience of a state engaged in terrorist activities against a section of its population and its neighbours - as it was the case with apartheid South Africa or the regime currently at the helm of the Israeli state -is an essential component of the definition of terrorism. So is the importance of factoring in development concerns in one's definition of and strategies against terrorism.

The definition debate is also far from over in Africa, especially as many countries, in response to United Nation Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, are currently passing national anti-terror legislation. The definition of terrorism in these anti-terror laws is so broad and could be used against the opposition and other constituencies organised against the state. Also worrying are the measures provided for in the anti-terror law, such as detention without trial, the establishment of special/military courts, and, in some cases, the institution of the death penalty.

These debates notwithstanding, there is an effort here in Africa to define terrorism in accordance with local conditions. For example, Article 3 of the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, emphasises that "the

struggle waged by people in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts". Similarly, "political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives shall not be a justifiable defence against a terrorist act".

So, the "war on terror" is also a "war of ideas". But ideas are dangerous because they can be translated into action. If states are excluded in the definition of terrorism, then they can get away with serious crimes such as ethnic cleansing. If the "cause" factors are marginalised and not considered, the "war on terror" will be just a simple military operation, even if this entails the destruction of infrastructure and "collateral damage".

A post-post-Cold War world order?

The "war on terror" cannot be discussed without tracing the developments back to the immediate post-Cold War era, which had presented Africa with a set of new challenges and opportunities which included new forms of globalisation and the transformation of the global security architecture. The response of the continent was very complex, thanks to the democratisation wave which came with this process and the rise of civil society which had been dormant since the late 1960s.

Accompanying this response was, first of all, the ideology of the "African Renaissance" which was an attempt to reconceptualise the new challenges, especially as these pertain to issues of governance and the promotion of the culture of human rights and the rule of law; efforts aimed at eradicating violent conflicts on the continent; economic development; the affirmation and protection of African culture; and improving Africa's global standing. Secondly, and much later, was the transformation of the OAU into the African Union; and, indeed, thirdly, NEPAD as a programme of action for continental socio-economic renewal.

However, the post 9-11 period introduced a new dimension to the post-Cold War era. The Clinton Administration's approach to the world was developed in A National Security Strategy for a New Century which was released in October 1998. The document identified as US' objectives: to enhance US security; to bolster US economic prosperity; and to promote democracy abroad. The document put US interests into three categories, namely: vital (threaten the survival of the US); important (threaten the well-being); and humanitarian and other interests. Five threats were identified: regional and state-centered threats; transnational (terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, etc); spread of dangerous technologies (weapons of mass destruction); foreign intelligence collection and "failed" states. The document argued for the need for an integrated approach which should include diplomacy, multilateralism and the use of the US military might as a deterrence. The approach to Africa, according to the document, was to be informed by the promotion of democracy; enhancing security and promoting prosperity.

In the aftermath of 9-11, the Bush Administration released The National Security Strategy of the United States of America wherein the practice of deterrence is rejected in favour of "pre-emptive strikes". Terrorism is also elevated in the threat level scale to a principal priority. The approach of the Bush Administration, notwithstanding 9-11 as a trigger of the "pre-emptive strikes" doctrine, was informed by the Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century - a document which was released in the presidential election year (September 2000) by the neo-conservative think-tank (The Project for the New American Century), as a blueprint of how the new administration was going to approach global security matters. Members of the think-tank included figures some of whom now hold key posts in the Bush Administration. The document tried to argue for a strategic shift in how the US approaches the post-Cold War, and advocated for a significant increase in defense spending with the view to defending the US territory; fighting and decisively winning multiple, simultaneous major theatre wars; performing the "constabulary" duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical regions; and transforming US forces to exploit the "revolution in military affairs". According to the document, the security system of the 21st century will be unipolar; US strategic goal should therefore be to preserve Pax Americana. The main military missions should, among others, be to deter the rise of a new great-power competitor; and, according to the document, the main military threat is the potential theatre wars spread across the globe (as opposed to global war across many theatres as was the case during the Cold War). The focus of strategic competition, argued the document, is to shift from Europe to East Asia (primarily because of China).

It has since become apparent, especially with the occupation of Iraq in mind, that the Bush Administration is committed to implementing elements of the Rebuilding America's Defenses and The National Security Strategy. Thus a new global order is emerging whose key elements include, first, the strategic shift from "states" as threats to "terrorist". So, the "war on terror" can be fought anywhere, and against anybody, with little regard to the rules of the game; hence "regime change" as an approach to "rogue states". Secondly, the abandonment of the practice of deterrence in favour of "pre-emptive strikes" doctrine. Thirdly, the onslaught on multlateralism and broad principles of global governance, in favour of vulgar unilateralism. Fourthly, growing militarism. And, finally, the selective use and politicisation of "human rights" and "democracy".

Some key figures in the Bush Administration have characterised this new era as the "post-post-Cold War", because Russia and China, in particular, are potential US allies in the fight against the new evil -i.e. transnational threats (especially terrorism and weapons of mass destruction). According to the US Department of State's Director: Policy Planning Staff, Richard Hass (in his April 2002 lecture to the

Foreign Policy Association), the immediate post-Cold War was a "decade of transition defined by uncertainty". Accordingly, he continued, "then came the tragic events of September 11. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon did not create the post-post-Cold War world. But they helped end the decade of complacency". The challenge according to him: "US foreign policy, therefore, will succeed or fail in the post-post-Cold War world by how well it copes with this era's diverse security challenges, traditional and transnational alike". He then argued for a "doctrine of integration", because "the principal aim of American foreign policy is to integrate other countries and organisations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with US interests and values".

Africa's response to the "war on terror"

The importance of Africa in the "war on terror" is relatively insignificant if one were to use Africa's share of the total global terror attacks and casualties as reported in Patterns of Global Terrorism. According to this report, between 1997 and 2002, African ranked fifth in the "total international terrorist attacks by region" after Latin America, Asia, Western Europe and the Middle East. The continent is followed by Eurasia and, last in the ranking, North America. In terms of casualties, between the same period, with the exception of 1998 when US embassies were bombed in Kenya and Tanzania, African casualties are comparatively insignificant, with figures for Asia leading the ranking.

Nonetheless, most African counties condemned the 9-11 attacks and co-operated with the US government in the apprehension of suspected terrorists, including the freezing of the bank accounts of suspected organisations. An African anti-terrorism summit was convened in Dakar, Senegal, a month after the 9-11 incident and adopted a Declaration Against Terrorism which proposed, among others, an additional protocol to the OAU Convention on Terrorism. In November, the OAU Central Organ issued a communiqué against terrorism which (among others) – and consistent with the continent's definition of terrorism – stressed "that terrorism is a universal phenomenon that is not associated with any particular religion, culture or race", and that terrorism "should be combated in all its forms and manifestations, including those in which States are involved directly or indirectly". In September 2002, the Africa Union (successor to the OAU) convened a senior officials' anti-terrorism meeting in Algiers, Algeria, which adopted a Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism with the view to addressing capacity problems on the continent, including the need to accelerate the ratification of the Terrorism Convention. All in all, particularly in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1373, African countries' focus is in four areas.

First of all, is the signing and ratification of international and regional anti-terror instruments, particularly the 12 United Nations conventions and protocols which were developed between 1963 and 1999. African countries' reports to the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee established in terms of Resolution 1373, as well as the Patterns of Global Terrorism, are a good source on the state of accession to and ratification of the 12 UN instruments on the continent.

This global drive for activating international anti-terror instruments gave momentum to the continental effort towards the ratification of the OAU Terrorism Convention which was inoperative at the time of the 9-11 attacks. Thanks to this global drive, the OAU Terrorism Convention got into effect in 2003.

Within countries, the expectation, as per Security Council 1373, was that national anti-terror agencies, with executive authority, will be established and a legislative framework put in place for combating terrorism. This has happened and is continuing in many countries across the continent as reflected in the reports to the Counter-Terrorism Committee. But this process, especially the passing of enabling legislation, is not without contradiction as human rights groups and opposition forces in many of these countries, including South Africa, attack the anti-terror law as an onslaught against basic freedoms and, in the case of South Africa, a reintroduction of apartheid-era's brutal internal security regime. However, some countries are using the OAU Terrorism Convention and the United Nations' Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols as their guide.

The fourth area is in the collaboration with the US' global anti-terror military campaign, especially – in the case of Africa – in East Africa and the Horn. The US anti-terrorism policy towards Africa has historically been focused on Sudan and Libya as "states sponsoring terrorism" and Somalia as a "failed state". This policy was given impetus by attacks on US targets in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.

A number of US military projects are currently in full swing across the continent. One example is the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) which was established by the Bush Administration in 2002 to replace the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) which was set up by the Clinton Administration to provide training largely in African peacekeeping operations. The programme involves troops from Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Ivory Coast and Kenya. The main difference between ACRI and ACOTA is that the latter includes – and in line with the "war on terror" – training for offensive military operations. Complementing this programme is the US Department of State's Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) aimed at assisting Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania in, among others, protecting their borders and combating terrorism.

Military bases in Africa is another interesting new development. The US European Command is responsible for most African countries, while Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Sudan, Kenya and Seychelles fall in the sphere of the US Central Command. Comoros and Madagascar, including the Indian Ocean, are the responsibility of the US Pacific Command.

Until recently, only Kenya had a formal agreement which allowed the US to use the country's local military facilities, including the port of Mombasa which was used during the US intervention in Somalia in 1992-1994. From 2001 a process was put in place which culminated in the establishment of the Headquarters of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa in Djibouti as a military base for US counter-terrorism operations in six East African countries and Yemen. This development makes Djibouti host to the only US military base in Sub-Saharan Africa.

As to allies to US operations in the Horn and East Africa, Kenya and Ethiopia remain the most important, and to some extent, Uganda. And thanks to the "war on terror", the Bush Administration reversed Clinton's policy of isolation towards Sudan by getting involved in the peace talks between the south and the government in Khartoum. A breakthrough is now imminent in the talks, and a peace agreement is about to be signed.

As shown later, West Africa has largely been a focus area in US policy because of its oil reserves. Indeed, the NATO Supreme Commander US General. James Jones remarked in 2003 that: "The carrier battle groups of the future and the expeditionary strike groups of the future may not spend six months in the Mediterranean Sea, but I'll bet they'll spend half the time going down the West Coast of Africa", because, according to him, the region included "large, ungoverned areas... that are clearly the new routes of narco-trafficking, terrorists' training, and hotbeds of instability". The recent coup attempt in Sao Tome and Principe prompted reports to the effect that the US was planning to open a military base in that small island.

One area where the African Union and many African countries differed with the US anti-terrorism campaign was in the motivation for the war against Iraq. The US campaign to mobilise global support for the war in Iraq did indeed win some sympathy among African countries such as Uganda and Ethiopia, but in general, most African countries were not convinced that a peaceful route to the settlement of the issue was not possible.

Africa's development forgotten?

The US reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq must be teaching us a good lesson down here in the Dark Continent. We must be sitting and watching with great concern how countries around the world and international organisations are being mobilised to dig deep into their pockets to support reconstruction efforts in those two countries.

This demonstration of political will and the mobilisation of the rich of the world is not new. The Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of post-World War II Europe is one example. During the Cold War, those who were friends of the West were rewarded with golden hand-shakes to the extent that, especially in East Asia, some of those countries are today economic success stories.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and East Europe was also greeted with joy, and resources flowed to that part of the world to build new institutions and construct capitalist economies.

The Afghan and Iraqi experiences are, however, unprecedented in some respect. Reconstruction support websites are in place for the two countries, hosted by the US government, to mobilise donors and the private sector. Ministerial meetings are being convened to urge the rich to come on board.

For example, at the ministerial Conference on the Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan held in Tokyo, Japan, in January 2002, over 20 countries pledged US$1.8 billion for the first year, and US$4.5 billion for the successive two-and-a-half years. An Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund was established four months later. In one of its donor reports of 2003, actual paid-in contributions to the Fund by October 1st of that year were US$366.9 million, with US$95.9 expected by March 20th, 2004.

The elections scheduled to take place in Afghanistan in June 2004, have also added a new momentum to the resource mobilisation effort for the country. One important gesture was the allocation of US$ 1.6 billion to the country by the US government from the US$ 87.5 billion supplemental appropriation fund signed into law recently by President Bush. This gesture was well received by, among others, the US Under Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs: "A surge in our reconstruction effort can now yield big payoffs both economically and politically. Afghanistan is an extremely poor country. Without strong economic growth, it will stay poor for a long time. An acceleration of the economic reconstruction effort now will help stimulate that economic growth. It will also help to lock-in politically the important gains that have been achieved thus far. When the Afghan people go to the polls next June, how will they view the improvements in their own lives? Will they feel that the progress lives up to their expectations? We want the answer to be 'Yes'".

However, a chunk of the fund appropriated recently by the Bush Administration will be for "Operation Iraqi Freedom". Of course, US$50 billion will be for military operations, and US$5 billion for "public law, order and safety". US$15 billion from this fund will be used to "build... clinics; provide safe, clean drinking water; open ports, railroad and airports; restore oil production; (and) provide reliable electrical service".

Iraq has also had its international donor conference which was held late 2003 in Madrid, Spain. The conference concluded on a positive note: "Donors noted that priorities for Iraq's reconstruction in 2004 and beyond include strengthening institutions for sovereign, transparent, and good government, restoring critical infrastructure and core human services and supporting economic and social transition that provides both growth and social protection". US$33 billion was pledged, including US$5 billion from Japan and US$500 million from Kuwait.

The World Bank had estimated that the Iraqi reconstruction effort will need an injection of US$56 billion over the period 2004-2007, hence the BBC could lament after the Madrid donor conference: "With $20billion already pledged by the United

States, the $33billion total falls short of the estimated $56billion needed to rebuild the war-torn country."

Reading this BBC lament from down here in the Dark Continent, one could ask: does the difference of just $3billion really matter?

One thing that is very clear is that the strategic interests of the West determine donor enthusiasm more than mere moral outrage against hunger and deprivation. The positive thing, however, is that we should now rely more and more on ourselves if we are to place our continent firmly on the renewal path. Depending on the West to build our future, is like planning a harvest entirely upon the whims of rainfall.

We must come to terms with the reality of our situation that, for now, we do not matter to the West; we will not receive huge sums of money to grow our economies, develop our private sector, strengthen our institutions, provide a social safety net for the vulnerable, and build roads, schools and clinics.

Alas, our oilfields a target!

President Bush, following on the footsteps of his four predecessors, has identified his country's dependence on imported oil as a critical energy, economic and security matter. Imported oil currently accounts for 50 percent of total US consumption, and this figure is expected to rise to 64 percent by 2020. The "war on terror", including the strategic fall-out with Saudi Arabia, coupled with the political unrest in Venezuela, have now complicated the picture. Africa and the Caspian area are now being explored as long-term, alternative, dependable sources of US oil needs.

Whereas Africa currently holds 6 percent of the total world's oil reserves (as opposed to 66 percent for the Middle East, 12 percent for Latin America and 4 percent for North America), the continent only accounts for 3 percent of the total global primary energy consumption (as opposed to 3.3 percent for the Middle East, 5 percent for Latin America and 28 percent for North America). The top four African oil producers are, in order: Nigeria, Angola, Gabon and Congo Republic. Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan, are considered up and coming oil producers with a lot of potential. Nigeria is the fifth largest crude oil exporter to the US after Canada, Saudi Arabia, Mexico and Venezuela. Angola is in ninth position.

The pro-African oil lobby in the US is not missing the opportunity. These include the US Geological Survey which, among others, produced its "Studies of Energy Resources in Sub-Saharan Africa". The Corporate Council on Africa also organised in 2002 its "West Africa oil and gas forum", a high-level conference aimed at encouraging US corporate investment particularly in Nigeria, Cameroon and Angola. Similarly, the African Oil Policy Initiative Group's report of 2002 on "African Oil: A Priority for US National Security and African Development", was described as a welcome development by the Republican Chairman of the Africa Subcommittee: "Africa's emerging potential as a major oil producer, and supplier to the United States, has been of interest to the Subcommittee on Africa that I chair for some time. The subcommittee held a hearing to look at this topic in 2000. It's clearly in our national interest to diversify our energy supply, especially given the turbulent political climate in key parts of the world today. The expansion of energy production in Africa matches that interest. Today, over 15 percent of our oil imports come from Africa. This figure will increase substantially in the years ahead".

Thus, African oil-producing countries, under the guise of the "war on terror", are subjected to a US-led invasion on two fronts. One front is the Sudan, where the Bush Administration has abandoned Clinton's hardline stance towards the government there, and has taken an active and special interest in the settlement of the conflict in that country. The second front is the West African coast stretching from Nigeria to Namibia. US activities in that region include giving unprecedented attention to Sao Tome and Principe because of the belief that the island is sitting on 4 billion barrels of oil reserves; the launch of the US$ 3.6 billion Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline project (the US' single largest investment in Africa); and in Angola, abandoning its long-time ally, UNITA, to establish cordial relations with the once-hated MPLA government.

Diplomatic manoeuvres are also part of the package. High-level visits into the region include Secretary of State Colin Powell's trip to Gabon and Angola, which was followed by Bush's five-nation tour of Senegal, Uganda, Botswana, Nigeria and South Africa. The US embassy in Equatorial Guinea which was closed some eight years ago due to human rights concerns, was to be reopened.

Corporate giants reaping the fruits of this invasion include, indeed, Exxon, Mobile, ChevronTexaco and Vanco Energy of Houston. Recently, at the 9th Annual Africa Upstream 2002 held in Cape Town, Chevron, ExxonMobile and BP-Shell revealed their multibillion dollar investment plans which will entail investing up to US$45 billion over the next few years in African oil. The truth of the matter, however -and a sad one indeed -is that inspite of their oil wealth, these African oil producing giants are homes to people who are among the poorest on the continent. This is simply because these oil fields are in the hands of foreign corporate interests, and their proceeds end up in the pockets of a collaborating comprador elite.

Conclusion

The impact of the "war on terror" on Africa has many dimensions and long-term implications for the political stability and development of the continent. Only the future will tell, but Africans can do something to determine their destiny. For now, this destiny is, in many respects, in foreign hands.

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HIV/AIDS IN THE SADC REGION

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Abstract

Southern Africa is today confronted with a social crisis of monumental proportions due mainly to the widespread HIV/AIDS pandemic. Evidence abounds that Southern Africa has become the epicentre of the lethal epidemic. Why is this the case and what is the state of policy discourses and interventions to address this development crisis? Both have been extremely useful in mitigating some of the adverse effects of HIV/AIDS although more remains to be done. One of the major adverse effects of HIV/AIDS is clearly the stagnation and decline in human development. This article argues strongly that one of the major missing links in both the discourse and response is that the institutional arrangements (what we term stewardship) have not been interrogated sufficiently in order to gauge the effectiveness and sustainability of policy responses.

Introduction

There is a general consensus that the HIV/AIDS epidemic is more than just a health crisis. It is, in fact, a development crisis. As one writer puts it: "What we now see is a major development crisis. Not since the Black Death devastated medieval Europe has humankind observed infectious disease deaths on such a scale. HIV/AIDS has become one of the worst killers among infectious diseases" (Bonnel, 2000:822). The latest UNAIDS report on the global HIV/AIDS epidemic corroborates this observation and asserts that "the scale of the AIDS crisis now outstrips even the worst-case scenarios of a decade ago. Dozens of countries are already in the grip of serious HIV/AIDS epidemics and many more are on the brink" (UNAIDS, 2002:22). Although the impacts of HIV/AIDS are many and varied, the most devastating impact is surely the phenomenal decline in human development levels in the whole SADC region. There is today a marked regression in terms of progress towards sustainable human development. Indeed the performance of most SADC states in terms of Human Development Index in the latest UNDP Human Development Report (2002) is both revealing and instructive. Population growth rates are on the decline and life expectancy levels are dwindling.

Measurement of the scale, depth and impact of HIV/AIDS still remains dicey. For the purpose of this paper, we adopt measurement indicators used by other experts in the field. There are two (2) commonly used indicators namely (a) HIV/AIDS incidence and (b) HIV/AIDS prevalence. Whiteside and Sunter define these indicators vividly: "incidence is the number of new infections over a given period of time. The incidence rate is the number per specified unit of population (this can be per 1000, per 10,000 per million for rare diseases) prevalence is the absolute number of people infected. The prevalence rate is the percentage of the population which exhibits the disease at a particular time (or averaged over a period of time)" (2000:28).

This paper interrogates various policy responses to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and argues that the strategies adopted thus far, albeit useful and necessary, have amounted simply to crisis management and as such are limited in scope, depth and impact. The paper argues for deliberate policy responses that transcend crisis management and are anchored upon strategic and sustainable interventions which are more pro-active than reactive and which are also more purposive and involve a broader range of stakeholders. Furthermore, the form and content of the HIV/AIDS prevention strategies should be profound enough to cover all aspects of social life in both urban and rural areas. It is precisely in this context that the paper investigates the essence of stewardship in health in relation to HIV/AIDS prevention. This concept is introduced specifically to bring into sharp relief the significance of governance to HIV/AIDS prevention.

The notion of stewardship denotes governance in the health sector, in this particular case in relation specifically to HIV/AIDS prevention. To date the issue of effective stewardship in HIV/AIDS prevention has not been subjected to debate in the current policy discourse around AIDS. Much more attention has gone to awareness campaigns, training strategies and rather ad hoc intervention measures most of which have essentially been driven by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. African governments and local policy actors must drive and own strategic interventions against HIV/AIDS if stewardship in health is to improve. This paper thus argues that the effectiveness of stewardship is critical for it determines the impact (or lack thereof) of the policy responses by various actors. Thus stewardship should be at the centre of strategic responses of SADC governments to the pervasive HIV/AIDS pandemic in the region.




Figure 1: Adult Deaths from Infectious Diseases in the Developing World, 1990 and 2020

The discussion that follows is organised as follows: the next section constitutes an environmental scanning of the scale and magnitude of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on a global and continental level and defines the depth of the problem at the regional (SADC) level. The third section presents a conceptual framework for our understanding of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The fourth section grapples with the impact of HIV/AIDS epidemic on human development and teases out some lessons learnt since the emergence of this social scourge. The fifth section presents critical challenges for stewardship (or what is commonly referred to as governance) if policy discourses and interventions are to be more strategic in both form and content. The conclusion wraps up the debate by reinforcing the main observations in the paper.

Contextual Framework and Problem Statement

The profundity and intensity of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on a global scale suggest clearly that this is not just an ordinary disease presenting a grave health crisis for states of the world, but that this social scourge represents, in a fundamental way, a development crisis of monumental proportions (see the South African Journal of Economics, 2000). It is thus crucial that from the onset we appreciate the stark reality that HIV/AIDS transcends, by far, the health crisis that most nations of the world, in particular developing states, are confronted with at present, but does in fact present a daunting development challenge (see Hope, 1999). Even the World Bank, an institution that has, for decades, propounded, neo-liberal economic orthodoxy, almost with religious faith, has now accepted that "HIV/AIDS epidemic is not only the most important public health problem affecting large parts of SSA, but also an unprecedented threat to the region's development. It is, therefore, a development crisis" (Emphasis Mine)(2000:6). This is more so not only because the disease claims human lives at a scale unprecedented and by far surpassing the malaria and TB scourge, but also because the socio-economic and political repercussions of the disease are undoubtedly enormous in both depth and scale. Figure one below compares the patterns of human fatalities by the nature of disease in 1990 and projections for the year 2020 comparing in particular HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB and various other respiratory diseases. Judging by data in this figure, while in 1990, the biggest killer disease was TB which claimed about 52% of human life compared to HIV/AIDS (about 7%) in 2020 it is projected that although TB will still remain one of the lethal diseases (claiming about 55% of lives, HIV/AIDS fatalities will soar up to about 37%.

It is now generally acknowledged that the HIV/AIDS pandemic has a devastating negative effect on Sustainable Human Development (SHD) and various global human development reports produced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the SADC Regional Human Development Reports produced by the Southern African Political Economy Series (SAPES) Trust in collaboration with the SADC Secretariat and the UNDP in both 1998 and 2000 have also vividly demonstrated this worrying trend of declining SHD in most SADC member-states as a result, principally, of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. This is the main concern of this paper which interrogates this alarming trend and confronts the policy responses. In so doing we challenge the effectiveness and efficacy, thus far, of the stewardship or governance machinery put in place to prevent the HIV/AIDS scourge.

While on a global scale the total number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS was fourteen (14) million in 2001, the Sub-Saharan Africa's share of this calamity was 11 million while the SADC share of the same burden was about five (5) million. The top five (5) SADC countries with the highest populations of HIV/AIDS orphans are the Democratic Republic of Congo (930 000), Tanzania (810 000), Zimbabwe (780 000), South Africa (660 000) and Zambia (570 000).

The HIV/AIDS epidemic hit the world, in earnest, in the late 1970s and early 1980s and began to spread throughout the globe on a phenomenal scale leaving no single part of it untouched. Hence, the 1998 UNAIDS report, which depicted a map of global HIV/AIDS infection had an interesting, albeit instructive, caption: "No place on earth untouched".

However, as Whiteside and Sunter remind us "some parts of the world are worse affected than others" (2000:36). Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and Southern Africa in particular are the hardest hit (see UNAIDS, 2000; UNAIDS, 2002). Spreading like wild fire and leaving misery and social destruction in its wake, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has definitely been accelerated by the onset of globalisation which facilitates easy mobility and social interactions almost unknown during the heyday of the pre-industrial era. Indeed, the mayhem caused by HIV/AIDS and spread rapidly in the current era validates the argument by radical political economists that globalisation amounts not so much to a global village, as neo-liberal economic orthodoxy

would like us believe, but rather to global pillage.

Almost three (3) decades since the onset of the disease, HIV/AIDS has claimed the lives of about twenty million (20) million people while a further forty (40) million people live with HIV. 18.5 million people living with HIV/AIDS are women while three (3) million are children in the age bracket of 0-14. AIDS deaths in 2001 totalled three (3) million of which about one (1) million were women and 580 000 were children. It is worth noting that ninety (90) percent of the HIV/AIDS infections occur in developing countries, "where the disease has already reduced life expectancy, in some cases by more than a decade" (World Bank, 1999:1). According to recent estimates, "the epidemic continues to grow, as 16,000 people worldwide become newly infected each day" (World Bank, 2000:5). This World Bank report corroborates our earlier observation that the region most affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic is Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It reveals that "at the end of 1998, 22.2 million people, including 1 million children, were living with HIV/AIDS in SSA, two-thirds of the world total. At least 4 million Africans were newly infected with the virus in 1998" (2000:5). Table one below illustrates in a graphical fashion the magnitude and intensity of the HIV/AIDS worldwide.

Table One: Global Summary of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic

HIV/AIDS Incidence	People newly infected with HIV/AIDS in 2001	Total	5.0 million
		Adults	4.2 million
		Women	2.0 million
		Children<15 Yrs	800 000
HIV/AIDS Prevalence	Number of people living with HIV/AIDS in 2001	Total	40.0 million
		Adults	37.1 million
		Women	18.5 million
		Children<15 Yrs	3.0 million
HIV/AIDS Fatality	Total deaths due to HIV/AIDS in 2001	Total	3.0 million
		Adults	2.4 million
		Women	1.1 million
		Children<15 Yrs	580 000

Source: UNAIDS, 2002:8

Although all strata of society get infected and are affected by the HIV/AIDS, it is abundantly evident from the table above that the disease hits women and children hardest. Of total new HIV/AIDS infections in 2001 estimated at five (5) million, two (2) million were women while 800 000 were children. This does not suggest that men are not massively affected by the HIV/AIDS scourge, but simply that it seems to be more heavily laden against women and children. On the whole, however, the HIV/AIDS pandemic hits the adult population in its prime of life and thus "exacts a heavy toll on surviving family members, especially children, and may exacerbate poverty and inequality (World Bank, 1999:1). Table Two below illustrates global data of the HIV/AIDS epidemic by region in 1999.

What is undoubtedly clear from Table two is that the HIV/AIDS wave which began to sweep the globe in late 1970s and early 1980s had by 1999 reached a total of about thirty four (34) million people of which twenty three (23) million were in Sub-Saharan Africa. During that year alone, 5.6 million people were newly infected by HIV/AIDS, 3.8 million of whom were in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Table above vividly illustrates the stark reality that SSA is the hardest hit region of the world. It is worth noting that the major concentration of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in SSA is in the Southern Africa region. It is mainly for this reason that the 2000 Regional Human Development Report suggests that the region is the epicentre of the epidemic and that the disease presents an enormous challenge for SHD. The report further neatly links the incidence and prevalence of HIV/AIDS on one hand and poverty and inequality on the other (SAPES/UNDP/SADC, 2000:154). About twelve (12) million people are HIV positive in the SADC region (SAPES Databank, 2002). Thus, Southern Africa has an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 12.8% in sharp contrast to the Sub-Saharan rate of 8.6% and the World rate of 1.1% (SAPES Data Bank, 2002). It is estimated that the adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rate ranged

Table Two: Regional HIV/AIDS statistics and features, December 1999

Region	Adults & children living with HIV/AIDS (prevalence)	Adults & children newly infected with HIV in 1999 (incidence)	Adult prevalence rate (per cent)	Proportion of HIV – positive adults who are women (per cent)
Sub-Saharan Africa	23,3 million	3,8 million	8,0	55
North Africa & Middle East	220 000	19 000	0,13	20
South & South-East Asia	6 million	1,3 million	0,69	30
East Asia & Pacific	530 000	120 000	0,07	15
Latin America	1,3 million	150 000	0,57	20
Caribbean	360 000	57 000	1,96	35
Eastern Europe & Central Asia	360 000	95 000	0,14	20
Western Europe	520 000	30 000	0,25	20
North America	920 000	44 000	0,56	20
Australia & New Zealand	12 000	500	0,1	10
Total	33,6 million	5,6 million	1,1	46

Source: Whiteside and Sunter, 2000:38

between 0.08% in Mauritius and 36% in Botswana in 1999 (SAPES Data Bank, 2002).

The pattern of the HIV/AIDS epidemic judged in terms of absolute population living with the disease is more pronounced and profound in South Africa (5 million), Zimbabwe (2.5 million), Tanzania (1.5 million), Zambia (1.2 million) and the DRC (1.3 million). All these countries have large populations. However, when considered as a percentage of the total population, the pattern of changes. The five (5) SADC states with the highest percentage of the population living with HIV/AIDS are Botswana (21%), Zimbabwe (19%), Lesotho (18%), Swaziland (16%) and Namibia (13%). It is worth noting that all the five states have small populations, apart from Zimbabwe.

In 2001 HIV/AIDS fatalities globally reached a staggering three (3) million of which 2.2 million deaths were in Sub-Saharan Africa and the SADC share was about 1.2 million. The six (6) SADC states with the highest number of AIDS deaths are South Africa (360 000), Zimbabwe (200 000), Tanzania (140 000), Zambia (120 000), DRC (120 000) and Malawi (80 000).

Table Three illustrates the plight of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS in years 1999 and 2001. This data graphically illustrates the excruciating impact of HIV/AIDS on children in the SADC region.

Table Three: Cumulative AIDS Orphans, 1999 and 2001

Country	AIDS Orphans 1999	AIDS Orphans 2001	Variance
Tanzania	1 100 000	810 000	(290 000)
Zimbabwe	900 000	780 000	(120 000)
DRC	680 000	930 000	250 000
Zambia	650 000	570 000	(80 000)
South Africa	420 000	660 000	240 000
Malawi	390 000	470 000	80 000
Mozambique	310 000	420 000	110 000
Angola	98 000	100 000	2 000
Namibia	67 000	47 000	(20 000)
Botswana	66 000	69 000	3 000
Lesotho	35 000	73 000	38 000
Swaziland	12 000	35 000	23 000
SADC	**4728000**	**4 964 000**	**36 000**
Sub Saharan Africa	12 100 000	11 000 000	1 100 000
World	13 200 000	14 000 000	800 000

Source: UNAIDS, Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic, June 2000

Conceptual Frame of Analysis: Do we Know?

A plethora of literature analysing the HIV/AIDS epidemic exists and is easily accessible. A review of this literature reveals two basic conceptual frameworks in the discourse on the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The first school of thought is predicated upon medical science perspectives and the second on social science perspectives. The first links biological explanations with behavioural patterns and outlines the challenges posed by the HIV/AIDS for medical science. The second school explains the HIV/AIDS pandemic by reference to socio-economic (as well as political) ramifications of the epidemic and addresses the policy challenges posed by the disease. The approach in this article is informed more by social science perspectives (what others refer to as the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS) than by the medical perspective.

We need to open the discussion with definitions of the three (3) key concepts employed throughout the paper namely (a) HIV/AIDS, (b) Sustainable Human Development (SHD) and (c) Stewardship or what is commonly referred to as governance. The interface between the three (3) concepts is undoubtedly strong. HIV/AIDS tends to undermine sustainable human development and if the stewardship of health is poor and marked by imprudent policy interventions then sustainable human development will remain a distant mirage for the SADC states.

1. Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is a virus that enters human body and attacks a person's immune system thereby weakening the body's resistance towards various types of diseases. As the immune system weakens progressively due to HIV infection, the body becomes extremely vulnerable to opportunistic diseases such as TB. That HIV causes or ultimately leads to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) brooks no controversy today. This suggests that the deficient immune system is acquired by some means and that AIDS itself is not just one disease, but rather a cocktail of opportunistic disease "that come about as the immune system falls. Hence it is regarded as a syndrome" (Whiteside and Sunter, 2000:1). Thus far, there are five (5) major modes of HIV/AIDS infections and transmission namely:

- Unsafe or unprotected sex;
- Mother-to-child infection;
- Intravenous drug-use with contaminated needles;
- Use of infected blood or blood products; and
- Bodily contact involving open bleeding wounds (Whiteside and Sunter 2000:10).

2. Sustainable Human Development (SHD), as a concept, was introduced by the UNDP in its first Human Development Report of 1990. It has gained currency in development discourse because it debunks conventional wisdom which tended to blur the interrelation-ships between economic growth and development. By introducing such development indicators as HDI (Human Development Index), GDI (Gender-related Development Index) and HPI (Human Poverty Index) , the concept of SHD has also added weight to wide-ranging criticism regarding the utility of such indicators as GNP (Gross National Product) and GDP (Gross Domestic Product) as reliable measurement for development a la World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). SHD refers to a process of enlarging people's choices in a manner that enables them to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives (UNDP, 1990).

Sustainable Human Development (SHD) denotes a decent standard of living for human beings and has three (3)

Table Five: HDI Ranking among SADC Member-states, 1998

HDI Country RANK	Human Dev. Index (HDI)	Gender Related Dev. Index (GDI) (GEM)	Gender Empowerment Measure*	Human Poverty Index (HPI)	SADC Integration Index SII	GDP per capita (PPP, US$)	Popula-tion millions)	Land Area (000s) square kilome-tres
1 Seychelles	0.808	..	..	..	..	10 600	0.1	0.5
2 Mauritius	0.782	0.765	0.359	11.5	0.038	8 312	1.1	2
3 South Africa	0.718	0.706	0.540	20.2	0.080	8 488	39.4	1221
4 Swaziland	0.672	0.659	0.329	27.3	0.556	3 816	1.0	17
5 Namibia	0.651	0.638	..	28.6	0.285	5 176	1.7	824
6 Botswana	0.613	0.598	0.403	28.3	0.198	6 103	1.6	582
7 Lesotho	0.583	0.558	0.389	23.3	0.362	1 626	2.1	30
8 Zimbabwe	0.570	0.562	0.359	30.0	0.322	2 669	11.4	391
9 DR Congo	0.440	0.416	..	..	..	822	49.1	2345
10 Zambia	0.429	0.415	0.238	37.8	0.075	719	8.8	753
11 Tanzania	0.422	0.411	..	29.2	..	480	32.1	945
12 Angola	0.419	..	..	54.7	..	1 821	12.1	1247
13 Malawi	0.393	0.370	0.238	41.9	0.077	523	10.3	118
14 Mozambique	0.350	0.320	0.331	50.7	..	782	18.9	802
SADC	0.538	0.536	..	31.5	..	2 663	189.7	9 277.5

*GEM is for 1997

Source: SAPES Databank

measurable components namely (a) long and healthy life, (longevity) (b) high literacy rate (knowledge) and (c) high per capita income (standard of living). These three (3) components of SHD are measured by the three (3) main indicators namely (a) HID which measures the "overall progress in a country in achieving human development" (UNDP, 1998; 15), (b) GDI) which measures progress towards SHD taking due regard of inequalities arising out of power relations between women an men, and (c) HPI which measures human deprivation levels that undermine human development. Table Four below captures the three components of SHD and the accompanying indicators of human development.

Table Four: Measurement and Components of Sustainable Human Development

Index	Longevity	Knowledge	Decent Standard of Living
HDI	Life expectancy at birth	1. Adult literacy 2. Combined enrolment ratio	Adjusted per capita income in PPP US$
GDI	Female and male life expectancy at birth	1. Female and male adult literacy rates 2. Female and male combined enrolment ratios	Female and male per capita incomes (PPP US$) based on female and male earned income shares
HPI	Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40	Adult illiteracy rate	Deprivation in economic provisioning measured by 1. Percentage of people without access to safe water 2. Percentage of people without access to health services 3. Percentage of children under five who are underweight

Source: SAPES/UNDP/SADC, 2000:147

The current state of SHD in the SADC regions as shown in table 7 below suggests that the top three (3) countries in terms of HDI ranking are Seychelles (0.808), Mauritius (0.782) and South Africa (0.718). The three poor performers in terms of SHD are Mozambique (0.350), Malawi (0.393) and Angola (0.419).

3. Stewardship in health delivery essentially denotes the governance regime and machinery health service delivery. Put somewhat differently stewardship implies leadership in health delivery and prevention of HIV/AIDS. As a recent WHO position paper observes:

Whereas leadership in health sector reforms has put most emphasis on areas directly under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health (Stewardship health) what is being advocated in Stewardship considers two other aspects. These are the responsibilities and tasks for strategic management of health systems (Stewardship of health) and for factors in the broader social, political and economic environment with which the health system operates (Stewardship for health). Government should ensure in a coordinated manner, that the Ministry of Health and other key stakeholders are able to play their roles and assume their responsibilities in the process of health development (emphasis mine) (WHO, 2002:5)

Evidence abounds that the HIV/AIDS epidemic is progressively reducing levels of HDI and reversing progress towards sustainable human development in the SADC region. This trend is exacerbated and compounded by poor and inefficient stewardship or governance regimes in the delivery of health services and in the development of prudent policy instruments for the prevention of HIV/AIDS.

Various studies have chronicled the multi-variety, multi-layered impacts of HIV/AIDS in the SADC region. It is to this

debate that the next section of this paper now turns our attention.

The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Human Development: Any Lessons Learnt?

The HIV/AIDS pandemic represents a developmental crisis of monumental proportions given that its impact goes far beyond the health sector and poses policy challenges are unprecedented in human history. The impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic can be conveniently clustered into two (2) categories namely socio-economic and demographic.

Socio-Economic Impact

Available literature points to the stark reality that the economic impact of HIV/AIDS is marked by both by stagnation and decline in sustainable human development. Not only does HIV/AIDS leads to a severe reduction in skilled human resources and critical mass of rural social capital, it also presents a heavy burden on scarce financial resources available to the state, communities and households. There is abundant evidence that HIV/AIDS kills young and adult people in their prime years and as such robs countries of the most needed productive labour. As Oucho reminds us "HIV/AIDS hits active young and adults hardest and is therefore a killer of the fittest; in its early stages it tends to affect disproportionately the more skilled and the better educated; and as the pandemic advances, it focuses more on the poorest and the most disadvantaged"(2001:41).

This leads to enormous drainage of the productive human resources needed for economic development and the survival of households. The World Bank corroborates this observation thus: "Worldwide, AIDS hits people hardest in their most productive years. This profoundly disrupts the economic and social basis of families. When a family loses its primary income earner, its very survival is threatened. It sells assets and exhausts savings to pay for health care and funerals" (2000:8). In essence, therefore, HIV/AIDS drastically reduces returns on investment in education. As the World Bank poignantly observes "scarce resources spent on education will be lost if teachers and students die of AIDS – the more skilled, the greater the economic loss. Millions of teachers and students are dying or leaving school for economic reasons because of illness, or to care for family members, reducing both the demand for education and the supply of teachers. More than 30 percent of teachers in Malawi and Zambia are already infected (2000:11).

Most SADC states are primarily agrarian economies with agriculture constituting the mainstay of the economy. In many of these countries, the agricultural sector is the main employer and rural social capital is critical for survival of households. However, the agricultural sector is being adversely affected by HIV/AIDS epidemic in that labour productivity is increasingly dwindling and the rural social capital is also disintegrating. Additionally:

coping strategies developed by rural communities affected by HIV can lead to greater poverty and increased vulnerability. The loss of adults to AIDS often leads to a shift in cropping patterns. In many cases, this means switching from cash crops to subsistence farming. It can also reduce investments in soil enhancements, irrigation and other capital improvements, which have long-term impacts on output. AIDS forces families to make irreversible decisions to sell livestock, equipment and land to cover AIDS – related expenses. Leaving surviving family members in poverty, from which it is hard to escape (World Bank, 2000:12).

It is thus evident that HIV/AIDS is indeed "both a symptom and increasingly a cause of underdevelopment" (Oucho, 2001: 41) and poverty. The causal linkage between HIV/AIDS and poverty/social inequality is clear enough to have caused such furore and outcry when the South African President, Thabo Mbeki, brought it to the centre of the debate in the past two years. Thabo Mbeki has steadfastly raised the issue of the linkage between HIV/AIDS and poverty arguing that there is a tenuous relationship between these phenomena. On one hand HIV/AIDS accentuates poverty and inequality, while on the other, the poorest strata of society are more vulnerable to the epidemic than the nuvo rich in society . Hence he concludes that "the world's biggest killer and greatest cause of ill health and suffering across the globe, including South Africa, is extreme poverty" (Mbeki 2002:52).

Mbeki's analysis and observations are plausible and have been vindicated by a recent SADC regional human development report which argues that the relationship between HIV/AIDS and poverty is two-pronged. First and foremost, the poorest strata of society is more likely to be exposed to HIV/AIDS. Second, the HIV/AIDS infection is likely to cause impoverishment. According to the Report, the poor are more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection due to the following factors:

- they lack easy access to health facilities and services;
- they often participate intra-state and inter-state labour migration;
- the nutrition status of their household members is low;
- they lack information on HIV/AIDS and are not well-informed about policy interventions to prevent the epidemic;
- they lack resources to afford preventive activities such condom use and purchase of exorbitant anti-retroviral medication (SAPES/UNDP/SADC, 2000: 154).

Demographic Impact

During the pre-HIV/AIDS era, concern among many developing countries was the high population growth rates which were out of line with economic growth rates and thus presented a Malthusian nightmare, currently the reverse is true. Most developing countries are worried about the high mortality rate caused by HIV/AIDS resulting in declining population growth rates and reduced life expectancy.

As the HIV/AIDS kills people in their prime ages primarily within the 15–49 age bracket, it leads to a large number of children left as orphans . It is estimated that by 2000, there were

already 13.2 million AIDS orphans in the world (90 per cent of whom are in Sub-Saharan Africa) and projections are that this figure will rise to 24 million by 2010 and reach an astronomical level of 40 million by 2020. As Gow et al aptly observe "in the absence of parents the care and support of these children will fall to extended families, civil society and governments in the various African countries .... Prior to the emergence of HIV, large numbers of children and families already lived in poverty. The epidemic is worsening and deepening the poverty experienced by the poorest children and families". (Gow, Desmond and Ewing, 2002: 3 and 6).

Not only are children being left behind as orphans in large numbers due to HIV/AIDS epidemic, but others are also infected leading to infant/child mortality. Data indicates that "in 1998, about 530,000 HIV – infected children were born in SSA, about 90 percent of the world total. By 2005 – 2010, infant mortality in South Africa will be 60 percent higher than it would have been without HIV/AIDS.... In Zambia and Zimbabwe, 25 percent more infants are already dying than would be the case without HIV. By 2010, Zimbabwe's infant and child mortality rates will have doubled" (World Bank, 2000:8).

Improving Stewardship for Health Service Delivery and HIV/AIDS Prevention: Towards Strategic Policy Interventions

The focus of the debate on HIV/AIDS has tended to centre around impact assessment, awareness and advocacy issues regarding mitigation. In a large measure this has been useful in terms of influencing patterns of knowledge, attitudes and beliefs (KAB) in the fight against HIV/AIDS. However, to a great extent, this approach has been rather ad hoc and reactive with minimal government initiative and leadership. In the initial stages of the HIV/AIDS pandemic an awareness and advocacy role was played by NGOs and donors. Essentially therefore government basically abdicated their stewardship role. Fortunately, the situation has changed considerably today as government has now come to realise the serious implications and consequences of HIV/AIDS for sustainable human development. The challenge that remains is no longer how to get governments involved in HIV/AIDS prevention, but rather how to make their policy interventions more sustainable, meaningful and strategic in both form and content. Herein lies the essence of stewardship in health delivery services and prevention of HIV/AIDS. The WHO defines stewardship as "the careful and responsible management of the well-being of the population....and the very essence of good government. Stewardship goes beyond management of the state's role in the health system to taking responsibility for the health of the population" (WHO, 2002:3).

In simple terms, stewardship, thus, describes the governance regime and institutional arrangements for health sector reform broadly with specific focus on three (3) main functions namely:

- health financing;
- resource-generation for health sector reform; and
- improved health service provision.

The general improvement of the health system in the SADC region should, of necessity, be anchored on a well-defined vision for redressing the general decline in human development as a whole and the spread of HIV/AIDS specifically. To this end, stewardship should be addressed at three (3) main levels of critical policy interventions as follows:

(a) Stewardship IN health: ensuring the effective leadership of the Ministries of Health in health sector reform, improved health development and prevention of HIV/AIDS;

(b) Stewardship OF health: institutionalisation of strategic management of the health sector through adoption of a broad vision and prudent policies for health development in general and prevention of HIV/AIDS in particular; and

(c) Stewardship FOR health: influencing the external environment that directly or indirectly impacts on the health system including policy frameworks for education, environment, agriculture, employment, trade and industry etc, thus evolving a comprehensive policy response to the health crisis broadly and HIV/AIDS epidemic specifically (WHO, 2002: 5-7).

Whereas to a large measure SADC states have ensured stewardship in health, they are yet to effectively put institutional arrangements and policy frameworks in place for stewardship of health and stewardship for health if efforts towards health development and prevention of HIV/AIDS are to bear palatable fruits.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that the HIV/AIDS epidemic presents an unprecedented policy challenge for human development in the SADC region. As such HIV/AIDS represents not just a mere health crisis in the region, but a development crisis of phenomenal proportions. Primarily as a result of the HIV/AIDS scourge, sustainable human development levels and social progress registered over the years in the region have plummeted since the 1990s. This profound crisis of social development in the SADC region not only spells disaster and doom for national development efforts but even regional integration arrangements as well. It thus calls for urgent action to improve stewardship at various levels with a view mainly to put in place institutional mechanisms, visions, strategies and policy frameworks for health development and prevention of HIV/AIDS.

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POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

BY PROF BEN TUROK MP

The information about poverty emerging from a range of local studies is frightening. We are all overwhelmed by the data and the stories of individual and community hardship that assail our consciousness daily. Government has remedial measures on the way but the scale of the problem is so large that remedies will only be incremental.

What intrigues me is the fact that the link is seldom made between poverty and the growing inequality. Let me put it this way. According to Statistics South Africa our national growth rate of the economy for 2001 was 2.2 percent. Our population growth rate for the same year was also 2.2 percent. That means that our real growth rate per head of population was zero. So whatever wealth the country created in 2001 averaged for each individual was nil, and the material base for the cake we all share was static.

So if one section of the population was getting a bigger share, some other section was getting less, that is the rich, or a part thereof were getting a bigger share of the cake and the poor a smaller share. Statistics South Africa say that for the period 1995 to 1998 there was a rising trend of inequality for all population groups with African inequality greater than the other groups due to African movement into higher paid jobs.

But there are also indications of a degree of regression at the bottom. The Income Expenditure Survey for 2000 shows that the ratio of average income and expenditure for all households declined between 1995 and 2000 and the number of Africans in the lowest 20 percent of households increased from 29 percent to 33 percent. These figures still need close examination, because they deal only with incomes and therefore leave out of account improvements in living conditions such as access to housing, water, electricity etc. But what is clear is that about half of our population live in relative poverty and at least a third are unemployed.

We knew the phenomenon of poverty well enough under apartheid. We called it a system of internal colonialism based on the super-exploitation of forced cheap labour. We said that our system was designed to enrich a small white part of the population at the expense of the large, black majority, which was held captive by a range of political, social, and legal powers given to the minority by their constitution. The result was plain for all to see in 1991. White per capita incomes were 12.3 times higher than black per capita incomes, the worst inequality in the world at 0.68 for the Gini coefficient. Furthermore, a substantial section of the white population enjoyed a colonial lifestyle where good incomes were enhanced by cheap servants, large houses and many privileges typical of colonial societies. Blacks, on the other hand, were excluded from the benefits of the developing economy, living in poverty and conditions of underdevelopment, again, typical of colonial systems.

For instance in 1995, the Human Development Index of black South Africans was 0.67 compared with 0.92 for white South Africans - equal to that of Denmark.

Hence, the first objective of the ANC was to take control of parliament, and change the apartheid laws and constitution to remove the institutional machinery which maintained gross inequality. This enabled the country to begin a process of inserting people of colour into senior positions in government, in the public service and all the related institutions.

The private sector was not so easily penetrated, but the ANC pressed forward with the overall strategy of deracialising the economy, affirmative action, and black economic empowerment, with some success.

However, as black people advanced into senior positions in the public and private sectors, they were also accorded the salaries and perks of the privileged found there. So, although the colonial structure of the system was removed, the income inequalities were preserved. That is, the new black elite gained the incomes accorded to whites under apartheid. Hence the data referred to above and the fact that the Gini coefficient for Africans so closely resembles that for the population as a whole.

The implications of this scenario is that previous inequalities are now partly deracialised but largely similar as before in purely quantitative terms.

If the economy had grown substantially in the last decade, a black middle class would have emerged which would have graduated inequality and improved the Gini. But in a slow growth economy, and the rather slow emergence of small black business, together with a significant fall in formal sector employment, the sharp income divisions of the old society remain to haunt us. Most important, poverty remains a major social disorder, especially in the rural areas and the townships. Moreover, even as the state enhances the social wage of the poor by the improved access to services, electricity, housing, etc, the actual cash disposable income still remains a problem. People have to buy food, for instance.

Could it be different? Is it inevitable that we remain a highly divided society with sharp differences between rich and poor? Do we really approve of Eskom, a state corporation, giving its directors bonuses totaling R 6.5 million on top of generous salaries? Answers are not easy, and indeed, political dynamite. But let us speculate.


What if the democratic government had insisted that under the new dispensation salaries were frozen, and that new incumbents had to receive less than those in the same posts? No doubt black people would cry foul on the grounds of discrimination, and their cries would certainly be justified. Or, what if public service promotions were restructured so that as white officials departed, new, black incumbents were introduced at lower categories. Again, this would cause an outcry which no government could survive.

On the other hand, some countries curb inequality by steeply rising taxes, and, in the case of Taiwan, a firm grip is kept on public salaries and individual consumption by obliging officials to get permission to acquire property or other major assets, among other measures.

I cannot see that such measures would work here. So what could be done to diminish the legacy of huge inequalities which continue to plague our society? The easy answer is to grow the economy faster, so that there is more to share all round. But this is easier said than done. Despite the stability we have achieved in the economy, it is still not growing fast enough to create the jobs needed to alleviate poverty.


I have no answer to this puzzle. But I am convinced that if we do not face up to the inequality issue, we will not easily remove harsh poverty from our midst.





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AFRICA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: PROSPECTS FOR TRANSFORMATION

By Kwame Owusu-Ampomah
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Introduction

The 21st century has been declared as Africa's century. The unpleasant fact, unfortunately, is that at the turn of the century the continent continues be plagued by poverty, disease and ignorance, having long lost the momentum of the socio-economic gains of the 1960's and the early 1970's. Worse still, the continent is being ravaged by intra- and international conflicts, as well as the scourge of AIDS, with devastating effects on life and property. Not only do the development obstacles highlighted in the 1950s and 1960s continue to persist; new ones have also emerged in post-colonial Africa to compound the economic woes of the continent. Inadequate infrastructure and lack of entrepreneurs; predator-political leaders, intra- and international wars, military intervention in politics, weak and inappropriate institutional arrangements and political instability appear to be intractable obstacles to development. Others such as the debt crisis, exploitation and destabilisation, globalisation and marginalisation and the imposition of a misplaced neo-liberal macro-economic agenda and the promotion of a hegemonic polyarchy, have swung the clock of Africa's progress decades backwards.

With these internally and externally generated impediments to Africa's development, it is hardly surprising that the average African lives on less than US$2 a day. Today, over 80 percent of the poorest countries in the world, as measured by the UNDP's Human Development index (HDI) are found in Africa and the growth rates of most African countries are negative, or at best unimpressive. In contrast, many developing countries, particularly the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) such as South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore have achieved phenomenal economic growth rates in the last four decades or so. Yet, some African economies such as that of Ghana at independence, were much stronger than many of these East Asian economies.

Against the backdrop of Africa's bleak economic disposition, what does it mean to be an African in the 21st century? What is the way forward for Africa to extricate itself from the quagmire of poverty, instability and the threat of disintegration? In exploring answers to these critical questions, I believe that the African problem is too complex to elicit simplistic solutions. This paper thus seeks to indicate possible directions and offer practical suggestions that might be useful for Africa's emancipation.

Eurocentric Idea of Africa

First and foremost, how is Africa perceived and how does this perception impact on the African of the 21st century? The bleak picture of Africa has, at the turn of the millenium, watered the fields of Afro-pessimism. Already assorted delicacies of despondency, ultimatums and threats have been served in the western-controlled media: Africa is "a high risk investment area"; "write off the continent" if it does not put its house in order; South Africa (relatively better-off) should distance itself from the "basket cases". These conclusions do not even faintly acknowledge the West's complicity in the pathetic goings-on on the continent let alone commend the high level of sophistication of the great African empires - Ghana, Mali, Songhai etc. at a time when Europe was anything but a civilisation.

Apparently, the kind of reporting on events in Africa by the Western media makes a mockery of the tools of objective analysis that the so-called liberal paradigm purports to expound: logic and empiricism. But what is the purpose of this deliberate denigration of the African, one form of which began with the zoological exhibitions of "exotic natives" in Germany in 1874. The answer is nothing less than serving their capitalistic greed for the continent's mineral resources, strategic metals and natural resources which form the basis of the wealth of the capitalist countries and their false sense of white supremacy.

In perpetuating this notion of supremacy, Subcommandante Marcos's observation that lies have become a universal currency, is as much applicable here as it was with the Zapastita's cause. The root of these lies dates back to the Enlightenment philosophers, who, as the African philosopher, Eze has succinctly captured in his writings, framed the African as a different, sub-human species and therefore philosophically and anthropologically sanctioned the exploitation of Africans in barbaric ways that were not allowed for Europeans. For Hegel, for example, as Eze said, Africa was outside history, a wasteland filled with lawlessness, fetishism and cannibalism - waiting for European soldiers and missionaries to conquer it and impose order and morality. The African was incapable of rational thought or ethical conduct and deserved to be enslaved, so that the relationship between the European and the African need not be prescribed by ethical considerations. In a later treatise, the Philosophy of Right, Hegel justified imperialism and colonialism as a logical solution to poverty and enhancement of the welfare of Europeans, but on what basis? Not the tenets of

his own theoretical edifice but ignorance which he embraced as a source for his irrational racism and thus turning a blind eye to the contradictions in his discourse on African culture.

Being an African in the 21st Century

The damned image imposed by outsiders, especially Europeans on the African is obviously devastating and should be of great concern to the African of the 21st century. But before we turn to it, who or what is an African? While the question is ontologically and teleologically significant - the former addressing the question of being and the latter that of purpose, it has proven to be problematic in various contexts, particularly, in the "new" South Africa. According to Professor Mabogo More of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, identity is fundamentally a dialectical notion whose meaning makes sense only in the presence of the other that is different than self and in the post-apartheid South African context the term "African" is multi-dimensional. It connotes racial, geographical, political or ideological dimensions.

Evidently, then, it makes sense for Professor Kwesi Kwaa Prah to argue that if everyone is an African, then Africanism has lost its meaning. Arguably, however, if we should throw in the Lucy factor, then, at a macro level of analysis, we might conclude that humanity are all Africans and that there is no "other", contrary to the theories on otherness. But paradoxically, there is the other even if some of the differences are unreal and therefore there must be an African, whose Africanness, according to James Karioki, emanates from history, culture and African consciousness (such that): "He is an African who feels African". But if he who feels African is an African, then for teleological purposes, it might not be easy to identify an African, for, to paraphrase Shakespeare, it is virtually impossible to find the mind's construction in the face. Thus, trying to discern identity from a person's psychological disposition is like looking for a needle in a haystack.

The question "Who or what is an African?" could, then, be polemic; it could also evoke bizarre ideas and destructive goals, especially when it is racially perceived. It might, then, suffice to conclude - taking a cue from Hernando de Soto - that we may not be able to define precisely who or what an African is but we know one when we come in contact with one. By this conclusion we, perhaps, lay to rest the risk of committing what is described in philosophy as naturalistic fallacy, i.e. trying to define an indefinable concept.

Appiah reminds us that being an African has a certain context and a certain meaning and in accordance with Achebe, that meaning is not always one that we can be happy with. Invariably, that identity is one we must constantly reshape. Indeed, like all human beings, Africans cannot be happy with the denigrating Eurocentric image imposed upon them even if it is premised on so-called objective conditions. If a denigrating image constructed on objective conditions is repugnant then an invented identity, a kind that is based on ignorance and falsehood is absolutely objectionable and must be confronted. In the confrontation we must observe with conviction that the identity of any civilisation, in the words of a columnist, "is constructed on images of the other, which through their mirroring effect, enable it to develop an image of itself and define its place in the world".

From this perspective, there cannot be any exceptionalism about pre-colonial Africa and if that is so post-colonial Africa will then necessarily have to reshape her distorted image. Reshaping Africa's identity in the 21st century should thus have a rational appeal: It is, at least, a psychological recipe for Pan-Africanism, black solidarity, which can be an important force with real political benefits. One condition that appears unassailable in reshaping our identity is the internalisation of Africanism, which invariably should inspire the African to be proud of being, in the Nigerian platitude, a "son-of-the-soil" and nurture a deep sense of moral and philosophical rejuvenation. In the process, the African of 21st century ought to recognise that there is no other bona fide habitat other than the continent called Africa. Africans, thus, need to transform themselves and the continent from "the wretched of the earth" (apologies to Fanon) to the affluent of the universe.

This is an enormous challenge but it should inspire the African's primordial instinct to survive and live within the comity of nations with dignity. After all Obi nnom aduro mma oyarefo - no one takes medicine on behalf of the sick. Thus, it is the primary responsibility of Africa to extricate herself from poverty and insecurity and no one else's; an outside intervention is a mere bonus.

Prospects for Emancipation

The prospects for Africa's recovery appear not encouraging, but recovery is not impossible. Africa has the potential to rejuvenate itself and Nkrumah's vision that the black man is capable of managing his own affairs ought to resonate constantly in the consciousness of the 21st century African. Here, we may not need to look far for a visionary dream. Of this, Abiola Irele reminds us that: "the Pan-Africanism of W. E. B. Du Bois and Kwame Nkrumah, which envisioned an Africa free and self assured, is still a relevant concept for us, reinterpreted as this concept must be in our own time as an ideology of African interests, bent towards the formidable task of repositioning Africa and its Diaspora with dignity in the world".

Historically, the resilience, courage and tenacity of our forebears, who, firmly believing in their inalienable right to freedom and self-determination wrested the continent from the clutches of colonialism and apartheid – constitutes a source of inspiration.

These attributes should stand us in good stead to turn the tide against poverty, insecurity and oppression. In doing so we need, as Irele advises, "to banish the image of a naive and simple Africa that gave a powerful affective charge to the literature of cultural emancipation but which can have no place in any serious proposition concerning our place and status in the contemporary world".

In spite of the diversity, African peoples share a common basket of experiences and history which is a great unifying factor in itself: the pain of subjugation, humiliation and deprivation, untold economic hardships, an unprecedented scale of exploitation in human history and even genocide.

Although the plundering of the continent's human and natural resources has been going on for over half a millennium, Africa still has substantial levels of and diverse human and natural resource endowment to meet its needs if judiciously harnessed. Africa, in the 21st century, has even greater human resource capacity to transform the continent than she has had at any other time. Tanzania's case, succinctly articulated by the late president Julius Nyerere in a dialogue with top-level staff of the World Bank in Washington in 1998 illustrates this point: "The British Empire left us a country with 85 percent illiterates, two engineers and twelve doctors. When I left office (thirteen years ago) we had nine percent illiterates and thousands of engineers and doctors." This is equally true of all African countries. However, the brain drain, induced by the lure of modernity in the West and the push of the insensibility of the African state has deprived the continent of realising the full potential of its pool of highly skilled professionals. Neither has Africa been successful in tapping the huge human resource potential in the diaspora. This source is beckoning and it should not be out of Africa's reach, when the dust settles.

The Way Forward

Prescribing concrete solutions to the African crisis, given the multi-faceted nature of the dilemma and the complexity of the development phenomenon, is a daunting task and far beyond the scope of this paper. What we intend to do, therefore, is to sketch possible direction(s) which could form the building block(s) for action towards Africa's socio-political and economic transformation.

Traditional Political Ideas and Values

Issues of good governance have featured in most analyses of the African crisis. But what does the term "good governance" mean? How do we harness it for our own good? In one sense good governance is equated with democracy, i.e. the institutional expression of the will of the people and respect for democratic principles and institutions such as the constitution, bill of rights, multiparty system, elections, the rule of law, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. In the context of the development agenda of the World Bank, the concept is used with reference to "public management techniques: it stresses elements such as an efficient public service; an independent judicial system; and accountable administration of public funds - it is "synonymous with sound management".

The colonial and post-colonial African experience of liberal democracy, as good governance is supposed to mean, has been disastrous: it did not only fail to function but also resulted in political confusion, instability, uncertainty and frustration. The reasons, as many scholars will agree with Kwame Gyekye in his book "Tradition and Modernity", cannot be farfetched: These institutions were alien to Africa and hence Africans were not disposed, psychologically, culturally and politically to grapple with their concomitant demands and practices. Moreover, the colonial governments made no effort to inculcate the liberal democratic ideals in the people in a way that would have ensured their understanding, legitimisation and entrenchment into the political fabric of African societies. Rather the colonial governments were themselves undemocratic. Laws were made without popular participation.

Good governance, as defined by the World Bank i.e. in relation to management, requires that democracy be regarded as simply a means - a device to ensure that public officials manage in a particular way. In this sense Stephen Friedman's argument that the characteristics of "good governance" are separated from the question of those to whom those who govern are responsible, is not farfetched. On that score democracy in the African context is far superior; it allows far more opportunities for the majority to participate in the decision-making process, than liberal democracy which by and large, reduces political participation to a once-and-for-all activity, i.e. voting. Among the Asante, for example, participation in politics did not end with the "election" of the chief or king; it was only the beginning of a new on-going political relationship between the ruler and the ruled.

Democracy was not and has never been alien to pre-colonial Africa, in both centralised and acephalous societies. Participation in political life was natural in the lives of the people. Essentially, participation in political life in these societies was not only motivated by the obvious desire for societal equilibrium but also by peer- or group-pressure and the significance of issues arising within the communities. Moreover, democratic institutions that permitted power to be decentralised made governance at both "state" and local levels a fait accompli. The system was not discriminatory; it promoted unity within the self, community and the state since decisions taken were consensual. People "elected" to public office represented all the people or lineage (as the case may be), which in the case of the Asante, was the basic political unit. Elected officers did not represent a section or the majority of the electorate, as it is the case with liberal multi-party democracy and they served the people with humility. The question then is whether, given the political turmoil in some African countries, non-party politics is not the best for Africa.

The point we are making is that the political ideas and values of pre-colonial Africa are consistent with the "modern" elements of democracy: accountability, consent/popular will, participation, freedom of expression, consensus, reconciliation, toleration of opposing views, the rule of law, consultation and conferring, openness/transparency, oneness and humility. Indeed, in relative terms, these values manifest themselves more profoundly in the African political setting than even Europe's and these should guide us to structure a functional modern political system. Bearing in mind that Western democracy has

evolved through the rugged terrain of despotism, wars and revolutions there is no gainsaying about Africa gearing itself up for the construction of a political system that is not only responsive to its social and economic problems but also takes into account its traditional values and ideas and the exigencies of the contemporary geopolitical imperatives.

On this account, there appears to be a consensus on the need for the following:

- Accommodating traditional authority, which is an indispensable feature of our political system, either as integral part of formal government or outside it. Its role and powers, in each case, must be clearly defined to enable it to contribute positively to Africa's reconstruction. If it should operate outside the formal government it should be strengthened administratively with adequate resources especially qualified personnel.
- A more active role for traditional rulers in infusing traditional African values (discussed throughout this paper) in citizens, especially the youth, through constant interaction, exhortation, rewards and citations.
- Giving substance to openness as a traditional value, through adequate dissemination of information to citizens. Media restrictions, including ownership and operation of information outlets of all forms (such as the press, radio and television) should be removed.
- Responsive and committed governments that seek the interests of citizens, as defined by them.
- An electoral system that allows greater representation and in this respect, permits nomination of representatives of sections of the community e.g. the traditional authority (where it remains outside formal government), civil society organisations and gender organisations, at local, regional/provincial and national levels.
- Direct accessibility of elected and nominated representatives, as well as the traditional authority, by the citizens;
- National, regional and continental coalitions of civil society organisations to serve as a bulwark for democratic government on the continent.
- Decentralisation for effective local government.
- Referendum as an important feature of the political system to maximise participation.

The Role of Intellectuals

It is commendable that through the writings of a vast array of intellectuals our knowledge of traditional rule in Africa has been greatly enhanced. Knowing, per se, is not a bad thing but it should not be an end in itself; it must contribute to human well-being. Unfortunately, many African intellectuals have taken pleasure in filling the role of colonial anthropologists and historians, conducting social research just to maintain the status quo (the colonial state). They have perpetuated a slavish acceptance of western liberal democracy and negated the authentic African democratic values, which make sense to the African and hence are more likely to promote his or her progress. This is one of the puzzles, which Fanon explains as being "the result of the intellectual laziness of the national middle class (the African intellectuals), of its spiritual penury and of the profoundly cosmopolitan mould that its mind is set in".

Similarly, Nkrumah laments over why education does not arouse the national consciousness of the African intellectual to such "an order as to permit his (or her) full grasp of the laws of historical development or of the thorough-going nature of the struggle to be waged if independence was to be won..."

Sadly, independence was won but the African intellectual, in the main, did not change. This, of course does not mean that all African intellectuals were timid, western-oriented or traitors. To be fair, some African intellectuals, as Nkrumah acknowledged, sought knowledge as an instrument of national emancipation and integrity and the number is growing. Nonetheless, the collective weakness of African intellectuals seemingly remains intractable and this underlies much of the continent's woes.

New Directions in Education

The problem of the African intellectual as expounded by Nkrumah and Fanon is a crisis of alienation, which in part is a direct consequence of cultural imperialism. The colonial educational system bombarded the African with knowledge and values that he/she could hardly relate to and were far removed from his/her culture, immediate experience and aspirations to be of any practical use to him/her. This was done for a purpose: to subjugate, "civilise" and exploit the African. Strangely, the educational system of post-colonial Africa has not changed much after independence. The result is that Africa continues to miss the boat of functional education, which, among other things, should aim at empowering the receiver to be able to take control of his or her environment, manage his/her affairs efficiently and contribute to the common good of his or her society.

A case in point is the content and trajectory of political science as a discipline in South African universities. By and large African politics is taught as an appendage, i.e. as an option, to the western-centred political science curricula in these universities. Of course, it should be understandable if African Studies is an adjunct to the study of politics in European universities, but certainly, a serious anomaly if it is peripheral in African universities. In fact, it is unthinkable for African Studies to be in the mainstream of political science courses in a European university and European Studies becoming peripheral.

This does not suggest any prejudice against the teaching and learning of European political philosophy and/or system and for that matter that of any other part of the world. The point is that feeding the African on purely European epistemology is a misnomer. Africans need to have a thorough grasp of their own knowledge systems, cosmology and environment, as a principle. It is only there and then that they will be able to understand the social conditions of their societies and be in a position to make meaningful contributions towards a better life

for their people.

In this event, Africa surely needs to get its house in order. Getting its house in order, in educational terms, does not only mean a rethinking of what goes on in institutions of learning or rearranging the subjects and disciplines; it is also a question of rethinking which education, for whom, for what and by whom? Towards these goals

- Education must aim at the total development of the African, taking into account all the dimensions of the human factor in development, i.e., moral capital, spiritual capital, human capital, aesthetic capital, human potentials and human abilities.
- Greater co-operation among African countries is required in areas of curriculum design, methodology and teaching aids.
- Curricula should reflect African culture, philosophy, socio-economic and political experiences and aspirations of African peoples.
- Curricula must emphasise the human factor, with the aim of producing a new African, conscious of his/her role in the development of himself/herself and his or her society.
- Exchange programmes for African students should be a significant feature in the educational system.
- Efforts should be made to educate African students in other African institutions where necessary, instead of sending them to study in western institutions.
- Integration of the educational systems of various African countries should be explored to avoid duplication, ensure efficient use of resources and guarantee institutions of high academic standing.

Self Reliance: The Economy, Pharmacopoeia and Science and Technology

The discussion, thus far, logically brings us to the concept of self-reliance, which as observed earlier, is a derivative of the idea of autonomous development. On the premise that the pursuit of a better life is the ultimate goal of every society, it might well be justifiably grounded in self-reliance, i.e. building one's economy through one's own efforts and resources. This approach does not imply a rejection of foreign assistance or investment. All that it means is that the continent must take, as a principle, the responsibility for its own progress, using its human and material resources and buying only from abroad things she cannot produce or are least demanded. The role of self-reliance in the success of North Korea barring her recent economic setbacks and food crisis, for example, should awaken Africa to the virtues in this philosophy, long articulated by prominent black leaders like Nkrumah, du Bois and Nyerere.

The notion of self-reliance necessarily connotes relying on our knowledge systems and resource endowment to a large extent. This will not only free us from the burden of producing what we do not consume and consuming what we do not produce but also from the pressure of maintaining a healthy balance of payments records and the ignominy of dependency. This will require a definition of our priorities, commitment, the will and tenacity to harness local resources and above all, improvise, with a depth of ingenuity, to fulfil our societal needs.

Calls have also been made to democratise knowledge, particularly in the fields of science and technology and the hype is also on the prioritisation of indigenous knowledge systems which though have always existed, have not been taken seriously partly because of the inferiority complex syndrome. These are particularly significant developments. In the field of medicine, for instance, the efficacy of some indigenous medicinal plants is beyond questioning and could prove to be decisive in the fight against many diseases, including the AIDS pandemic. Medicinal-plant mainstreaming should be integral to health and educational policy in this millennium. To reach this goal we will have to include not only institutional arrangements but also concrete R&D policies and link these to health care and educational agenda. Already, this trend exists in many African countries; all it needs is to step up these initiatives.

Parallel to such initiatives, is the issue of technology. In the modern context technology is widely held to be the engine that drives the economy. The promotion of science and technology in the 21st century Africa is therefore imperative and there is the need for a renewed commitment in these fields. An illuminating fact is that when the missionaries came, it took them a long time to produce engineers and medical doctors, but very quickly they had produced seminarists, priests, theologians, philosophers, classical philologists, bishops and cardinals. The logic is simple: produce what you need.

Reshaping the OAU

The reshaping of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) is a significant political development although the African Union may not be the best option for Africa to counter the vagaries of globalisation and the hegemonic strategies of the United States and its NATO allies. Nevertheless, it is indicative of the new crop of African leaders' determination to position the continent for progress, peace, security and stability. As a unifying factor, even if lose, it is also likely to pave the way for collective approaches to finding solutions to the continent's economic woes, political instability and susceptibility to manipulation. The new continental body must then charge itself with a mission to lead the continent to stability and prosperity for all by the year 2050, working in tandem with the Pan-African Parliament and other agencies it might find necessary to establish. In this task, the restructuring and institutional arrangements may cover areas such as

- economic growth and development
- social and human-factor development
- peacekeeping and security (ECOMOG can serve as the starting point)
- conflict resolution and reconciliation
- science and technology
- gender and youth
- human rights
- the environment
- the legal framework, including the harmonisation of customary law and common law
- the issue of refugees

- land reform
- foreign policy
- political reforms (to incorporate traditional African political systems).

The new continental body, with a new mandate to articulate the common vision of African peoples, should position itself as the common voice, speaking for and on behalf of Africa and as an equal actor in the international system. It should be able to engage the rest of the world, particularly the West in the constant struggle for power over the world's resources on behalf of Africans. It will have to move away from the position of self-inflicted weakness and marginalisation that tend to humble African governments to negotiate with cup in hand, accept raw deals or fail to register their displeasure at the West's policies that are inimical to African interests and ultimate survival. (South Africa's former President, Nelson Mandela, demonstrated that after all, weaker countries could also have their way, at times, in the international system when he defied the West, on a few occasions, to pursue foreign policies that he considered in the best interests of his country).


In this context the contemporary African leaders' development initiative, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is commendable. However, it stands the risk of being stillborn: It does not prioritise Africa's fundamental development problem - human factor decay and/or underdevelopment. This is because it adopts the neo-liberal macro-economic framework, which views social and human-factor development as anathema. Further, it assigns a key role to the Bretton Woods institutions, which have proven to be unreliable allies for the development of the continent (forget about the loans and aid; they are a source of Africa's dependency, poverty and sluggish response to the need for ingenuity). For NEPAD to succeed, the architects will have to rethink and live up to their objective of pursuing a policy of sustained indigenous development, which President Thabo Mbeki upholds. This will require asserting Africa's right to autonomous development and a paradigmatic shift to social and human factor development without which Africa's progress would simply be a mirage. Indeed, the hegemonic forces in the international system constitute a major obstacle to these designs, but they are not insurmountable if African leaders shared a common vision, acted in concert, marshalled their political will and honed their skills in statecraft.

Conclusion

This paper has been concerned with Africa's dilemma and the possible directions for the continent's rejuvenation in the 21st century. The reality of the African situation has been presented and in that context it is acknowledged that the task of Africa's emancipation may not be an easy one. Notwithstanding the gargantuan internal deficiencies and external pressures and the damaging Eurocentric ideas on Africa, there is hope that Africa can reshape its image and identity and emerge as the triumph of the 21st century. This hope emanates from Africa's resilience and courage that hitherto, spurred her to confront her history of slavery, colonialism and imperialism; the existence of her vast human and natural resources and the common experiences of her peoples which ought to act as a unifying factor. However, the critical issue is Africa's ability to find ingenuous ways of overcoming the plethora of problems confronting her, i.e. transforming this hope into reality, bearing in mind that Africa is primarily her own emancipator.

The process of emancipation may require radical and uncompromising approaches that place premium on theory and action. Such approaches may take into account traditional African philosophical ideas and values underlying the political, social and economic organisation of the African peoples, in the context of the exigencies of the contemporary world economic order, to meet our vision of peace, stability and prosperity.

The process, informed by the ideology of autonomous development, the idea of African Renaissance and Pan-Africanism and guided by a pragmatic educational system and a combination of modern science and technology and autochthonous knowledge systems, requires a syncretic approach in a unified Africa. But above all, Africa's emancipation, while requiring both theory and action and perhaps, more action than ever before, also needs the political will of her leaders and a positive attitude. Pascal's wager should guide us here: "Assume the worst and it will surely arrive; commit oneself to freedom and justice and its cause may be advanced".



THE AFRICAN CRISIS

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Over the last quarter of a century, the African crisis of the late 1970s has been transformed into what has aptly been called the "African Tragedy". In 1975, the regional GNP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa stood at 17.6 percent of "world" per capita GNP; by 1999 it had dropped to 10.5 percent. Relative to overall Third World trends, Sub-Saharan health, mortality and adult literacy levels have deteriorated at comparable rates. Life expectancy at birth now stands at 49 years, and 34 percent of the region's population are classified as undernourished. African infant mortality rates were 107 per 1000 live births in 1999, compared to 69 for South Asia and 32 for Latin America. Nearly 9 percent of Sub-Saharan 15 to 49-year-olds are living with HIV/AIDS - a figure that soars above those of other regions. Tuberculosis cases stand at 121 per 100000 people; respective figures for South Asia and Latin America are 98 and 45.

The main purpose of this essay is to recast this transformation in world historical perspective, locating Sub-Saharan Africa's experience within the broader bifurcation of Third World destinies that has taken place since 1975.

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA

Over the last twenty years the dominant interpretation of the African crisis has traced it to an alleged propensity of the elites and ruling groups of Africa for "bad policies" and "poor governance". The definition of these, as well as the reasons for the alleged African addiction to them, has varied. But the idea that the primary responsibility for the African tragedy lies with African elites and governments has been common to most interpretations. However, this idea has been challenged by some authoritative investigations of the determinants of economic performance in Third World countries.

The most influential text in launching the standard interpretation was a World Bank document of 1981, known as the Berg Report. Its assessment of the causes of the African crisis was highly "internalist", sharply critical of the policies of African governments for having undermined the process of development by destroying agricultural producers' incentives to increase output and exports. Overvalued national currencies, neglect of peasant agriculture, heavily protected manufacturing industries and excessive state intervention were singled out as the "bad" policies most responsible for the African crisis. Substantial currency devaluations, dismantling industrial protection, price incentives for agricultural production and exports, and substitution of private for public enterprise - not just in industry but also in the provision of social services - were singled out as the contrasting "good" policies that would rescue Sub-Saharan Africa from its woes.

The diagnoses and prognoses of the Berg Report converged with those of another highly influential text also published in 1981- Robert Bates' Markets and States in Tropical Africa. This rapidly acquired classic status as an exposition both of the "new" political economy and of the perils of state intervention in underdeveloped countries. In Bates' view, state officials in newly independent African countries used the powerful instruments of economic control that they had inherited from colonial regimes to benefit urban elites and, first and foremost, themselves. By destroying farmers' incentives to increase agricultural output, these policies undermined the process of development. Bates' answer to the problem - dismantling state power and leaving the peasantry free to take advantage of market opportunities - was similar to that advocated by the World Bank in the Berg and subsequent reports on Africa.

World Bank assessments of the situation were ostensibly based on a double assumption. They assumed that an important reason for the "bad" policies was that African governments had failed to understand their negative effects, and that the positive effects of "good" policies, once implemented, would generate widespread support for their continuation. The only (or main) thing needed to solve the crisis, therefore, was to persuade African governments that the switch from bad to good policies was in their own and their constituencies' interests.

The "internalist" and "state-minimalist" diagnoses of the World Bank and the Bates position – which can be called the "new" political economy – did not go unchallenged. The greatest challenge came from the African governments themselves. In a document published the same year as the Berg Report, but signed in 1980 at a meeting in Lagos, the heads of state of the OAU traced the crisis to a series of external shocks. These included deteriorating terms of trade for primary products, growing protectionism of wealthy countries, soaring

interest rates and growing debt service commitments. The Lagos Plan of Action – as it came to be called - accordingly saw the resolution of the crisis in a greater reliance, not on worldmarket mechanisms, but on the capacity of African states to mobilise national resources and foster greater mutual economic integration and co-operation. In its emphasis on collective self-reliance through the eventual creation of a continental common market, the plan reflected the influence of dependency theory at the time, as well as the sense of empowerment that African states derived from the near completion of the continent's formal decolonisation. Neither the influence of dependency theory, nor the sense of empowerment, however, lasted very long.

Shortly after the promulgation of the plan, and in the midst of a rapidly deteriorating economic situation, the Sahelian drought and famine struck with staggering virulence, peaking in 1983-4. The following year, a new summit of the OAU was convened in Addis Ababa with the specific purpose of preparing a proposal for action on Africa's economic and social problems, to be presented to a special session of the General Assembly of the UN. The summit produced a document, Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986-1990 (APPER), which emphasised once again the role of external shocks in deepening the crisis and the need for greater self-reliance in order to overcome it. In sharp contrast to the Lagos Plan, however, APPER openly acknowledged the responsibilities of African governments for the crisis, and the limitations of any actions undertaken by African states on their own. In line with this acknowledgment, it agreed to implement a variety of policy reforms consistent with the Berg Report and asked the international community to take action to ease the crushing burden of Africa's external debt, and to stabilise and increase the prices paid for their exports. The result was a "compact" between African states and the "international community" for joint action towards the resolution of the crisis, set out in the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-1990 (UNPAAERD).

As a growing number of African states subjected themselves to IMF and World Bank structural-adjustment programmes, with mixed results at best, the World Bank started to revise their neo-utilitarian, state-minimalist prescriptions and to emphasise the role of institutions and "good governance". By 1997, the World Bank had for all practical purposes abandoned a minimalist view of the state. In its World Development Report for that year, earlier concerns with the size of state apparatuses and the extent of public intervention in the economy were completely overshadowed by the call for effective bureaucracies and activist states in the implementation of structural adjustment programmes. The new imperatives, however, put even greater responsibility on the shoulders of African elites and governments both for the failure of their economies to recover and for the social disasters accompanying that failure. Bouts of optimism premised on Africa's greater integration into the world economy, the freeing of markets from governmental control and the wider opportunities for private enterprise - that is, African compliance with IMF and World Bank prescriptions - were followed in short order by ever more pessimistic assessments of the capabilities of African governments and elites to resolve the long-standing crisis.

In an essay first published in 1968, John Saul and I argued that the most central of these problems was a pattern of "surplus absorption" that fostered the conspicuous consumption of urban elites and sub-elites in bureaucratic employment, the relatively high mass consumption of "labour aristocracies" and the transfer abroad of profits, interests, dividends and fees of various kinds. By restraining the growth of agricultural productivity and domestic markets, this pattern perpetuated the dependence of African economies on the growth of world demand for primary products. Unless the pattern changed, we observed, "an acceleration of economic growth in tropical Africa within the existing political economic framework is highly unlikely and, as the phase of easy import substitution is superseded, a slowdown may actually be expected ".

At the same time, a change in the pattern of surplus absorption capable of stimulating agricultural productivity required "an attack on the privileges of those very classes constituting the power base upon which most African governments are likely to rely". We therefore characterised the economic development of tropical Africa in the 1960s as "perverse growth"; that is, growth which undermines rather than enhances the potentialities of the economy for long-term growth. At a time of general optimism about the prospects of economic development in Africa, and especially about the developmental role of African elites, we were thus rather sceptical about both. Indeed, we even noted how "the character of inter-elite competition in contemporary Africa and, in particular, the rise of the military to a position of special prominence, show the strength of forces driving the situation in a counter-revolutionary direction".

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFRICAN CRISIS

In spite of a widespread disposition to treat Sub-Saharan Africa as a uniform developmental disaster, the sub-continent has had its fair share of success stories. In their study of sustained economic growth experiences in Africa between 1960 and 1996, Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Ludvig Soderling identify as many as 20 such experiences, four in North Africa and the remaining 16 in Sub-Saharan Africa . These are exceptionally good performances which compare very favourably with those of the "miracle" economies of East Asia. As such, they provide conclusive evidence that African countries in comparison to other low-income countries have no "character flaw" that makes them incapable of sustained development, as the Economist has claimed. For our present purposes, however, the main interest of these experiences lies in their distribution over time.

TABLE I: Sub-Saharan Africa's Success Stories, 1960-96

Start of growth period	End of growth period					
	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-96
1960-64	Ethiopia South Africa Togo	Cote d'Ivoire Malawi Namibia Tanzania	Kenya			
1965-69		Gabon		Cameroon		Botswana*
1970-74			Lesotho			
1975-79						Ghana Mauritius
1985-89						Mozambique Uganda*

The total population of Sub-Saharan Africa by 2000 was 650 946 000

* Growth period continues after 1996.

Source: Constructed from Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Ludvig Soderling, "The Role of Capital Accumulation, Adjustment and Structural Change for Economic Take-Off", p 325.

In the Table, I have classified the 16 Sub-Saharan success stories by the years in which they started and the years in which they ended. As can be seen from the table, most success stories (12 out of 16) cluster in two groups: a larger group of experiences (8) that began in the 1960s and ended in the 1970s, and a smaller group (4) that began in the 1980s and had not yet ended in 1996. With the exception of demographically insignificant Mauritius, the smaller group consists of countries that had disastrous developmental experiences in earlier years. Since their later growth did not compensate for their earlier contraction, their "success" was largely fictitious. The larger group, in contrast, consists of true success stories and provides strong circumstantial evidence in support of our 1968. It was our contention that the economic growth experienced by African countries at the time was "perverse" - that is, a pattern which undermined rather than enhanced their potential for long-term development. Indeed, all but one of the eight success stories that started in the early 1960s ended in the 1970s, and the one that survived the 1970s (Kenya) ended in the early 1980s.

TABLE 2 : Percentage changes in GNP per capita as a proportion of world GNP per capita

	1960-75	1975-90	1990-99	1960-99
Sub-Saharan Africa	-5	-33	-17	-47
Latin America	3	-19	2	-15
M. East & N. Africa	13	3	-6	10
South Asia	-17	20	17	17
East Asia	29	89	47	257
Third World	**6**	**12**	**21**	**44**
North America	-26	44	4	10
Western Europe	27	-1	1	27
Australasia	11	-15	13	5
Japan	90	34	-2	150
First World	**15**	**16**	**1**	**35**

The table provides a synthetic overview of the comparative success or failure of world regions.

Three main features of the record stand out for comment. First, although Sub-Saharan Africa is by far the worst performer among Third World regions, this negative record is almost entirely a post-1975 phenomenon. Up to 1975, the African performance was not much worse than that of the world average and better than that of South Asia and even of the wealthiest among First World regions (North America). It is only after 1975 that Africa experiences a true collapse - a plunge followed by continuing decline in the 1980s and 1990s, which is the main reason for the comparatively poor performance for the period 1960-99 as a whole. Here too, "perverse growth" may help to explain the collapse but can hardly account for its extent.

Second, the African collapse of 1975-90 was integral to a major change in the inter-regional unevenness of Third World economic performance. In this period a sharp bifurcation developed between the deteriorating performance of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and to a lesser extent, the Middle East and North Africa, on the one hand, and the improving performance of East and South Asia on the other. The African collapse was a particularly extreme manifestation of this divergence. The question then arises of why the divarication occurred when it did, and why it proved particularly deleterious for Africa and particularly beneficial for East Asia.

Finally, both the African collapse and inter-regional bifurcation were associated with an important reversal of tendencies within the First World itself. As the figures above show, the comparative performance of First World regions since 1960 has been characterised by three main tendencies. One is the very substantial improvement up to 1990 of Japan's position, and its levelling off thereafter. Another is the less substantial improvement of Western Europe's position also up to 1990, and its less marked levelling off in the 1990s. The third is the deterioration of the North American position up to 1975 and improvement thereafter. The question then arises of how these tendencies relate to one another and whether the African and Latin American collapses of the 1980s are in some way connected to the contemporaneous reversal in the fortunes of North America.

In sum, what turned the crisis of Sub-Saharan Africa into tragedy, with disastrous consequences not only for the welfare of its people but also for their status in the world at large, was the region's economic collapse of the 1980s. Although unique in its severity, the collapse was integral to a broader change of tendencies among First and Third World regions. The African tragedy must therefore be explained in terms of both the forces that brought about this transformation, and those that made its impact on Africa particularly severe. That is to say, we must provide answers to the following two basic questions. First, what accounts for the change in the fortunes of world regions

of the late 1970s? And second, why did the change affect the performance of some Third World regions positively and others negatively, and the performance of Sub-Saharan Africa far more negatively than that of any other Third World region?

WORLD SYSTEMIC CONTEXT OF THE AFRICAN CRISIS

A good part of the answer to the first question lies in the nature of the crisis that overtook world capitalism in the 1970s, and in the response of the hegemonic power, the United States, to it. The global crisis of the 1970s was due primarily to the world-wide intensification of competitive pressures on business enterprises in general, and industrial firms in particular, that ensued from the great expansion of world trade and production of the 1950s and 1960s. Policies and ideologies that had played an essential role in launching and sustaining the worldwide expansion of trade and production in the 1950s and 1960s - so-called Keynesianism, broadly understood - became counterproductive, socially as well as economically, once the expansion intensified competition for increasingly scarce resources, human and natural. But the crisis of legitimacy was also due to the increasing social and economic costs of US reliance on coercion to contain the Communist challenge in the Third World.

The initial response of the United States to the crisis - withdrawal from Vietnam and opening to China, but continued adherence to Keynesianism at home and abroad - only worsened it, provoking a precipitous decline of US power and prestige. Integral to this decline was a widespread disenchantment (particularly acute in Africa) with the achievements of what Philip McMichael has called the "development project" launched under US hegemony . This was not due to a deterioration of economic conditions in the Third World. For initially the global crisis seemed to improve the economic prospects of Third World countries, African states included. In the early 1970s, the terms of trade - especially, but not exclusively, for oil-producing countries - improved for them. Moreover, the crisis of profitability in First World countries, combined with the inflation of oil rents routinely deposited in Western banks and "extra-territorial" financial markets, created an over-abundant liquidity. This excess liquidity, in turn, was recycled as loan capital on highly favourable terms to Third and Second World countries - African states included. As a result, in the early 1970s the position of all Third World regions, except South Asia, if anything improved . Yet it was at this time that Third World countries, becoming increasingly impatient with the "development project", sought to renegotiate the terms of their incorporation in the global political economy through the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). There were at least three good reasons for this.

The first was that, even in the best performing Third World regions, economic progress fell far short of the expectations aroused by decolonisation and generalised industrialisation or modernisation. Relative to First World countries, all Third World regions increased their degree of industrialisation (as measured by the manufacturing share of GDP) and urbanisation (as measured by the non-rural share of total population) to a far greater extent than they improved their GNP per capita. Comparatively speaking, in other words, Third World countries were bearing the social costs of increasing industrialisation and urbanisation without the economic benefits they had expected to reap on the basis of the historical experience of First World countries.

A second, and in part related, reason for the crisis of the "development project" was that economic growth was doing little to alleviate poverty in the Third World. Already in I970, the president of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, had acknowledged that the attainment of high rates of growth of GNP in low-income countries left infant mortality "high", life expectancy "low", illiteracy "widespread", unemployment "endemic and growing" and the distribution of income and wealth "severely skewed." Although for most of the 1970s the income of many Third World nations increased in absolute and relative terms, the welfare of their populations continued to improve at a slow pace, if at all.

Finally, improvements in the economic position of Third World regions, or at least some of them, vis-à-vis the First World seemed to fall far short of the generally perceived shift in the world balance of political power that followed the US debacle in Vietnam, Portuguese defeat in Africa, Israeli difficulties in the I973 War, and the entry of the PRC into the Security Council of the United Nations. The first and second oil shocks were in part both effect and cause of this perceived change in the world balance of power. So too was the growth of North-South flows of capital, both private and public. Third World demands for a NIEO sought to increase and at the same time institutionalise this ongoing redistribution of resources.

The Lagos Plan of Action signed by African heads of State in 1980 still expressed the sense of empowerment that Third World governments derived from the crisis of US hegemony. But the plan also reflected rapidly changing circumstances. These were, in part, an effect of the slowdown in world trade and production, which after 1975 resulted in worsening terms of trade for most non-oil-producing Third World countries. More important, however, was a radically new response of the United States to the continuing slide in its power and prestige. This decline reached its nadir in the late 1970s with the Iranian Revolution, a further hike in oil prices, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and a new and serious crisis of confidence in the US dollar. It was in this context that, in the closing years of the Carter Administration - and then with greater determination under Reagan - there occurred a drastic change in US policies.

Militarily, the American government began avoiding the kind of battlefields on the ground that had led to defeat in Vietnam, opting instead for war by proxy (as in Nicaragua, Angola and Afghanistan), confrontations of merely symbolic value, with insignificant enemies (as in Grenada and Panama), or

bombardment from the air, where its high-tech war machine had an absolute advantage (as with Libya). At the same time, the US unleashed an escalation of the arms race with the USSR well beyond what the latter could afford. More important, the US government began resorting to economic policies - a drastic contraction in money supply, higher interest rates, lower taxes for the wealthy, and virtually unrestricted freedom of action for capitalist enterprise - that liquidated not just the legacy of the domestic New Deal but also, and especially, the Fair Deal for poor countries ostensibly launched by Truman in 1949. Through this battery of policies, the US government started to compete aggressively for capital worldwide, to finance a growing trade and current account deficit in its own balance of payments; thereby provoking a sharp increase in real interest rates worldwide and a major reversal in the direction of global capital flows.

Thus the United States, which in the 1950s and 1960s had been the major source of world liquidity and of direct investment, in the 1980s became the world's main debtor nation and by far the largest recipient of foreign capital. The extent of the reversal can be gauged from the change in the current account of the US balance of payments. In the five-year period 1965-69 that account still recorded a surplus of $12 billion which constituted almost half (46 percent) of the total surplus of G7 countries. In 1970-74 the surplus contracted to $4.1 billion and to 21 percent of the total of G7 countries. In 1975-79 the surplus turned into a deficit of $7.4 billion. After that the deficit escalated to previously unimaginable levels: $146.5 billion in 1980-84; $660.6 billion in 1985-89; $324.4 billion in 1990-94; and $912.4 billion in 1995-99. As a result of these escalating US deficits the $46.8 billion outflow of capital from G7 countries of the 1970s (as measured by their consolidated current account surpluses for the period 1970-79) turned into an inflow of $347.4 billion in 1980-1989 and of $318.3 billion in 1990-1999.

This was a reversal of historic proportions that reflected an extra-ordinary, absolute and relative capacity of the US political economy to attract capital from all over the world. It is likely that this was the single most important determinant of the contemporaneous reversal in the economic fortunes of North America and of the bifurcation in the economic fortunes of Third World regions. For the redirection of capital flows to the United States reflated both effective demand and investment in North America while deflating it in the rest of the world. At the same time this redirection enabled the United States to run large deficits in its balance of trade that created an expanding demand for imports of those goods that North American businesses no longer found profitable to produce. Since competitive pressures had become particularly intense in manufacturing industries, these imported goods tended to be industrial rather than agricultural products.

These contrasting effects tended to split world regions into two groups. On the one hand, there were those that, for historical and geographical reasons, had a strong advantage in competing for a share of the expanding North American demand for cheap industrial products. These regions tended to benefit from the redirection of capital flows, because the improvement in their balance of payments lessened the need to compete with the United States in world financial markets. On the other hand, there were regions that, for historical and geographical reasons, were particularly disadvantaged in competing for a share of the North American demand. These areas tended to run into balance of payment difficulties that put them into the hopeless position of having to compete directly with the United States in world financial markets. In broad outline, this seems to me the primary source of the bifurcation in the fortunes of Third World regions that began in the late 1970s and materialised fully in the 1980s.

A secondary but nonetheless significant source of the bifurcation was the emergence of the so-called Washington Consensus which accompanied the change in US policies in the military and financial spheres - what John Toye has aptly called the "counter-revolution" in development theory . The Berg Report and the string of World Bank reports on Africa that followed, as well as much of the New Political Economy, were part and parcel of this counter-revolution. The development-friendly regime of the preceding 30 years was officially liquidated and Third World countries were invited to play by the rules of an altogether different game - that is, to open up their national economies to the cold winds of intensifying world-market competition, and to rival each other and First World countries in creating within their jurisdictions the greatest possible freedom of movement and action for capitalist enterprise. Especially in Africa, this new strategy of "structural adjustment" was presented as the antidote to an increasingly discredited statist model, prevalent in the preceding 30 years. In practice, the cure often turned out to be worse than the disease. Nevertheless, while the new strategy did not deliver on its promises of development, it did - knowingly or unknowingly - succeed in inducing Third World countries to adapt their economies to the new conditions of accumulation on a world scale created by the redirection of capital flows towards the United States. The Washington Consensus thus contributed to consolidating the bifurcation in the fortunes of Third World regions.

THE AFRICAN CRISIS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Why, however, did East Asia - and, to a lesser extent, South Asia - perform so much better than Latin America and, especially, Sub-Saharan Africa under these conditions? At least part of the answer is that, through the 1970s, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa had become far more dependent on foreign capital than East or South Asia. As the re-direction of capital flows towards the United States gained momentum, such dependence became unsustainable. Once the Mexican default of 1982 dramatically revealed how unviable the previous pattern had now become, the "flood" of capital that Third World countries (and Latin American and African countries in particular) had experienced in the 1970s turned into the sudden "drought" of the 1980s.

Greater previous dependence on foreign capital may explain why Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa turned out to be more vulnerable than South Asia and East Asia to the drastic change in world-economic circumstances that occurred around 1980. Nevertheless, it can hardly explain why, under the new circumstances, South Asia and East Asia performed so much better than they had before 1980. Nor does it explain the persistence of South and East Asian improvement relative to Latin American and, especially, African deterioration. I suspect that in order to understand why the change in global context had such a persistently uneven impact on Third World regions, we must look at these regions as geo-historical "individuals" with a specific pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial heritage which endowed them with different capabilities to cope with the change.

Here, I will confine myself to illustrating the point with some remarks on the two regions with which I am more familiar, East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa - which also happen to be the best and worst performers of the period under consideration. I will focus on three distinct but closely related questions: labour, entrepreneurship, and state and national economy formation.

Sub-Saharan Africa's primary form of interaction with the Western world in pre-colonial times - the import of guns and the export of slaves - undoubtedly worsened whatever structural shortage of labour relative to natural resources might have existed in the region prior to that interaction. The scarce factor was not land but labour. The subsequent depopulation and disruption of productive activities, directly or indirectly associated with the capture and export of slaves, left a legacy of low population density and small local markets which, in many parts of Africa, persisted through the colonial era.

Under colonialism the supply of labour did expand; but so did the demand for it, as exploitation of African natural resources was stepped up. Large population surpluses, readily available for employment at the conditions obtaining in the formal sectors, were often present in urban areas. These conditions, however, were available only for that minority of the labour force which private or public employers chose to incorporate in stable fashion within their organisations - they were, that is, the conditions of an "internal labour market". Although here there was indeed a surplus of labour, in the conditions actually available in the "external" labour market supply tended to fall generally, and persistently, short of demand.

During and after de-colonisation, the underlying shortage of labour was reproduced partly by a demand for Africa's natural resources which remained brisk through the mid-1970s and partly by the efforts of the newly independent states to modernise and industrialise. It was only after the collapse of the 1980s that Sub-Saharan Africa's structural labour deficit turned into a labour surplus, evident in the sharp increase of migration in the 1980s in most Sub-Saharan countries, in spite of the collapse of urban "internal labour markets" and diminishing rural-urban income gaps. Suffice it to mention that, at the end of the 1980s, African cities were growing at 6-7 percent per annum, compared with only 2 percent for the rural areas.

Comparatively speaking, the surplus of labour in East Asia remains one of the largest among Third World regions. Especially in China, sustained economic growth has been associated with an intensification of migratory flows to the centres of expansion which, in absolute numbers, far surpass similar processes in Sub-Saharan Africa.

This first difference was crucial because, under the conditions of escalating competition among Third World regions of the 1980s, the availability of a large, flexible and low-cost labour supply became the primary determinant of a country's capacity to reap the benefits rather than bear the costs of the new conjuncture.

Equally important, however, was the presence of an indigenous entrepreneurial stratum capable of mobilising the labour supply for capital accumulation within the region, so as to expand its share of the world market and of global liquidity. Fortunately for East Asia, and unfortunately for Sub-Saharan Africa, the discrepancy between local entrepreneurial resources inherited from the colonial and pre-colonial past was also far more favourable to East Asia. In this respect, indeed, the East Asian endowment was truly exceptional. By far the oldest and most extensive among the region's entrepreneurial networks were those embedded in the overseas Chinese diaspora. This was a network which had dominated the region for centuries; it continued to do so until it was overshadowed by Western and Japanese rivals, growing under the carapace of their respective imperialisms, in the second half of the 19th century. After the Second World War, the spread of economic nationalism restrained the expansion of all kinds of transnational entrepreneurship. But it often promoted in hothouse fashion the formation of new entrepreneurial layers at the national level. All along, moreover, the structural abundance of labour relative to natural resources continued to provide a favourable environment for the emergence of such strata in trade and industry. But the greatest opportunities for old and new strata to profit from the mobilisation within and across borders of the regional labour supply came with the expanding US demand for industrial products.

Nothing of the sort could be observed in Sub-Saharan Africa. All along, the region's structural shortage of labour relative to natural resources created an unpropitious setting for the emergence and reproduction of entrepreneurial strata in trade and industry. In the pre-colonial era, the slave trade had not just intensified both labour and entrepreneurial shortages, it had also redirected already scarce entrepreneurial resources towards the protection-producing industry. In the colonial era, protection-producing activities

were taken over by colonial administrations and armies, while entrepreneurial functions in trade and production came to be exercised predominantly by foreigners-Africans, indeed, were often barred from operating businesses. As Bates noted, "indigenous people throughout much of Africa turned quickly, vigorously and skilfully to production for colonial markets", members of indigenous agrarian societies even championing the cause of private ownership. Ironically, however, the primary agents of capitalism in the region - the governments of the colonial powers - often thwarted these tendencies by advocating and enforcing "communal" property rights .

After independence, economic nationalism - whether capitalist or anti-capitalist – scared away large numbers of non-African small businesses without creating a compensating number of new African entrepreneurs. In the late 1970s, Sub-Saharan Africa was thus at a disadvantage in the incipient competitive struggle, not just because of its structural shortage of flexible and low-cost labour supplies, but also because of the sparsity of local entrepreneurial strata capable of mobilising profit- ably whatever flexible and low-cost labour supplies existed. Whether the greater abundance of flexible and low-cost labour supplies brought about in Sub-Saharan Africa by the collapse of the 1980s will over time create a more favourable environment for the growth of an indigenous business class, remains to be seen. For the time being, by provoking a sharp contraction in domestic markets, the collapse has worsened rather than improved the prospects of such a development.

Finally, these competitive advantages of East Asia and disadvantages of Sub-Saharan Africa were compounded by the very different legacies each inherited in the domains of state-formation and national economic integration. Contrary to widespread belief, throughout the 18th century East Asia was ahead of any other region of the world, Europe included, in both respects. This early edge did not prevent, over the next century, the subordinate incorporation of the China-centred system of states and national economies within the structures of the European-centred system. Still, this did not erase the historical heritage of the China-centred system. Rather, it promoted a process of hybridisation between the structures of the two systems which, after the Second World War (and especially after the crisis of the 1970s), created particularly favourable conditions for the accumulation of capital.

In sharp contrast to East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa inherited from the pre-colonial and colonial eras a political-economic configuration that left little room for the construction of viable national economies or robust national states. Attempts to build these against all the odds did not on the whole get very far, in spite of the considerable legitimacy that they enjoyed at the time of independence. At that time, as Mahmood Mamdani has emphasised, the core agenda of African nationalists comprised three basic tasks: "deracialising civil society, detribalising the Native Authority, and developing the economy in the context of unequal international relations". While nationalist regimes of all political persuasions made major strides in deracialising civil society, they did little or nothing to detribalise rural power. In Mamdani's view, this is the reason why deracialisation was not sustainable, and why development ultimately failed . The argument developed here suggests that African states would have probably failed economically even if they had been successfully detribalised. Nevertheless, the fact that African elites needed to detribalise the social structures they inherited from colonialism, if they were to create viable national states, did constitute yet another handicap in the intensely competitive environment created by the global crisis of the 1970s and the US response to it.

CONCLUSION

Let me briefly state what, in my view, are the three most conspicuous problems. First, although there was very little that the ruling groups in Africa could have done to prevent the change in systemic circumstances that precipitated the economic collapse of the region in the 1980s, they could nonetheless have mitigated it if they had been more realistic about the sustainability of the region's prior pattern of economic growth. This might have led to greater restraint - not just in fostering conspicuous consumption but also, and especially, in assuming levels of foreign indebtedness that magnified the region's vulnerability to the change of systemic weather. In this respect, the Lagos Plan of Action's call for collective self-reliance was right on target. Unfortunately it came too late and, worse still, led to no action at all.

Second, once the change had occurred, it would probably have been less damaging to default on the foreign debt than to reschedule it under the conditions dictated by the World Bank. In the short-run, the collapse would have been more severe; but the negative long-term effects of the "good policies" imposed by the agencies of the Washington Consensus would have been avoided. In this respect, UNPAAERD was a bad bargain for Africa from the start - all the more so, once African states kept their side of the bargain while wealthy countries and their agencies did not.

Third, and most important, even assuming that there was nothing that the ruling groups of Africa could have done to pre-empt or mitigate the economic collapse of the 1980s, there was much that they could have done to alleviate its impact on the well being of their citizenry. This brings us to the issue of the relationship between national wealth and national welfare. Over the last half century, it has become increasingly evident that the global hierarchy of wealth, as measured by relative GNP per capita, is very stable. With few exceptions, low-income countries tend to remain poor, high-income countries tend to remain rich, and middle-income countries tend to remain in-between. At the same time, it has also become evident that within each stratum there is considerable variation in the degree of welfare (as measured by a variety of social indicators) enjoyed by the citizens of different states. It follows that, while there may be little that most states can do to upgrade their national economies in the global hierarchy of

wealth, there is always something that each can do to increase (or decrease) the well-being of its citizenry at any given level of poverty or wealth.

In the African context, the kind of detribalisation that Mamdani advocates would have probably yielded greater returns than any other strategy. From this standpoint, most African ruling groups have probably done far less than was in their power to do. But it is not at all clear whether and to what extent they have on the whole been more deficient than the ruling groups of other countries and regions, the United States included. Indeed, if we take into account differentials in wealth and power, it seems likely that they have been comparatively less so.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN AFRICA

BY MUKELANI S DIMBA

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Introduction

It is the time for regeneration. It is the time for Africans to take charge of their destiny as a people. A destiny not controlled by the colonial master nor controlled by the military dictator who succeeded the colonial master. It is a time when people enjoy or should enjoy the right to participate in processes which are aimed at developing their communities, nations and the continent at large.

It is essential that the democracy that so many people have sacrificed so much for, including their lives, does not remain an exception to the rule in Africa, while most of the continent continues to crumble under the iron rule of despots.

It is imperative that Africans demand, and take, a stake for themselves in their own governments. Africans have begun to ensure that the gains achieved through the liberation struggle are not lost to new forms of oppression. There are conscious campaigns throughout Africa to ensure that democracy is consolidated and entrenched in every aspect of African life.

One of these campaigns has been the campaign for the full realisation of the right to Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information. It cannot be questioned that for citizens to be able to influence public policy, they have to be informed about all that may affect their lives.

South Africa has only recently come out of decades of the most atrocious human rights abuses, a number of which were made possible because of the closed and secretive government machinery. The issue of the importance of openness by government and the private sector is beyond question.

It is therefore hardly surprising that a post-apartheid South Africa would be the first country in Africa to have a parliament pass an act that seeks to open up government and the private sector.

The Open Democracy Campaign in South Africa

Throughout the apartheid era, South Africa's minority government suppressed access to information - on social, economic and security matters - in an effort to stifle opposition to its policies of racial supremacy. Security operations were shrouded in secrecy. Government officials frequently responded to queries either with hostility or with misinformation. Press freedom was habitually compromised, either through prior censorship of stories or through the banning and confiscation of publications. Information became a crucial resource for the country's liberation forces and their allies in international solidarity movements as they sought to expose the brutality of the apartheid regime and hasten its collapse.

Consequently, progressive groups came to see unrestricted access to information as a cornerstone of transparent, participatory and accountable governance.

This consensus was ultimately captured in South Africa's new constitution. A democratic parliament then gave further shape to the right of access to information by enacting enabling legislation - a process in which civil society organisations played an unusually influential role.

Bill of Rights Guarantees Access to Information

One of the most important aspects of the constitution was the introduction of a Bill of Rights designed to ensure equal protection of a broad range of human, socio-economic and civil rights, irrespective of race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, belief and other factors.

Among the rights upheld, was that of access to publicly held information. Following the historic general election of 1994, the interim constitution's broad right of access to information was expanded further. Section 32(1) of the final constitution, enacted by the National Assembly in 1996, guarantees

"everyone ... the right of access to any information held by the state and any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights."

Enabling Legislation gives effect to the Right

Shortly after the democratic government took office in 1994, it appointed a five-member Task Group on Open Democracy under the auspices of the then - Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. The task group was established to draft appropriate enabling legislation. After about 14 months, the task group produced a draft bill.

It took nearly five more years - and revisions so extensive that not even the bill's original name survived - before the legislation was enacted.

The Open Democracy Campaign Group

Civil society played an extensive and influential role in helping Members of Parliament to craft the final act. From the outset, civil society organisations took a keen interest in open democracy legislation, including its information access provisions. A lot of these activities were done under the auspices of the Open Democracy Campaign group.

The Open Democracy Campaign continues to track the implementation of the final act and has commented extensively on proposed regulations associated with the legislation. And from its roots, a new initiative - the Open Democracy Advice Centre - has emerged, with a central objective: to help make the act work well in practice and to ensure that it does not "gather dust".

The Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000

The Promotion of Access to Information Act 2000 (Poatia), which came into force on March 9, 2001, is an important and far-reaching law that has great significance for the public, private and civil society sectors. Information is not just a necessity for people - it is an essential part of good corporate and state governance. Weak companies and bad governments need secrecy to survive. Secrecy allows inefficiency, wastefulness and corruption to thrive.

In terms of government, access to information allows people to scrutinise the actions of their government and is the basis for proper and informed debate on those actions. For the private sector, access to good information is vital for tendering, for open competition and for an efficient market place of ideas and products.

Poatia aims to:

- create the framework and the rules to allow people to access the records that government holds on their behalf and also records what private companies, organisations or individuals hold and which are needed to exercise or protect any right.
- set out exactly how people will be able to access these records, and
- set out exactly how private bodies and government should deal with requests for records.

The Objects of the Act are (Section 9):

- to give effect to the Constitutional Right of Access to Information (Section 32 of the Constitution),
- and to generally promote transparency, accountability and effective governance by all public and private bodies, by establishing procedures to do so, which enable requesters to obtain records held by the state and by private bodies as swiftly, inexpensively and effortlessly as reasonably possible
- in a way that balances the right with other rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution (the Bill of Rights)
- and the need for certain justifiable limitations, such as privacy, commercial confidentiality and effective, efficient and good governance.

In addition, the act's objects include the empowerment and education of everyone so as to:

- understand their right to access information in order to exercise their rights in relation to public and private bodies
- understand the functions and operation of public bodies
- effectively scrutinise, and participate in, decision-making by public bodies that affect their rights.

This act applies to both public bodies and private organisations. For the purposes of this act, public bodies would include government departments and other government agencies. Private organisations/bodies would be private businesses, individuals who carry, or have carried on, any trade, business or profession, but only in that capacity, and other juristic persons.

Implementation of the Act - The Experiences

We live in an "information age." There has been an explosion in the amount of information held by governments, companies, NGOs and CBOs. Information is power - usually, the more you know, the more you are able to influence events and people. Information is vital for individual citizens, communities and citizen's organisations if they are to participate in the democratic process and to realise the many other rights that are now enshrined in the South African Constitution.

Under Poatia, citizens and organisations, such as companies, have the right to access records held by private bodies and government, provided that they have made the request for the record in the prescribed way and an exemption does not apply.

The act encourages private bodies and government to adopt a "right-to-know" approach, in the interests of both the holder of the information and the citizen, whereby as much information as possible is automatically published. This is cheaper for private bodies and avoids individual requests having to be made and adjudicated upon.

It is very interesting to note that because the act applies "horizontally" to private organisations, as well as to government, it means that community organisations and

individual citizens may also be subject to requests for access to information.

The horizontal applicability of the act and the fact that it influences policy and strategy implementation, as well as other pieces of legislation which determine the way South Africans are governed, employed and the way they do business, is intended to give a good shot in the arm to the campaign aimed at creating and nurturing openness, transparency and accountability in government, business and the community at large.

Challenges

The Act and Media

While the media in South Africa welcomed the act and support the spirit of the act - which establishes a culture of openness in South Africa - there seems to be some dissatisfaction with the clauses in the act which slow down the process of accessing information in bureaucratic requirements.

The Process:

The act calls for highly bureaucratic requirements to be satisfied before any requester can be granted access to records. The requester must complete an official application form and pay the required application fee. The body with whom the application is being lodged then has 60 days to decide on the application. If the application is denied, there are even longer periods involved in taking the process into appeal and getting a decision on the appeal.

This certainly does not help the journalist who wants to hand in the story by the deadline which is "next week," but it is more suitable for a journalist who is working on an investigative report over an extended period. The Bofors Report by Christoph Andersson (a Swedish journalist) is a sterling example of the perfect merger between using the traditional methods of getting information for a story and using access to information legislation to get more details on the story.

Costs

The act provides for payment of different kinds of fees for access to a record. There is, for a example, a:

- request fee of R35 (to access government records) and R50 (to access privately-held information)
- reproduction and access fees (charge per page of the record or type of media in which they are reproduced)
- appeal fees, if the decision on request is subject to an internal appeal (government records)
- legal costs, if the decision on the request is subject to an appeal by the High Court (privately held records).

All these costs are very prohibitive to the majority of South Africans, a lot of whom are poor and might be uneducated or even illiterate.

Awareness and Attitudinal Change

Creating openness in a society which used to be closed is not an easy task at all. The main goal is to create awareness about the act. Without doubt, the majority of South Africans are not aware of their rights and responsibilities in terms of the act. It then becomes the duty of government, civil society organisations like non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the media to educate people in this regard.

We still pick up situations where officials will only release information because they feel like it and not because it is required in terms of the act. Only when people are aware of legislation can we have the required attitudinal change to create a more open society.

Status of Implementation of the Act

It has been 12 months since the act came into operation and implementation is starting to be detected, even though such cases are few and far in-between. It was to be expected that an act whose main charge is the transformation of South Africa into a more open and transparent society would take years to be fully entrenched in the psyche of the nation.

The Open Democracy Advice Centre is currently conducting a survey that is aimed at showing how far South African government departments and companies in the private sector have gone in implementing the act. Having glanced at the returned survey questionnaires - which have not been analysed yet - it is apparent that the results of the survey will be mixed.

The responses from government departments show that about 70 percent of the government departments sampled for the survey know about the act and have begun the process of putting in place mechanisms as demanded by the act. The most exemplary is the Department of Water Affairs.

Some bodies who have begun putting in place mechanisms in line with the act are also trying to get to grips with the procedural requirements of the act.

Take for example the case of the Khulumani Support Group. This group consists of people who were victims of torture and other related crimes at the hands of the apartheid government security agencies. Members of the support group made submissions to South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission and spoke about what had happened to them. In terms of the Truth and Reconciliation Act, the people who had made disclosures to the TRC and had been victims of torture, or had even lost their loved ones at the hands of the apartheid government, were to be given some form of monetary reparation.

After the TRC hearings were concluded, some payments were made to the victims and a promise of more substantial reparations at a later stage was made. Having not received any feedback from the TRC on the next round of payments, the support group approached the Open Democracy Advice Centre to assist them in trying to get a copy of the government's reparations policy. With the assistance of ODAC, the group made an application in terms the Promotion of Access to

Information Act. After the 90-day period had lapsed and there was still no response from the government, this was deemed as a refusal in terms of the act.

The group and ODAC are currently considering other legal options available as the way forward.

In contrast, the most common response given by representatives of the private bodies surveyed is that they "have not heard about the act" and "would like to get more information on the act."

Multilateral Interventions

As can be observed from developments in some countries and the lack of it in others, there needs to be a concerted effort by multilateral organisations in Africa to take the necessary steps to ensure that most countries get on board and actually start to put in place some mechanisms to ensure that the right to information is protected, enhanced and respected.

There have been attempts to ensure that other countries in Africa join in the campaign. The most important action was certainly the declaration of the "African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" which guaranteed that freedom of expression is a fundamental human right. Countries that are not signatories to the charter are still bound by the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights", which has the same declaration.

However, such declarations need to be supported by effective instruments which are aimed at ensuring that the people actually get to enjoy such rights.


Conclusion

It is early days still in the campaign for the exercise of rights of freedom of expression and freedom of information in Africa. It is important for those who have specialist skills in the field to join forces and push for more openness in the continent. To the African, openness is not something which has to be achieved because it is the latest trend or the latest cause for rebels who became bored and idle when apartheid was defeated.

To the African, access to information is a matter of high importance. Openness or the lack of it affects people's livelihood and lives. It is an issue that is very dear to people's hearts. It is almost a way of saying: "NEVER AGAIN!" It is therefore very important that progressive governments, civil society organisations and the media speak for those who are either afraid, or not able to speak for themselves, by doing all that they can to protect this right.

"The world-wide trend towards democracy and freedom of information and expression is a fundamental contribution to the fulfillment of human aspirations"

Windhoek Declaration on Promoting an Independent and Public African Press



PPASA

PPASA TACKLES THE HIV/AIDS CHALLENGES

LEADERS IN SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH INTEGRATE HIV/AIDS INTO THEIR RANGE OF PROGRAMMES



ABOVE: Members of the PPASA Women's Wellness Programme in Khayelitsha wear Xhosa attire they made in their sewing project. BELOW: Peer educators discuss sexual and reproductive health issues including HIV/AIDS at a national conference.



The Planned Parenthood Association of South Africa (PPASA), the country's largest and oldest non-governmental organisation working in the field of sexual and reproductive health, has integrated HIV/AIDS training into all its programmes, based on its successful youth model.

From a youth centre in Acornhoek to a sex workers peer counselling group in Cape Town, HIV/AIDS prevention, peer counselling and training are part of a holistic approach to seeing HIV/AIDS as a community concern including youth, parents, teachers, health workers, faith-based organisations and government departments.

As a pioneer in providing youth information centres, PPASA recognised the need to provide sexual and reproductive health services, specifically for young people. PPASA has developed its adolescent-friendly clinics, peer education programmes and educational workshops into a nation-wide adolescent reproductive health service involving community-based youth centres in each province. These centres now provide computer training, entrepreneurial skills development, sports and recreation and soon to be rolled-out HIV voluntary counselling and testing services.

Lerato Louw, a peer educator in Kimberley, Northern Cape, said: 'The PPASA peer education programme has given me the opportunity to work in my community; to encourage the youth to make informed choices, share responsibilities and to be positive about their sexuality.'

Using this experience of developing relevant and targeted sexual and reproductive health services, PPASA is leading the way in a number of other life skills programmes that integrate the huge range of challenges associated with HIV/AIDS. These programmes, often conducted with partners such as provincial departments of heath, NGOs, or donors, are specially designed for women, men, school learners, parents, refugees, workers and groups at higher risk, such as commercial sex workers and truck drivers.

Men As Partners


For many years, campaigns around sexual and reproductive health, HIV/AIDS and gender violence focused on empowering women. As important as this work is, very often the people who need the information just as much, if not more, than women - the men - were left out.

Men As Partners (MAP) is a PPASA programme that aims to change that by bringing men on board through specially designed education and training programmes. MAP reaches out to men and women in communities on issues including gender equity, reproductive health, relationships, HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), domestic violence and sexual violence. MAP also uses life skills workshops, professional training and educational materials to create awareness and facilitate attitudinal and behavioural change among programme participants.

PPASA is the largest and oldest South African NGO in the field of sexual and reproductive health. It is affiliated to the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), which works in more than 180 countries around the world. Now over 70 years old, PPASA has developed innovative programmes including:

- Adolescent Reproductive Health Services
- HIV/AIDS Workplace Training
- Groups at Higher Risk
- Men As Partners
- Life Skills Programmes for Schools
- Parent Education Programmes
- Refugee Life Skills
- Teen Parenting
- Women's Wellness

PPASA has a large network of dedicated staff, volunteers and peer educators who work in communities, clinics, youth centres and offices, and on projects in all nine provinces. For more information, contact Martha Molete at (011) 880-1162 or email martha.m@ppasa.org.za or see our website www.ppasa.org.za



PPASA has centres in rural communities such as Nhlangwini, KwaZulu-Natal, pictured here.

"NEPAD: A VIABLE RECOVERY BLUEPRINT FOR AFRICA?"

BY NJUNGA-MICHAEL MULIKITA
The Author is a lecturer at the University of Zambia

Introduction

This short article assesses recent efforts to strengthen the profile and role of Africa in the international community. It focuses on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which aims to define a far-reaching common denominator for African states in their collective developmental aspirations, within the context of globalisation. The document is reviewed within the current process of transforming the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) as a new platform for closer inter-state collaboration on the continent. The paper is premised on the assumption that for NEPAD to be successful in realising its major goals and objectives, the plan must be anchored on a two-pronged sustainable partnership between African governments and civil society on the one hand, and the wider international community on the other. A major factor, which will be critical in determining whether or not such partnerships will be developed and sustained relates to the performance of African governments in the sphere of political and economic governance. The paper also cautions that NEPAD's exaggerated preoccupation with the endogenously induced causes of poverty and bad governance in Africa, without critically addressing the paradigm of global economic governance as determined by the forces of international capitalism may constitute a major "Achilles heel" of this ambitious continental developmental recovery blue print.

The document outlining the nature of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a long and exhausting one. "The New Partnership for Africa's Development is a pledge by Africa's leaders based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time to participate actively in the world economy" . NEPAD could thus be cautiously summed up as being a programme of action originating from within Africa and owned by African countries with the principal aim of reversing Africa's marginalisation in an increasingly globalising world.

Essential Aspects and Scope of NEPAD

NEPAD emphasises in its introduction the "common vision and a firm and shared conviction" by African leaders, anchoring the programme "on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world" (article 1). It goes on to state that "African peoples have begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept poor economic and political leadership" (article 7). With reference to the painful historical experiences of the continent's impoverishment it postulates as a lesson that "Africans must not be wards of benevolent guardians; rather they must be the architects of their own sustained upliftment" (article 27). This underlines the ownership claim previously articulated by President Thabo Mbeki, defining "a new framework of interaction with the rest of the world ... based on the agenda set by African peoples through their own initiatives and of their own volition, to shape their own destiny" (article 48).

In order to achieve these objectives, the African leaders declare joint responsibility for the following goals and tasks (article 49):

- strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution and ensuring that they are used to restore and maintain peace;
- promoting and protecting democracy and human rights by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and participative governance;
- restoring and maintaining macro-economic stability by developing standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies and appropriate institutional frameworks;
- instituting transparent legal and regulatory frameworks for financial markets and auditing of private companies and the public sector;
- revitalising and extending the provision of education, technical training and health services (with priority to HIV/Aids, malaria and other communicable diseases);
- promoting the role of women in social and economic development;
- building the capacity of African states to set and enforce the legal framework and to maintain law and order;
- promoting the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification into agro industries and manufacturing to serve both domestic and export markets .

The preconditions for sustainable development identify three

areas:

- peace, security, democracy and good governance (articles 71–85);
- economic and corporate governance, with a focus on public finance management (articles 86–92); and
- sub-regional and regional approaches (articles 93–98). The long-term objectives single out poverty eradication and promotion of the role of women (article 67). The goals list an annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate above 7 percent for the next 15 years and fulfilment of the agreed International Development Goals (IDGs) (article 68) . Realising these internationally agreed upon developmental targets will be anything but easy. Indeed NEPAD itself admits, "unless something new and radical is done, Africa will not achieve the IDGs and the 7 percent annual GDP growth rate" (article 70). This sounds more down to earth, but the document does not clearly spell out what it considers as new and radical essentials in its approach.

The key themes identify peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management as conditions for sustainable development (article 71), as well as the need for regional co-operation and economic integration (article 94). Sectoral priorities include infrastructure (subdivided into information and communication technology, energy, transport, water and sanitation), human resource development (poverty reduction, education, brain drain, health), agriculture, environment, culture, science and technology.

The Challenge of Forging International Partnerships in the context of NEPAD

NEPAD clearly recognises the strategic importance of external resource inflows into Africa, if the continent's marginalisation in the global economy is to be meaningfully addressed. To achieve the target of an annual growth rate of 7 percent, "Africa needs to fill an annual resource gap of 12 percent of its GDP, or US$64 billion" (article 147). Measures to achieve this are identified as increased domestic savings, improvements in the public revenue collection, but mainly funds from outside the continent. Hence NEPAD "focuses on debt reduction and ODA as complementary external resources required in the short to medium term, and addresses private capital flows as a longer-term concern" (ibid.).

Notwithstanding such declarations, however, there remain considerable challenges to obtaining meaningful results that can contribute to sustainable human development. As President Mbeki (2002) put it, when opening a NEPAD Work-in-Progress Review Workshop: "We now have an urgent responsibility to develop implementable plans, to ensure that the excellent programmes and policies that exist on paper succeed in practice, that African technical expertise from within Africa and the Diaspora is harnessed to convert those programmes and policies into practical and implementable programmes and projects, that the African people come to own these programmes as belonging to them."

The Challenge of Advancing Good Governance in the context of NEPAD

For NEPAD to crystallise into a framework of co-operation and partnership between Africa and the international community, African governments must on a very urgent basis back their publicly stated commitments to collective responsibility over policy issues with tangible actions. The notion of "good governance" is explicitly recognised as a substantial ingredient in socio-economic development. The NEPAD document notes that "across the continent, democracy is spreading, backed by the African Union, which has shown a new resolve to deal with conflicts and censure deviation from the norm" (article 45). It goes on to state: "The New Partnership for Africa's Development has, as one of its foundations, the expansion of democratic frontiers and the deepening of the culture of human rights. A democratic Africa will become one of the pillars of world democracy, human rights and tolerance." (Article 183) NEPAD's strong emphasis on democracy and governance does indeed make it genuinely different from earlier initiatives to promote, propagate and seek external support for African development within a continental perspective. As its main initiator confirmed: "The New Partnership is unique in African history in that African leaders have pledged to co-operate and be accountable to one another and to their people in terms of the development strategy, plans and delivery of programmes." (Mbeki, 2002) Conflict prevention, democracy and governance are considered of primary importance. This perception underpins NEPAD's claim to speak for the people of Africa through democratically legitimised representatives. Legitimacy and credibility are keywords and essential contributing factors in the ongoing efforts to turn NEPAD into a success story. If NEPAD is to be judged as a success story by the ordinary people of Africa and the wider international community, the effectiveness of the peer review mechanism envisaged under NEPAD as an enforcement instrument of good governance norms and practices on the continent, will be absolutely crucial .

NEPAD & the Future

The question remains, however, to what extent current African efforts can claim sufficient authority to convince the world outside of Africa – the OECD states in particular – that support for this initiative is both a necessary acknowledgement of the continent's problems and a contribution to solving them. It is furthermore questionable to what extent the political and economic commitment of African leaders (or actually the lack thereof) can ensure the intended responses and achieve an international consensus on NEPAD with material results. African countries therefore need to move quickly and decisively on improving the continent's record in political and economic governance if the international community is not to be rapidly overwhelmed by "NEPAD fatigue". With the US firmly focused on dismantling the global infrastructure of international terrorism, any indications emanating from Africa suggesting that African countries largely perceive NEPAD as another grandiose blueprint with which to secure donor resources

whilst they relegate political and economic governance issues to an inferior status will simply generate scepticism and more Afro-pessimism vis-à-vis NEPAD on the part of an excessively cautious international community.

A major concern that appears to have been overlooked as a result of the media hype NEPAD has generated is that the conceptual foundation upon which NEPAD has been developed implicitly and uncritically accepts the paradigm of global economic governance as determined by the forces of international capitalism. NEPAD appears to implicitly and timidly accept that the causes of poverty and bad governance in Africa are essentially home grown, whilst the influence of exogenous factors is underplayed. Whereas previous strategies to address poverty and underdevelopment such as the New International Economic Order (NIEO) package and the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) drew attention to the raw deal accorded to Africa by the international division of labour, this factor has been definitely underplayed by the architects of NEPAD. It therefore remains to be seen in the medium and long term whether or not NEPAD will succeed in reversing Africa's marginal position in the international system by largely focusing on factors endogenous to Africa's development at the expense of exogenous forces.

Richard Cornwell, "A New Partnership for Africa's Development?" African Security Review, Volume 11, Number 1, 2002,p. 91

Republic of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) & New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD, Pretoria, 2002, p.26

The IDGs are an ambitious catalogue of declared aims to be achieved by 2015. The UN New Agenda for the Development of Africa (UN-NADAF) adopted by the UN General Assembly in the early 1990s,the two Tokyo International Conferences on African Development (TICADI-1993 and TICADII-1998) and the other UN global conferences have consequently embraced these IDGs

Henning Melber, "The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) – Old Wine in New Bottles?" Forum for Development Studies Vol. 6, no. 1 (June 2002), p.7

On the 4th November, 2002,in Abuja, Nigeria, twelve African countries belonging to the sixteen member NEPAD Implementation Committee, "agreed to create an All African peer review system monitoring their governments" conduct in a bid to attract lucrative aid from Western governments wary of wars and human rights abuses on the continent'. However Botswana, Cameroon, Senegal and Tunisia did not sign. See "NEPAD Members to Monitor Governments", Times of Zambia, November 5 2002, p. 4.

Njunga-Michael Mulikita, "The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): Peace & Security Challenges", Paper presented to the First NEPAD National Workshop, Mulungushi International Conference Center, Lusaka, 23rd August, 2002,p.4



IMPUMELELO INNOVATIONS AWARD TRUST

The Impumelelo Innovations Award Trust was formally established in 1999 under the auspices of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa. It became an autonomous legal entity in 2001 with a new Board of Trustees.

MISSION

Impumelelo rewards innovations in government and public-private partnerships that reduce poverty and address key developmental issues of national concern through an annual award programme.

AIMS

- Improve the quality of life of the poor.
- Identify and highlight innovative and effective examples of service delivery in the country.
- Encourage good governance and promote trust in government.
- Break through fiscal and structural delivery constraints.
- Highlight models of innovative government projects to encourage replication.
- Recognise public managers who are the backbone of these exemplary programmes.
- Provide compelling and credible portraits of the ways in which government contributes to public problem-solving.





AWARD CRITERIA

- INNOVATION
- EFFECTIVENESS
- POVERTY IMPACT
- SUSTAINABILITY
- REPLICABILITY

AWARDS

Each winner receives a grant that must be used, in equal portion, for three purposes: to support replication; dissemination; and to strengthen internal capacities of organizations.

ANNUAL CYCLE:

PHASE 1

Applications are invited from all government departments throughout the country. Applicants are screened and assessed against the award criteria, leading to the selection of 15-20 finalists.

PHASE 2

Professional teams assess the finalist projects by means of site visits, interviews and relevant data gathering.

PHASE 3

The selection board screens finalists and adjudicates. This meeting culminates in an awards ceremony, and winning projects are announced.

PHASE 4

The award-wining projects spread information using various methodologies to disseminate their service delivery model in other contexts.

IMPUMELELO AFTER FIVE YEARS

In five years Impumelelo has received 912 submissions across a range of sectors including agriculture, community development, criminal justice, education, infrastructural development, environment, healthcare, HIV/AIDS, job creation and water delivery.

Experts evaluate submissions by conducting site visits, writing reports and making recommendations as to their praise- and/or prize-worthiness. Short-listed projects stand before a panel of judges that selects the final winners. To date 98 projects have received awards, totalling R4.5-million. The award money must be used to disseminate information about their success story to others.

From 2003-2004 Impumelelo will embark on a series of sectoral case studies focusing on HIV/AIDS, housing, public works, sanitation & waste management, the environment and criminal justice, using the award-winning projects to demonstrate best practice and lessons learned from the public sector. Aim: to translate these case studies into manuals that will help build capacity among public officials to implement best practice successfully in contexts that need delivery.

Impumelelo has become a prestigious and professional award programme, attracting some of government's best examples of public sector delivery. The winners appear in its annual magazine that highlights models of innovation and publicizes the work of public managers who are the backbone of these exemplary projects. The magazine is distributed to key departments of government, civil society and the private sector.



IMPUMELELO AWARD WINNING PROJECTS 2003/4

PLATINUM AWARDS

Bethesda AIDS Action Team

The Bethesda AIDS Action Team is based at the Bethesda Hospital and operates in the Jozini District in KwaZulu-Natal, one of the poorest areas in the province. Aim: to stop the spread of HIV/AIDS and eradicate the social and economic devastation of AIDS, by caring for AIDS orphans and those infected and affected, through a partnership with government, NGOs and CBOs.

Gundo Lashu – Labour-intensive Rural Roads Programme

Gundo Lashu is a 3-year Pilot Phase Project initiated in 2001 by the Limpopo provincial government and implemented by the Roads Agency to address the backlog of rural road infrastructure. It creates jobs to improve livelihood in poor rural communities.

Rural Mobile Community Service Centres (RMCSCs)

RMCSCs were established in 2001, in response to the high crime rates being reported by police stations in rural areas in Limpopo Province. To solve the problem, the South African Police Service (SAPS) established satellite stations in remote areas. With limited funding, scrapped police vehicles were refitted as RMCSCs by previously disadvantaged people. 14 RMCSCs are now operational.

Re-engineering of health services at Kimberley Hospital Complex

The Kimberley Hospital Complex (KHC) is located in the Northern Cape. Prior to 1994 the hospital service was poor, but partnerships between the hospital, private sector, tertiary institutions, government departments and NGOs have resulted in significant improvement in the standard of care. The pendulum has swung to such an extent that even those who can afford private care and specialists prefer to use KHC facilities.

Masakhane: People working together to build a community

The Masakhane Project is situated at the Ebuhleni Primary School (Mooiplaas) in the Mpumalanga province. The area is characterised by high unemployment and poverty. Partnerships exist between the school, community and NGOs to address these socio-economic challenges. The result: the implementation of various income-generating activities - 3 water tanks have been built; 42 grandparent-headed households received pension grants; 80 families receive food parcels regularly; 300 children obtained birth certificates and identification documents. A nursery has been established allowing the community to start vegetable gardens. Masakhane has been transformed from rhetoric into reality.

GOLD AWARDS

Operation Rachel: cross-border operation between South Africa and Mozambique

Operation Rachel is a bilateral cooperative agreement on arms destruction between the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the police of the Republic of Mozambique, effective since 1996. The project destroys arms caches left behind after the civil war in Mozambique. Since implementation, 8 operations have been conducted involving 320 rural people; rewards range from agricultural equipment and seedlings to financial compensation. Numerous arms have been destroyed: 4 356 machine guns, 23 072 rifles, 183 vehicle mines and 3 158 personal mines.

GH Starck Centre - Rehoboth Age Exchange: 'A response to ageing in a community of need'

A partnership between the City Mission, an established NGO and government resulted in the 'Rehoboth Age Exchange' Project of 2002. It is a community-care facility offering housing to 136 older persons, and providing a wide range of supportive and rehabilitative services to 150 day-visitors.

Oasis Recycling and Waste Management Project
In 1992 a partnership between Oasis, the private sector and government resulted in the Oasis Recycling and Waste Management Project in Claremont and Elsies River. Three hundred and thirty-six disabled people are employed in the protective workshops recycling waste material.

Lifeline Durban Outreach Project: Ukuba Nesibindi
The Lifeline Durban Outreach Project: Ukuba Nesibindi (Centre of Courage) was established in March 2002 to serve the disadvantaged communities in the Durban Unicity. It serves communities that have high rates of poverty, unemployment, rape and HIV/AIDS infection. Achievements: 439 volunteers have been trained; 2 057 people have received voluntary counselling and testing (VCT); 119 people receive ongoing counselling; counselling and support are provided to 60 clients of domestic violence; 210 sex workers have received counselling and have changed their lifestyle - 15 returned to school, 5 received VCT and 3 have returned home.

Potlaka - Service Delivery Innovation Project
The Department of Public Transport, Roads and Works in Gauteng initiated the Potlaka - Service Delivery Innovation Project in 2001. Main objective: to render infrastructure maintenance services to other government departments; upgrade management systems; improve the technical skills of staff; and implement business techniques. A three-phase operation was implemented and service delivery has improved substantially.

eThekwini Water and Sanitation Programme
The eThekwini Water and Sanitation Programme was introduced in 2001 to provide communities in the Durban Unicity with water and sanitation services. These predominantly rural and peri-urban communities lie beyond the 'waterborne sewerage line' where a higher level of services is both unaffordable and inappropriate. To date 2 260 toilets have been built; nearly 6 000 are under construction; nearly 5 500 ground tanks, and the relevant connections, are in place, or on course. Work was provided for 4 660 manual workers and 85 local community facilitators were trained.



Efficient Management of Sexual Offences
Partnerships between the South African Police Service, various NGOs and the Department of Justice resulted in the Efficient Management of Sexual Offences Project being established in July 2000. Intervention takes the form of 50 specialised sexual offences courts and 5 integrated care centres around the country. The care centres serve as one-stop treatment initiatives with all the relevant personnel - doctors, police, counsellors and prosecutorial staff - on hand and at hospitals. The project needs to be expanded but results indicate an increase in the rate of conviction of perpetrators of sexual violence.





SILVER AWARDS
- Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (NMMM) Safety and Security
- Community-Based Tourism Development Fund (CBTDF)
- Phaphamani Home-Based Care Centre (PHBCC)
- Child Justice Project
- Tembisa/Phomolong Ward-Based Refuse Collection Project
- Morning Star
- Mangaung CANSA (Cancer Association of South Africa)
- Library Business Corners (LBC)
- Urban SEED
- The Integrated Nutrition Programme (INP)
- Soweto Mountain of Hope (SOMOHO)
- Project Vuk'uhambe
- Siyazama Community Allotment Garden Association (SCAGA)
- Johannesburg Inner City Fashion/Garment Operators Social Capital Project
- Child Witness Project
- Gauteng Rental Housing Tribunal
- Uniondale Integrated Empowerment Project (UNIEP)

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IMPUMELELO INNOVATIONS AWARD TRUST

PRIVATISATION AND SOE'S LESOTHO'S BANKING INDUSTRY.

BY M SOOTHO

INTRODUCTION.

Most advanced economies have engaged in privatisation of State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) on an unprecedented scale in the recent past and the majority of Less Developed Economies (LDEs) have been forced to follow suit.

Many reasons have been advanced for privatisation including:

- poor performance of SOEs
- economic and social costs imposed by SOEs
- lack of technical and managerial skills in SOEs
- financial loses.

By privatising SOEs it is hoped that the following benefits will be realised:

- greater competition
- promotion of market-based economies
- stimulation of economic growth
- transformation of SOEs into viable and successful businesses
- promotion of effective and efficient performance
- transfer of funding of major capital expenditures from the public to the private sector.

While privatisation may bring about the above and other benefits to individuals and society, the problem with it is that it is advocated as though it is a panacea for all the ailments of SOEs; the implicit assumption behind it is that states are inherently inefficient while the private sector is inherently efficient. The aim of this paper is to show that this is not true, hence privatisation cannot be regarded as a panacea for the poor corporate performance seen in the public sector in most countries and privatising SOEs will not necessarily improve their performance. That is why privatisation in most countries has failed to produce the hoped for results. In arguing my case, I shall take a specific case of Lesotho's banking industry and show what it was like before and what it is like after privatisation of state banks.

Privatising State banks in Lesotho: did the process deliver the goods?

A few years back, the World Bank came to Lesotho - at the invitation of the Lesotho government, it claims - to help address the country's economic problems, particularly those caused by loss making state enterprises (including banks). As usual, the World Bank prescribed its highly controversial universal medicine – privatisation of state companies. The objectives of privatising state enterprises included, but were not limited to:

- relieving government and tax payers in general off the heavy burden of subsidising loss-making SOEs.
- phasing out state control of commercial enterprises and introduce competitive pressure
- providing efficient and reliable services, and create more jobs.

It was hoped that the post privatisation performance of former state enterprises, particularly in the banking sector, would become more efficient and reliable.

Having no other option, the Lesotho government accepted the prescribed medicine and started on its privatisation path in 1995. The privatisation programme was to be driven by the Privatisation Unit (PU) placed within the Ministry of Finance. The programme was to be guided by the Privatisation Act.

Before privatisation of SOEs, Lesotho had four banks (excluding the Central Bank of Lesotho -CBL), two privately owned and two state-owned, one of which was an Agricultural Development Bank in 1998. Due to poor performance, the agricultural bank was unceremoniously closed down, and the only remaining state bank, Lesotho Bank, was later privatised in 1999, by selling 70 percent shares to Standard Bank South Africa. The reasons that led to the closure of one of the two state banks, and privatisation of the other included, but were not limited to:

- inadequate management and political interference
- financial losses due to non-compliance with prudent lending policies
- to phase out heavy government subsidies to these enterprises.

In other words, these banks, while in state hands, were net cash eaters from the public purse. In one local media, The Lesotho Monitor (volume 2 No. 1 of February 2002), an officer of the Privatisation Unit said that the former Lesotho Agricultural Bank (Agric Bank), at the time of its closure, was eating as much as 2 million Maluti (M2 million) from the public purse every month to keep it from sinking. The former Lesotho Bank, reportedly, ate as much as M20 million a month just to keep it afloat.

Admittedly, to any sound mind, such a bad financial state of affairs is totally unacceptable. Clearly, it was very expensive to run these highly inefficient and unreliable institutions. However, it is my belief that it was rather too optimistic, and perhaps somewhat misleading, for the Lesotho government

(and other proponents of the widely held neo-liberal doctrine of "markets more efficient and states inefficient") to have given the public the impression that privatising loss-making state enterprises such as for example the former Lesotho Bank, would necessarily ensure efficient and reliable service. Privatisation in Lesotho, as elsewhere in the world, was indeed advocated as the gospel truth – "the" only solution to Lesotho's ailing SOEs. You may ask: what is the situation six years down the line? The answer is simply: nothing much has changed.

Although it was hoped that the post privatisation performance of former state banks, and the banking sector in general would become more efficient, the sad part is that this hoped for efficiency and reliability have not - even three years after privatising Lesotho Bank - materialised yet, at least not as far as customers are concerned. Customer service delivery is as bad as it was prior to 1999. Customers are often subjected to very long queues that move at a snail's pace. The situation is even worse during month-end or when the few available automated teller machines (ATMs) experience some shutdowns (a thing that also happens often). This level of inefficiency is in conflict with the assurances that the public was given by the powers that be to the effect that privatising the only remaining national bank, Lesotho Bank, would be in the best interests of depositors and other bank customers.

Given this state of inefficiency in the banking sector, bank customers are haunted daily by the big question: "where is the efficiency that privatisation was supposed to bring about?" The majority of the public would agree that the product quality and customer service that the banks, and privatised state enterprises in general, provide are no better than they were in their old state ownership days; if anything, these two most important commodities – quality and customer service – are now scarcer than ever before in the Mountain Kingdom.

As a matter of fact, even the uninformed eye can see that such poor customer service is costing Lesotho, an already poor country, heavily in terms of opportunity cost. Just think of how much the long hours customers spend in the queues at the banks, especially around month-end, cost the country in terms of lost productivity and production. The country is loosing millions. Under the circumstances, the banking sector has deteriorated into being a liability to the country and not an asset the public was made to believe it would become after privatisation.

Apparently, nobody is ready to tell the nation why conventional wisdom has failed it. Why the dominant Paradigm just doesn't deliver the efficiency the nation was promised. But some people would like to argue that this inefficiency of the banking sector has nothing to do with privatisation.

What the preachers of the appealing privatisation gospel in Lesotho (as elsewhere) were not aware of, or decided not to acknowledge, was the fact that privatisation in itself does not guarantee efficiency, for the simple reason that it does not take place in a vacuum. One has always argued — and there is abundant supporting evidence – that there is very little, if at all any, correlation between enterprise ownership and efficiency. The reason, why privatisation does not always yield efficiency is because it sometimes, and against the wishes of free marketers (or neo-classicals/neo-liberals), results in more concentrated (or less competitive), rather than deconcentrated (or more competitive) markets - this is the paradox of the free market doctrine. This is exactly what happened with Lesotho's banking industry; the closure of Agric Bank and privatisation of Lesotho Bank has reduced (rather than expanded) the banking industry from what can be called an oligopolistic industry (a few number of banks) to a duopolistic industry (only two banks). Unfortunately, concentrated (or less competitive) markets - such as Lesotho's post privatisation banking industry - are as inefficient as state dominated industries are said to be. This is the painful truth that the country's economic and political policy- and decision-makers should have envisaged before they went onto their privatisation spree. At the end of the day, it is bank customers who are left at the mercy of such highly concentrated markets (that become sellers' markets) that allow these dominant, inefficient banks to make super (or unjustified) profits. No wonder that despite its appalling customer service, Lesotho Bank managed to declare huge profits (and sizeable dividends to government, as minority shareholder) in just five months of its being privatised!

Can this profitability be seen as a sign of efficiency? Well, if the numbers in an enterprise's income statement and balance sheet are all that matters, the answer to the question would be yes, especially in the light of the fact that the Lesotho government is no longer losing millions monthly in an attempt to keep state banks operational. But if we are concerned about the most fundamental reason for the existence of any business enterprise, namely the provision of quality products and quality customer service, then the answer is an absolute NO! I am reminded of an incidence of when one customer went to Lesotho Bank to change his savings account to an ATM account. For some reason, the figures in his savings book and those in the bank's computer system were not in balance and some reconciliation was necessary. This reconciliation, which in my view should have taken a few days or a week in the worst-case scenario, took a full month. To me, this is efficiency and this was not just one isolated case of inefficiency in Lesotho's now private sector controlled banking industry. This inefficiency is so prevalent, not only in Lesotho, but also in other LDEs, and derives from the fact that less than perfect, oligopolistic or duopolistic, markets (such as Lesotho's banking industry) are more characteristic of the economies of LDEs than the supposedly more perfect markets of the more advanced economies on which the privatisation model is based. Indeed, in Lesotho's case, the poor service delivery of its concentrated banking sector is a clear defiance of neo-liberal (or neo-classical) predictions of privatisation-induced efficiency. As it is now, it looks like inefficiency is here to stay with the people of Lesotho regardless of the new dispensation of state absence in enterprise ownership.

What is even more interesting is that the banking sector is becoming more impersonal by the day, by replacing people with machines (thus adding to unemployment and undermining government's objective of job creation). While the banks must be applauded for installing more ATM machines (thus making it possible for people to take cash out from an ATM machine even outside normal banking hours), the sad part is that this well-meant improvement has simply transferred inefficiency from within the banking hall to the outside of the banks. All that can be seen are the same old queues, which are now even more visible because the entire queue is outside the bank. Worse still, the painful thing about machines is that if a machine breaks down and no one attends to it, the customer has only two options at his/her disposal: either he/she waits, hoping that it will start working again after some time or he/she simply quits, hoping to come back for service some other time. The point is: customers don't get service when they want and deserve it. It is my feeling that for as long as the country's banking industry remains as concentrated as it is, and unless policy makers do something to try and level the playing fields, bank customers are most probably not going to obtain that most needed commodity – efficiency – any sooner.

The whole point one is trying to drive home is that the old myth that private ownership necessarily yields efficiency, as proponents of privatisation would have us believe, is neither here nor there: it does not matter whom between the state and private investors owns an enterprise; inefficiency remains inefficiency. No enterprise is immune from it simply by reason of the nature of its ownership. In light of the foregoing, one believes that policy makers should have done much more than just selling-off state enterprises: privatisation alone is as inefficient as states are said to be.

Lest one be accused of only at showing the weak points of something without providing an alternative, let me suggest a possible solution. Perhaps the authorities should have "privatised" the hearts and mindset of the people who work for state enterprises rather than privatising the entities themselves, in the hope that the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith and his classical flock (and lately, neo-liberals) would bring about the efficiency and reliable customer service that are admittedly so wanting in the public sector. Such efficiency and reliability have not materialised in Lesotho's post privatisation banking industry. Or perhaps efficiency is there, as the neo-classicals (and now neo-liberals) would have us believe it but the ordinary bank customer just happens not to see it! One however, doubts whether this is the case. Maybe if the Lesotho authorities had privatised the mindset of the people in former state banks, the end result would have been better!

What then is the Verdict and what would be the best way forward?

On the balance of the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the dominant privitisation paradigm is based on a precarious foundation – i.e. questionable assumptions that fail the test of empirical evidence. As a result, its policy prescription of privatisation, based on a flawed paradigm, cannot be relied upon to always yield efficiency (in resource allocation, production, distribution and consumption). This is particularly true in cases where privatisation results in more concentrated (hence less competitive) markets – a thing that happened in Lesotho's banking industry (and this is not an exceptional case). Neo-classical theory itself agrees that monopoly or near-monopoly markets are highly inefficient. So, it would appear that since markets are not necessarily efficient, then states could not be said to be necessarily bad either.

One couldn't agree more with former World Bank Chief Economist, Joseph Stiglitz - in his article "An Agenda for the New Development Economics" – that developing economies (and I add, such as Lesotho) need a more balanced approach that attempts to identify the limitations of both markets and governments alike and tries to minimise or eliminate both. He argues that this approach asks how both markets and governments can be improved; recognises the gap between "average" and "best practice"; and observes that in some of the most successful economies, both markets and governments have been complementary, rather than adversarial. This is the approach LDE governments should be adopting.

In my view, and in agreement with Stiglitz, both states and markets are partners in development. This is precisely the reason why I believe that there is still room for state ownership of enterprises in the development agenda: we only need to "privatise" (i.e. transform) the cultures, behaviours, and processes in state enterprises to make them as efficient as markets are said to be, if not more efficient. Simply privatising state enterprises may not bear much positive fruit as evidenced by the continued inefficiency of Lesotho's banking sector, whose customer service is still as terrible as it was before privatisation of state banks.

In my book, there are basically two factors that determine market efficiency: the one factor is the existence of highly deconcentrated "competitive" markets; and competitive markets do not imply no role for state in economic activity. Also, competition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for efficiency. The second, and perhaps most important, determinant of efficiency is entrepreneurial talent, which, luckily, does not depend on whether an enterprise is state-owned or privately owned. Unless and until business enterprises (both state and privately owned) exhibit entrepreneurial behaviour, Lesotho (and indeed other LDEs) will find it difficult to experience the benefits of market efficiency, not only in the banking sector, but also in other, equally inefficient, sectors of the economy. The challenge to both LDEs' governments and the private sector is therefore to create an environment that stimulates entrepreneurial behaviour in both small and big privately owned and state-owned enterprises alike.

One would just like to stress that it is incumbent upon leaders

of LDEs to carefully weigh the impact of the possible negative economic and social outcomes of privatisation, rather than just go on an indiscriminate selling spree of state enterprises. Ill-conceived, ill-implemented privatisation is a sure recipe for economic disaster. Once implemented, privatisation is very costly to reverse; so, states must tread very carefully once they decide to embrace this double-edged economic policy. LDEs must remember that their markets are less developed than the arguably "liberalised", hence competitive markets of the First world. As such, the policies meant to address LDEs' economic ills cannot be an exact replica of First world policies, if economic progress is to be achieved.

CAN UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIPS BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL?

BY PROF BEN TUROK M P (SOUTH AFRICA)

INTRODUCTION:

Unequal partnerships within a marriage can work if there is mutual attraction and good understanding. Between countries more is required. When colonial rule introduced European languages and culture into Africa, this did not establish the basis for equal relations between their countries. Relations between unequal countries can only be meaningful and sustainable where it is based on mutual benefit.

Africa needs dialogue and partnerships with Europe since it seeks economic benefits, while Europe continues to gain material benefits from its relations with Africa. However, there is no intrinsic obstacle to recognising that while the existing relationship is unequal, it is yet possible to identify mechanisms for building partnerships and even overcoming this imbalance.

The new consolidation of Europe and the strengthening of unity in Africa provide a solid basis for continent-to-continent co-operation. Such co-operation is also vital for enhancing multilateralism in decision making and ensuring global stability.

ACKNOWLEDGING ASYMMETRY

The initiative to advance the Europe-Africa dialogue is to be warmly welcomed. Whatever problems beset our troubled world, dialogue is an essential alternative to tension and conflict. It is also important to identify what is helpful and what is unhelpful in moving dialogue forward. In particular we should avoid postures based on "blame" and yet face squarely existing problems and their origins.

Dialogue can become sterile and self-perpetuating if there is no serious analysis of the asymmetry in the existing international world order and the consequent tensions, and if no solutions based on universal values of fairness and justice are on the agenda. However we should avoid an approach based on sentimentality since this inevitably leads to proposals based on charity rather than the pursuit of mutually beneficial relations. We must insist that co-operation should be long term and sustainable and that means that there must be strong structural element rather than ad hoc measures which can be easily reversed.

An Agenda for Priorities must be based on a recognition of asymmetry and that any outcome of dialogue will involve managing an unequal partnership. The emergence of the African Union and NEPAD is partly a response to this asymmetry, as is also proposals for SOUTH-SOUTH economic co-operation, and indeed the emergence of the Group of 21+. The Europe-Africa dialogue must examine the implications of intra-Africa regional co-operation as well as co-operation within the South. Do these factors constitute a threat to Europe ? If so, can these relations be managed so that this is minimised. And, how can the polarisation at Cancun be managed in the interests of all? Or, are we facing the first hints of global economic co-ordination which excludes the North as well as Europe?

Fortunately, it is accepted by many in Europe that there has been insufficient attention paid to the problems of Africa on the one hand, and that there is an urgent need for new policies which will allow Africa's peoples to advance their own conditions of existence. The current process is rooted in the restructuring of the political systems of both Europe and Africa. But the initiative for Africa's renewal must belong firmly in Africa's hands.

It is noted that EU development aid amounts to 0.34 percent of GDP, which is below the target of 0.7 percent but nevertheless better than that of the US, the richest country in the world, which is a mere 0.12 percent. The EU provides $29 billion, over half of global aid while the US provides $ 12 billion ($43 per US citizen). However this aid is not enough. Overall, per capita assistance to Africa has dropped by almost 40 percent over the last decade. In a world of six billion people, one million own 80 percent of global gross domestic product

and one billion struggle to survive on less than a dollar a day. Most of these reside in Africa.

The evidence is in the data. Per capita income in real terms in 2000 was 10 percent lower than in 1980. If we compare the GNP per capita as a proportion of world GNP per capita between 1960 and 1999, we find that Sub Saharan Africa fell by 47 percent while the First World rose by 35 percent. For each dollar of net capital inflow into Africa from the rest of the world, a dollar and six cents flows out, or is lost, through the negative trade balance, debt servicing, profit remittances or capital outflows. In the words of James Wolfensohn, the world is "out of balance". The promise of $3.715 billion for development assistance for Africa from the World Bank this year will help but will not turn the situation around.

Much is made of prevailing conflict and instability in Africa as the root cause of distress. However the lack of safe water and sanitation causes more deaths than armed conflict, showing that economic problems are more fundamental. Indeed without addressing socio-economic stagnation there can be no escape from instability. It must also be recognised that wars are not always without a basis in seeking control of valuable resources for private gain.

This bears out the main contention of this paper that existing programmes such as Cotonou, the Barcelona process, the Generalised System of Preferences, and even the EU-SA agreement are not adequate. Despite important concessions for many African exports to Europe, the unequal relations remain in place. Some economists argue that Sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region of the world, was actually made worse off as a result of the last round of trade negotiations. The World Bank concedes that many African countries are worse off now than in the 1960's. Hence, we must critically examine our socio-economic priorities if the proposed dialogue is to bear fruit.

MAJOR AREAS FOR INTERVENTION

It is universally accepted that colonial and neo-colonial practices served Europe's material interests and led to major inequalities between Europe and Africa. Many of these unequal relations remain in place and have to be redressed if unequal relations are to be overcome. Unequal relations are manifested in:

- Material Interests
  trade relations, investment, skills transfers, labour and environment protection
- Social Relations
  tourism, family relations, immigration and refugee flows
- Political/Security Issues
  multilateral political relations, conflict resolution, peace and confronting terrorism
- Human Solidarity
  a hardheaded unsentimental approach to co-operation does not exclude notions of human solidarity. Under this heading we can include ODA, and non-governmental aid, support by volunteers, twinning, campaigning on human rights, trade union solidarity, political party co-operation, ideological debate, religious solidarity, and the effective blocking of monies derived from corruption by both African and European organisations and individuals
- Intergroup Relations
  whatever proposals emerge on EU-Africa co-operation at state level, space must always be created to inter-group relations and co-operation
- Inter-Parliamentary Relations
  it is extraordinary how often parliaments are omitted from discussions on dialogue despite the role of Parliaments in setting agendas internationally

COMMON PRIORITIES AND CLEAR OBJECTIVES

There is a clear imperative to get away from platitudes and generalities. What are the objectives and priorities which can lead to measurable progress and which demonstrably serve the interests of both Europe and Africa ?

The most obvious areas for co-operation are trade, aid and external debt. It should be possible to discuss these areas without adopting a patronising positions such as: "Africa must behave better with respect to governance then Europe will be more generous". The majority of the beneficiaries of transfers also want good governance, indeed they are more concerned about good governance than observers at a distance. So we need to be very objective about such requirements and pay more attention to the mode of transfers than on lectures to corrupt regimes.

As to trade, unfortunately trade hit an impasse at Cancun which will not be resolved easily. Yet aid without trade relief, is inadequate. Pascal Lamy concedes that Sub-Saharan Africa has suffered a sharp deterioration in living standards over decades and its share of world trade has shrunk from 3 percent in 1950 to less than 1 percent now. Africa wants "a fishing rod not fish". Since 45 percent of Africa's foreign trade is with the EU, trade adjustment which goes beyond present concessions is fundamental. And that means attending to the massive agricultural support within the EU which makes African agricultural exports uncompetitive.

Without these measures, it is wrong to require structural adjustments in Africa such as opening up markets, liberalisation of the service sector, or even macroeconomic adjustments which will tighten the austerity screws on the economy which are already too severe in many instances.

We also require greater scrutiny of aid. It is in the interests of Europe that aid is not dysfunctional. Instead it should be efficient and effective. This is not always the case as numerous studies have shown. This can only be changed through donor-recipient dialogue involving all stakeholders and not merely the relevant officials. Aid should be based on a transfer of actual resources to the recipient country and not to personnel and companies from the donor country. It is important that aid is not seen as providing employment to Europeans on temporary

transfer to Africa, or to providing jobs in European NGOs. A joint review of aid on a multilateral basis is of the highest priority.

Debt relief has been canvassed ad nauseum. The current solution on offer, HIPC, is cumbersome, costly and slow. It has taken many years of talk for only five countries to get irrevocable relief from debt servicing. Surely a new EU-Africa Dialogue can come up with a more effective proposal which will see speedy relief, and not just to the poorest countries. There is a spurious argument with respect to middle income countries of no debt relief without good governance, but it is clear that such pressures are not meaningful where governments are badly managed. Far more complex pressures are required to restore good democratic practices. Many economists argue that Africa's decline began in the late 1970's in tandem with the global bifurcation of North and South. Until then, the new governments in post-independence Africa had performed quite well. So Africa's decline is attributed primarily to "structural and conjunctural processes of the global economy", rather than to poor leadership in Africa. We need a major, public dialogue on these issues – they cannot be settled in the closed confines of the G8, IMF and Paris Club.

The principal outcome of these measures must be poverty relief on a long-term trajectory. Poverty must be seen as a violation of human rights. Much has been said on this subject which requires no embellishment here. Suffice to say that the present situation is untenable, given the enormous inequalities between social groups and countries globally. Current EU development policy is said to be focused on poverty eradication, but this needs to be demonstrated rigorously.

Joseph Stiglitz argues that the present dynamics of globalisation are not working for many of the world's poor, nor for the stability of the global economy. If we are to move to a greater sense of solidarity globally, and a solid basis for EU-Africa partnership, the above issues need urgent and practical attention.

THE PARTNERSHIPS OFFERED BY NEPAD

While NEPAD is an initiative by African governments to install African ownership and leadership, it offers ample scope for broad partnerships within Africa and internationally. The organisational structure of NEPAD is as follows: NEPAD falls directly under the African Union Heads of State and Government Summit. The summit has appointed an Implementation Committee (HSIC) which reports to the summit. Then comes a NEPAD Steering Committee which oversees projects and programme development and it has a secretariat which is currently based in South Africa. NEPAD is therefore not a formal separate Organ of the AU, but "an integrated socio-economic development framework for Africa".

Although the focus of NEPAD is on socio-economic matters, its vision and mission is very broad - to create conducive conditions for meaningful and sustainable development in Africa which encompasses overcoming poverty, growth and development, halting Africa's marginalisation, and empowering women. The priorities are establishing the conditions for peace and security, democracy and good governance, regional co-operation and integration and capacity building. The mandate is very broad indeed.

Since NEPAD is conceived as a broad programme of sustainable development, it includes;

- the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), facilitating infrastructure programmes for transport, energy, ICT, Water and Sanitation,
- facilitating food security and agricultural development,
- coordinating Africa's positions on market access, debt relief, and ODA reform,
- monitoring the Millennium Development Goals in health and education.

A recent report (May 2003) by the African Development Bank reviews in considerable detail the implementation of the infrastructure short-term action plan. For the first time it gives information on actual progress with NEPAD programmes and identifies areas of partnerships across Africa and with institutions abroad. Most importantly it identifies "flagship projects" which have the highest priority. These are:

- implementing the Yamoussoukro Decision (air traffic control)
- facilitating road transport
- ICT policy and regulation at regional level
- power pools
- Nile Basin initiative
- Greater Inga integrator study
- regional linkages for energy
- capacity building for regional Economic Communities (RECs)
- West Africa Gas pipeline
- COMTEL

It may be useful to set out the institutions which will oversee these projects at regional level in Africa:

1 ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
2 ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
3 IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
4 EAC	East African Community
5 COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
6 SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
7 UMA	Union of Arab Maghreb
8 ITAF	Infrastructure Technical Assistance Facility

The African Development Bank study shows the extent to which infrastructure development is prioritised. It is clear that NEPAD believes that unless every aspect of communication and co-operation is vastly improved within regions and across the continent, development will remain piecemeal and fragmented.

To give a sense of the actual projects, we list the projects for ECCAS (one of the poorest regions) – electricity networks, energy, capacity building, road transport and regulation, trade, one-stop border posts, railway networks, ports, air transport regulation, global navigation satellite system, transport recovery, telecommunications equipment manufacture and ICT policy and regulation.

In detailing these projects, the AfDB lists the stage of development for each and the actual and potential sources of funding. It shows that there are many foreign partners already involved in practical implementation. However the NEPAD Secretariat and the APRM team keep insisting on analysis of Africa's own revenue generation and funding capacity.

THE WAY FORWARD

The EU–Africa dialogue must be based on a recognition that we need global collective action for the enhancement of global public goods. Many of these have been listed above.

Many other issues require deeper analysis, such as the effect of the current international financial architecture and the constraining role of the IMF in Africa.

We need a well-funded think tank led by African intellectuals which will unpack these issues and propose remedies.

We also need to create a range of fora where parliamentarians, experts, officials, and civil society representatives can examine concrete issues and identify solutions. These matters cannot be left to officials alone, nor to summits. It is understood that Cotonou seeks a significant shift to partnering through political dialogue, but this should be inclusive.

It must also be recognised that existing economic agreements such as Cotonou, have had limited success in lifting Africa out of its stagnation or in reducing poverty. Some even argue that existing international arrangements are increasing polarisation and exacerbating poverty. The Least Developed Countries, especially in Africa are increasingly marginalised.

The fact that NEPAD is the socio-economic programme of the African Union and that it is now linked with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), there is a sound basis for examining in very concrete form how EU-AU economic relations are to structured from now on.

We also need far greater clarity on what is meant by "regionalism". Some use the term for groups of states, others for the continent, others for even wider relations. Is it necessary for there to be common identities for regionalism to work ? Is the goal primarily for economic integration ? Or, can political-security considerations be the main motivation ? In either case, where does the EU-AU connection come in most obviously ?

We also need clarity on the possible contradictions between co-operation within a region, and liberalisation to open up globally. Which gets primacy, "open regionalism" or "developmental regionalism"? Or is it a matter of creating building blocks for global integration? If so, is there room for regional co-operation with preferential provisions ? Does the EU favour regional integration among ACP countries in order to gain access to larger markets, or to facilitate developmental integration within a sub-region? What are the consequent effects of liberalisation? Why does the EU favour the creation of free trade areas linking Europe's economy to regional groupings of ACP countries? The evidence on the advantages needs to be publicly available. And will this reduce ACP dependence on exports of primary products?

Is it realistic to argue that poor developing African countries can combine to realise economies of scale in production and/or trade? What research is needed to demonstrate either case?

Broadly constituted task groups, not only officials, should examine

- the development of core techno-bureaucratic, managerial, technical and entrepreneurial skills in Africa,
- the effective use of capital resources,
- the mobilising of financial resources within Africa,
- the facilitation of intra-regional trade in Africa,
- manufacturing, processing and downstream enterprises within regions,
- intra-regional trade and investment.

To conclude. There are many people of goodwill in Europe, within and outside of government institutions. Their goodwill is often frustrated in formal state-to-state negotiations, often creating a negative climate in Europe-African relations. The greatest challenge facing the proposed dialogue is how to ensure the widest possible participation in order to allow space for those who can think beyond their immediate short-term self-interest as Europeans.

Postscript

The estimated population of Africa in 1995 was 580 million.

Of these:

291 million people had average incomes below one dollar a day in 1998

124 million of those up to 39 years old were at risk of dying before 40.

43 million children were stunted as a result of malnutrition in 1995

205 million were without access to health services in 1990-5

249 million were without safe drinking water in 1990-5

More than 2 million infants died annually before reaching their first birthday

139 million youths and adults were illiterate in 1995

(African Poverty at the Millennium, The World Bank 2001)

TOWARDS 10 YEARS OF FREEDOM



THE EASTERN CAPE – A PROVINCE ON THE MOVE



On 27 April 1994 a new era dawned on the Eastern Cape – land of rolling green hills, unspoiled beaches and passionate people. The newly-elected government of the day stepped boldly into the fray, enthusiastically facing the seemingly insurmountable challenges in the province.

That was nearly ten years ago. As South Africa inches closer to celebrating the end of 10 years of democracy, the Eastern Cape has a great deal to rejoice.

At the forefront of transformation

The Eastern Cape Province has historically borne the brunt of the greatest repression and deprivation, but has always proven to be a formidable force – from the early frontier wars of resistance to colonialism fought 100 years ago, and the liberation struggle fought against the apartheid government in the latter part of the century.

In the process a formidable resource for the advancement of the country and the province has been forged – a strong and capable leadership. Premier of the Eastern Cape, Reverend Makhenkesi Stofile, says: 'The sons and daughters of the province are sought after the world over, and continue to make meaningful contributions in all spheres of life - not only here in South Africa, but also abroad.' Icons such as former President Nelson Mandela, President Thabo Mbeki, Oliver Tambo, Chris Hani and Archbishop Desmond Tutu all hail from, or received their education in, the



Eastern Cape. The list of others born or schooled in the province, and who continue to make a difference, is endless.

Facing up to the challenge

A legacy of abject poverty among thousands of people, especially in the former homelands, had to be overcome. 'A situation of having to amalgamate 5 separate governmental entities made the challenge faced by the Eastern Cape unique in post-apartheid South Africa,' Premier Stofile explains. A single democratic government first had to be forged from disparate administrations such as the Ciskei, Transkei, Cape Provincial Administration, House of Representatives and House of Delegates.

In addition, huge development backlogs in infrastructure, services and economics needed to be addressed. Several key turnaround strategies were developed, and in its implementation the province has become a 'best practice' example to other provinces in the country.

The Eastern Cape has emerged from the first 10 years of democracy with flying colours. Amongst others, we have registered the following tangible impacts:

Economic development

- Outpacing economic growth for South Africa as a whole: while the country's economy grew by 3.5% in 2000 and 2.8% in 2001; the Eastern Cape grew by 6.2% and 5.3% respectively in the same periods.
- Recording a growth of 21% in the manufacturing industry between 1998 and 2001, as compared to 9% for South Africa as a whole over the same period.
- Building a R2.65-billion deepwater port, Ngqura, at the Coega Industrial Development Zone (IDZ). Currently negotiations are being finalised for a R16-billion aluminium smelter in this IDZ.

Social development

- Extending a social security lifeline to some 1.3-million impoverished people. This includes 530 000 child support grant beneficiaries.
- In December 2002, the department paid out 369 087 child support grants. By March 2003, that figure had risen to 530 000.
- Since 1996, beneficiaries of the care dependency grant increased from 5 023 to 12 855, reflecting the increasing number (12 855) of HIV/AIDS orphans in care programmes.

Education

- Improving both access to education and its quality through the construction of almost 636 new schools and more than 11 000 classrooms. This has decreased the educator-learner ratio from 1:40 in 1995 to 1:30 in 2003.
- Quantifying of infrastructural backlogs and the cost thereof (database developed to keep track of development in each

infrastructural element).
- Merger of 21 colleges into 8 Further Education and Training (FET) institutions.




Health
- More than 3 000 critical medical posts filled.
- A quality assurance directorate with a toll-free help line has been set up.
- 121 clinics have been built; 44 hospitals have been upgraded or extended.
- Improving immunisation coverage from 52% in 1998 to 64% in 2003.
- Establishing 220 HIV/AIDS voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) sites and rolling out a prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) programme to 156 health facilities.

Agriculture
- Launching the Massive Food Production programme aimed at increasing food production through low-interest mechanical equipment loans for rural contractors and a conditional grant scheme for agricultural inputs and marketing.
- Five Farmer Support Centres have been established in the province. R100-million has been invested in farmer support through mentorship programmes; commodity group formations in historically disadvantaged areas; farmer training short courses and advisory services; and amalgamation of farmer groups.

Housing, local government and traditional affairs
- Mass conversion of 90 000 project-linked subsidies to the People's Housing Process (PHP) Subsidy Programme.
- Renovations of the House of Traditional Leaders building and great places.

Roads and public works
- Since the 1997/98 financial year, the province has expended approximately R14.8-billion on road construction and maintenance.
- The lengthmen system or 'Vukuzakhe' commenced in 2002 and is both a road maintenance programme and a poverty alleviation strategy that specifically targets female-headed households.

Transport
- Launching the Kei Rail Project that will open the way for agro-forestry development in the former Transkei. Total cost: R40-million.
- The province's major ports are at East London and Port Elizabeth. Its third, the Ngqura deepwater port at the Coega IDZ, is under construction. National government has allocated R47-billion to address capacity problems at three ports, including Port Elizabeth.
- The 2002/2003 Annual Report, hailed as one of the best in the province for financial accountability, accelerated service delivery and transparency.
- Fleet management facilitated by public-private partnership with Fleet Africa.



A bright future – the next 10 years

On 4 June 2004 the executive council of the Eastern Cape adopted the strategic framework that will guide development in the province over the next 10 years (2004 to 2014). This Provincial Growth and Development Plan (PGDP) was developed after extensive consultation with public and private sector stakeholders. Implementation of sectoral strategies and intervention prgrammes is already underway.

The PGDP sets bold targets for 2014:
- Halving the unemployment rate.
- Reducing the number of households living below the poverty line by between 60% and 80%.
- Establishing food self-sufficiency.
- Reducing the under-five mortality rate by two-thirds and the maternal mortality rate by three-quarters.
- Halting and beginning to reverse the spread of HIV/AID and TB.

Premier Stofile ascribes the successful passage of 10 years in the Eastern Cape to 'the outstanding partnerships and cooperation of our people, organizations, various spheres of government and the international community.' He acknowledges that the depth and intensity of the challenges facing the province cannot be addressed overnight, but adds that 'we have set a great foundation from 1994 to 2003, and are gearing to reach even greater heights from 2004 to 2014; making the Eastern Cape a compelling place in which to live, work and invest.'

MANAGING SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTH WEST PROVINCE

Since the dawn of democracy there has been a progressive move from the conventional welfare model to a social development model, placing more emphasis on addressing the structural causes of poverty and responding to their social symptoms. There has also been significant progress in developing and strengthening the system of social grants and other tools associated with improved community functioning.

In the North West province the Department of Social Services, Arts, Culture and Sport, under the political leadership of Mr Eliot Mandlenkosi Mayisela, has greatly improved and expanded the social safety network. Along with social grant administration, the government's key instrument in direct poverty relief, these developments provide an improved service to our people.

Women are subject to discrimination, exploitation and violence despite the constitution. It is for this reason that most of the projects funded by the department are implemented in the effort to speed up gender equality.

Through the National Development Agency (NDA) the department has been able to strengthen the capacity of civil society organisations to combat poverty.

The NDA is a statutory funding agency whose primary focus area is to contribute towards the eradication of poverty and its causes. The Directorate of Social Development constructs interventions in this regard. This Directorate is responsible for improving the quality of life of children, individuals, families and communities through social development interventions. It has to oversee services pertaining to Poverty Alleviation, Community Development, Social Assistance (i.e. Social Relief, Public/Private Partnership, Refugees, NGOs and Disaster Management), Community Development and Volunteerism. One of its key programmes is the National Food, Security and Nutrition Programme (NFSNP), which not only provides food but empowers communities to provide for themselves.

The North West province has been allocated R64.8 million. The process will unfold by doing a skills audit among the beneficiaries to enable the department to give them necessary training that will enable them to start income-generating projects.

Municipalities are central in the sustainability of any poverty alleviation programme. The training must be in line with local municipality development plans so that they are able to be involved in their local projects.

The Department of Agriculture will lead the second phase. Beneficiaries will receive agricultural starter packs and small livestock to start their own projects and small business enterprises. It is envisaged that after the second phase poor communities will be able to provide for themselves.

In order to accelerate service delivery the department will develop and implement an integrated poverty reduction strategy. Necessary consultations will be made with other stakeholders. A target of 40 funded projects has been set aside for 2001-2004. To improve the performance of funded Community Based Organisations, 20 projects were visited for support and interventions made where necessary.

The challenge faced by this directorate, and the department as a whole, is the building of proper capacity for staff members as this will enable them to deal effectively with poverty relief programmes.

TOGETHER WE MAKE A DIFFERENCE

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
ARTS, CULTURE & SPORT
NORTH WEST PROVINCE

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THIRD WORLD NETWORK'S VIEW ON CANCUN

The collapse of the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico on 14 September came as something of a surprise to observers the world over.

While those monitoring the Cancun negotiations as well as the preparatory process in Geneva were clear that there was a huge chasm in the negotiating positions between the developed and the developing countries, few had anticipated the talks would collapse on the last scheduled day of negotiations.

Going by past precedents, the usual tactic by the developed countries when confronted with such chasms has been to extend negotiations by a day and then to turn on the heat on the developing countries (particularly through the Green Room process of exclusive small-group meetings) to secure their capitulation.

The failure to pursue this path (which, for instance, was taken in Doha in 2001) may itself be a reflection of the conclusion of the conference chairperson (the Mexican foreign minister) and by some developed-country negotiators that the gap was too large to bridge, particularly in the context of a new firmness of purpose displayed by the developing countries.

It is this manifestation of unity and resoluteness that has been the hallmark of the developing countries in the Cancun negotiations. Despite attempts by the rich countries to split their ranks, the developing countries remained united. More importantly, they refused to settle for a rotten compromise and stuck to their principled positions on the key issues.

This newfound resolve and sense of unity has clearly shaken the leaders of the rich countries. This is evident from their reaction to the collapse of the Cancun talks.

Instead of re-examining their own conduct and their indefensible negotiating offers to the poor countries, they have been either looking for scapegoats to blame for the collapse or issuing veiled threats of a backlash.

Among the scapegoats singled out for blame are Brazil (for its allegedly uncompromising position), the Mexican Chairperson of the ministerial conference (for his alleged mishandling of the negotiations) and, most sinister of all, the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (who have been accused of "radicalising" and "disinforming" the Third World trade delegates). Such attempts at evading culpability for the collapse are an exercise in self-delusion. The developed countries must face up to the fact that it was their intransigence and their attempts to ride roughshod over the wishes and interests of developing countries that really brought about the collapse.


Although the immediate issues which triggered the debacle were the Singapore issues (investment, competition policy, government procurement and trade facilitation), agriculture and the African cotton issue, the problem goes much deeper and involves the whole question of the lack of transparency and democracy in the WTO's decision-making process.

It is imperative that the WTO be reformed so that there is more transparency and democracy, to enable developing countries to participate more effectively. Unfortunately, reports from Geneva appear to indicate the developed countries have not come to terms with the significance of the Cancun collapse and are still bent on pursuing their old tactics to secure their aims.

For the developing countries, Cancun clearly marks a new benchmark in their conduct of WTO negotiations. They should now build on this new strength and attempt a systemic reform. They should be wary of attempts by the rich nations to strike bilateral or regional trade deals designed to secure the same goals. They should strengthen their unity and seek greater co-ordination and consensus on the vital issues that affect them, albeit differentially. Above all, they must resist all attempts by developed countries to play off one group of Third World countries against another.




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EXTRACTS FROM A REPORT ON WTO AT CANCUN, 24 SEPTEMBER 2003 AND A SPEECH IN LONDON, 28 OCTOBER 2003

PASCAL LAMY, COMMISSIONER ON TRADE, EUROPEAN UNION

The Group of 21, including Brazil, India, South Africa and 13 Latin American countries, was born of two parents. The political father comes from a desire to give the developing countries a voice in dealing with the supposed US-EU duopoly. An odd sort of duopoly, considering the differences in the American and European positions on access to drugs, the Singapore issues, geographical indications, the WTO implications of the biodiversity convention, the reform of the dispute settlement mechanism or access to agricultural markets. So I think the gleam in the father's eye, in this case, went beyond the WTO: I see the coalition as an expression of the larger emerging countries' desire to make their mark in international debates. They didn't manage in the UN in the debate on Iraq but at Cancun, on trade, they got their act together.

In Cancun, there was no north and the south confrontation, rather the "norths" and the "souths" crossed paths without actually meeting.

Having invested our political capital heavily in a negotiating programme which is now, as I said in Cancun, if not dead then certainly in intensive care, what do we do next? Well, there will be a period of assessment, discussion and proposals, conducted among ourselves in the spirit of European unity and dialogue that has guided us since the outset of this enterprise. Calmly, coolly, without panic, in the hope that others will do the same and that collective wisdom will once again prevail.

This has been a major shock, there's no point in denying it. And whenever there is a political upset, like Cancun, we have to go back to the essentials. That means we have to ask ourselves some questions about the EU's international trade policy and see whether the fundamental assumptions on which we have built it for decades need re-examining. I will conclude with those questions, since we are keen to hear your answer.

And so we must perhaps confront a systemic question: was Cancun really about a north-south confrontation, long coming, barely visible beforehand, a tidal wave of trade resentment blown on the winds of political schism following the Iraqi crisis of the last year? In some respects, yes, if we focus on the detail of the trade issues. Clearly, the G20 was opposed to "the north" on agriculture. Clearly the Africans were viscerally opposed on cotton. And undoubtedly there was a common, if not universal, theme of opposition in the G90 to the Singapore issues which were obviously close to our heart.

Finally - and perhaps we in the EU must recognise this as well - there was a general difficulty in addressing rules to address what are rather wide differences in collective preferences.

First question: should we continue to favour the multilateral system as at present? Well here, on the authoritative basis of European Council conclusions, I can tell you that the answer is...yes. I know that those European Council conclusions get pretty long, and it can be pretty tedious trawling through what feels like a telephone directory looking the name of that elusive pizza parlour, but it's in there, in black and white, and I am sorry Guy de Jonquieres missed the European Council Conclusions when he was writing his long piece this week, for they were rather positive.

So, as the European Council put it, rather well, if I may say so: "The EU's commitment to the multilateral approach to trade policy remains, and the EU should remain open to an early resumption of the DDA negotiations". But "a commitment by all will be indispensable to any successful resumption of negotiations".

Third question: what do we do about developing country preferences?

This question is probably the most difficult to answer in the short term. But it needs to be considered because one major reason for developing country, and particularly African, opposition to making progress in Cancun lies in their perception that they had relatively little to gain and relatively much to lose in terms of their preferences, in a successful, multilateral market opening outcome. Not so much worried about their own markets, but their ability to keep market share elsewhere, both in agricultural and industrial goods. I have already mentioned China, of course, and underlying much of this concern, of course, is the rise and rise of China as an industrial and exporting powerhouse and the fear that continued mfn liberalisation can only advantage China even more. So no answers yet here, either, but we are continuing to work very hard on this one. For example, an idea: rather than leaving the hard work on preferences just to the OECD countries, would the G20 countries be ready to offer preferences to the G90? Just a thought.

WOMEN IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

BY NANDITA BHATLA AND ANURADHA RAJAN

(Edited version of original published in *Political and Economic Weekly*)

Introduction

In India, and probably the world over, domestic violence perpetrated against women by partners and close family members continues to remain a matter of silent suffering within the four walls of the home. Despite the awareness others may have of a woman's ongoing experience of abuse, the phenomenon of intimate violence against women is typically identified as a private matter, made invisible by society and kept under wraps because of concerns of guilt, shame and secrecy. The norms that perpetuate silence and the stigma around domestic violence in family and community settings permeate the formal institutional response as well.

Available evidence indicates that this silent crime reigns rampant within Indian homes. Not only has the overall number of cases of crimes against women (CAW) gone up in the past five years, there has been a dramatic increase in violence against women within the household. Torture (cruelty by husband and relatives) forms the largest category of reported crime against women, constituting 32.3 percent of the total recorded CAW in 1999, showing a 5.9 percent increase over the previous year. A series of research studies that examined prevalence rates, analysed government and non-government records and responses to the issue provide further evidence and a comprehensive understanding on domestic violence in India. Results from a multi-site household survey (IndiaSafe study) reveal the pervasiveness of violence perpetrated against women by intimate partners across class, caste, education and employment status. Of a sample of 10 000 women across urban slum, non-slum and rural populations in seven sites across India, about 50 percent women reported experiencing at least one form of domestic violence in their married life, and nearly 50 percent of the women reporting physical abuse experienced it during pregnancy.

Of a sample of 10 000 women across urban slum, non-slum and rural populations in seven sites across India:

- about 50 percent of women reported experiencing at least one form of domestic violence in their married life
- 43.5 percent reported experiencing at least one form of psychological abuse in their married life
- 40.3 percent reported experiencing one form of physical abuse in their married life.

These figures are disturbing as they highlight the extreme vulnerability of women, not only in society, but within the home as well, questioning the fundamental belief that the family is the safest space for women. However, equally disturbing are findings pointing to the wide acceptance of, and the normalcy accorded to, domestic violence being an integral part of marriage. This notion forms one of the primary barriers preventing women from seeking any help for their situation. A household level study in Gujarat reveals that 40 percent of the women reporting abuse did not share this with any outsider, in the above-mentioned IndiaSafe study, 58 percent of women reporting partner violence said that they continued staying with the abuser because of the perception that violence within marriage is normal. Examination of records of NGOs and the Special Cell for Women and Children shows that most women tend to seek external help only after the violence has been ongoing for many years and/or when faced with situations that threaten their immediate survival such as loss of shelter, income, threat to life of self/children, threat of loss of custody of children. Even then, domestic violence may not be the reason for which help is sought. These results make it obvious that violence is seen to be a matter of individual responsibility and the woman is perceived to be the one responsible for either adjusting more adequately to the situation as dictated by cultural norms or developing an acceptable method of suffering silently.

Even when women gather the courage to approach external institutions, they are met with insensitive attitudes and inadequate redress mechanisms. A study on judicial records has shown that conviction rates in cases of domestic violence are very low. Lengthy court proceedings, inordinate delays in investigation and irrational procedures such as the requirement of sufficient evidence to prove intimate partner abuse are serious deterrents for women to approach courts, let alone see the entire case through. Content analysis of police records reveal that women's experiences are often filtered through an institutional lens of what is legally acceptable as violent behaviour, usually undermining the history of violence within the marriage.

This lack of a sensitive and effective response to domestic violence and the social pressures to keep it silent and private, finds its roots in deeply embedded cultural and social norms and values. Domestic violence is not seen as an aberration, let alone a crime. There is an obvious bias evident in the lopsided emphasis of the state responses towards reconciliation. Feelings of shame, guilt, backlash and lack of support from family and society often leave women entrapped within violent abusive situations. It is critical, therefore, that any attempt to transform the situation must enable fundamental normative changes to occur in institutions across society.

As a result of feminist advocacy within the arenas of international human rights and development, social

responsibility for domestic violence is slowly being acknowledged in many parts of the world. In India, for example, families and community leaders are beginning to organise at the local level to reshape community norms and attitudes regarding violence against women in marriage. This paper is based on a participatory research study that sought to explore the dynamics of such community-based responses to domestic violence across five sites in India. The research study was intended to provide better documentation of how these women-led innovative responses have emerged, how they operate, how successful they are in addressing the needs of women facing violence and the communities they live in. The study shows that, indeed, one of the primary features of these innovative programmes is their ability to transform one woman's private complaint into a community-wide concern. It also demonstrates the ways in which this transformation is operationalised, and how family dynamics become topics for democratic discussions such that progressive decisions for the woman are sanctioned and validated by the larger community. For this reason alone, these methods of addressing domestic violence offer significant insights for similar efforts.

Studying Domestic Violence

The prime objective of studying domestic violence was to document the process of identified women-initiated community responses and to assess the impact of these responses, thereby deriving indicators for evaluating such responses. The study also sought to build the institutional capacities of organisations in the areas of research, process documentation and evaluation. The initiatives studied were:

- the "shalishi" which is a traditional system of arbitration utilised extensively by the group, the Shramajibee Mahila Samity (SMS) in West Bengal
- the "nari adalat/mahila panch" initiatives, evolved and run by the Mahila Samkhya programme in Baroda an Rajkot districts respectively in Gujarat
- the "nari adalat/sahar a sangh" initiatives, evolved and run by the Mahila Samakhya programme in Saharanpur and Tehri Garhwal districts respectively in Uttar Pradesh.

The research was designed and implemented through an innovative process that utilised participation through all steps of the study as its key principle. Intensive interactive workshops became the sites for designing the study, training the research teams in methods of data collection and discussion issues emerging during the data collection, debriefing and analysis, thus ensuring that all partnering organisations collectively participated in each stage of the research study. In addition to being an important data source, the experiences of the women formed the basis for conceptualisation and analysis of the study. A critical outcome envisaged by participants in the project was the impact on the intervention itself.

Central to all the responses studied was the presence of a structured community-based arbitration forum and dispute resolution process dealing with cases of domestic violence. Here the term community is not necessarily used to describe an idealised homogeneous setting, but to distinguish these efforts from state and national initiatives. It is also a way to characterise and focus upon the smaller scale social mobilisation that is occurring at the village and cross-village level. The fact that women-oriented dispute resolution mechanisms have emerged independently from any wider national strategy or government directive is worthy of close attention. Thus, identifying features that distinguish a community-based response from a more formal state-initiated or institutionalised response was the first task. Discussion eventually generated certain key elements of an informal community-level response to domestic violence. It had to be situated within the community setting and implemented by members of the community. Further, it had to derive its authority and acceptance from the community, as in contrast to a more formal codified system of law. The ownership of the process and the decision had to lie with the community, and it is their sanction and responsibility that validated the decision and its enforcement. Most importantly, the process had to be one which sought to shape and change existing community norms. The unusual role that women and women's collectives have played in the initiation, conceptualisation and implementation of these processes was another significant element characterising these responses.

Comparing Responses

All these community-based initiatives across multiple sites have evolved spontaneously and independently, yet they have several similar features and follow similar steps/procedures in the process of case resolution around domestic violence. They have evolved public and community-based responses to domestic violence, because of the limitations experienced in earlier methods and interactions with formal justice systems. Each form of mobilisation requires community support to effectively undertake face-to-face arbitration. This is a significant event in the process of dealing with a case, as it seeks the involvement of the larger community through participation in an open and public forum in dispute resolution around the private and personal issue of domestic violence.

However, there is also distinctiveness in the conception and operationalisation of community involvement and dispute resolution in different ways. The enquiry, for example, that is conducted as part of the shalishi process, is a non-negotiable in each case taken up by SMS, but this is not so with the MS initiatives as they expect the sangha to fulfil this complementary role as a norm in each case. The presence of the sangha women is therefore a critical feature in the meetings of the MS initiatives. Similarly, the follow-up is a responsibility of the sangha as well, and thus does not require a formalised procedure. In the shalishi process, this is prescribed as the specific responsibility of certain individuals, who may constitute a follow-up committee in villages where the presence of the organisation may not be strong. Another distinction is the constitution of the community at the arbitration forum. The MS initiatives are characterised by a very strong presence of the women from NA/MP and village sanghas. The shalishi, on the

other hand, has a broader participation including participants from the general public and, more often than not, locally important people like panchayat and local political leaders, or members of youth clubs. The political and cultural specificities of the region and of the community play an important role in shaping the unique character and strategy of each programme.

The evolution of a response to domestic violence that is largely community-based, has its roots in the ideological pinning of the organisations, and an ever-sharpening perspective arising from reflections on the ongoing work on violence. Initial work on violence saw more interactions with the formal legal system for redressing violence cases. However, the inadequacies and limitations of the system and a strong feminist perspective enabled organisations to articulate their position as an alternative to the formal structures. For example, a lot of violence cases in Gujarat stem from the existence of suspicion in the husband's mind about the character of his wife. The arbitrators say:

"There is no way such a case can be fought in court. It is purely based on what the man says and feels is right versus what the woman says. How can any 'proof' solve this problem, when it has actually got its roots in the attitude and perspectives around relationships? All the while that the case is pending in the court, who will take responsibility and care of her shelter and other needs? Moreover, the voice and experience of women are hardly given any recognition and respect in courts. It is money that plays a larger role than concern for finding solution to the problem. We need a justice system that gives respect to women."

Apart from these practical concerns, the arbitration process is based on a fundamental perspective that decisions can be more effectively enforced if the people of the community are involved - that they own, control and validate the decisions. This is based on the realisation that the community forms an important reference point for the individual that is not just geographic, but emotional as well, and that disapproval by the community can have more power than judgments pronounced by a much more removed institutional system. The women, the perpetrator and their families all form part of the community; and if that very community can be convinced of a decision that is progressive for the woman, it not only pushes the boundaries of existing social norms to create spaces available for women, but also contributes to the larger organisational agenda of transformation and social change. Since the community is part of a democratic and open, participatory process of resolving the case, the implicit ownership creates a sense of responsibility among local citizens toward a problem that they have played a part in solving. Moreover, the conviction that true change in the situation of the woman necessitates change in the unequal gender dynamics within the family and community, ensures discussions on issues of gender and relationships in the process of case solving. As the women say:

"If the man is given a six-month sentence by the court, this does not mean that he has changed, or that the woman has got justice or that their situation is any different from before. He, his family and community need to feel that what happened was wrong, such behaviour is not right. Taking the family and the community along their thinking must be changed, only then can the woman live with respect, in peace and with her rights intact."

It is evident that punishment for the perpetrators does not equal justice for the woman. Each organisation is guided by a belief that reinstating the woman's rights within the family is more important than simply punishing the perpetrator and that these two ends are not the same. The processes thus seek the twin tasks of social accountability towards violence, and strives to reinforce values that would democratise gender relations within the family, using the democratic arbitration process at the forums as a means of public education and debate on norms and family dynamics. While links with the formal legal system and administration remain an inevitable key feature, the role for which they are approached has changed. The knowledge of law remains a critical framework within which they operate, the threat and pressure helps in the negotiating with the perpetrators, and their presence remains a system which can be resorted to if all else fails.

Democratic Processes

The objective of ensuring community participation and ownership is governed by the principle of democracy. This is evident not only from the processes followed at the forums, but also from the logistics of organising the sittings. For example, the shalishi is held at a place that is central and accessible as "community" space - either beside a major road junction or next to the market place. Often passersby come and watch, and even actively participate in the proceedings. Since the idea is to make the event as public as possible and encourage as many people to be part of it, even the meetings that are held at the village level are held in the most open space available. Similarly, the NA/MP are held in formal community places like the panchayat bhavan, the premises of the block office, where several government offices are located, or in front of the district court. Besides, these being the most accessible places, this also accords a semi-official status and gives visibility. It is also making a statement about the rights of women over public and mostly male-dominated spaces. As the arbitrators say: "It is an open meeting, we want everyone to see and know what is happening. What is wrong has to be hidden, not what is right!" Additionally, the proceedings start with a brief, but formal opening stating certain rules followed by the forum, and emphasising that everyone in the community is welcome to participate in the proceedings, though in a disciplined and neutral fashion, and this sets the tone of the meeting.

This public place also fulfils two other critical functions. One is the subtle psychological pressures that is exerted on the perpetrators. The very fact that the perpetrators have to be publicly present "serves as social punishment. Everyone at their village and neighbouring ones obviously get to know that they are going to attend the meeting. They lose face in the

community as it becomes an open fact that they have done something wrong. If they have to go repeatedly (as is when a decision is not reached quickly), then it usually adds to the community feeling against them - first they have treated the woman badly, on top of that they are not agreeing to the suggestions given by the women."

The second is that this forum is perceived as a safe middle ground for negotiations by both the organisations as well as the community members who access it. One of the limitations faced by the women of the collectives in dealing with issues of violence at the village sangha level was that kinship ties placed restrictions on the extent to which these women could take objective or radical stands on the issue of violence within their own villages. This joint community forum provides a space that is objective by virtue of the fact that it belongs neither to the accused nor the complainant, either geographically or through personal kinship ties. Cases can thus be brought to this space irrespective of kinship ties, heard by women who participate in the forum as women with the aim of arbitration and not because they are associated with either party, or belong to a particular village or caste group. It is emphasised that people present there, including influential leaders, are for truth and justice and not for any personal reasons. There is collective representation, giving a collective show of strength. It also gives a neutral place for the activists to share their views and hold discussions without the pressures of relations.

The feature of being a public and open forum goes hand in hand with the non-negotiable aim of providing a safe environment for the woman, where she feels physically and psychologically supported and safe to share her personal experiences. This is governed by the feminist principle of making the process woman-centred, such that it is a validating the women's experience of going public. There is a strong presence of the women from the organisation at the meetings. While the shalishi sitting has both men and women from the organisations, the NA/MP are public spaces that are uniquely women-centred, with a large presence of women who are part of the NA/MP and from other sanghas as well.

The democratic process is also evident in the sequence of events followed in the arbitration process. It illustrates how the community is taken along in the entire process of negotiation and reaching a decision, that is of course carefully and balanced and skilfully manoeuvred by the activists. Typically, the procedure followed is that the applicant (usually the woman, but may also be the man), is asked to speak first and narrate whatever they want to say about the problem and the situation, followed by the other person's narration. Activists ensure that these detailed narrations are patiently heard out by everyone present. The narration of the problem in the larger community presence means that the facts of the case are known to all, everyone can participate, various versions can be corroborated and the areas of differences thrashed out. After this, as people present also share what they know, give opinions about what has been said and clarifications, counter-clarifications and discussions flow. This not only takes the responsibility of reacting from one or two women, but also helps in giving direction to arbitration process towards a mutually agreeable decision, making it a process that is "owned" and "validated" by the community involved in the discussions.

Redefining Justice

The community responses to violence use an open, democratic form of dispute resolution and model an unusual degree of flexibility and accessibility in the decision-making process and its enforcement. Apart from being an inexpensive, accessible forum, the fact that the decision-making involves giving time to think of the best solution, rather than focusing on polarised positions of absolute wrong and right, and includes the possibility of renegotiating if the decision does not work out, add to the acceptance of these forums. During the study, it was found that the common perception of these fora among community members is that they are transparent, non-partisan, objective, and sites where "justice" is done. The findings showed that responses manage to operationalise an objective process through a feminist perspective. Their neutrality is maintained by giving equal space for the women and the perpetrators to share their experiences and express their points of view, by presenting "facts" about the case collected through interactions with neighbours and villagers, and by facilitating a mutually agreeable consensus decision with members of the community. A feminist perspective was seen in the placing of the woman's interests as the starting point for negotiations, and the explicit effort to change situations and create improved spaces for women by pushing the cultural and normative boundaries of the community whose sanctions they seek are additional expressions of a feminist perspective. The feminist agenda was also evident in the processes which determined which voices, issues, and concerns were articulated during arbitration, which individual voices were deliberately highlighted and which were suppressed or viewed to be debatable. Nevertheless, the dependence on community consensus may also place limitations upon the extent to which the arbitrators are able to challenge community norms to obtain progressive decisions in favour of the woman. Thus decisions may be a blend of forward movement and necessary compromise.

Being an Arbitrator

A prerequisite of implementing a community response is the critical role and perspective of the women who arbitrate. Across sites, it appears that developing a community response to violence is constantly plagued by the incessant conflicts of operationalising an ideal feminist ideology on the ground. Skilful diplomacy and facilitation are required to:

- balance and negotiate contradictions between the ideal solution and the pragmatic circumstances,
- push and redefine boundaries for increased rights to the woman while appealing to existing cultural norms, and
- gain acceptance from the community while simultaneously holding it accountable and changing it.

Arbitrators have to carefully monitor and direct this process

Venezuela, representing the G-77 and China, stressed that the type of development should be defined, and the development model of the north very often caused the underdevelopment of the south. Chavez added that the south had paid $800 billion to the north in interest plus capital of another $800 billion. "Yet, the debt – like a strange monster – grew and grew." Joy Kennedy of the World Council of Churches Ecumenical Team said: "That a free market system would effectively address society's woes was pure science fiction."

The new views of development, articulated at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre were well represented in Monterrey. But as is often the case at UN summits, they were relegated to the dozens of forums, college auditoriums and the Global Forum hosted by Mexico's NGOs. Their theme "Another World is Possible" is becoming ever more mainstream – in spite of the officials still guarding the old order and the "suits" running the global Enron economy. Malaysia has demonstrated that capital controls are workable in dealing with "hot money". Other countries also cited the need to reform the global financial architecture.


The Monterrey delegates were trapped in the realpolitk of the post-cold war, with the USA the world's single superpower – even as alliances have shifted. Since 9/11 and Bush's reactivation of Ronald Reagan's earlier war on terrorism, Star Wars and military buildups (with many of the same cabinet members), US unilateralism dominates international affairs. With a domestic US population disenfranchised by money politics and public opinion manipulated by jingoistic commercial media and polls, the world looks for countervailing forces. The EU and China have the necessary clout to challenge the US economically. Latin America is still too divided. Russia is busy cozying up to the US. India, another potential powerhouse, is preoccupied with the US' new ally, Pakistan.

The hopes of the developing world for breakthroughs at Monterrey foundered on these realities. Yet, the US cannot long remain the global hegemony. Many delegates stressed that the new realities of globalisation require co-operation between states since all are now linked economically – whether or not they benefit or are hurt by globalisation. Vulnerabilities of the US go beyond terrorism. They include reliance on fossil fuels by a still energy-wasteful, obsolete industrial structure – kept in place by overgrown sectors controlling Washington: oil, coal, nuclear power, military contractors, automobiles, steel, chemicals, agribusiness, and their lobbyists, accountants and lawyers.

As in Japan, these special interests prevent an orderly restructuring of the US economy toward energy-efficiency, and the emergence of a cleaner, greener more equitable society. These goals, along with halving poverty by 2015 were widely-shared in Monterrey, and are desired by millions of US citizens and many millions more worldwide – as global polls show. Paradoxically, the fundamentals of the US economy are less sound than those of the EU, with unprecedented levels of corporate and consumer debt, unsustainable trade deficits and financial markets kept afloat as the world's flight capital haven. The US dollar cannot continue to serve as the world's de facto reserve currency – as many economists agree. The dollar is widely expected to fall – since its current level is unsustainable and hurts US exports as much as those countries that compete to buy up dollars for their currency reserves – thus pushing its price up further. The world economy is still in recession.

These realities were only discussed frankly in Monterrey by NGOs. If developing countries want to help themselves, they can begin by diversifying their currency reserves from dollars into euros – for more balanced portfolios, as two powerful countries, China and Venezuela, now leading the G-77 have already done. EU companies accounted for nearly 70 percent of world investment in developing countries by 2000. As the euro and the dollar move closer to parity, the G-8 could peg them together in a trading band. Such a balanced, dual currency reserve system, together with the IMF's new issue of SDRs could create a new, more stable system for the global economy.

Other self-help moves by developing countries could follow some OPEC members that successfully barter their oil for commodities going begging in world markets. These win-win counter-trades save precious hard currencies in developing countries, while clearing underpriced commodity inventories. To further a euro-dollar parity currency regime, OPEC members could switch to more euro currency reserves and decide to denominate their oil in euros. The "Washington Consensus" recipe for GNP growth was still in evidence in Monterrey – but the new recipe of sustainable human development is going mainstream.



CLUB OF MADRID STATEMENT

Madrid, November 4th, 2003. The General Assembly of the Club of Madrid, an organisation led by former heads of state and government from democratic countries and chaired by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, approved a Final Declaration on the impact of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programmes on democratic governance of the countries where it intervenes.

After analysing the relationship between the IMF and several countries now in the process of democratic transition and consolidation, and which have experienced financial crises over the last twelve years, the 26 members present at the Assembly of the Club of Madrid called on all democratic governments to pursue sound economic policies within the framework of a market economy and their own democratic procedures. We urge them the Final Declaration adds to focus on effective strategies to foster and enhance sustainable development in the long-term.

The 26 former Heads of State and Government, the representatives of the constituent foundations of the Club (FRIDE Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior/Foundation for International Relations and Dialogue of Spain, and the Gorbachev Foundation of North America) and a select group of experts from all over the world analysed the cases of Brazil, Korea and Poland, with a view to drawing conclusions from the particular cases of those three countries.

These experiences led the members of the Club of Madrid to stress that democracy has proven to be not only a great value in itself, but also a system capable of designing and applying effective and sustainable market economy policies.

Although the IMF is, primarily, a financial institution, with a fundamentally economic focus to its activity, the members of the Club of Madrid urged the Fund to recognise the link between democracy and economic policies. The former Heads of State and Government thus pointed out that democracies are much stronger with good economic policies and stressed that the IMF should be sensitive to the importance of strengthening, not weakening democracies.

The members of the Club of Madrid urged the IMF to deepen its efforts toward transparency in formulating, communicating and explaining the economic policy requirements that it expects from governments that seek its assistance. They added: Policies must be technically correct, but citizens must also perceive them to be politically and socially fair. The members of the Club also urged the Fund to become more democratic in its own operations, including the composition of voting rights and the transparency of its proceedings.

The Club of Madrid the declaration concluded also calls attention to the fact that the economy has become global, but politics has not. It is therefore urgent that the international community work towards a new model of global governance, one that responds to the demands of its citizens for sustainable development and social justice.

The Club of Madrid will prepare a final report on the IMF and its relationship with democratic governance in the countries where it intervenes. That report will be published in early 2004.





"SwimSAFE"®: Learn-to-Swim System

The Western Cape Department of Education has noted that 98% of children in local townships are at risk of drowning because they cannot swim. Lifesaving South Africa (LSA), South Africa's largest voluntary water-safety community service body, recorded more than 2 000 people rescued from drowning by its duty-squads during October 2002 – September 2003, and has more than 3 000 qualified lifeguards, countrywide, as a potential resource to implement the 'SWIMSAFE Project' in township and rural primary schools.

The 'SWIMSAFE Project' implements the 'SWIMSAFE: Learn-to-Swim'® System in six primary schools in Cape Town Unicity's Langa, Guguletu, Khayalitsha and Mitchells Plain townships. By 30 April 2004, some 4 500 children in grades 4 to 7 will have received at least 20 formal swimming lessons as part of the Western Cape Education Department's sports curriculum.

The 'SWIMSAFE Project' is a National Lottery Board sponsored project

Western Province Lifesaving (WPL) is the operator of the 'SWIMSAFE Project', a pilot project financed by the National Lotteries Board until 30 April 2004, and has launched the 'SWIMSAFE for a Lifesaving Experience' promotional campaign to promote the world's most ambitious drown-prevention and community learn-to-swim campaign ever attempted by any organisation.

The Departments of Education in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng are selecting certain townships and rural primary schools to participate in an extended 'SWIMSAFE Project' programme, with effect from 1 October 2004. The 'SWIMSAFE: Learn-to-Swim System'® is uniquely versatile and can be effectively instructed by LSA lifeguards in swimming pools, farm dams, ponds of water or the ocean.

For more information, contact:
e-mail: gmoke@sars.gov.za or swimsafe@mjvn.co.za
Tel: 021-715-6679 Fax: 021-715-9785
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TOGETHER IN SERVICE DELIVERY AND DEVELOPMENT

WHEN THE YOUNG THREATEN POWER

The young have lost interest in politicians – not politics, writes GEORGE MONBIOT
Mail and Guardian 28 November 2003

All leave for Britain's journalists is cancelled when a few hundred elderly people converge on a seaside town for the annual conference of the British Conservative Party. Every stave and quaver of the death rattle of a moribund movement is recorded and drummed into our ears.

But when 51 000 mostly young people converge for a conference on the future of politics, they are ignored. The European Social Forum, which ended in Paris in mid-November, generated just one report in the printed editions of the British mainstream press. Doubtless the papers will inform us again this week that young people have lost interest in politics.

In one respect it is true. The young in their millions have turned away from the solipsistic pomposities of parliament, the point-scoring and willy-waving of men who have spent their lives in quadrangles and who know as much about the people they govern as George W. Bush knows of higher mathematics. The young have not lost interest in politics. Politics, of the kind represented at Westminster, has lost interest in the young.

One of the reasons why events like the Paris conference are not reported is that they do not exist inside a capsule, so they cannot be easily encapsulated. The forum was a vast, messy, rambling affair, spread out over four distant suburbs and about 300 meetings. There was no leader whose speech could be dissected, no party whose splits could be anatomised, no single manifesto whose implications could-be discussed. It was messy and rambling because it reflected the messy and rambling realities of the lives of its participants.

But despite the complexity, it was not difficult to see that something remarkable is happening in European politics. The delegates were, on the whole, far better informed about the big issues than most British MPs and journalists. While British newspapers can tell you everything you were too bored to ask about the relationship between various politicians, they have nothing to say on the trifling issue of the future of humanity.

But the young people in Paris have worked it out for themselves. They have become fluent in the complexities of the European Constitution, of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, of the North Atlantic thermohaline shift.

It was also clear that few people in this movement of the disenfranchised are content any more simply to document the problems we confront. The question now is no longer what, or why, or when, but how? How do we threaten power? How do we recapture the political processes that have excluded us?

We don't yet have all the answers; but 50 000 Europeans have now joined the search party. These numbers are staggering, but they are drawn from a bottomless reservoir of discontent in Europe. Democracy everywhere looks as if it has been hit by a neutron bomb. Its structures - the parliaments and their committees, the elections and referendums - remain intact, but the life within them has died. In hardly any European country is there now a real choice between the policies of the governing party and those of the main parliamentary opposition.

The big issues - such as the kind of economy we want and the extent to which the state should provide for its people - are scarcely debated in parliament; all that is left is the jostling and posturing.

No one at the European Social Forum seemed to be in much doubt about why this is happening. The real decisions are being made at the continental or the global level in Brussels, the White House, the boardrooms of the banks and corporations - and handed down to national governments for implementation. This is why the movement is obsessed with globalisation: until citizens can seize control of global politics, we cannot regain control of national politics.

But there are other questions that we seem to have neglected. Our movement has a tendency to fetishise new forms of participatory democracy, such as the consultas developed by the Zapatistas in Mexico, or the participatory budgets drawn up in Brazil. These are useful models, but we must also ask ourselves what we can do to recolonise and revitalise parliamentary politics. It is not enough, as many advocate, simply to turn our backs on the system for which our political ancestors lost so much blood. True democracy surely involves a combination of participation and representation. Our task is to find the means of rattling the bars of our enclosed and corrupted Parliaments without succumbing to their enclosure and corruption.

The biggest question of all is the one concerning the c-word. We have little difficulty in dealing, in theory at least, with the medium-sized issues: What should be done about the World Bank? How can the anti-union laws be reversed? But we have

taken by international institutions and developed countries to support NEPAD process (Including ODA, debt cancellation, enhancing flows in private capital (foreign direct investment), and increasing investment in infrastructure, information technology, human resource development – notably in education and health – and provision of greater market access for Africa's trading goods).

- Delegates acknowledged that the NEPAD initiative has been successfully marketed outside the continent, especially to the G8 countries. Africa's developmental needs have been highlighted and put firmly on the global development agenda as never before. The initiative has received endorsement from the rest of the world for its holistic nature, frank assessment of problems and its bold vision.

- However, it is imperative that NEPAD should also be firmly anchored within the organized private sector and civil society in Africa countries and within the regional economic communities. Until NEPAD becomes owned by the people of Africa, its civil society, the initiative will not take off. And if the majority of the African people are to identify with NEPAD, accelerating the promotion of its comprehension (through an effective communication, outreach and mobilisation strategy) should be given the highest priority by African governments. It is only by so doing that NEPAD will become owned by the people and its vision and objectives translated into programmes, projects and budgets.

- The meeting acknowledged the fact that across the African continent, debate about the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is heating up among Parliamentarians, civil society representatives, church figures, trade unionists. Whatever their particular outlooks, all seem to accept that the New Partnership is now the continent's main official development framework.

- Participants noted the following five areas of concern raised by civil society organisation on NEPAD: NEPAD's conceptual and ideological assumptions, NEPAD's conception of the substance of Africa's integration into global economy, NEPAD conditionality, NEPAD and Africa developmental experience, NEPAD and African Union.

- Participants agreed that these criticisms were due mainly to the way NEPAD was initially marketed, to decades of authoritarian rules that lead to lack of trust of African people in their leaders, to the legacy of the struggle against structural adjustment programme and to the transformation and transnationalisation of civil society, the antiglobalisation movement

- Participants noted that that recent development inside NEPAD brought some answers to the civil society concerns. Conceptual issues have been comprehensively addressed: NEPAD has grown since the release of the base document two years ago. Participants stressed that NEPAD has to be seen as dynamic, open and consultative process rather than a frozen programme.

- It was also noted that there is now clarity on the status of NEPAD within the AU process and structures and closer collaboration and harmonization between the AU Commission and the NEPAD Secretariat. The AU-NEPAD agenda is a single and indivisible agenda for addressing issues and challenges relating to Africa development. The participants highlighted that the AU represents a political agenda for the continent, while NEPAD plays the role of a collective African economic plan.

- The participants welcomed the creation within the AU of the Pan-African Parliament. Due to the importance of popularizing ownership of NEPAD, it was urged to establish a forum for engagement with Africa's elected representatives through the mechanism of the African Parliaments and Pan-African Parliament.

- The organizers of the expert briefing in consultation with the NEPAD steering committee propose the establishment of a Parliamentary Contact group on NEPAD
  - The Meeting made the following recommendations:
  - That each African parliament establishes a Committee or Working group on NEPAD
  - That each Africa parliament holds a debate on the Country Action plan on NEPAD
  - The endorsement, if not done already, of the NEPAD programmes by all Africa parliaments
  - That all African parliaments propose motions and hold debates on NEPAD
  - That all African parliaments request a briefing by the executive following all summits
  - That Africa parliaments be made more democratic and accountable in accordance with the separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative
  - That the parliamentary contact group on NEPAD function as a focal point for parliamentary reporting to the NEPAD steering Committee

- The meeting suggests that an initiative be launched to record the character of all parliamentary systems in Africa and that all Africa Parliaments be requested to prepare a paper on the emergence and development of their parliamentary system

- The Meeting calls for an open and inclusive dialogue on the proper utilization of Africa's national resources and the releasing of the productive energies of the people

- The meeting called the organisers to make a full report of the Expert Briefing proceedings and make this available to all African Parliamentary Speakers

- The Meeting requests Awepa to seek support in Europe to reproduce and distribute basic documentation on NEPAD as widely as possible in different languages and to support the Ad Hoc Committee



the dti
THE DEPARTMENT
OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
SOUTH AFRICA

We could fill an entire magazine with stories of how **the dti** has transformed from an inward bureaucracy-bound institution to a customer-orientated organisation.

Or how we have changed the lives of millions of South Africans through our Business Express project and incentives. Perhaps list our achievements.

But time is money and that is our interest.

Creating economic freedom for all South African citizens.

1994 - 2004

the dti

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the dti design studio

TISA – promotes business and trade



*Lungisa Magwentshu, CEO of TISA, a division of **the dti***

When Trade and Investment South Africa (TISA) was formed in 2000 as a division of the Department of Trade and Industry (**the dti**), the original investment promotion agency, Investment South Africa, and the export functions of **the dti** were merged to form a single organisation. TISA is responsible for stimulating foreign direct investment and exports of South African goods and services to international markets. As part of the country's national economic strategy, TISA is tasked with identifying and targeting key high-growth sectors and enjoys direct access at the highest levels to both South African business sectors and trading partners. Thus, TISA is the essential point of contact for anyone involved in investment and export promotion in this country.

At Home in South Africa

Locally, TISA is a division of **the dti**, a broad family of institutions controlling state assets in excess of R25bn and led by Minister Alec Erwin, whose deputy is Mrs Lindiwe Hendricks. The Director-General of **the dti** is Dr. Alistair Ruiters. A number of units dedicated to specific aspects of the business process operate within TISA.

Sector specialists and strategic analysts work together to oversee targeted export incentives. Simultaneously, logistics specialists identify and take steps to eliminate bottlenecks in the supply chain, for both exporters and investors alike. Thus, TISA provides a single-transaction arena for investors and exporters at a national level and is mandated to co-ordinate provincial initiatives to match investor requirements with opportunities available within each of the nine provinces.

TISA focuses on promoting sectors of the South African economy that have shown the greatest growth potential and marketability. These include:

- Tourism
- Arts and crafts
- Chemicals - fine and speciality chemicals, polymers and pharmaceuticals
- Minerals and metals - ferrous and non-ferrous metals
- Agro-processing - meat, fruit and vegetables
- Textiles - clothing and leather
- Automotive - materials, technology and research
- Information and communication technology - electronics and IT.

Abroad

TISA identifies opportunities and provides core-market intelligence in 48 regional offices within South Africa's diplomatic centres worldwide. Key investors are targeted in priority-growth sectors and specific sectoral expertise is added to the equation. The regional managers operate according to international best practice standards, pioneered by leading trading nations such as Singapore and Ireland. TISA's single-transaction arena approach to service is ensured and promoted via their efficient use of an extensive array of communication mediums. From negotiations and exhibitions to handing over prospective leads to domestic-based facilitators and units dedicated to specific aspects of long-term business processes,

the dti

the dti

THE DEPARTMENT
OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
SOUTH AFRICA


TISA – promotes business and trade

TISA has a finger on the communication pulse continuously. TISA is a flexible, customer-oriented organisation, specifically in regard to the services it delivers and financial incentives it oversees. For instance, in 2001 the export sectors prioritised by TISA realised R15.8bn in trade growth. In addition, South Africa's manufacturing sector gained R4.7bn in fixed inward investment. Clearly TISA plays a guiding role in the promotion of South Africa as a leading, internationally competitive business destination.

Doorway to Business

As the central point of contact for anyone interested in investing in South Africa, TISA offers the following services:

- Information on the various investment sectors and industries within South Africa
- Facilitation of inward investment missions, including travel itineraries and movement within the country
- Introduction to potential joint-venture partners
- Consultation on the prevailing regulatory environment
- Introductions to relevant stakeholders in the private and public sectors
- Information on tax incentive packages
- Assistance with work permit applications
- Guidance with plant / site locations
- Logistical support for relocation
- Dedicated aftercare services
- Input into policy formulation on investment and trade promotion.

The export process is sector specific, and sector strategies offer the framework within which exports are encouraged and incentivised. These strategies address competitive issues and international best practice standards regarding the product. TISA sector specialists have a clear understanding of, and access to, the various industries. Hence, they are able to provide sound advice, recommendations and assistance – information that is invaluable to the potential exporter. TISA provides a customer care service for manufacturers, a facility that offers information and advice on current export processes and procedures. To ensure enquiries are channelled to the relevant specialist organisations, the Customer Contact Centre can be contacted on:

+27 (11) 254 9405
(International callers)
or 0861 843 384
(Local callers)

TISA is also mandated with developing small and BEE exporters and to managing the Export Marketing and Investment Assistance Scheme (EMIA) as a key enabling incentive. Through EMIA funding is provided to companies for:

- Primary export market research
- Foreign direct investment research
- Exhibition assistance
- Outward-selling trade missions
- Outward investment recruitment missions
- Inward-buying trade missions
- Inward investment missions
- Assistance to industry specific sectors.

In addition, the formation of industry-based export councils to assist exporters in reaching their targets is promoted. The approach has been tailored to allow small businesses, as well as artists and craftspeople, to form an SMME Export Council and an Arts and Crafts Export Council, which are able to function as entry points for first-time exporters. This allows small businesses in any sector to access **the dti** support structures and become successful exporters.

TAKING BUSINESS INTO AFRICA

No matter what has become the 'flavour of the month' or which new business guru has published the definitive work on how to conduct business, Damelin International College of Postgraduate Business Sciences believes that the basic tenets of business don't change

The latest business buzz is spelt with a capital 'A for Africa' as more and more South African businesspeople recognise the opportunities being created north of their borders.

Foremost among these is Damelin College which has a vision to be the preferred private university of Africa.

'The amount of interest in African development sparked by our normal MBA programme was one factor that led us to look at opportunities on a continental level,' says Dr Charlene Lew, dean of the Damelin International College of Postgraduate Business Sciences. 'Also, there's a lot of talk in the business community, in general, about Africa and the potential that exists to the north.'

This has resulted in the college introducing a programme called Leading Business in Africa (LBA) which encompasses a holistic business management perspective. The programme is registered in South Africa as the Postgraduate Diploma in Business Administration. It essentially mirrors the first year of the Damelin Masters in Business Administration (MBA) degree and covers business knowledge, managerial techniques and strategic mindsets.

'It teaches the fundamentals of business administration and leads to personal and managerial development through exercises in self-awareness and interpersonal skills,' explains Charlene. 'This programme has an additional benefit as it opens the door of postgraduate studies to those with extensive business acumen who may be lacking in formal academic qualifications. In addition to those with a tertiary qualification, we expect to attract people who have, say, seven years of senior management experience and who have proved themselves within their organisations.'

The college is already offering this programme in Tanzania and is about to move into Uganda. Several other African countries will be targeted during the course of the year. Charlene is an enthusiastic supporter of this move. 'Damelin sees the opening up of Africa as a two-pronged opportunity – as a pathway to expand its business interests across the continent and, more altruistically, to operate in line with Nepad and our own holding company, Naspers. The LBA programme helps empower Africa's businesspeople. We are giving something back to Africa as a continent, rather than just to South Africa as a small part of the whole,' she says.

The college is adamant that one sure way to success in business is to be well-versed in the basics. A holistic approach is advocated where a 360-degree perspective of business is encouraged and a sound knowledge of basic business principles is taught. 'You cannot afford to be too specialised,' explains Charlene. 'Of course, specialisation can help add value to your company, but you must also have a good knowledge of all aspects of business in order to make informed, intelligent and creative decisions based on the knowledge you have available. This applies not only within the company, but also in the overall business environment. It's necessary to know and understand the overall macro- and micro-economic factors that may affect your business.'

While the basics of business remain unchanged, the business environment is in a constant state of flux and, according to the college, it is essential that students be fully equipped with the knowledge to embrace change and make it work for them. In the past, when things changed slowly, 'seat of the pants' experience may have helped businesspeople through, but in today's global environment, proper training is what's needed. 'Our MBA and LBA programmes teach a certain way of thinking – how to open your mind to receive information; how to process it and arrange it so that you can consider all the available options and use all the information to make the right decisions'.

The training offered by Damelin applies to people managing small businesses, as well as those in larger corporations and institutions. Legislation - whether it involves labour, finance or any other area - impacts on everyone equally. 'It is vitally important to know how the law impacts on your operation,' avers Charlene. 'Also, marketing forces impact on small and large organisations alike. Knowing how to deal with these and all the other aspects of business equips managers with the ability to make strategic plans and recognise opportunities wherever they are.

'It is really exciting to see how students become motivated by ideas; how their new thinking takes them to levels they never before believed possible; and the enthusiasm and excitement this generates when planning strategies for the months and years ahead.'

Wherever one goes, the value of a sound business education is recognised as a powerful tool in one's armoury. More and more, people are taking the course and advancing themselves in the business community.

This programme opens the door of postgraduate studies to those with extensive business acumen who may be lacking in formal academic qualifications'



CHRIS HANI DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY


Executive Mayor: Mafuza Sigabi

INTRODUCTION

Local government has undergone major restructuring and institutional transformation since 1994. Old racially segregated settlements have been united under democratically-elected leadership which has become increasingly empowered through capacity building, the creation of full-time councillors and executive mayor positions, as well as more democratic structures for community participation in the affairs of local government and governance in general.

The chapter of our First Decade of Freedom and governance is about to be closed. This has been a chapter which has had its own ups and downs. We have met many obstacles as we travel the road, and some were not easy; the former State President Dr Rolihlahla Mandela entitles his noble book 'Long Walk to Freedom'. However difficult, this was, and is, our journey, and our resolve is to create conditions conducive to a better life for all, even for the communities like Gubenxa, Mbulukweza and other formerly neglected rural communities. That is why we can safely say the foundation has been laid; therefore, we have reason to celebrate the First Decade of our Freedom.

ENGINEERING SERVICES

The institutional set-up must be geared towards fulfilling the objective of council; that is, to spend the money so as to have the necessary impact on communities. At the present moment most of the critical posts have been filled. Water Services is an area that has overtaken other functions of the CHDM. This leads to the review of the organogram of the department to conform with new powers and functions given to us.

SPORTING FACILITIES

Thanks to the National Department of Sport which has made it possible for the communities of Engcobo, Emalahleni, Intsika Yethu, Inkwanca, Inxuba Yethemba, Lukhanji and Sakhisizwe to have basic sporting facilities. We are progressing well on building the sports programme.

COMMUNITY-BASED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME

Allocation from the National Department of Public Works has been used for the following projects:

- Revitalization of irrigation schemes at Emalahleni, Lukhanji, Intsika Yethu and Tsolwana.
- The fight against soil erosion, establishment of schools and shearing sheds at Emalahleni, and other related infrastructural projects at Intsika Yethu.

ROADS

The roads function is an agency function from the Department of Public Works. At the moment the department is cutting ties with all the district municipalities in terms of this function.

While the termination is in progress, the department of Public Works has asked us to undertake some work on their behalf. The relationship on the matter is not that cozy and needs to be treated with urgency as it affects both the psychological and emotional focus of the roads staff.

DMA

We are making a contribution to the development of tourism in our area and building community confidence in the DMA. Tarring of the road that connects Mountain Zebra Park with the main road between Cradock and Graaf Reinet has commenced and we are working very well with Inxuba Yethemba Local Municipality on this project.

EQUITABLE SHARE PROJECTS


We made allocations for infrastructural development projects in municipalities. The projects in these municipalities are not running as smoothly as we had envisaged for a number of reasons. At the moment the department is working on a strategy to overcome the expenditure problem. We appeal to municipalities to support the strategies to help turn the situation around. We cannot afford to refuse services to our communities because of our bureaucratic concerns.

SUSTAINING GROWTH THROUGH OUR PEOPLE

CHRIS HANI
DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY

REFURBISHMENT OF SCHEMES

The council made an allocation for refurbishment of water schemes out of the equitable share. The focus is on Engcobo, Sakhisizwe, Emalahleni, Intsika Yethu, Lukhanji and Tsolwana. The department has assessed about 375 schemes and 30% of those have been refurbished. We see progress on this programme.


Pieterus School

DWAF-FUNDED PROJECTS

The projects are going well and expenditure of about 51% has been reached. The intention is to accelerate spending to impact on the quality of life in our communities.

CONSOLIDATED MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME

We have worked well with the municipalities in this area. The support to the CHDM is welcomed, to the extent that the whole budget is spent. Because of the need in our communities, the Mayoral Committee has agreed to loan the programme some money in order to make sure that services are brought to our communities. Let us continue to work this way; we should not be afraid of raising concerns in order to provide better service to the people.


Lady Freere Sporting Field

WATER SERVICES AUTHORITY (WSA)

The Water Services Act states that the CHDM is responsible for water services. That means that it is a Water Services Authority and a Water Services Provider. Provision is not the intention of the district municipality, but a system of qualification will be set for the municipalities to be given the status: water services provision.

SECTION 78 ASSESSMENTS

An amount of R1.1-million has been budgeted for this exercise. The district, partnered with Municipal Infrastructure and an Investment Unit, has contributed 80%, and CHDM 20% of the total funding of this project. Phase one of the report is out for comments.

DEPARTMENTAL CHALLENGES

The Government is introducing the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) to consolidate the various projects i.e. CMIP, CBPWP, Sports and Recreational Facilities, Water and Sanitation, and related infrastructure.

- The department is forced to restructure in order to be in a position to cope with the changes.
- The Water Services Authority function is another challenge.
- The liability of the schemes to be transferred by DWAF.
- The maintenance thereof.
- The consummate staff complement.

The CBPWP and CMIP are coming to an end by themselves and that provides a challenge to the staff and communities in terms of the way in which they deal with those challenges.

The termination of the roads function also affects the staff and the provision of the roads function to the community. Our institution has been hailed as one of the best districts in road cutting and maintenance.

The Section 78 assessment will hopefully provide the best options for implementation by the CHDM. There are municipalities, there are NGOs, there is a private sector, there are parastatals and communities etc. There are rural and urban settings that require different means to the seamless provision of water and sanitation to communities.


Bengu Shearing Shed

SCHOLARSHIPS OFFERED

I am happy to bring to your notice two scholarship schemes offered by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, Government of India to South African nationals:

I) 1 scholarship instituted in the memory of Yusuf Dadoo and Monty Naicker of the South African Indian Congress – known as the Dadoo-Naicker scholarship. It is awarded to a South African student of Indian origin for Postgraduate studies for two years in an Indian university in any discipline except MBBS. The selected candidate would also be entitled to a return air passage by tourist / economy class.

II) ICCR General Scholarship Scheme for 2004-05: 19 scholarship slots for the whole of South Africa are offered to meritorious South African nationals. These are for undergraduate/postgraduate and doctoral studies. Apart from tuition fees and accommodation charges, a small living allowance is also offered depending on the type of degree being pursued. The applicants are, however, required to pay for their own air passages. It may be noted that students applying for doctoral/post-doctoral courses or architecture should include a synopsis of the proposed area of research and students wishing to study performing arts should enclose video/audio cassettes of their recorded performances wherever possible.

Anyone interested in applying for these scholarships is advised to contact the High Commission Office (9th floor, 'The Terraces', 34, Bree Street) to consult the 'Universities Handbook' available with us, with respect to the course he/she may wish to pursue. We do not guarantee that the interested candidate will automatically be chosen for the scholarship by the ICCR authorities, but can only put in our recommendation, depending, of course, on suitability and qualifications.

Head, Cape Town Office
High Commission of India

NEDLAC'S ROLE IN TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENT DEFINED

The National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac) has an important role to play in the formulation of trade policy. Involving labour and business as the constituencies that bear the burden of adjustment in trade policy pre-dates 1994, when these constituencies were brought into South Africa's offer to the Uruguay Round of the then GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

After Nedlac's formation in 1995, a special committee was set up to deal with trade policy negotiations. It has the acronym of Teselico – the Technical Sectoral Liaison Committee.

Via this committee, organised labour and business have had the opportunity to contribute to South Africa's position in WTO meetings, as well as SADC, EU, MERCOSUR, and various bilateral trade negotiations.

It is recognised that the consultative process is only as strong as the contribution of the parties. Teselico has therefore been working on a Trade Policy Framework, which will consolidate principles and guidelines for the Nedlac consultations.

In order to address concerns that the negotiations are not inclusive enough, efforts will be made to widen the net to include all company/industry representatives who wish to make submissions in relation to their industry.

Government is committed to providing constituencies with a broad outline of its timetable for trade negotiations. This will help constituencies to provide timeous input which will influence government's discussions, and give them sufficient time to ensure that all relevant parties are brought into the negotiations.

The issue of confidentiality is obviously an important one, and parties may be required to sign confidentiality agreements.

LEAD REPRESENTATIVES FROM CONSTITUENCIES ON TESELICO:

XAVIER CARIM
(government)
(012) 310-9419

TANYA VAN MEELIS
(labour)
(011) 339-4911

MICHAEL MCDONALD
(business)
(011) 833-6033

JOY SMITH
(committee coordinator)
(011) 328-4223



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Delivered as a full-time, part-time and block release programme (to accommodate managers from all over Africa), the MM-PDM is aimed at people who are tasked with managing complex processes in dynamic organisational and environmental contexts.

The MM-PDM focuses on the interplay between public, business and non-profit sectors. If you work in government, an NGO or similar organisation, you will benefit from this highly specialised programme which provides in-depth exploration into the challenges confronting managers in the public and development sectors. It is the MBA equivalent for managers working in these areas.

The MM-PDM is designed for managers wanting to improve their professional management skills or refocus their management expertise to a public and development context. The course provides an opportunity for participants to:

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- Interact and network with leading academics and practitioners
- Reflect on personal goals, values and career

The MM-PDM explores the complex interaction between public policy, management and development, and enables participants to develop a critical awareness of the relevance of research and academic insight into the practice of public and development management. It examines the challenges of poverty alleviation, democratic governance and improved service delivery, in conditions of global competitiveness and limited resources.

The MM is designed for participants with a baseline of an honours degree or equivalent, and a minimum of three years working experience. Those who wish to improve their management expertise may opt for a Professional Certificate in Public Management, which consists of the six fundamental courses for the Masters programme. If you then wish to study further, you may be allowed to register for the Postgraduate Diploma, and eventually the Masters.

Address enquiries to:
Tozi Zeka: (011) 717-3523 / 717-3931
E-mail: robertshaw.t@pdm.wits.ac.za

JN0555 The Looking Glass

Graduate School of Public and Development Management

P&DM

University of the Witwatersrand

Africa's Leading School of Governance



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to your world.



There was something in the air that was touching Melissa's life. Working quiet miracles.

This morning at 06:15 she stretched across the bed, turned on the radio, then lay back and snuggled down for an extra minute listening to the music. "Isn't that Mafikizolo's new number?" she wondered.

Here, in the first moments of her day, Sentech was bringing her the radio signals that transmitted the sounds of the music.

Again, as she buttered her toast, a television news flash caught her attention. Rain was predicted! This television broadcast signal was brought to her by Sentech.

Sentech signals followed her in her car on the way to the office, as she laughed at the morning jokes of her favourite DJ.

She was touched again by Sentech, as she turned on her laptop at the office and browsed through her emails. The server that sent them was using a Sentech network.

Her Internet connection was carried, not through a fixed telephone line, but through Sentech's broadband wireless infrastructure, making it faster, easier, always-on and portable.

And when she communicated with her colleagues at their offices in Sekhukhune land, it was through Sentech's VSTAR satellite services.

Little did she realise that even the cellphone call she received in the afternoon from Abuja, was carried by Sentech's international telephony network.

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